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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the market conditions under which the Greek manufacturing sectors 
operate, and provides a formal measurement and determination of the observed degree of 
rigidity in nominal prices using panel modelling techniques. Two parameters in particular are 
found to capture the essence of market imperfections and price rigidity arising from various 
sources: the first parameter is conjectural variation elasticity which defines the degree of 
market divergence from perfect competition; and the last parameter refers to the speed of 
price adjustment towards the equilibrium level, which is estimated along with a set of 
important factors that affect this parameter.  
The data sample of this research consists of 56 3-digit manufacturing sectors, as 
defined by Eurostat (NACErev2) over the period 1980-2012, while the econometrical 
approach mainly incorporates the Fixed and Random Effects Model for panel data. The 
estimation process is divided into four steps: in the first step, the degree of market power and 
the speed of price adjustment are estimated for the whole manufacturing industry; in the 
second step, the same process is reiterated for the 3-digit sectors individually; in the third step 
the estimations are conducted for each year over 1980-2012; in the last step, the effects of a 
set of variables on the speed of price adjustment are estimated in order to provide an adequate 
interpretation of how market imperfections and price rigidities can be formed and how they 
relate to each other. By using the Greek economy as a case study, the empirical results 
provide significant evidence of a degree of market power similar to the one of a duopoly 
accompanied by relatively slow price adjustment in the 56 manufacturing sectors and the 33 
years over 1980-2012. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1.The Greek Manufacturing Industry as a Case Study 
Economists and market analysts pay close attention to the logic and mechanisms of industrial 
organization and the interactions of economic agents in the marketplace. An area of particular 
interest is the identification and measurement of potential market imperfections such as 
monopolistic power and anti-competitive behaviour that warrant public policy intervention. 
Earlier indicators of the degree of competition amongst various sectors and/or firms within a 
market include the size of a sector/firm or the market share that each sector/firm holds. More 
recent attempts to critically examine market imperfections tend to focus on firms’ pricing 
decisions and the frequency they tend to change in response to both endogenous and 
exogenous market forces (Olive, 2008; Rezitis and Kalantzi, 2011a; Kano, 2013; Polemis, 
2014). On the one hand, any variable that individual firms are able to manipulate can be 
considered as endogenous, such as production and pricing decisions due to competitive or 
oligopolistic interactions. On the other hand, any changes that are beyond the firms’ ability to 
manipulate can be treated as exogenous, such as fluctuations in input prices or taxation policy. 
The main interest of this research is to investigate the existence of market power and 
whether or not nominal price rigidity arises from strategic industrial behaviour. Such 
behaviour is determined by the levels of production and operating costs within the firms, in 
addition to competitive interactions observed between the participating firms or sectors in the 
market. The theoretical framework that examines the interrelations of market power and 
nominal price rigidity has been developed by the New Keynesian School of Thought and 
particularly, by Julio Rotemberg (see chapter 2). The main argument of this theory is that 
firms with market power will exercise their power in their pricing decisions. This indicates 
that the greater the power, the greater their ability to manipulate nominal prices and thus, 
nominal rigidity emerges whenever it is beneficial and profitable. As a result, this line of 
reasoning may associate nominal price rigidity with sub-optimal equilibrium by deviating 
from the point of perfect competition (Tirole, 1988). This means that it is of great importance 
to test whether a relationship between market power and nominal price rigidity exists and 
how they tend to interact. 
The present study focuses on the estimation of two essential measures that define the 
very meaning of competition and pricing decisions according to the New Empirical Industrial 
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Organization methodology: the first one corresponds to conjectural variation elasticity 
(Bresnahan, 1982; Lau, 1982) that measures the effect of a sector’s individual production 
upon the aggregate (industrial) level of production; and the second concept sheds light on the 
speed of price adjustment to changes in particular endogenous and exogenous factors as 
initially presented by Means (1935) where the mechanism with which the market structure 
affects pricing behaviour is developed. 
The measure of conjectural variation reflects the indicator of market power in terms 
of production decisions that is going to be considered in this study. In particular, it is more 
accurate to interpret market power by considering the aforementioned decisions in order to 
identify whether that power is exercised by the firms or sectors of the market. Production 
decisions may result in market power acquisition but causation may also depend on pricing 
decisions. Consequently, in addition to this indicator, the speed of price adjustment is taken 
into account for the identification of the degree of nominal price rigidity to changes in 
production factors.  
The main purpose of this study is to identify the degree of market power and price 
rigidity and subsequently, test whether the latter measure is caused by the former. As 
Rotemberg (1982a, 1982b) highlighted, pricing decisions are highly affected by market 
factors and as a result, they may lead to rigid nominal price levels over a time period. For this 
reason, the theoretical interest lies on the identification of market power and nominal price 
rigidity and whether the latter issue is affected by the former. As a case study for this 
research, the Greek manufacturing industry is selected due to its highly significant role in the 
Greek economy. An important element of such investigation refers to the aggregate demand 
externality of nominal price rigidity. This means that nominal price rigidity in the 
disaggregated manufacturing levels (i.e. 4-digit level) could give rise to substantial 
fluctuations in output and employment at the aggregate level. In addition, by empirically 
identifying and estimating the significance of the main factors and mechanisms underlying 
price rigidity, this study can also enrich the empirical literature concerning sectorial pricing 
behaviour. 
There are a number of studies that identify the degree of market power in the Greek 
manufacturing industry and sectors (Rezitis and Kalantzi, 2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2013) by 
using the conjectural variation and the price-cost margin approaches. However, the analysis is 
restricted to the manufacture of foods and beverages sectors or in the manufacturing industry 
12 
 
at a 2-digit level. As a result, this study will take into account 56 dissagragated sectors by 
expanding the aforementioned studies in the market structure investigation of the Greek 
manufacturing industry. In addition, the only study that identifies the degree of price rigidity 
in the Greek manufacturing industry is the one of Bedrossian and Moschos (1988) but the 
time sample ends at 1977. Therefore, the present analysis provides an update on this issue 
over the period 1980-2012. Consequently, the present study extends the literature of market 
power and price rigidity in the Greek manufacturing by employing dissagrated sectorial data 
which can accurately reflect the industy’s market conditions and pricing behaviour. 
To begin with, the selection of that particular industry and the selection of the Greek 
economy in general is based on the economic environment in Greece in the post 1970s era. It 
is conjectured that market power and pricing decisions had a significant impact on the 
economic fortunes of the Greek manufacturing industry and hence, of the whole Greek 
economy (see below).  
In the early 1980s, the macroeconomic performance of the Greek economy was 
relatively poor compared to the rest of European countries due to expansionary fiscal policies 
that resulted in a rapid increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. In conjunction with the second oil 
shock that took place at the start of 1980s, inflation rose significantly. The average rate of 
inflation over that particular decade was fluctuating around 19 percent, which was almost 
three times higher than the European Union average. Consequently, the Greek government 
had to adopt a policy mix that would bring inflation to its long-run sustainable path and 
therefore, the revaluation of the national currency would lead to a fall in nominal debt 
(Oltheten, Pinteris and Sougiannis, 2004). 
Such policy programmes were implemented in the late 1980’s by cutting down public 
expenditures and reducing the inflation rate to 16 percent in 1987. Despite the fall in 
inflation, the debt-to-GDP ratio remained at relatively high level, so there was a sense of 
urgency to curb the debt level especially since the European Union imposed an adjustment 
programme on the Greek markets known as the Single European Market (European 
Commission, 2012). The main goal of this policy framework was to introduce a number of 
developmental programmes and laws in order to enhance the incentives of competition in the 
European markets and to minimize exploitation acts of consumer surplus. This action also 
contributed to the overall reduction of the inflation rate in the Greek economy as the degree 
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of imperfect competition lessened and therefore, the wholesale price-cost margin was reduced 
(Rezitis and Kalantzi, 2011a, 2011b).  
The implementation of the SEM in the Greek markets enhanced competition, 
especially in the manufacturing industry but nonetheless, the inflation rate remained at very 
high levels. For instance, when the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992, the fiscal deficit 
and debt-to-GDP ratios were far above the convergence criteria set by the European Union. 
The Greek deficit-to-GDP ratio was 11.5 percent in comparison to the European Union 
average which was 3.65 percent
1
. Nevertheless, the implementation of the SEM in 
conjunction with the efforts of the Greek government resulted in the improvement of the 
macroeconomic indicators by converging to the required levels under the Maastricht Treaty 
by 1999. Therefore, by meeting those criteria, the Greek economy was ready to enter the 
monetary European project known as the Eurozone under which it would be able to adopt the 
single European currency. 
As a result, in 2000, Greece became part of a monetary union with a strong and 
credible currency compared to the old national currency of drachma. Over the early 2000’s, 
the Greek economy appeared to exhibit very strong growth rates compared to the average 
growth rate of 4 percent for European countries as a whole. This outcome led to the third 
exogenous shock for the Greek economy which corresponds to the hosting of the Olympic 
Games. Given the remarkably annual growth rate, Greece was chosen to host the sporting 
event in 2004 as expectations about macroeconomic performance were very optimistic. In 
terms of fiscal policy, the Greek government invested vast amounts of money in 
infrastructure by expecting higher returns over the Olympic era (i.e. 2003-2005). In terms of 
domestic markets, the Greek firms and especially the manufacturing sectors experienced an 
exogenous boost in their demand which gave rise to overpricing behaviour as the 
international components of demand dramatically increased. The outcome of that shock 
resulted in a temporary, if not permanent, increase in the sectorial market power in the 
manufacturing industry (Rezitis and Kalantzi, 2012, 2013; Kasimati, 2003). 
The post-Olympic Games era did not generate any unexpected effects in the aggregate 
economy. However, the fourth exogenous shock which is considered to be the beginning of 
the Greek economy’s downfall corresponds to the global financial crisis erupted in 2008. In 
particular, through the mechanism of contagion and the interrelations of internalization, the 
                                                          
1
 See Eurostat database. 
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collapse of the US financial system eventually spread to the European system. A contagion of 
that magnitude could not have left the European continent unaffected and thus, the 
governments of the European Union would have to react to such shocks by strengthening the 
fundamentals of their economies (Rose and Spiegel, 2010). Many governments, including the 
countries of continental Europe, as well as Ireland, reacted by imposing austerity policies on 
their economies immediately following the eruption of the financial crisis in order to prevent 
a chain of reaction process that would have led to a depressing impact on the real economy. 
Nevertheless, the financial crisis exposed the “Achilles’s heel” of the Greek economy, 
corresponding to the fiscal derailment in terms of deficit and debt-to-GDP ratios. In 
particular, following the election of a new government in 2009, updated data concerning the 
fiscal condition of the Greek economy came to surface, indicating a fiscal deficit-to-GDP 
ratio of approximately 12 percent, (which was re-estimated a few years later to 15.5 percent) 
and a debt-to-GDP ratio of 120 percent. Such evidence resulted in the inability of the Greek 
state to both finance its deficit and also to repay a part of its loans that was about to expire in 
late May of 2010. This fact led the Greek government to come to a mutual agreement with 
the European Union, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund under 
which a loan equivalent to one hundred ten billion euros would be provided in return for 
fiscal consolidation and contraction (Tsakalotos, 2011). This meant that Greece had a limited 
time horizon to achieve fiscal adjustment to a deficit target below 3 percent of GDP, as well 
as to a debt-to-GDP ratio below 60 percent, imposed by the Maastricht Treaty. 
This was the fifth and last shock to the Greek economy in the form of the imposition 
of the austerity programme which is considered to be an endogenous shock. In this case, the 
main aim of such policies corresponds to the consolidation of the aforementioned fiscal 
sustainability indicators, the reform of the structure of the economy
2
 and the sustainability of 
the financial system. By fullfilling these outcomes, the Greek economy would be able to 
reinforce its fundamentals against the current recession and improve future economic 
performance (Europe, 2012). Nevertheless, macroeconomic policies always depend on the 
micro interactions in markets. If policy makers wish to form policy proposals, they have to 
take into account the forces of competition in domestic industries that affect both producers 
and consumers. For this reason, the focus of this study is placed on the Greek manufacturing 
                                                          
2
 These policies are also focused on the modernization of the Greek public services. 
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industry and in particular, the manufacturing sectors, due to their significance and influence 
in aggregate consumption and thus, aggregate production (IOBE, 2014). 
According to the Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research (IOBE), the Greek 
manufacturing industry has a significant contribution to the overall Greek economy in terms 
of employment, sales and value added. Nevertheless, within the broad sector itself different 
subsectors experienced significantly different economic fortunes. For instance, over 2000-
2010 the sector of chemical products along with the sector of structural metal products 
accomplished the highest average annual increase in total value added (i.e. 1.5 and 1.2 
percent respectively), when the manufacturing industry as a whole was facing a modest 0.1 
percent expansion over the ten year period’s value added. In addition, over the period 2008-
2010, when the global financial crisis erupted, the manufacturing industry shrank by 1.7 
percent, which led to a loss in its share of GDP by 3 percentage units, leading to an 8.7 
percent overall contribution to Greek output (IOBE, 2013).  
The Greek manufacturing industry contributes to annual nominal GDP by 16 percent, 
whilst the contribution by the service sector amounts to 80.6 percent. According to the 
Eurostat database, out of all the member states of the European Union, Greece achieved the 
highest manufacturing growth rate of 6 percent from 2005 to 2010. This growth rate is 
considered to be particularly remarkable if the exogenous shocks of the financial crisis of 
2008 and the fiscal crisis of 2010 are taken into account. These shocks reduced 
manufacturing production by 13.4 percent over 2005-2010 but still, the actual growth rate 
was the highest in the European Union. Another significant indicator of the underlying 
robustness of the Greek manufacturing industry is the retail trade of manufacturing products 
as the average rate of growth was equal to 4.4 percent over the period 1999-2009. As a result 
of the resilience of the industry, the Greek manufacturing industry is considered to be the 
main power of the Greek economy’s exports with a percentage contribution of around 60 
percent despite its low percentage share in total GDP. 
In terms of labour productivity, the annual growth rate is very close to the average of 
the European Union; however, according to IOBE (2014), productivity of output per hour of 
work was reduced over the period 2010-2012 as a result of the implementation of austerity 
policies. Therefore, labour productivity in the manufacturing industry was reduced to 74 
percent of the European Union average productivity. An important aspect which is neglected 
from relevant studies concerns the means through which such productivity is achieved. For 
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instance, Giokas, Eriotis and Dokas (2015) estimate that increased productivity in the 
manufacturing firms of their sample was achieved due to technology improvement rather than 
labour efficiency. This means that additional investment does not always produce comparable 
complementary improvement in labour efficiency.  
At the sub-sectoral level, the most influential sector of the Greek manufacturing 
industry refers to the sector of food, beverages and tobacco which has retained the highest 
share of manufacturing output for many years equal to 19.8 percent in 2012. According to 
IOBE’s report (2013) for the Greek manufacturing industry, the Greek food, beverages and 
tobacco sector creates about 150,000 jobs annually which account for about 25 percent of 
total employees in manufacture and holds about 25 percent of total sales of the whole 
industry. Also, the food and beverages manufacturing sector holds the highest share of total 
value added which is equal to 30 percent of the industry’s total value added. 
             The importance of the manufacturing industry in the Greek economy can also be 
verified in comparison with the role of the industry in the European Union. Germany, 
followed by France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain enjoy a share in employment 
manufacturing to aggregate activities around 65 to70 percent. In the European Union the 
share of employment that is captured by the food and beverages sector is 16 percent of total 
employment in manufacturing industry and the share of sales is 16 percent. In addition, its 
gross value added exhibits a share of 14 percent, by rendering the food and beverages sector 
as the one with the highest share in value added in the whole industry. 
In conjunction with the aforementioned facts, the Hellenic Statistical Authority 
(EL.STAT.) provides evidence that despite falling GDP over the period 2010-2012, 
Consumer and Producer Price Index followed an upward trend. Clearly the short-term 
wholesale price levels did not follow the long-run trend of GDP. In other words, the Greek 
economy showed signs of stagflation during this period and the underlying reasons and 
mechanisms warrant critical scrutiny. A number of reasons might be behind the apparent 
divergence in the paths of the aggregate price and GDP. One reason may be due to a short-
term lag of realization of the condition of the aggregate economy and therefore, in the long-
run the aforementioned price indices will adjust to the path of GDP. This is proof of sluggish 
price adjustment to equilibrium according to changes in production factors. Bedrossian and 
Moschos (1988) provided evidence of nominal price rigidity in the Greek manufacturing 
industry over the period 1963-1977 under which fluctuations in particular factors are not fully 
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reflected by the wholesale price level. However, there is no additional contribution of price 
rigidity in this particular industry in subsequent periods. 
In addition, the studies of OECD (2012, 2014) denote that the whole industry is 
under-performing as a result of inefficient regulations. Given the significance of the industry 
in the aggregate economy, the acquisition and exercise of market power on pricing and 
production decisions restrains the industry from operating efficiently. Due to the presence of 
heavy regulations, there exist barriers to entry that prevent entrepreneurial innovations, thus 
providing market power to the incumbent firms without the need of innovation. This has 
resulted in the stagnation of the whole industry over the years, thus forming an imperfect 
form of competition where only the strongest firms can survive. Consequently, the present 
study validates such claims by identifying the degree of market power and the speed at which 
prices adjust to changes in market clearing factors. This means that competition must be 
restored in the manufacturing industry by abolishing inefficient regulations and reformulating 
them in that manner under which imperfect competitive actions will be minimized. 
             Based on such indications, the Greek manufacturing industry will be a perfect case 
for the investigation of the degree of market power and the level of nominal price rigidity 
between and within the participating manufacturing sectors (Table A). Various econometrics 
approaches will be employed by emphasising in panel data analysis and subsequently 
utilizing time series and cross section analysis in order to identify the market conditions in 
the manufacturing sectors and thus, the manufacturing industry. The crucial variable of 
identifying market imperfections refers to the conjectural variation methodology (Bresnahan, 
1982; Lau, 1982). This measure focuses on production decisions and whether they 
correspond to the production level under perfect competition.  
On the other hand, the measure of price rigidity is the speed at which prices adjust to 
changes in endogenous and exogenous market factors (Means, 1935a; Dixon, 1983). Such 
factors may refer to input costs (i.e. labour and capital) and decision variables influencing the 
pricing strategies of the Greek sectors, such as the European Single market pricing decisions 
and the value added tax (i.e. VAT). Therefore, the main scope of this research is to test the 
effects and interactions of market factors and pricing behaviour by employing robust 
estimation procedures which reflect their relation. 
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1.2.Research Aims and Objectives 
The primary purpose of this study is to empirically measure the extent of price rigidity and 
determine the mechanisms whereby such rigidity arises in the Greek manufacturing industry. 
Conceptually, nominal price rigidity can only be meaningfully defined with reference to a 
perfectly competitive market structure with the Walrasian auctioneering mechanism. Under 
such a market structure, all that matters for the optimal production and consumption decisions 
is a set of equilibrium relative prices; the aggregate price level is simply a multiple of a 
monetary numeraire; and all the nominal values are homogeneous of degree zero in nominal 
prices. Given the usual absence of such a paradigm in reality, the task of empirically 
capturing and measuring the extent of price rigidity is not straightforward and calls for 
indirect approaches. In the literature, price rigidity can arise from a number of mechanisms, 
including non-competitive market structures according to production and pricing decisions, 
market power of individual firms, existence of menu costs and structural sluggish price 
adjustment mechanisms (e.g. arising from staggered wage contracts or sluggish inflation 
expectations formation).  
Moreover, there are intricate interactions between such mechanisms, further 
complicating the observed pattern of nominal prices at the aggregate and sectorial levels. 
Following relevant theoretical and empirical literature, this study adopts a number of indirect 
approaches that are proposed to examine market power and price rigidity arising from such 
different mechanisms.  
In particular, the main aim is to conduct a thorough empirical investigation in order to 
provide answers about the market structure and the degree of price rigidity in the Greek 
manufacturing sectors. The first part is centered on the nature of competition that emerges 
between and within the sectors of the Greek manufacturing industry. By estimating the 
production effect of the 3-digit manufacturing sectors to the production of the whole industry, 
the market structure of each sector can be identified by utilizing the conjectural variation 
methodology. The greater that effect, the closer the sector will be considered to be to 
monopoly because production will be low relatively to a perfectly competitive firm. For 
instance, if price demand elasticity of a sector is quite inelastic, then the firms of that sector 
will have the opportunity to charge a higher price than they could charge under perfect 
competition. This happens because the level of production is lower than it should be under 
perfect competition. 
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The second part concerns the estimation of the degree of nominal price rigidity in the 
manufacturing sectors of the Greek economy. If such rigidity is significant, then it is 
important to identify whether it depends on exogenous and/or endogenous market factors. 
Exogenous factors refer to those that are normally beyond the managerial control in the 
firm’s pricing decisions, like taxes imposed by governments, costly price adjustment, 
revaluation in input prices, high entry costs for new firms, restricted funding by institutions 
etc. 
On the other hand, endogenous effects comprise of every factor that firms and sectors 
are able to manipulate, such as their behavior towards expected future demand, formation of 
cartels or trusts, pricing below their marginal cost for a limited time, in order to force their 
competitors to exit their sector etc. Based on the theoretical and the empirical literature of 
imperfect competition and price rigidity that will be presented in chapter 2, the main focus 
will be directed on factors such as input costs, competitive foreign prices and additional 
taxation. Such elements may be appropriate to describe pricing behaviour due to uncertainty 
about the future. This behaviour can motivate entrepreneurs to maximize their present 
expected value in return for any future gains and thus, retrieve part of their losses which 
occurred due to unexpected circumstances (i.e. recession) or even secure their survival. 
Additionally, market power and/or rigid price levels may be a result of greater 
concentration or of greater size in terms of sales. This means that the greater the level of 
production and the volume of sales of a single firm or sector, the greater the market power of 
that particular sector will be (with respect to the level of production of the manufacturing 
industry). A potential reason of this outcome may address the fact that a greater share of 
production of a single firm or sector may indicate a greater expected or actual level of 
demand, which will result in greater concentration. On the other hand, the size of each sector 
is determined by the value of its sales. The greater the volume of sales, the greater the size 
and thus, the greater the market power may be since an increase in revenues signals either an 
increase in demand of such products or an increase in the price level (or both). Therefore, 
competitive behaviour depends on the capability of firms and sectors to change their 
production and/or pricing decisions without experiencing a fall in their returns. 
The contribution of this study is to examine the relationship between price rigidity 
and imperfect competition and whether sluggish price levels emerge as a result of imperfect 
competitive conduct. For this reason, the profitability and leadership effects (Bedrossian and 
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Moschos, 1988) will be tested in the Greek manufacturing sectors over 1980-2012 by 
estimating and employing the measures of conjectural variation and speed of price adjustment 
(see chapter 4). This is an original contribution to the literature of price rigidity in the Greek 
manufacturing industry as the last attempt by the aforementioned authors was carried out for 
the time period over 1963-1977, thus there is no recent analysis. As a result, the aim of this 
study is to introduce new evidence and results about the competitive conditions and the 
pricing decisions in the Greek manufacturing industry under the scope of the NEIO approach. 
For this reason, the measures of conjectural variation and speed of price adjustment have 
been selected as the mainstream tools of carrying out an analysis of this kind.  
In addition, a theoretical model of collusive decisions is presented which is an 
extention of the original model of Green and Porter (1984). This model provides the 
foundations of how rigid price levels may persist in a particular market through informal 
price agreements. This model helps with the understanding of how market power and rigid 
pricing decisions may be related as firms with oligopolistic power may be able to influence 
the price level in order to obtain more profits. Consequently, the model describes a condition 
of collusive agreements which is in accordance with the empirical results of the profitability 
effect. 
The structure of the remainder of the dissertation is as follows: chapter 2 includes the 
evolution of ideas of the literature of imperfect competition and price rigidity; chapter 3 
develops an extension of the theoretical model of collusion by Green and Porter (1984) which 
captures the rationale of imperfect competition; chapter 4 presents the theoretical background 
for the identification of non-competitive market conditions; chapter 5 analyses the 
specification process and data variables along with the approach of price adjustment; chapter 
6 presents the econometric approaches and tools for the empirical investigation; chapter 7 
provides the analysis of the empirical results;  chapter 8 gives the summary of the main 
conclusions and policy implications that can significantly reduce market imperfections in the 
manufacturing industry. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
“Industrial organization is as old as economics”. This sentence was used by Peltzman (1991: 
p.201) as an opening in his literature review in The Handbook of Industrial Organization. 
This phrase can be extended a little bit further by stating that industrial organization is as old 
as civilization. Many economists and philosophers support the fact that economies cannot 
exist without markets and markets cannot exist without individual agents. From Aristotle’s 
ancient Greece till Francois Quesnay’s physiocrates and from Classical economists like 
Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus and Karl Marx till the revolution of 
Keynesianism and Neoliberalism, markets have played the most crucial role in providing all 
the necessary conditions under which transactions between two or more parties can 
materialize. This procedure is the very essence of every market-based activity that is 
performed within any economy and defines the future evolution of the whole society. The 
evolution within this domain has taken various meanings through time depending on its 
structure and efficiency outcomes. 
Based on Léon Walras’ model (1874) of a pure market exchange economy, an 
auctioneer is able to extract all the available information about demand and supply for certain 
goods from the participant agents and come up with a unique relative price equilibrium which 
equates total demand with total supply. The most prominent features of this model, which can 
be characterized as a “benchmark” for the theory of price rigidities, laid the very foundation 
of the theory of free markets and how individuals interact according to market signals. 
Specifically, a multiple agent equilibrium is formed, after the auctioneer has extracted the 
clearing price of every commodity that equates supply with demand of the public. The 
simplicity of this assumption lies with the fact that any interactions between participants are 
absent, so is any externalities that could affect the decisions of another agent. 
When this process is completed, a set of equilibrium relative prices is determined that 
eliminates any imbalances between demand and supply. If a change in either variable for a 
certain commodity is observed, then the price level of that commodity will change as well, by 
indicating completely flexible prices upon output decisions. Such effect occurs for any 
commodity produced by resulting to the fact that if every market is under the concept of 
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Walras’ equilibrium, then the whole economy will be under General Equilibrium. This fact 
shows the interrelation between the set of markets that constitute the economy, as well as the 
flexibility describing all decision variables, including relative prices. Such variables depend 
only on the forces of demand and supply by ignoring any other effect that can originate from 
both within and outside the sphere of the market economy. 
Even before Léon Walras, Adam Smith provided a theory in The Wealth of Nations 
(1776) where in every market, the principals of perfect competition and the maximizing profit 
behaviour of entrepreneurs will be able to extract the equilibrium price for goods based on 
the implication of the invisible hand, which is the forefather of the auctioneer concept. The 
hidden axiom of these theories and especially of the neoclassical theory lies on the absolute 
trust in the forces of markets between interacting private participants. Given that individual 
agents are rational, they have no need for intervention, unless there is any exogenous or 
endogenous shock that may cause equilibrium divergence.  
This factor is the most crucial for arguments in favor of any notion of equilibrium, 
either partial or general. The effects of monopoly or collusion between any number of firms 
can easily destabilize a perfectly competitive economy due to price deviation from the 
optimal level. The first significant contribution in this field of market theory was made by 
Antoine Augustine Cournot (1838) in the 19th century. By observing the competitive 
behaviour in a spring water duopoly, he developed a model which has inspired most of the 
contemporary analytical frameworks in imperfect competition and oligopoly theory. This 
model provided the motivation to Walras to present a clear notion of General Equilibrium, 
rather than the definition of the Partial Equilibrium that was presented by Cournot. 
The main point of this review is focused exactly on the very outcome that Cournot 
provided through his model; even if competition takes place between firms, the equilibrium 
state the theory of perfect competition suggests may not be the one that the interacting firms 
will choose to compete under. Specifically, they will choose an equilibrium point where the 
output produced (since it is the only decision variable) is less than the one suggested by 
perfect competition by leading to positive profit rates along with a relative price level that 
remains rigid according to the behaviour and strategic interactions between competitors. 
Unless there is a change in decision variables, the nominal price level of each firm will 
remain the same for some time. This feature leads to the following review by examining the 
ways and mechanisms through which such rigidities in the nominal price level arise. 
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Despite the great significance of such market structure, the initial contribution in this 
part of theory had not taken place until the 1930’s. The two great figures behind this 
revolution were Edward Chamberlin and Joan Robinson. In particular, they provided a theory 
of monopolistic and imperfect competition respectively, by rejecting the “utopian” state 
described by the theory of perfect competition. Their books “The Theory of Monopolistic 
Competition” (1933) and “The Economics of Imperfect Competition” (1933) are considered 
to be the major benchmarks in the field of imperfect competition due to the fact that many 
contemporary mainstream models have been constructed on the basis of the underlying 
reasoning. For instance, the “Structure-Conduct-Performance” paradigm provided by this 
theory has been used by many industrial economists in their empirical models in order to test 
specific theory implications upon markets and interacting firms, like the degree of industrial 
concentration or the degree of price markups.  
Following the resulting theory of imperfect competition, many economists like Means 
(1935a) and Stigler (1964) have presented new assumptions and implications within this area 
of study
3
. They provided the necessary tools with which economists can test both the 
behaviour of real markets and the degree of consistency between their theoretical and 
empirical results. Such papers have focused their interest on the two significant issues that 
describe the very core of this review; oligopolistic behaviour and its resulting effect upon the 
flexibility of firms’ relative prices. This means that according to the degree of such behaviour 
and the deviation from the competitive price level, pricing decisions may attain 
characteristics similar to the ones of a monopolistic pricing firm, by resulting in a higher and 
more rigid price setting. 
These concepts have a significant impact on the literature of oligopoly theory 
especially after the 1970’s where the most important contributions had taken place mostly by 
the New Keynesian School of Thought (Rotemberg, 1987). Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) have 
extended Chamberlin’s theory of monopolistic competition by focusing their interest on the 
scales of economy and product diversity, while Barro (1972) has presented a monopolistic 
model by giving emphasis to price variations. Following these papers, the initial New 
Keynesian contribution was made by Rotemberg (1982a, 1982b) who developed the notion of 
menu costs within oligopolistic markets which was found to be consistent in real world 
economies, especially in the United States. Subsequently, there were many extensions of this 
                                                          
3
 Also see Stigler and Khindhal (1971). 
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theoretical stream and especially of the rigid price adjustment theory that was used in order to 
provide estimable and consistent results about the price level across industries. 
According to such theories, many industrial organization and econometrical methods 
were developed, like the NEIO (New Empirical Industrial Organization) methodology that 
includes the conjectural variation approach developed by Iwata (1974), as well as the conduct 
parameter and the weighted profits approach presented by Bresnahan (1982, 1989, 1991)
4
. 
This methodology is focused on the estimable results along with their derivation from 
demand and cost functions by obtaining micro level and using 3 or even 4 digit SIC data. In 
addition, many algorithms have been developed as well, like the one described in Ericson and 
Pakes (1995), where they construct a Markov-Perfect industry dynamic model by using a 
number of specific assumptions. In addition, an extension of this paper provided by Bajari, 
Benkard and Levin (2007) uses a more developed algorithm that estimates dynamic models 
of imperfect competition under which oligopolistic pricing decisions emerge as a result of 
market power acquisition.  
So far, all the theoretical and empirical methods in the literature of imperfect 
competition have acquired a high level of attention from many schools of economic thought, 
despite opposing arguments about the validity of assumptions. The most important outcome 
is based on the fact that such theories, from the initial contribution of Chamberlin-Robinson 
till the New Keynesian rigid price adjustment concept, have contributed to the set of 
knowledge surrounding this theoretical field by analyzing the facts that occur within real 
world markets. Such theories can definitely motivate the economists of the new generation to 
imply or to extend their content to industries and individual firms in order to identify the 
malfunctions and any failure that occur under the veil of markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 See Kadiyali et al. (2001). 
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2.2. The early contribution in the theory of imperfect competition 
2.2.1. Edward Chamberlin and Joan Robinson’s theory 
As described above, the Chamberlin-Robinson contribution was the turning point in the 
market theory that had been dominated by the perfect competition ideology. A great amount 
of doubtful thoughts were brought to surface regarding the theoretical implications on 
markets, especially during the Great Depression after 1929. They both intuitively predicted 
the flaws of the structure of perfect competition and tried to provide a realistic interpretation 
of real world phenomena in markets around the globe under the impact of a financially and 
socially destructive recession. 
Edward Chamberlin published his book “The Theory of Monopolistic Competition” 
in 1933 by structuring his model on the neoclassical assumptions of perfect competition and 
monopoly theory. In particular, he changes the assumption under which every market is 
characterized by either perfectly competitive or monopolistic behaviour. He assumes an 
overall market which consists of a small number of markets and identified by an imperfect 
competitive structure. By also assuming that each market is characterized by a seller’s 
monopoly which is imperfectly isolated from the others, he studies the whole interaction 
between these institutions under the scope of a genus market (which has the leading role in 
this model) and the assumption of two demand curves (one in the genus market and one in 
the remaining which is called species demand curve). The latter demand curve varies 
according to price changes in the species of these markets, while the genus demand curve 
represents any fluctuations in the purchase of a single product when the price of the rest in 
that market may vary with the price of the leading species. The nature of the two demand 
functions is the crucial assumption that differentiates his theory from the perfect competition 
or the absolute monopoly theory; perfect competition is a limiting case where the species 
demand curve is horizontal and absolute monopoly is the other extreme where the two curves 
coincide by leading to a single level of quantity.  
By following this structure, Chamberlin argued that firms will reach a cooperative 
solution, the “joint maximization” solution, where total profits are maximized and 
consistency with the Pareto optimal solution exists. Despite the fact that this solution is not 
Nash equilibrium due to high incentives of deviation (cheating) from this collusion, 
Chamberlin supports that such actions will not occur because they are “foreseen to be 
ultimately self-defeating”. The main flaw of this outcome, as it has been argued by many 
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game theorists like Fisher (1989), was that Chamberlin thought of the market structure as a 
Stag hunt game, where firms try to reach the joint maximizing solution. Instead, the game is a 
prisoner’s dilemma game where firms have to find a coordinative solution which is not the 
one suggested by this model.  
Regardless the outcome of this theory, one thing is for certain; Chamberlin formed a 
new stream of ideas that future economists would be called to expand and imply on real 
world economies. His intuitive assumptions and theory implications were very important for 
economic theory in general because he conducted the first market experiment and the first 
economic experiment of any kind by showing how prices cannot necessarily reach the 
equilibrium level of perfect competition. 
The intersection that Chamberlin used between the theory of perfect competition and 
his own theory can initially be understood by showing that the equilibrium price is no longer 
a Walrasian-Smithsonian concept. It may be spontaneously defined by the forces of demand 
and supply alone, but it is also dependent on the outcome of a set of production decisions 
along with strategic interactions. In addition, the extent of nominal price rigidity lies on the 
monopolist’s expectations about the reaction of his pricing decision by other monopolistic 
competitors. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that the author focused his interest on 
identifying why a cooperative solution will occur as an optimal decision between firms, 
opposing any action that may result in a defection from this solution as the conception of 
Nash Equilibrium suggests.  
An interesting, but rather insufficient explanation could be based on the term of 
product differentiation that can be used as a strategic variable by firms in order to render their 
products more competitive, even under perfect competition. This means that the 
differentiation of a product can be interpreted as a strategic decision for acquiring greater 
market share, which can also result in a rigid relative price level as long as the quality of that 
product satisfies the needs of consumers. Nevertheless, this fact cannot capture any 
interactions that emerge among firms regarding their pricing behaviour and the externalities 
they are called to face from such decisions. A potential explanation could be that such 
externalities result in non-cooperative interactions which may trigger an all-out “price war”, 
but such analysis is neglected by this particular model. 
The second great contributor to this theoretical field of economics is Joan Robinson. 
Her book “The Economics of Imperfect Competition” was published in 1933 as well by 
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providing an alternative pattern of competition; the imperfect competition. This book was 
heavily criticized during its publication by many economists due to the definition of the word 
imperfect.  
In particular, Chamberlin himself stated that “Imperfect Competition followed the 
tradition of competitive theory, not only in identifying a ‘commodity’ (albeit elastically 
defined) with an ‘industry’, but in expressly assuming such a ‘commodity’ to be 
homogeneous. Such a theory involves no break whatsoever with competitive tradition. The 
very terminology of ‘imperfect competition’ is heavy with implications that the objective is 
to move towards perfection” (1950: p.87). The opposition essence behind this argument is 
that Joan Robinson (as John Maynard Keynes) provided an extension of the Marshallian 
tradition, so there was no intension in providing a breakthrough in the theory of competitive 
value as many economists expected. 
One of the most important aspects of this book is the utilization of the relationship 
between average and marginal curves. By adopting Cournot’s notion of marginal revenue, 
Robinson incorporated the whole reasoning behind the equilibrium of a group, as it was 
presented in Sraffa’s essay (1926). By co-working with Richard Khan, she used more 
complicated assumptions, like the variability in the number of firms, in contrast with Sraffa’s 
fixed number. So, the main problem in this analysis was the very nature of the demand curve. 
By using Marshall’s notion of monopoly, where a single firm controls the whole industry, 
Robinson tried to face the problems posed by the interdependency between firms and provide 
a reasonable analysis of this market structure.  
In particular, she wished to create a structure under which a “logically coherent 
marginalist theory of the firm” will be reached, by rejecting the neoclassical view, where the 
forces of free markets lead to an outcome in which unsatisfied customers’ needs can coexist 
along with firms’ excess capacity.  This argument is based on the nature of the cost curves 
that every firm has to face; the average, marginal and total cost curves. For instance, under 
perfect competition, a single firm can sell all the desirable amount of products without 
influencing the aggregate price level because an increase in production will be followed by an 
increase in its total cost function.  
Nevertheless, if demand for a single product is falling (shift of demand curve to the 
left), then marginal revenue will fall as well. This indicates a spontaneous initial move on the 
relative curve and a backward move of that curve afterwards, as demand falls, which means 
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that beyond a certain threshold, sales will result in negative marginal revenues (diminishing 
marginal revenue curve). Therefore, under perfect competition firms will have no incentives 
in increasing their supply beyond a certain level of production due to a decrease in the level 
of their profits and thus, sustaining a rigid nominal price level for the desirable volume of 
production. 
Given this state of market, the next question imposed refers to the existence of 
positive profits in equilibrium due to a small number of entrepreneurs. Robinson argued that 
competitive equilibrium profits are related with the “marginal productivity of the 
entrepreneurial ability for the industry”. This argument holds because the rate of 
remuneration of a factor is proportional to its marginal productivity, which in turn cannot be 
satisfied by the entrepreneurial ability when marginal productivity refers to the firm level. 
This means that if this factor is supposed to be a variable input, then profits can never be 
equal to the marginal contribution of entrepreneurial ability.  
The only way to fix this inequality is to assume the two following conditions; to treat 
the latter meaning as a fixed productive factor and to shift the analysis attention from the firm 
to the industrial/sectorial level. In this case, aggregate output will be related to the number of 
firms within the industry. This means that for a given level of inputs, the marginal 
productivity of a firm will be defined by the output increase and thus, marginal gains will be 
equal to the marginal productivity of the industry which it belongs to.  
It is clear that Joan Robinson by preserving the main neoclassical assumptions of the 
market structure and by forming extra assumptions about certain measures that coexist with 
this theoretical domain, presented a different outcome than the one described by neoclassical 
theory. Also, by extending the scheme of perfect competition to other states, she proved that 
distortions in the aggregate industry can result in deviation from the optimal solution and 
thus, to a sub-optimal social welfare outcome.  
Both Edward Chamberlin and Joan Robinson at that time provided a different 
approach of the existing literature of competition based on the assumptions of neoclassical 
theory and formed their results about different market structures. Despite Chamberlin’s 
continuation of using the neoclassical pattern as his main tool, Joan Robinson made a shift to 
the Post-Keynesian school of thought. Specifically, in 1953, Robinson published a paper 
called “Imperfect Competition Revisited”, where she provided a Post-Keynesian critique of 
her earlier book. She stated that “The assumptions which were adequate (or which I hoped 
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were adequate) for dealing with such questions are by no means a suitable basis for an 
analysis of the problems of prices, production and distribution which present themselves in 
reality” (1953: p. 579).  
On the other hand, Chamberlin accomplished to provide an early stage of collusion 
between firms by indicating a form of nominal price rigidity that could also lead to price 
rigidity for the whole industry. This argument is based on the fact that firms will always 
prefer to sustain an agreement where they maximize their profits. By adopting such 
behaviour, any inefficient levels of competition that result in a lower level of profits in the 
long-run are not taken into consideration. Either way and regardless the theoretical 
background that the authors used, these books have been and will be the major landmarks in 
the field of imperfect competition by providing the basic foundation for the evolution of 
future work with application to both theory and real world economies. 
 
2.2.2. The Administered Price Thesis and the Development of Oligopoly Theory 
Two years later in 1935, a controversial theory that could be considered as a complement to 
the revolution of 1933 is presented by Gardiner Means. This theory comes by the name of 
“Administered Price Thesis” and argues in favor of a positive relationship between the 
infrequency of price changes, according to changes in the market clearing price, and 
industrial concentration. Means (1935a, 1935b, 1939) challenged the perfect competition 
assumption about price flexibility and proved that market power allows firms to circumvent 
the normal workings of markets and control the variation of prices which tend to change less 
in administered markets.  
Means tested 747 Bureau of Labour Statistics wholesale price series from 1926 to 
1933 and found that approximately 50 percent of his sample changed price at the rate of less 
than once every four months, 25 percent changed less than once every ten months and 13 
percent changed less than once every eight years. Such findings proved to be a very important 
challenge to mainstream economics and especially to the economics of perfect competition 
due to his evidence that firms with market power are more “upward aggressive” than 
competitive firms. This fact resulted in the validity of the price rigidity assumption in markets 
with oligopolistic or monopolistic power. 
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Means also believed that the frequency of price changes was positively correlated 
with their amplitude due to evidence that over 1929-1932, there was a greater decrease in the 
average value of more frequently changing prices but only a smaller decrease (or no decrease 
at all) in the average value of less frequently changing prices. Therefore, given these facts, he 
concluded that the administered price concept resulted from the relative small number of 
concerns that dominate particular markets.  
Following the 1950’s, Means (1959, 1975, 1983) observed an additional interesting 
fact about price behaviour; administered prices had risen sluggishly during booms but they 
continued to rise even in recessions. The rate of inflation caused from such behaviour drew 
the attention of policy makers during the 1970’s and his theory was revised as the 
“Administered-Inflation Thesis”. But even Means himself did not provide any theoretical 
interpretation about how some firms with market power are able to ignore market conditions 
in order to administer their prices. In addition, there was also inadequate evidence of an 
empirical explanation of how the prices administered by such firms are related to inflation. 
Following the publication of the previous literature in the theory of oligopoly, the 
third important aspect that complements this chain of evolution is considered to be Stigler’s 
paper “A Theory of Oligopoly” (1964). In this paper, a different approach compared to the 
classical ones of Cournot or Stackelberg is presented under which oligopolists have to form 
collusion in order to avoid any unnecessary conflicts that will have a negative impact on their 
profits. This reasoning is based on Chamberlin’s theory of equilibrium solution were firms 
have to cooperate in order to maximize their total profits. But the main attribute of Stigler’s 
model is the fact that he takes into account the case that Chamberlin rejected; collusion 
cannot be sustained for too long because it is not a stable Nash equilibrium and thus, there 
will be incentives for defection under certain circumstances. Therefore, in order for such 
actions to be avoided there must be an endogenously determined “self-policing” way that will 
maintain the agreement signed by the participating firms of the collusion.  
The main market characteristics assumed in this model are product homogeneity, in 
order for the substitution axiom between goods to be valid, and heterogeneity among buyers 
while the industry structure is immune to entry. Given these assumptions, Stigler focused his 
interest on what he identified as “secret price cutting” instead of testing the degree of 
industrial concentration, as the administered price theory suggested. The action of secret price 
cutting is motivated by specific fluctuations in markets, such as an unexpected increase in 
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demanded quantity. It gives the incentives to firms to break the collusive contract and charge 
a lower price level in order to attract a higher portion of consumers and thus, attain more 
profits. In order for such behaviour to be avoided, Stigler considered the collusion as a 
“Leviathan” (following the notion given by Thomas Hobbes) whose work is to protect the 
interacting members from exogenous shocks and impose penalties to anyone who would try 
to deviate from their contract.  
To this end, this is a more realistic application of Chamberlin’s theory where strategic 
pricing decisions are dependent on detailed market conditions specification, like the fact that 
the number of sellers is very small while the number of heterogeneous buyers is quite large. 
Also, unsustainable equilibrium can be attained under some restrictions imposed by the 
collusion by avoiding infinite reversionary episodes, like a Cournot competition, which will 
result in less discounted profits compared to the ones that can be attained under the collusion. 
The fact that sets such conditions credible (that can be characterized as “threats”) regards the 
market power that every firm possess; the higher that power is, the more endurable a firm 
will be by entering a state of competition as a form of punishment for the ones who have 
defected from collusion. These restrictions can transform this solution into a sustainable 
equilibrium by changing the payoffs of every player and provide them an efficient outcome 
compared to the one acquired by the non-cooperative solution.  
The empirical results of the manufacturing industries of the United States and Canada 
show that the higher the degree of industrial concentration, the higher the frequency of price 
reductions (Stigler, 1964). This means that either there is no sufficient motivation for 
collusion in real world markets or participants are not willing to maintain their agreement 
under positive demand fluctuations. The implication behind that intuition is that nominal 
price rigidity can be manipulated by the market structure along with any strategic interaction 
formed by competitors, as well as by any external shocks that can affect the demand curve for 
the industrial products. In addition, the form of such collusions can sustain the price level to a 
certain path for a long time, depending on the behaviour of firms. Such action enhances the 
price rigidity assumption in the interacting industry under any form of competition. Even in 
Adam Smith’s markets, if firms have the incentives to strike an agreement and form 
collusion, then the invisible hand will fail to do its work and aggregate surplus (especially 
consumer’s surplus) will be reduced by causing inefficiency to the whole society. 
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Given Stigler’s reasoning about collusion and how prices can be rigid through 
informal agreements, such behaviour can be strengthened under specific circumstances, when 
a small number of firms get a large portion out of a product’s demand. For instance, during 
recessions many firms find themselves difficult to operate and thus exit their market, by 
allowing the remaining firms to serve their portion of consumers. As a result, aggregate 
demand will decline (due to a decrease in aggregate income) and the remaining firms will get 
a greater market share depending on the elasticity of their products (Keynes, 1936).  
In addition, Cagan (1974) studied the recession behaviour of wholesale prices since 
World War II and compared them to the 1920s as the most recent period of earlier recession. 
He found that prices failed to fall according to aggregate income over the recessions of 1954, 
1958 and 1961. This fact occurred due to the presence of downward nominal price rigidity 
along with the tendency of producers to administer their prices with less regard in short-term 
changes of demand. An explanation provided by Cagan was that the growth rate of firms’ 
market power after World War II allowed them to set rigid prices in conjunction with labour 
unions that dictated wages. Another explanation is based on future expectations about price 
setting. Specifically, he argued that “The Employment Act” of 1946 which enforced 
governments to pursue full employment policies was followed by high inflation periods and 
thus, an upward pricing trend by presuming that any deflationary pressure would be very 
brief. A significant factor of this trend was the “sporadic bursts” of demand-pull inflation 
which caused the failure of prices to undergo any fall during the recession. 
In 1970, the aggregate price level kept on increasing due to expectations about future 
inflation. This happened because a highly anticipated rate makes the actual one to rise and if 
quantity demanded declines by a slow and steady rate, prices will continue to rise. For this 
reason, prices that respond to recessions have to be measured by the rates of change relative 
to the anticipated rates. This shows that expectations formulate a very important element in 
such theory due to the power of psychology and behaviour about fluctuations. If people 
expect that the price level will rise in the future, then it will definitely rise, since their actions 
will lead to a similar outcome (self-fulfilling prophesy). The essence of this mechanism is 
based on the economic agents’ rational concern of the decision variables that must be 
protected through the inflation-indexation process of the corresponding nominal variables. 
According to these theoretical implications, Cagan’s empirical evidence support that 
changes in the composition of aggregate indexes, such as production and price indexes, have 
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indeed affected their cyclical behaviour. This happened due to a decline of the average rate of 
inflation over recession periods since the 1920s. Their distributions provide a high rate of 
variability, compared to the ones of the 1920s, with little change during the last four 
recessions. Therefore, the slowdown of the price change rate had taken place due to the 
reduction of the frequency of price response to excess capacity along with the increase in the 
expected speed of price adjustment. The rate of inflation at the end of 1969 remained 
persistent for the two following years and the expected adjustment of anticipated prices was 
faster as a result of the high post-war inflation level. The main result from such evidence is 
that changes in pricing behaviour appear to take some time and remain rigid for a few years, 
while elasticity of price to aggregate shocks appears to have moderate accumulations across 
industries. 
Carlton (1978) following the reasoning of price rigidities based on the entrepreneurial 
behaviour indicated by Stigler, studied price inflexibility, timing consideration and demand 
uncertainty as a result of market interactions between firms. He argued that prices cannot 
instantly adjust after a change in demand preferences or expectations about future 
consumption. This happens because they are endogenously determined by market forces and 
their magnitude, followed by time of realization of these changes that will shape the time 
adjustment of the price level. Uncertainty about demand lies on the assumption that 
entrepreneurs cannot observe the demand function after they have set their prices. This means 
that they have to rely on expectations by taking into account past information, current and 
future conditions that can shape the economy (i.e. fluctuations of consumer income). Lastly, 
time consideration includes all the necessary equipment and resources needed in order for 
production to occur in every time period. 
Given these considerations, Carlton constructed a model in which the capacity of 
firms producing a single good is presented, along with the inability of some consumers to 
purchase that good. As a result, there will be excess capacity by a number of those firms that 
failed to sell their whole stock (due to fluctuations in demand). Each good is characterized by 
its price and probability of purchase. Under these assumptions, if social welfare is measured 
by expected surplus, then competitive equilibrium will be the optimal one, by excluding any 
implications under demand uncertainty.  
One year later, Carlton (1979) published an extension of this paper by adding the 
feature of contracts and transaction costs between interacting firms or agents. He argued that 
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uncertainty and transaction costs motivate firms to use both long-term and short-term fixed 
price contracts due to the difference in their move and their magnitude. Contracts can secure 
and provide information about future demand by eliminating uncertainty and search costs of 
future production. By using a simple equilibrium model, he shows that firms may use 
delivery lags as a reallocation mechanism for goods in order to ensure their efficient 
allocation that would result if signing new contracts was not too costly. The results 
demonstrate that in response to supply shocks, both short-term and long-term contract prices 
will move in the same direction by a different magnitude, while in response to demand 
shocks, both of them will move in a different direction. 
The final part of this theory was completed in his paper “The rigidity of prices” 
(Carlton, 1986) where he found consistent evidence with the administered price thesis. 
Aggregate price indices may be an inaccurate measure to test for price rigidity in 
concentrated industries due to the lack of information about individual actions that reflect 
transaction prices. By using the Stigler-Kindahl data (price data on actual transactions) he 
found that the degree of price rigidity is significant in many concentrated industries. This 
indicates that a fixed number of permanent consumers exist, by identifying no need for 
endogenous price fluctuations. 
His third finding concerns the existence of negative correlation between price rigidity 
and the length of buyer-seller association. If there is not any distrust or incomplete 
information between each other, the longer the association, the lower the cost of changing 
prices will be. If the transaction process would take place for a long time, then both parties 
would be interested in the average price. This happens due to the fact that prices would 
change less frequently but with higher intensity in rigid than in less rigid contracts. This 
procedure indicates a positive relationship between price rigidity and average absolute price 
change because higher rates of rigidity will result in more intense price changes. 
The evidence shows that there is not necessarily an asymmetry in price rigidity by 
indicating that prices are not necessarily rigid downwards as it has been implemented by 
many other papers (see sections 2.3, 2.4). There are also small fixed costs to some buyers of 
the sample to change their prices and very weak evidence that the same buyers have 
systematic preferences across products for unchanging prices. 
As a summary of the discussion so far, the main empirical finding concerns the strong 
correlation between the degree of industrial concentration and rigid prices. The higher the 
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market share within an industry, the longer prices will remain rigid. Carlton (1986) argued 
that this outcome does not necessarily imply inefficiency because it can result from an 
unchanged demand and supply curve for a long time period. Depending on the conditions that 
describe the sampling industries that have been taken into account, the outcome supports that 
price rigidity depends on the behaviour between buyers and sellers based on how they have 
formed their transactions (for example through short-term or long-term contracts). Such 
theories address the concept of price rigidity of individual products in confined markets but it 
is quite unclear how actual and potential entry and exit decisions can modify such results. 
 
2.3.The Concepts of Imperfect Competition, Pricing Behaviour and the Menu Cost 
Approach under the Scope of Macroeconomics. 
 
2.3.1. The Monopolistic/Oligopolistic Competition and Price Adjustment theory after the 
1970’s. 
 
Following the major contributions in price rigidity theory, there have been many approaches 
that tried to capture the very nature of such behaviour in many markets. The initial 
contribution was made by Barro (1972) who presented a theory of price adjustment under 
monopolistic market conditions in order to observe the impact of consumers’ actions upon 
this procedure. He constructed a model where there is one monopolistic seller (price setter) 
and many perfectly competitive buyers (price takers). Its main feature incorporates the 
variations in prices due to administrative and implicit costs that are generated only by 
markets and not by individuals’ actions. This means that optimal price adjustment depends on 
specific institutional characteristics under which trading occurs, such as the nature of 
contracts. An additional factor concerns the determination with which market participants 
declare the desirable prices in the absence of any marketeer which is similar to the Walrasian 
auctioneer. 
Given these assumptions, the market price level adjusts to a disequilibrium level due 
to the monopolist’s pricing behaviour where he equates marginal revenue to marginal cost in 
order to maximize his profits. An inelastic demand curve emerges if the firm is ever to 
change its price which is quite a reasonable outcome. It occurs because monopolistic firms 
may lose their customers either due to new entry of competitors in the operating sector or due 
to a decline in the demand curve of their goods.  
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According to this specific market structure, Barro provides the effects and interactions 
between price changes and demand behaviour that result from the actions of the monopolist. 
If price fluctuations occur within the market, then the optimal solution between average price 
change and excess demand (that will maximize the profits of monopoly under the assumption 
of costly price adjustment) can play a crucial role in such decision making. This happens due 
to the magnitude of excess demand which can result in a slightly price increase (or no price 
increase at all) that will both satisfy the maximization conditions of the firm and consumer 
preferences about the desired demanded quantity. 
The next step of a monopolistic competitive market state is developed by Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) by investigating the mechanisms through which scales of economy can affect 
social output. The central procedure refers to the level of production of any commodity that 
takes place only if operating costs can be covered by the sum of revenues along with an 
efficiently defined measure of consumer surplus. If this assumption holds, then the optimal 
solution of the scales of economy’s effect on production is determined whenever demand 
price is equivalent to marginal cost (this effect is realized only under perfect pricing 
discrimination). However, this condition cannot be sustained either by a competitive market, 
given that the marginal condition would result in negative overall profits, or by a 
monopolistic firm due to the maximization mechanism. Therefore, the only way to find a 
credible solution is to address the issue as one of quantity versus diversity, by differentiating 
between a good substitutability among commodities and a bad one within a particular 
industry. 
Under this line of reasoning, another interesting implication of the monopolistic 
competition theory would concern its relationship and impact on aggregate demand upon 
economic activity (Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987). Based on a general equilibrium model 
where monopolistic competition prevails in both good and labour markets, inefficiency in 
such market structure is associated with aggregate demand externalities. This means that 
monopolistic competition generates effects of aggregate demand that cannot be captured by 
perfect competition. The emergence of such costs that firms face may be an important factor 
based on consumer preferences about the price level of products (an accurate description of 
these costs is provided in the following section).  
The last finding of this research shows that a more accurate account of the response of 
the economy to aggregate demand shocks can be taken into consideration if prices and wages 
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are unaffected by changes in nominal money. In addition, monopolistic competition is 
assumed to allow for fixed costs in output, productivity and entries by new firms which are 
included in the firm’s objective function. The equilibrium level provided by this structure is 
characterized by “a relationship between real money balances and aggregate demand, a pair 
of demand functions for goods and labour and by a pair of price and wage rules” (Blanchard 
and Kiyotaki, 1987: p. 650). An interesting observation that can be made is that Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) turned their interest on the effects of scales of economy; while Blanchard and 
Kiyotaki (1987) focused on real economy effects, by choosing to standardize the effect of 
new entry in markets or consider it as an exogenous variable.  
In contrast, Encaoua and Jaquemin (1980) took into account the possibility of entry as 
an endogenous variable in oligopolies by studying both a static and a dynamic model under 
the threat of entry and cooperation between firms. They emphasized on the extent to which 
the main measures of industrial concentration can be related to the ones of the aggregate 
degree of monopoly. As a result, they made a distinction between a list of properties that a 
measure of concentration must satisfy based on the number of firms (Encaoua and Jaquemin, 
1980: p. 89).  
On the other hand, as Hannan and Kay (1977) proposed, if many small firms enter the 
industry but acquire a very low market share, then industrial concentration will not be 
affected; however, the degree of inequality in the size of the firms will greatly increase. 
Given this observation, the second set of properties, based on a variable number of firms 
declares that the measure of concentration must not decrease if a merge between two or more 
firms is to take place. Also, if the size of the two industries is equal, then this measure must 
remain the same even if the number of firms is increased. 
According to these arguments, concentration indices are not able to provide a 
sufficient interpretation of monopolistic power by themselves but instead, many other 
characteristics have to be taken into consideration. They refer to the threat of entry, the 
reasons related to the adjustment speed of prices, entrepreneurial behaviour and future 
uncertainty that can formulate a better approach in defining the degree of monopolistic 
power. Additionally, product differentiation and market segmentation can also be considered 
as influential factors determining the degree of market power. 
As an empirical validation of the aforementioned models, Dixon (1983) focused his 
interest on identifying the relationship between the speed of price adjustment and industrial 
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concentration. An econometric model was estimated where the effect of the lag coefficient of 
production and other variables, such as industrial concentration, is tested on the speed of 
price adjustment. Dixon found evidence that support the interrelation between the length of 
production lag and the lag between changes in unit costs with the dependent variable of price 
adjustment. Secondly, he contradicted Stigler’s hypothesis about the relationship between 
secret price cutting and the number of operating firms within an industry. Such actions can 
affect the rate of inflation only if they occur in an aggregate level. Therefore, attention has to 
be given to the characteristics of the production process along with the industrial structure. 
He also argued that there is a potential destabilization of macroeconomic policies that try to 
maintain the level of inflation to a certain low level.  
Instead of focusing on the characteristics that define monopolistic power as 
mentioned above, Green and Porter (1984) developed a direct expansion of Stigler’s original 
paper by reintroducing the assumption of imperfect information. They presented a model 
where price cutting is a rational choice for firms under specific circumstances without 
defecting from their contracting agreement. In particular, they argued that under demand 
uncertainty, optimal incentive equilibrium may involve “episodic recourse” to a short-term 
unprofitable solution, like a “price war”. However, in such state, it cannot be clearly defined 
if the explanatory outcome is the same with the one under perfect information. 
In spite of demand uncertainty, they made four fundamental assumptions in their 
model; industry stability holds in order for the rational expectations axiom to be valid, the 
only endogenous variable that firms can determine is the quantity of output so that there is no 
asymmetric incentives under collusion, information about the industry and environment is 
publicly known and lastly, the monitoring information that firms use in order to see the 
collusion’s behaviour is imperfectly correlated with firms’ conduct.  
Under these assumptions, Green and Porter showed that collusive conduct might be 
characterized by repeated episodes that may result in price and profit decreases. This result 
leaves no place for the view of an industry in which firms are acting on abortive attempts to 
form collusion. Therefore, if any collusion is formed under demand uncertainty, then no firm 
will ever defect due to the lack of information that will allow a cost-benefit analysis of 
expected future returns.  
Nevertheless, when low prices are observed, this signals an increase in quantity 
demanded for a particular product by rendering the participation in reversionary episodes for 
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every firm a rational choice. The final observations from these results indicate that price 
instability will be intense between normal and reversionary periods due to the stable pattern 
of prices when firms have decided to collude.  
The next step of this analysis is provided by Maskin and Tirole (1988a), where they 
overlook the micro-level of the collusion analysis and concentrate on the contestability, the 
nature of kinked demand curve and any short-run commitment that affect firm behaviour. 
They use a class of infinite horizon sequential duopoly games in which firms maximize their 
discounted sum of single period profits. At first, a type of exogenous commitment is assumed 
where firms can make their move once every three periods because of short-term contracts. 
Firms compete only in quantities; however, fixed costs are very high to enable any single 
firm from making profits.  
Under these assumptions, a unique symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium exists 
where only one firm produces and operates according to the monopolistic level in order to 
prevent any entry (this is a specific type of monopoly; natural monopoly). As the discount 
factor tends to unity, future profits become increasingly important and natural monopoly 
output tends to be equal to competitive output (Baumol, Pazar and Willig (1982)). Maskin 
and Tirole (1988b) in their companion paper provided findings arguing that when price 
competition is taking place under undifferentiated commodities, then equilibrium under a 
kinked demand curve along with the Edgeworth cycle determine the natural equilibrium of 
this model. 
 
2.3.2 The New Keynesian Contribution in Oligopoly Theory and the Menu Cost Approach 
Rotemberg (1982a) developed his model according to Barro’s work (1972) of monopolistic 
price adjustment and its effects on aggregate output. He argued that nominal shocks have 
persistent effects on output fluctuations, such as an expansionary monetary policy through 
liquidity increase. The producers of this model produce differentiated goods and have full 
information about present prices charged by their suppliers. In addition, they are aware of the 
aggregate price level and nominal monetary imbalances under which they are called to set 
nominal prices after their demand and cost functions are observed.  
The final assumption regards the cost of resources in order for price changes to occur 
due to fluctuations in consumers’ preferences. If a monopolist raises the price of his product, 
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then his consumers might reduce their purchases or even stop consuming this product i.e. due 
to an unsustainable loss of consumer surplus or other psychological factors that may affect 
their behaviour. This effect is known as the menu cost approach which forms a type of 
rigidity that represents a crucial factor for correlated responses in output to uncorrelated 
nominal shocks.  
The key point of this approach concerns the costs that firms face when they are called 
to change their prices due to the reaction of their customers, as was mentioned in section 2.1. 
If a price change is unpleasant for a portion of customers (i.e. price increase), then they will 
search for the desired product sold by another firm in the desirable price level. This means 
that whether or not a firm decides to change its price depends on the weighing up of costs that 
it will face in its purchased quantity along with the benefits of this price change. As a result, 
it will enjoy a lower portion of sales for a higher price. If the latter outcome is preferable to 
the former, then the firm will have the incentives to change the relative price. Otherwise, a 
menu cost will emerge that will provide the incentives to the firm to cut the price level in 
order to avoid any unpleasant loss of customers. 
Given these assumptions, monopolists set their prices optimally by taking into 
consideration the imposed costs in changing them. The model developed results in a rational 
expectation equilibrium which is a stochastic process for both price and output level, while it 
is affected by shocks to the level of monetary balances. When money supply follows a 
random walk path, then output will be serially correlated due to a constant expected rate of 
monetary expansion. According to these implications, the author argued that in times where 
prices are relatively high, workers may misperceive their current return to working to be 
higher than usual. This means that by working more hours for lower long run real wages, an 
increase in output will occur. As a result, the intensity of this behaviour can explain actual 
business cycles according to output fluctuations. 
To support the theory of costly price adjustment, Rotemberg (1982b) implied the 
previous model (with slightly changes) to the United States manufacturing industry by using 
a data set over 1948-1979. In this case, firms with market power face quadratic price 
adjustment costs, while a separation between the farming and non-farming sectors is made 
regarding the assumption of price setting. The estimates obtained by the empirical model are 
consistent with the menu cost concept for the United States because prices appear to be quite 
sticky. In order to ensure the robustness of these results, Rotemberg compared the estimated 
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equations with less restricted ones to ascertain whether the US data reject the model, even 
under general specifications. He found that the equations reflecting money and price balances 
are not rejected, in contrast to the output equation which neglects the effect of relative prices 
on aggregate output. 
These papers are considered to be of great significance to the literature of price 
rigidity and are considered as a benchmark for future work. The next step in the menu cost 
approach regards the argument that sticky prices can be, on the one hand, privately efficient 
but on the other hand, socially inefficient. Mankiw (1985) argued that business cycles result 
from this effect in response to demand shocks. Small menu costs can cause large welfare 
losses because “the claim that price adjustment costs are small does not rebut the claim that 
they are central to understanding economic fluctuations” (1985:p. 529).   
To support this argument, he constructed a simple static monopolistic model of partial 
equilibrium. In this model, the monopolist initially sets the price level and changes it 
afterwards, following the occurrence of a small menu cost effect which does not result in a 
socially optimal solution. This means that the firm has to incur this cost if it changes the 
declared nominal price due to fluctuations in aggregate demand. The results provide evidence 
of asymmetry between demand contractions and expansions, which means that upward price 
changes are more flexible than downward price changes.  
This effect can be explained on the basis of private incentives due to the maximizing 
profit nature of monopolists; they will increase their price when they get the chance but they 
won’t respond immediately to a shock that necessitates a price reduction. Another implication 
of this model is that aggregate demand contractions are highly associated with inefficient 
underproduction, while aggregate demand expansions are not necessarily associated with 
inefficient overproduction. To this end, the main outcome of this model validates the power 
of entrepreneurs to affect prices by restricting output (below social optimum equilibrium) 
whenever they expect a higher portion of their profits. 
In Rotemberg (1982a) and Mankiw’s (1985) models the market structure is 
considered to be of monopolistic nature in order to provide a theory of how menu costs can 
result in a socially suboptimal solution. Nevertheless, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) 
replaced this structure with one of oligopolistic nature and focused on its behaviour upon 
demand fluctuations. They argued that colluding oligopolies behave more competitive during 
periods of high demand in order to attract the maximum portion available of that demand 
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increase. For this reason, collusions tend to reduce the mark ups of their prices during such 
periods in order to avoid any defection that could break down their agreement. Such 
behaviour is proved to have macroeconomic effects because an increase in demand for the 
products of oligopolies will lead to an increase in competition by causing an efficient raise of 
output in all sectors. 
They constructed a two-sector general equilibrium model; one of oligopolistic and 
one of competitive behaviour, in which prices are strategic variables and the marginal cost of 
firms is constant. The findings show that the ensuing reduction in the price of oligopoly can 
lead the second sector, described by competitive characteristics, to increase its output as well 
due to the use of oligopoly’s output as input. Also, positive shocks in demand beyond a 
certain threshold will lower prices monotonically. If firms are capacity constrained during 
positive demand fluctuations, then they will be unable to deviate so that the oligopoly won’t 
have to cut prices. The main argument of this paper comes in contrast with the industrial 
organization folklore (Scherer, 1980). It provides evidence of the cement industry price 
behaviour (studied by Scherer) that price wars can occur more in times of high demand than 
in times of recession due to the relationship between business cycles and slow price 
adjustment. There is also evidence that the cyclical properties of the price-cost margin are 
consistent with this theory because the ratio of prices to marginal cost tends to be 
countercyclical in more concentrated industries. 
As the authors have argued, the significance of the demand multiplier indicates that an 
increase in demand will raise aggregate output, which in turn will lead to a further increase of 
aggregate demand. This mechanism justifies the reason for which the competitive sector will 
raise its output following an increase of oligopoly’s output. Therefore, an increase in quantity 
demanded will lower the oligopoly’s price level by leading to an increase in aggregate output 
and thus, national income. The latter increase will lead to increased demand for other 
products that will cause a fall in the oligopoly price level and an increase in their production 
which will further raise aggregate output. 
Following the implications of oligopolistic pricing, Rotemberg and Saloner (1987) 
focused on the oligopolistic part of the aforementioned model. They argued that duopolies 
change prices more often than monopolies because by treating prices as strategic variables, 
fluctuations in demand will have a higher impact on duopolists that antagonize each other. 
This effect will result in a Cournot-based game where firms try to attract the maximum 
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portion of additional demand, as was presented above. By assuming homogenous goods and 
constant marginal costs, they study a two period model described by an unexpected increase 
in firms’ constant marginal costs of production. 
Subject to fluctuations in their costs, it is more costly for each member of a tight 
oligopoly to maintain its price constant compared to monopoly. However, if fluctuations in 
demand occur, this argument is reversed due to positive shocks that will motivate the 
monopolist to raise the price level. When inflationary or deflationary shocks affect both cost 
and demand functions, the cost effect will be dominant due to a higher impact than the one 
caused by demand fluctuations, directly imposed on firms’ profits. It is also supported that 
circumstances that would cause a monopolist to change his price will always lead to price 
changes in oligopolies. 
Nevertheless, this outcome has been criticized by Fischer and Konieczny (1995), as it 
will be discussed in the next section, due to its inconsistency with real world markets. 
Rotemberg and Saloner have argued that their model is strictly based on a duopolistic market 
that interacts only for two periods. However, it could also be applied in the case of more 
firms by generating the same results. This effect holds because perceived demand curves 
from oligopolists become flatters as the number of competitors is increased by rendering 
price changes more attractive due to the derived benefits at their expense. Also, “the 
incentives to change price that firms face in response to exogenous changes in costs and 
demand, are related to the incentives that firms have to endogenously change costs and 
demand through innovation” (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1987: p. 925). This means that any 
change in the firms’ demand and/or cost functions will give them the incentives to innovate, 
in order to fill in the gap between present and expected profits by providing the probability to 
theoretically sustain the same price level as before. 
A different type of price behaviour in a duopoly was introduced by Rotemberg and 
Saloner (1990) where the two firms have colluded. Information about demand fluctuations is 
owned only by one firm (leader), while the other one adjusts its price according to the 
leader’s price level (follower). The model assumes differentiated products and asymmetric 
information in order to provide a price leadership pattern in which such actions emerge. 
Under this pattern, no overt collusion is required and both firms benefit from responsiveness 
in demand conditions because prices embody the leader’s set of information. This argument 
holds because even if the leading firm enjoys a higher amount of profits than the following 
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firm, the latter one will be benefited by price rigidity given the fact that the current price set 
by the leader reflects all the necessary information about consumer demand. This means that 
the follower has no cost about realizing private information and its only concern lies within 
the degree of uncertainty about the actual set of information owned by the leader. 
This study is developed under a price leadership scheme that can be sustained as a 
collusive equilibrium in a repeated game with a threat of deviation in presence if any firm 
decides to cheat. The follower can observe past price and demand levels but can only form 
expectations about the current ones, while it trades-off the one period benefits of deviating 
against the future costs of a breakdown in collusion. Under these characteristics, the 
equilibrium solution suggests that the preference on the price level will differ due to the fact 
that it is set according to the first firm’s cost function, while the second firm will have to 
adjust to this choice, when a common price is charged. Also, the disparity in profits between 
the two firms can be reduced if the price level remains rigid for some time, which will give 
the chance to the latter firm to perform this adjustment more efficiently. A rigid price level 
will raise the leader’s current profits if it exploits the follower to present relative demand 
fluctuations. However, such action will lower future profits if relative demand conditions are 
expected to return to normalcy.  
The last part of this line of inquiry addresses the effect of aggregate demand shocks 
on economic activity caused by a change in government purchases and acts as a consequence 
of imperfect competition. Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) developed and estimated a 
dynamic general equilibrium model by using data of the United States military purchases due 
to the consideration of being the most exogenous government purchases. Demand for such 
products is endogenously determined, as well as the cost of production, and follows a 
stochastic process, as random shocks occur frequently. In addition, there is close 
substitutability between military products that result in strategic interactions emergence 
between firms by competing in quantities, while they are regarded as monopolistic 
competitors. 
By competing over time, in order to reach a stationary equilibrium point, Rotemberg 
and Woodford argued that collusion is enforced on those firms in order to both avoid any 
inefficiency caused by Cournot competition and maximize their total profits. Nevertheless, in 
order for such collusion to be the optimal choice for the interacting firms, a penalty is 
imposed for any deviation which will lead to zero present discounted value. In order for such 
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behaviour to be prevented, the future gains from collusion must be greater than the present 
gains of every firm in order to prevent a collusion breakdown. This means that if an increase 
in future demand is expected, the gains of present deviation will be higher. The tool for 
avoiding such actions is a smaller price markup (as suggested by Rotemberg and Saloner, 
1986) in order for the incentive compatibility constraint to hold by eliminating any behaviour 
for defection. If such actions take place, then the markup can be considered as countercyclical 
and prevent any price wars that are about to occur among firms of the same collusion. 
Therefore, by concluding the literature of the New Keynesian contribution in 
imperfect competition, suggestions in favor of a stable equilibrium have been presented, by 
trying to avoid extreme competitive interactions. Such interactions will result in lower profits 
and thus, producer surplus reduction, due to the negative effects of defection. Collusion 
formation is the main tool in obtaining such outcome, while expectations about future 
demand fluctuations have to be realized as soon as possible. The main reason lies on the fact 
that the interacting firms must agree to a commonly accepted price level that will be charged 
for a certain time period; otherwise, if there is no sufficient time to come to such agreement, 
the possibility of a breakdown will be very high. Consequently, efficiency in private pricing 
decisions could be associated with sub-optimality in social welfare and aggregate fluctuations 
in real economic activities because collusive pricing decisions may result in consumer surplus 
exploitation. 
 
2.4. The Theoretical and Empirical Analysis following the dominant theories 
2.4.1. The administered price thesis; consistent evidence and contradictions 
A vast literature of both theoretical and empirical papers has been constructed on the basis of 
the aforementioned theories in order to provide evidence about their validity or rejection in 
real world markets. The prediction of such theories is not always very clear and may vary 
across different industries due to the absence of the axioms of homogeneity or ergodicity in 
reality, as John Maynard Keynes (1936) highlighted. The analysis of the evolution of ideas 
will start with the administered price thesis and the early contribution of imperfect 
competition, according to the aspects of Chamberlin-Robinson and the New Keynesian 
concepts of price rigidity. 
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The administered price thesis as presented by Gardiner Means (1935) reflects a 
positive relationship between aggressive pricing behaviour and industrial concentration. 
Many papers have provided empirical support for this theory (Bain, 1951; Ross Watcher, 
1975; Winters, 1981; Bedrossian Moschos, 1988; Ross, 1988; Shaanan Feinberg, 1995), 
while others have rejected its implications in various industries (Domberger 1979, 1980, 
1982, 1983; Aaronovitch and Sawyer 1981; Weiss 1993; Kraft 1995). 
To begin with, Bain (1951) estimated a model using data for the United States 
manufacturing industry over 1936-1940 in order to study the association between the 
intensity of competition and industrial structure. The main assumptions take into account 
seller and buyer concentration, as well as the degree of product differentiation to profits and 
selling costs. He found that the size of profit rates is related with the number of seller 
concentration in every industry. The higher the degree of concentration, the higher the rate of 
profits will be. Ross and Watcher (1975) concentrated their work on the argument that firms 
are characterized by high incentives in maintaining fixed pricing strategies for some time. By 
focusing on the relationship between market structure and the pricing time problem, the 
authors identified the presence of fixed planning periods for oligopolistic firms, under the 
assumption of a pending collusion that has been denied in the beginning. As a consequence of 
this action, imperfect information will lead to uncertainty that will cause firms to move at 
discrete times. Therefore, whether there are competitive interactions or any form of collusion 
within an industry, pricing behaviour will follow the path indicated by the administered price 
thesis.  
On the basis of this paper and the introduction of a price-cost margin relationship, 
Ross (1988) argued that these margins form the main cause of price rigidities in concentrated 
industries due to limited intensity of price changes. Specifically, he re-examined the studies 
of Thorp and Crowder (1941) and Neal (1942) and replaced part of their assumptions and 
data with consistent hypotheses. Thorp and Crowder collected data on a large sample of 
narrowly defined census products during the Great Depression. Despite their findings about 
an insignificant relationship between concentration and price changes, Ross argued that 
biased estimations are observed in this data set and thus, a larger database is needed in order 
to get robust results. Neal was the first to employ a cost-adjusted approach in a cross section 
sample by finding that price changes were closely related to changes in average costs.  
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Nevertheless, industrial concentration fails to provide an adequate interpretation, 
when it is statistically significant, by leading to extreme biased estimates in regressing prices 
on costs. The main result extracted from these models is that prices tend to be cyclical rigid 
due to short-run strategies adopted by oligopolists in order to resist temporary fluctuations in 
real demand. 
On the other hand, Aaronovitch and Sawyer (1981) by using data for the United 
Kingdom over 1963-1975, concluded that overall, there is no evidence that industrial 
concentration affects price flexibility. However, there is limited support for the administered 
price thesis in two out of five sub-periods of the sample, because price fluctuations were 
related to the industrial structure. The results of this study indicate that the relationship 
between price flexibility and concentration is quadratic rather than linear. It reflects a 
stronger effect along with a turning point in both periods where the relationship is statistically 
significant and equal to 0.25 (Herfindahl Index). Changes in costs have a limited role because 
their coefficient is lower than unity but marginally significant, while output changes have no 
impact on price changes. 
These results support that even if the administered price thesis holds for two periods, 
its effects are barely significant and do not provide a strong relationship between 
concentration and price fluctuations. Domberger (1979) as well, estimated a dataset of twenty 
one sectors in the United Kingdom over 1963-1974 and found evidence of positive 
relationship between industrial concentration and the speed of price adjustment. The main 
concluding argument of such evidence was that if concentration speeds up price adjustment, 
then it could contribute to the inflationary problem in the United Kingdom.  
Nevertheless, Winters (1981) argued against Domberger due to the consideration of 
every industry under the assumption of homogeneity, instead of having a division between 
engineering and non-engineering sectors. Specifically, he contradicted the argument in favour 
of inflation by supporting that this effect will have an impact only on the distribution of an 
inflationary shock over time rather than its ultimate effect. Therefore, unless more rapid pass-
through generates additional inflationary pressures, Domberger’s model cannot provide a 
sufficient interpretation of long-run inflation. The same linear equation as Domberger was 
used in that model by adopting the distinction between engineering and non-engineering 
sectors. Winters found that the mean square error of the latter group is about four times that 
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of the former. This means that the assumption under which higher concentration permits 
more rapid price adjustment does not hold for the engineering sectors. 
In addition, Bedrossian and Moschos (1988) provided evidence of how the “industrial 
profitability and leadership effect” affect the relationship between the speed of price 
adjustment and market structure in twenty Greek manufacturing sectors. They focused on the 
role of distinguishing profits between firm and sectorial level and analyzed the paths through 
which concentration exerts any influence on the speed of price adjustment. By assuming that 
the latter concept is related to both industrial concentration and the length of production, they 
found that both concepts are negatively related due to short-run price rigidities in high 
concentrated sectors. Such evidence is consistent with the administered price thesis, even 
when relative firm profitability within a sector and relative profitability among sectors work 
in different directions. 
Subsequently, a dynamic model of competition and price adjustment was developed 
by Shaanan and Feinberg (1995) by using data from the United States manufacturing sectors 
over the period 1972-1982. The main goal was to estimate the price effects of entry due to 
changes in optimal prices or in their speed of adjustment. By formulating an equation where 
price changes are considered to be the dependent variable, they found that cost and demand 
fluctuations have a positive effect on such changes but only the first value is significant and 
its elasticity is 0.74. The expansion of capacity by new firms to the manufacturing industry 
results in a negative impact on optimal price changes. It was also argued that entry decisions 
through a change in production leads to more intense price fluctuations due to a positive 
effect of variable costs on wholesale prices.  
Lastly, the results show that industrial concentration has a negative effect on the speed 
of price adjustment, while domestic entry has no significant effect. Nevertheless, the latter 
result may not hold for every country because changes in imports differ from OECD to non-
OECD countries regarding the amount and the influence on price levels. For instance, 
Encaoua and Geroski (1986) presented evidence for five OECD countries that price 
inflexibility is not universal across industries due to the rate of variation of particular 
measures that influence industrial decisions. Cost and demand mechanisms have a significant 
effect on price flexibility and through them the market structure and price variations can be 
identified in an intertemporal framework. 
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On the other hand, as Aaronovitch and Sawyer (1981) along with Domberger (1979) 
provided inconsistent results with the administered price thesis, two more papers complement 
their findings. Weiss (1993) argued that cost changes are less fully transmitted to prices in 
highly concentrated industries due to large economies of scale that result in low variable 
costs. In particular, he estimated a price equation for seventeen Austrian industries over 
1974-1988 to test the sensitivity of prices to cost and demand changes, the speed of price 
adjustment and the asymmetry of price behaviour. A weak relationship between industrial 
concentration and the asymmetry of prices is also observed, following either cost or demand 
changes. This means that the administered price thesis, as well as the implications of 
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) about price wars during high demand peaks, cannot be 
supported in the constituent Austrian industries.  
Kraft (1995) developed a consistent model with this literature by taking into 
consideration a dataset of seventeen German industries over 1970-1987 in order to provide 
the effects of business cycles and capital intensity on price adjustment. In this case, 
concentrated industries had faster price adjustments, a result which comes in contradiction 
with the administered price thesis. The findings also support that capital intensity had a 
negative effect on price adjustment because prices were more flexible during demand peaks 
than slumps, thus showing an asymmetry in dependence to demand and cost conditions. 
It has been presented that the administered price thesis has resulted in contradicting 
results, depending on the undertaken industry. For instance, evidence from the industries of 
the UK, Austria and Germany suggests a positive relationship between industrial 
concentration and the speed of price adjustment, thus rejecting this thesis. Consequently, no 
matter the theoretical framework, real markets can adopt a different behaviour due to factors 
that are either not taken into consideration or neglected on purpose based on the author’s 
interest in other parameters. 
 
2.4.2 The Behaviour and Effects of Imperfect Competitive actions 
The second part of the literature evolution of the theory of imperfect competition springs 
from the contribution of Edward Chamberlin and Joan Robinson, as well as by early papers 
(like Stigler’s theory of collusion). It provides a rational comprehension of the theoretical 
concept of industrial decisions, along with empirical implications observed in real world 
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economies. The analysis of this part consists of a complementary approach to the 
administered price thesis, by indicating how market structure can affect pricing behaviour. 
Stiglitz (1984) presented a theoretical interpretation of how prices and wages can be 
shaped under non-market clearing conditions, where real product wages may be decreasing if 
the economy is under depression. In particular, the author argued that if prices convey private 
information, then firms may be reluctant to reduce their price level only when consumers 
expect a fall in product quality. This means that there will be consumers who prefer a higher 
level of quality and as a result, the firms will reduce their market prices to offset that loss in 
quality. In this case, markups over marginal costs will rise by reducing consumer surplus and 
formulate incentives for collusion. Secondly, if the searching cost of consumers is relatively 
high, then demand curves may be kinked due to different assessment and preferences for this 
cost, which may lead consumers not to choose the optimal solution (lowest price).  
Lastly, as long as there is low threat of entry in oligopolistic markets, firms will have 
the incentives for charging a higher markup. This will result in higher price levels and 
possibly price rigidities, if collusive arrangements are sustained by a non-cooperative 
equilibrium. To this end, evidence validates the argument that even under recession, firms 
can charge a higher price level than the one proposed by traditional theories. They can 
maintain a form of rigidity due to the acquisition of market power, possibly after the exit of 
firms. 
An additional paper about price rigidity in a similar light was produced by Rotemberg 
and Summers (1990), where they introduced the effects of inflexible prices to procyclical 
productivity. They argued that rigid prices within periods of weak or strong demand can lead 
along with labour hoarding to the procyclical behaviour of total factor productivity. This 
happens because firms that set prices before demand is realized cannot afford to charge a low 
price in order for output value reduction to be equal to cost reduction.  
The results obtained from this model indicate that procyclical productivity along with 
positive markups occur whenever demand is low under free entry and constant returns to 
scale. Also the two measures of labour hoarding estimated are significantly related to the 
procyclical behaviour of productivity but the measure of market power has the opposite sign 
than anticipated. Therefore, these results confirm earlier studies, like Prescott (1975), 
suggesting that productivity rises to a certain point and then falls, by following demand 
impulses as it would be expected if labour was hoarded. 
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Rotemberg and Woodford (1993) discussed the consequences of imperfect 
competition on the effects upon product market growth and the new characteristics of this 
structure that differ from the ones under perfect competition. Such characteristics include 
increasing returns to technologies which reflect the significance of innovation in the 
production process; shocks to the level of government purchases; as well as changes in 
individual producer’s degree of market power. Under these specifications, the model refers to 
a dynamic general equilibrium model by showing that an increase in markups between price 
and marginal cost will result in a reduction in the level of labour input. This fact indicates that 
fluctuations in the level of markups can generate great employment variations.  
A different paper that is connected with the literature of oligopolistic and 
monopolistic pricing is the one of Fischer and Konieczny (1995). It provides evidence based 
on Canadian daily newspaper data over 1965-1990 which contradict the outcome of 
Rotemberg and Saloner (1987). In particular, they reject the argument that oligopolies change 
prices more often than monopolies by showing that price behaviour depends on market 
characteristics. Even if oligopolies change prices more frequently than monopolies, these 
changes will be larger due to the intensity of competition under fluctuations in demand by 
leading to lower future price levels.  
A higher expected inflation rate will reduce the gap between real price adjustments of 
the two types of firms, while prices charged by oligopolies will be more eroded between 
adjustments. This means that under such conditions, the lower bound of monopolies will be 
reduced but the one of oligopolies will increase due to the interaction of competitive forces. 
In monopoly, since there is no competition, a higher expected inflation will be able to reduce 
the lower bound of pricing in order for the monopolist to be able to extract the maximum 
amount of consumer surplus as before. 
 
2.4.3. When Theory Meets Reality; Market Operation and Industrial Interpretation 
Following the aforementioned literature, price discrimination can be considered as another 
form of price adjustment determined by firms endogenously. Ghoshal (2000), based on 
Rotemberg and Woodford’s model (1996), formed a sample of 253 4-digit SIC 
manufacturing firms over 1958-2001 in order to test the role of imperfect competition in the 
response of markups to energy and monetary fluctuatuions. A crucial part of this study 
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regards the distinction between the source of cost and demand shocks in order to retrieve a 
more realistic approach of business cycles fluctuations. If markups increase in response to 
demand variations due to cost revaluation, then there may be little or no information 
conveyed by using an overall business cycle indicator. The main findings of this paper 
support that in highly concentrated industries markups increase with monetary expansions 
and fall when energy prices rise in order to keep the real price level in a relatively stable 
state.  
On the other hand, in less concentrated industries markups are not affected either by 
monetary expansions or energy price changes due to the occurrence of competition and 
reflect a stable low price level. Despite that outcome, procyclical markups in highly 
concentrated industries are not being driven by differences in the degree of labour hoarding 
among markets of different type. This result is consistent with Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) 
about the criticism that markups are independent of labour hoarding due to intensive price 
wars when demand is relatively high.  
A similar study was developed by Olive (2004) in order to estimate the degree of 
markups and returns to scale for eight Australian manufacturing sectors along with their 
effects on business cycles. He based his model on a Hall type markup model (Hall et al, 
1986; Hall, 1988, 1990) in order to estimate the industrial markup by avoiding the direct 
calculation of marginal cost. He took into account fixed cross sectional data with time effects 
to investigate the contribution of technological change to industrial growth. The results 
indicated that in six out of eight industries, markups are higher than unity, which validates the 
emergence of market power within these sectors. Constant returns to scales are not rejected; 
however, in some cases, diminishing average cost is very intense according to technological 
growth.  
Bloch and Olive (2003) extended this theory in the segmented manufacturing markets 
of Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States by using an industry pricing 
equation that embodies price-cost margin and profit maximizing behaviour. The estimations 
show that the markup model does not hold for most industries due to intense competition. 
Nevertheless, a fixed low markup is observed in many of them, by suggesting that firms were 
competing in a Cournot game where cooperative behaviour is neglected. Countries facing 
high industrial concentration may have their markups influenced by competing foreign prices, 
resulting in pro-cyclical behaviour. 
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2.5. Recent Contribution in the Theory of Imperfect Markets 
From the most significant papers that have been considered as a benchmark in this field of 
industrial organization and macroeconomics to the most recent contributions, there have been 
quite a few controversial results that vary across industries, based on entrepreneurial 
behaviour. The most recent papers that present a narrow and targeted analysis can summarize 
the aforementioned theoretical outcomes by focusing on strategic interactions within sectors. 
They define the state of competition, the nature of the demand and cost functions. The crucial 
factors that determine and affect such behaviour comprise of the speed of price and cost 
adjustment, the amount of investment that will maintain a stable production process and the 
type of tools that firms will choose to compete with. According to these mechanisms, an 
efficient interpretation can be provided in order to acquire the necessary information about 
the market structure of any industry. 
Asche, Kumbhakar and Tveteras (2008) studied a dynamic profit function with 
adjustment costs to inputs and outputs under the optimization problem. The main interest is 
based on the nature of cost adjustment, whether it is quasi or fully fixed. The estimates 
showed that any disequilibrium in such factors, connected with adjustment costs, influence 
the demand of inputs and the final output level. This happens due to the effect of marginal 
productivity of capital, where the use of an additional capital unit will affect the production 
process.  
Additionally, the empirical results for the United States agricultural industry provided 
evidence that adjustment costs are associated with the production of one output and the use of 
all inputs, while there is no evidence that relates them with any other output. However, the 
estimated profit function includes two outputs (livestock and crop) and three inputs (capital, 
labour and intermediate inputs). This shows that adjustment costs do not always affect the 
whole production process and according to the characteristics of any output or input, their 
relationship may significantly vary.  
A similar study regarding the costs of price adjustment was presented by Olive (2008) 
for the Australian manufacturing sectors over 1994-2002 in order to calculate the speed of 
price adjustment as a function of market power. By estimating a profit function under 
quadratic price adjustment costs, he concluded that large firms have less reason to slow the 
speed of prices, while firms with market power are better able to offset it. The model derived 
focuses on the positive relationship between economies of scale in regard to quadratic price 
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adjustment costs and the speed of price adjustment. By averaging across sectors, the model is 
converted into an error correction model by limiting the restrictions on the short run 
dynamics of the estimating equation. The empirical results suggest that the speed of price 
adjustment at the sectorial level is positively related to the average size of scales for large 
firms and negatively related to industrial concentration. These effects occur because firms try 
to minimize their losses by maintaining a fixed output level through smaller price changes, 
which represents the fact that implicit costs can arise from adjustments in both product and 
input markets. 
The last part of this chapter concerns the estimations of market power and strategic 
interactions within particular industries that provide consistent results with the theory of 
imperfect competition. In the first paper, the market power in the Greek food and beverages 
manufacturing industry was estimated by Rezitis and Kalantzi (2012) by using the conjectural 
variation methodology (Bresnahan, 1982, 1989) over 1983-2007. The estimates are based on 
three approaches; the first one assesses the extent of market power of the whole industry over 
the testing period, the second one tests the degree of market power in each one of the nine 
sectors of the industry and the last one estimates the extent of market power for the whole 
Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry over specific sub-periods. Their interest 
also lies on the net loss of welfare along with the reduction of consumer surplus due to 
income transfer towards firms with oligopolistic or monopolistic power.  
The empirical results of the first and the second approach indicate that a non-
competitive market structure in all nine sectors is present, while the third one suggests that in 
each sub-period, imperfect competition appears to emerge due to some degree of market 
power in the whole industry. As a result, welfare losses are observed, by affecting consumer 
surplus the most. The results also prove that economies of scale are persistent, especially over 
1983-1985 where the degree of market power had reached its climax.  
The second paper involved a similar study for the product (graham crackers) of four 
producing firms that supply a large supermarket chain in Chicago (Kano, 2013). A state 
dependent pricing model was introduced in the presence of menu costs and duopoly strategic 
interactions in which the brands of retail products compete in a pricing dynamic game. The 
estimates of such model are considered to be unbiased compared with the ones resulting from 
a monopolistic competition model due to the fact that a duopoly can take into account the 
strategic interactions between firms. Since price changes can be based on such behaviour 
55 
 
partially justified by the menu cost approach, the estimates are found to give a more profound 
and unbiased outcome for this study.  
The structure of this model assumes that competition takes place between brands, 
while the shelf price level is set by each store separately. This means that pricing decisions at 
the brand level are dominant for the price of graham crackers, but retail stores appear to have 
a degree of discretional power. Based on these features, the estimates support that price 
rigidity in duopoly is more intense than monopolistic competition, while the size of own-
price and cross-price elasticities is crucial in determining how price rigidity is related to the 
level of own and rival price in the state space. As the strategic complementarity grows 
stronger, prices will tend to be more rigid as lagged price levels of both brands are higher. 
Therefore, strategic interactions under intensive price rigidity can be interpreted as a 
collusion outcome in a duopolistic and oligopolistic environment.  
 
2.6. Applying the literature of imperfect competition in the case of Greek markets 
Most of the aforementioned papers reflect the implication of theories of firm behaviour 
within industries that define the structure of competition and the market price level that can 
shape consumer demand. The most important elements that can lead to distortions in 
competitive market behaviour concern the formation of collusion among firms in order to 
attain higher market share. Therefore, they will acquire a degree of oligopolistic power under 
the motive of total profit maximization which will result in a higher portion of individual 
profits than before.  
Another interesting factor concerns the preferences of consumers and their elasticity 
in price changes which can motivate firms to sustain a fixed price level for some time. This 
way, they prevent any fluctuations in order to minimize the loss in the number of consumers 
and thus, minimize any profit losses. This means that when firms face the dilemma of 
whether to raise their prices or not, they have to consider an expected benefit-cost analysis in 
order to see whether the extra revenues from a price increase will overcome the losses by the 
dissatisfied consumers. Instead of treating the reaction of consumers as the main decision 
variable, many firms take into account their cost functions as well which consist of input 
costs, investment decisions and labour contracts. This effect will have an impact on the speed 
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of price adjustment by identifying the degree of price flexibility and market power that has 
been acquired by various industries.  
Furthermore, it is argued that sectors within the manufacturing industry have acquired 
a degree of market power due to the fact that many firms were forced to adopt exit decisions 
as a result of depression. In particular, there is a number of papers that investigate 
competitive conditions by Bourlakis (1992b, 1992c, 1997), Rezitis and Kalantzi (2011a, 
2011b, 2012, 2013) and Polemis (2014). Bourlakis (1992b) examined the relationship and 
effects between profits and market power over time by investigating the degree of correlation 
between concentration and profits. By empoloying industry-level data, the results do not 
support evidence of a systematic relation between those two measures but they indicate that 
more concentrated industries face a higher level of profits. On the other hand, by using firm-
level data, the estimations indicate a positive relation of concentration and profits. The 
empirical estimations imply that, at a large extent, monopolistic or oligopolistic market 
structures reduce consumer surplus. Therefore, the main findings indicate that there is a 
fluctuant level of market power in the Greek manufacturing industry over the period 1958-
1988. 
Additionally, Bourlakis (1997) investigated the competitive conditions in the Greek 
manufacturing industry and specifically, in the Greek food and beverages sector. He 
identified a co-moving pattern emerging between past and present price-cost margins, by 
verifying the presence of market power. A low degree of concentration and barriers to entry 
was also identified, where there is a tendency of general suppression and mobility in price-
cost margin ranks, indicating that disciplinary competitive forces are also at work within the 
manufacturing sectors.  
Another study which is of great importance to this analysis was made by Rezitis and 
Kalantzi (2012, 2013) for the Greek food and beverages industry, by providing evidence of 
market power over the period 1983–2007. In particular, by using Bresnahan’s (1989) 
conjectural variation model, they developed a three step approach: In the first step they 
assessed the extent of market power of the whole industry over the period 1983–2007; in the 
second step they tested the degree of market power in each one of the nine sectors of the 
industry over the whole period; and in the third one they estimated the extent of market 
power for the whole Greek food and beverages manufacturing industry over specific sub-
periods.  
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Rezitis and Kalantzi (2011a, 2011b) also investigated the market structure of the 
Greek food and beverages industry and the manufacturing industry in general, based on the 
Hall-Roeger (1995) approach in order to estimate the price-cost margin. Once more, by 
following a three step procedure as above, they provided evidence that the whole industry, as 
well as each constituent sector, operates under non-competitive conditions over the period 
1984–2007. These papers also identified factors significantly affecting the markup level, such 
as the size of the sector, the number of establishments and labour/capital intensity. In addition, 
Polemis (2014) took into consideration the Hall-Roeger (1995) methodology as well in order 
to investigate the level of market power in the Greek manufacturing industry and services 
over the period 1970-2007. He also supported that the aforementioned industries operate 
under non-competitive conditions, where the services industry is found to be more 
competitive than the manufacturing industry. 
To conclude with, regardless the conditions that can give rise to imperfect competitive 
behaviour, the outcome in every case is the same. On the one hand, prices tend to be rigid in a 
relatively high level compared to the one they should have been, had the prices been flexible. 
On the other hand, industrial activities become very limited and entrepreneurial decisions are 
based initially on the survival of the firm and afterwards, on a set of actions that will attract 
more consumers.  Therefore, based on the previous literature evolution, the best application 
for the current situation in the Greek markets would be to consider all the proposed 
assumptions and remedies under the scope of imperfect competition. 
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Table 1. Summary of the literature of Imperfect Competition and Price Rigidities 
Paper Form of Rigidity Type of Paper Characteristics Mechanism of Rigidity 
 
Cournot Model 
(Cournot, 1838) 
 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Theoretical 
Two firms competing in quantities, 
 
Homogenous products 
Strategic interactions resulting 
in a price level that allows 
positive profits (p
c
>p
pc
) 
General Equilibrium 
Model (Walras, 
1877) 
Nominal 
Flexibility 
Theoretical 
Multiple market/agent equilibrium, 
 
Perfect information about supply 
price 
Flexible price level that always 
equates demand and supply by 
clearing markets 
The Theory of 
Monopolistic 
Competition 
(Chamberlin, 1933) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Theoretical 
Small number of markets with 
imperfect competitive behaviour, 
 
Product differentiation, 
 
Each market is characterized by a 
seller’s monopoly imperfectly 
isolated from the others, 
 
Two demand curves 
Monopolistic competition 
through product differentiation 
(allows positive profits), 
 
Collusion through Joint Profit 
Maximization 
The Theory of 
Imperfect 
Competition 
(Robinson, 1933) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Theoretical 
Unsatisfied customers’ needs can 
coexist along with firms’ excess 
capacity, 
 
Introduction of average and marginal 
cost curves, 
 
Existence of positive profits in 
equilibrium due to a small number of 
entrepreneurs 
Competitive equilibrium profits 
relate with the marginal 
productivity of the 
entrepreneurial ability for the 
industry, 
 
Nominal price level varies 
according to entrepreneurial 
decisions 
 
Administered Price 
Thesis (Means, 
1935a) 
Nominal/Real 
Price Rigidity 
Empirical  
Industrial concentration leads to 
upward aggressive pricing (price 
manipulation), 
 
Sluggish rise of prices during 
booms and even recessions 
A Theory of 
Oligopoly (Stigler, 
1964) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Theoretical 
Homogeneous goods, 
 
Small number of sellers, 
 
Great number of heterogeneous 
buyers, 
 
No entry allowed, 
Heterogeneity of purchases, 
 
Collusion formation 
Monopolistic pricing, 
punishment of any defection due 
to secret price cutting, 
 
Strategic interactions due to 
externalities 
Changes in the 
Recession Behavior 
of Wholesale Prices: 
The l920s and Post- 
World War II 
(Cagan, 1974) 
Nominal/Real 
Price Rigidity 
Empirical  
The growth of firms’ market 
power and the contracts with 
labour unions for sticky wages 
and growing aggregate demand, 
 
Policies of full employment that 
led to high inflation levels 
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(Table 1 continue) 
Market Behaviour 
with Demand 
Uncertainty and 
Price Inflexibility 
(Carlton, 1978) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Theoretical 
Production of a single good, 
 
Inability of some consumers to 
purchase that good, 
 
Excess capacity of a portion of those 
firms that have failed to sell their 
whole stock 
Strategic Interactions, 
 
Entrepreneurial cost decisions, 
 
Demand uncertainty 
Contracts, Price 
Rigidity and Market 
equilibrium 
(Carlton, 1979) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Theoretical 
Production of a single good, 
 
Inability of some consumers to 
purchase that good, 
 
Excess capacity of a portion of those 
firms that have failed to sell their 
whole stock 
Contracts and transaction costs 
between interacting firms or 
agents 
The Rigidity of 
Prices (Carlton, 
1986) 
Nominal/Real 
Price Rigidity 
Empirical 
Lack of information about individual 
actions that reflect transaction prices 
Administered Price Thesis > 
Fixed number of costumers 
 
A Theory of 
Monopolistic Price 
Adjustment (Barro, 
1972) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Theoretical 
One monopolistic seller (price setter), 
 
Many perfectly competitive buyers 
 
Monopolistic Pricing, 
 
Administrative and implicit 
costs that are generated by 
markets’ and not by individual 
actions, 
 
Institutional characteristics 
under which trading occurs  
Monopolistic 
Competition and 
Optimum Product 
Diversity (Dixit and 
Stiglitz, 1977) 
Nominal/Real 
Price Rigidity 
Theoretical 
The production of any commodity  
takes place if the costs can be 
covered by the sum of revenues 
along with an efficient defined 
measure of consumer’s surplus 
Monopolistic Power by 
distorting resources 
Monopolistic 
Competition and the 
Effects of Aggregate 
Demand (Blanchard 
and Kiyotaki, 1987) 
Nominal/Real 
Price Rigidity 
Theoretical 
General Equilibrium model where 
monopolistic competition prevails in 
both goods and labour market 
Monopolistic Competition, 
 
Costly price changes, 
 
Low output due to demand 
externalities 
Degree of 
Monopoly, Indices 
of Concentration 
and Threat of Entry 
(Encaoua and 
Jacquemin, 1980) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Theoretical 
Static and Dynamic model of 
endogenous entry and firm 
cooperation 
Industry Concentration, 
 
Aggregate degree of monopoly 
Industry Structure 
and the Speed of 
Price Adjustment 
(Dixon, 1983) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Empirical  
Administered Price Thesis, 
 
Relationship between the length 
of production lag and the lag 
between changes in unit costs 
and prices, 
 
Resilience of oligopolies to both 
fiscal and monetary shocks 
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Non Cooperative 
Collusion (Green 
and Porter, 1984) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Theoretical 
Collusion formation, 
 
Cournot Competition, Industry 
Stability, 
 
Information about the industry and 
environment is publicly known 
Collusion,-Monopolistic 
Behaviour 
 
Monopolistic Pricing 
A Theory of 
Dynamic Oligopoly 
(Maskin and Tirole, 
1988) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Theoretical 
Infinite horizon duopoly games, 
 
Exogenous reasons for commitment, 
 
Large fixed costs allow only one firm 
to make profits 
Large fixed and sunk costs, 
Monopolistic pricing, 
 
Short- commitment 
Monopolistic Price 
Adjustment and 
Aggregate Output 
(Rotemberg, 1982a) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Theoretical 
Costly price changes, 
 
Monopolists observe their demand 
along with money supply and take 
any other price as given, 
 
Product differentiation 
Menu costs, 
 
Monetary shocks 
Sticky Prices in the 
United States 
(Rotemberg, 1982b) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Empirical  
Menu costs, 
 
Market Power 
Small Menu Costs 
(Mankiw, 1985) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Theoretical 
Simple static monopoly model of 
partial equilibrium in which the 
monopolist sets his price and changes 
it, after the occurrence of a small 
menu cost 
Small menu cost, 
 
Asymmetry in price changes 
during expansions and 
contractions, 
 
Monopolistic Power 
A Supergame of 
Price Wars during 
Booms (Rotemberg 
and Saloner, 1986) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Theoretical 
Prices as strategic variables and 
constant marginal costs, 
 
Oligopolistic structure and how it 
responds to demand fluctuations 
Price wars (strategic 
interactions) occur more during 
booms than recessions > Lower 
degree of price rigidity 
The Relative 
Rigidity of 
Monopolistic 
Pricing (Rotemberg 
and Saloner, 1987) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Theoretical 
Two period model described by an 
unexpected increase in marginal cost 
Fluctuating costs reduce the 
degree of price rigidity, 
 
Demand fluctuations increase 
the degree of price rigidity 
Collusive Price 
Leadership 
(Rotemberg and 
Saloner, 1990) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Theoretical 
Two-firm oligopolistic model; Price 
changes are announced by the first 
firm due to private information 
access about demand fluctuations 
while the second firm follows 
Price leadership due to 
realization of demand 
fluctuations, 
 
No incentives for overt collusion 
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(Table 1 continue) 
Oligopolistic Pricing 
and the Effects of 
Aggregate Demand 
on Economic 
Activity (Rotemberg 
and Woodford, 
1992) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Theoretical 
Dynamic General Equilibrium model 
with endogenous demand and 
production costs, stochastic industry 
demand 
Strategic Interactions, 
 
Sensitivity of demand changes 
on pricing decisions 
 
Markov Perfect 
industry Dynamics 
(Ericson and Pakes, 
1995) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Theoretical 
Industry dynamics with entry and 
exit decisions, 
 
Firm uncertainty generating 
variability in the future of the sector 
Investment Uncertainty, 
 
Strategic Interactions, 
 
Prevent from entry 
Scale economies 
with regard to price 
adjustment costs and 
the speed of price 
adjustment in 
Australian 
manufacturing 
(Olive, 2008) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Empirical 
Quadratic price adjustment cost 
function 
Slow speed of price adjustment 
due to market power 
Menu Costs and 
Strategic 
Interactions (Kano, 
2013) 
Nominal Price 
Rigidity 
Theoretical/Empiri
cal 
Estimation of menu costs in 
oligopolistic competition model 
Menu costs- Costly price 
adjustment 
 
Strategic interactions 
Note: In every model the assumptions of rational expectations and maximizing behaviour hold for every agent. 
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3. A Theoretical Model of Collusive Decisions and Punishment under 
Demand and Cost Uncertainty 
 
3.1. Introduction 
A crucial issue highly significant to both industrial organization and game theory economists 
concerns the formation of collusive contracts among firms in order to reach a desirable 
agreement. Such collusions are formed whenever market participants consider this action 
necessary in order to reach the joint optimal solution, under a set of circumstances and 
constraints they are called to face. The major interest is focused on the nature and the degree 
of implicit collusion that can be sustained through strategic interactions and production 
decisions depending on past and present information about every firm’s actions.  
In the seminal paper A Theory of Oligopoly, Stigler (1964) provided a dynamic 
interpretation of oligopoly theory were firms have to cooperate in order to maximize their 
total profits. Nevertheless, the main attribute of this paper is the fact that Stigler took into 
consideration the long run unsustainability of collusion due to its instability as Nash 
equilibrium by giving birth to incentives for defection under certain circumstances. Therefore, 
in order for such actions to be avoided there must be an endogenously determined “self-
policing” way that will monitor the signed contracts between the participating firms.  
Under product homogeneity and an industry structure immune to entry, Stigler 
focused his interest in secret price cutting. This action is motivated by specific fluctuations in 
markets, such as an unexpected increase of demand for a given price. It provides sufficient 
incentives to participants in breaking the contract with collusion, thus charging a lower price 
level to attract a greater portion of consumers and attain more profits. 
Green and Porter (1984) attempted a direct expansion of Stigler’s original paper by 
reintroducing the assumption of imperfect information. They presented a model where price 
cutting is a rational choice for firms under specific circumstances without defecting from 
their contracting agreement. In particular, they argued that under demand uncertainty, optimal 
incentive equilibrium may involve an episodic recourse to a short-term unprofitable solution 
(i.e. price war). However, under such regime, it cannot be clearly defined whether the 
explaining outcome is the same with the one under certainty. 
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In spite of demand uncertainty, Green and Porter (1984) supported that collusive 
conduct might be characterized by repeated episodes that may result in a reduction in the 
price and profit level. This outcome is triggered by a fall in the observed price of the 
collusion’s goods. This result leaves no place for the view of an industry in which firms are 
acting on abortive attempts to form collusion. 
The objective of the present chapter is to provide a general interpretation of how 
collusions work based on the model presented by Green and Porter (1984). This chapter 
incorporates the proposition of the original model where firms return to collusion after a 
temporary demand shock; however, the present model introduces the choice of punishment as 
a credible strategy whenever such defection occurs. The main intention is to present a point 
of view, under the fact that threat conditions are regarded as credible based on the market 
power that every firm possess; the higher that power is, the more endurable a firm will be. It 
will enter a competitive state as a form of punishment to the ones who have defected from the 
contracts of collusion.  
A major assumption of this model is that the credibility of punishment decisions 
depend on the economic environment and thus, on the behaviour of consumers in the market. 
For instance, in times of low demand (i.e. recession) the threat of punishment is highly 
credible because firms need to coordinate their actions in order to minimize losses. They are 
more reluctant to losses under recession because they may be forced to exit the market. 
Therefore, if any defection occurs under a temporary boom in demand, then a form of 
punishment will be imposed in order to disciple the collusion members and thus, to avoid any 
future unnecessary losses. These restrictions can transform this solution into a sustainable 
equilibrium by changing the payoffs of every player and providing them an efficient outcome, 
compared with the one acquired by the non-cooperative solution.  
Consequently, this form of equilibrium that consists of either collusive or punishment 
decisions reflects the mechanisms through which collusive agreements may result in nominal 
price rigidity. If firms decide to sustain a collusive agreement over a time period, then the 
nominal price level in that particular market will remain rigid. On the other hand, if for some 
reason a form of punishment is bestowed, then the nominal price level will change but still, it 
will remain rigid for some time. This means that no matter the state of equilibrium according 
to the decisions of the participants, the price level will remain rigid. This is the theoretical 
intuition under which market imperfections through collusive agreements result in nominal 
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price rigidity. This is the first step of the theoretical relationship between market power and 
rigid price levels which will be tested in chapter 6. 
The main argument consists of two parts; the first one provides a description of the 
collusion structure that is about to be studied in terms of industry conduct. The second one 
shows that even if collusive conduct results in reversionary episodes as a rational choice in 
which price and profit levels sharply decrease, as was shown by Green and Porter (1984), 
firms may prefer to bestow a form of punishment upon collusion participants
5
. However, a 
high degree of future uncertainty may render a number of firms unable to undertake such 
reversionary actions due to cost factors appreciation, even over the period of competition. 
This means that their costs might unexpectedly rise by leading to a forced price increase as a 
result of a marginal cost increase. As a result, this will render the products of such firms 
unattractive, given that their competitors will continue to charge a competitive price. 
Another reason may be the very case that is neglected by the fact that cost functions 
are publicly observed. If firms are able to observe the cost functions of their rivals, including 
all the elements such as production costs, investment and debt or liabilities, then they will 
have the incentives to charge a competitive price by creating a reversionary episode for the 
collusion when they face the lowest total cost. If expectations about their future net profit 
position are optimistic, then this action will force the remaining firms to charge competitive 
price levels as well. Therefore, if expectations are not falsified, the strongest firm(s) will 
survive in the long-run by forcing the remaining to exit the sector. This fact will provide 
monopolistic power to the remaining firm(s) by increasing its (their) profits and depreciate 
the losses imposed by competition in very short time. 
 
3.2.Collusive Decisions under Demand and Cost Uncertainty  
The model that will be studied is based on the fact that demand and cost fluctuations are not 
directly observed by other firms which may lead to unstable industry performance. The main 
structure reflects a market sector in which demand is deteriorating due to a slump in 
aggregate consumption. When firms notice that their profits are rapidly decreasing, they will 
choose to undertake an act of collusion in order to both secure their short-term profits and 
maximize their long-term expected returns as well, over the time horizon.  
                                                          
5
 This form of punishment is similar with the one proposed by Rotemberg and Wootford (1992). 
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The model consists of a super game defined by firms’ actions according to their 
incentives and the signals they receive from the market environment. They choose to compete 
under Bertrand behaviour by identifying a “trigger quantity” which may motivate firms to 
enter a reversionary episode. The time horizon includes k=0,1,2,…K time periods and 
t=0,1,2,…T time sub-periods. Sub time periods denote whether collusion is in a normal or a 
reversionary state, while time periods denote the decisions of collusion. Such decisions may 
refer to an outcome similar to Green and Porter’s or an outcome of punishment based on 
future uncertainty. Specifically, Green and Porter argued that it is optimal for all firms to 
enter a reversionary episode which is triggered by an observed price reduction (Cournot 
behaviour) as long as “the marginal return to a firm from increasing its production in normal 
periods is offset exactly by the marginal increase in risk of suffering a loss in returns by 
triggering a reversionary episode” (1984: p.93). In addition, since product homogeneity along 
with an accurate realization of competitors’ cost functions hold, then there will be no need for 
punishment. 
The main intention of this chapter is to overcome the assumption of fully observing 
competitors’ cost functions and by adding the element of uncertainty and speculation, to 
render the option of punishment credible. The industry that this model might appropriately 
describe is characterized by four features. 
 First, the industry is assumed to be stable over time by rendering any expectation 
made to be rational based on the available information that firms are called to use. 
This assumption is necessary in order for this model to result in temporary stability. 
 Second, the decision variable is the relative price set by firms which leads to Bertrand 
competition
6
.  
 Third, there is private information about cost decisions which sets uncertainty as a 
crucial factor of forming or deviating from collusion
7
. Therefore, an accurate idea can 
be formed regarding only the production costs of their competitors. 
 Fourth, the set of information that firms use to monitor whether the collusion is in a 
collusive (normal) or reversionary state has to be imperfectly correlated with their 
                                                          
6
 It is assumed that quality improvement during this game remains the same due to restrictions in investment, 
but differentiation in products exists, because of the set of actions undertaken over the periods prior to the slump 
in demand. 
7
 Despite the fact that the Nash equilibrium assumption presupposes that firms have an accurate idea of their 
competitors’ cost functions, private knowledge renders very difficult for variables such as quality investment or 
liabilities to be observed. 
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conduct. This means that no direct compliance is allowed because reversion would 
never occur.  
 
3.3.The Model 
As mentioned above, a game of K periods and T sub-periods is assumed that incorporates the 
decisions and strategic interactions of the participating firms. The game starts at k=0, t=0 
when it is assumed that the participants form collusion and charge a price level which 
maximizes their joint profits. Consider an oligopoly of N firms which produce a differentiated 
product in a stationary and time separable environment, like the one described by Friedman 
(1971). It is assumed that if i=1,2,…,N indicates the number of firms, then πi: R
2
+ → R is the 
return function of firm i and πi=πi(pi,qi), where pi is the set of price decisions and qi is the 
output produced corresponding to quantity demanded for a certain price level (expressed in 
logarithms). If β is the discount factor and firms are assumed to be risk neutral, then they are 
called to maximize their long-run value function E[∑ 𝛽𝑘
∞
𝑘=0
∑ 𝛽𝑡𝜋𝑖(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑞𝑖)]
∞
𝑡=0
. 
The observed demand function is given by  
1
( ) ( ) ( )i i i
bd it t it
it i
t it t t
P M Z
Q A
P I P P
 

                                                                                                        (1) 
where  
 Ai, is a constant that captures any shock in demand 
 Pit: R+→ R+, is the relative price charged by firms 
 Pt: R+→ R+ is the industry’s aggregate price level 
 ( )t
it t
M
I P
is the wealth effect or the realization of liquidity from the public 
 ( )it
t
Z
P
is the expected/undertaken investment in product quality 
      In this point, as denoted by Green and Porter (1984), it is assumed that firms choose their 
strategies from an infinite sequence si=(si0, si1, si2,….) where si0 is a determinate initial price 
level pi0, and sit+1: R+
t+1→R+ determines i's price level at time t+1 as a function of past output 
produced by sit+1(q0,…,qt)=pit+1. Also, it is assumed that a price decision taken at time t is 
dependent on past pricing decisions formed by both j competitors and firm i, thus confirming 
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the assumption of rational choices, where pit=pit(pi0,pi1,….,pit-1,pj0, pj1,…., pjt-1) and pjt 
indicates the pricing decisions of competitors.  
            A strategy profile (s1,…, sn) determines recursively a stochastic process of output, 
which in turn induces a probability distribution on the space of infinite sequences of such 
variable. Expectations with respect to this distribution will be denoted by
1 ,..., ns s
E . This means 
that a Nash Equilibrium is a strategy profile (s1*,…, sn*) that satisfies 
   
𝐸𝑠1,…,𝑠𝑛[∑ 𝛽
𝑡𝜋𝑖(𝑠𝑖𝑡(𝑞0, … , 𝑞𝑡−1), 𝑞𝑡)] ≤
∞
𝑡=0
 𝐸𝑠1∗,…,𝑠𝑛∗[∑ 𝛽
𝑡𝜋𝑖(𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗(𝑞0, … , 𝑞𝑡−1), 𝑞𝑡)]
∞
𝑡=0
⇔ 
𝐸𝑠1,…,𝑠𝑛[∑ 𝛽
𝑘𝑛
𝑘=0
∑ 𝛽𝑡𝜋𝑖
𝑘(𝑠𝑖𝑡(𝑞0, … , 𝑞𝑡−1), 𝑞𝑡) ≤
∞
𝑡=0
     
𝐸𝑠1∗,…,𝑠𝑛∗[∑ 𝛽
𝑘∞
𝑘=0
∑ 𝛽𝑡𝜋𝑖
𝑘(𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗(𝑞0, … , 𝑞𝑡−1), 𝑞𝑡)]
∞
𝑡=0
                                                                               (2) 
for all firms i and feasible strategies sit, where πi
k 
indicates the profit level at time k. 
On this basis, firms start their production at k=0, t=0 under a commonly accepted 
price when the slump in demand persists. The reasoning behind this process is based on the 
degree of influence each firm possesses. The higher that degree is, the higher the amount of 
output produced by that firm will be. As long as quantity demanded remains under a 
threshold ?̂?𝑘 (the value of ?̂? at time k) which is commonly accepted by all participants as the 
“trigger quantity” that will result in Bertrand competition, collusion is sustained and firms 
keep on charging a common price level. If for some reason, this threshold is overcome due to 
improvement in demand conditions, like an expansionary policy that bolsters aggregate 
income or demand, then at least one firm will reduce its price to the competitive level, by 
leaving no other option to the rest but to follow such action. 
In this model, the element of uncertainty does not provide an outcome based on 
mutual trust. In fact, three cases emerge after the increase of the observed quantity demanded 
above the trigger threshold; the first is the one where the trust of collusion is not broken and 
thus, firms return to charging the initial price level; the second declares a crumble in the 
relationship of the collusion members that leads to a new collusion under which the price 
level charged is lower than the initial one; the last reflects a complete lost in trust which leads 
to an infinite Bertrand competition for k=1,2,…, K where the strongest firm(s) will survive. 
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3.4.Profit Functions in Normal and Reversionary Period 
Initially, assume that p
k
={p1
k,….,pN
k
} is a profile of monopolistic pricing choices for each 
firm and p
Bk
={p1
Bk,….,pN
Bk
} is a Bertrand pricing profile. For simplicity, the case for k=0 will 
be considered. An output level ?̂?𝑚 is chosen along with a length of time t to be normal if (i) 
t=0 or (ii) t-1 was normal and ?̂?𝑘≥ qt-1
dk
 or (iii) t-T was normal and qt-T
dk 
>?̂?𝑘,where qt
dk
= 
qt
dk
(pt
k
)  indicates the observed demand function for time k. For any other case, define t to be 
reversionary. Each firm faces a pricing strategy set  
                𝑝𝑖
𝑚, if t is normal under no punishment in effect 
  𝑝𝑡 =     𝑝𝑖
1, if t is normal under punishment in effect 
                𝑝𝑖
𝐵, if t is reversionary 
It is optimal for firms to charge a fixed common price ?̅?𝑘8 in normal periods and  𝑝𝐵𝑘 
in reversionary periods. The analysis starts from the first collusion.  The joint expected profits 
that firms have to maximize for k=0 are given by 
    
𝜋𝑡
𝑚 = ∑ 𝛾𝑖 = 𝑝?̅?
𝑚𝑞𝑡
𝑑𝑚(
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑝?̅?
𝑚, 𝑧𝑡) − ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑡(𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑚, 𝑙𝑖𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1                                                          (3)   
where 
?̅?𝑡
𝑚 = 𝑝𝑡 = ∑
𝜓𝑖
∑ 𝜓𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑚
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                                                                                                       (4)9 
    
𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑚 =
𝜓𝑖
∑ 𝜓𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑞𝑡
𝑚                                                                                                                   (5) 
   
𝑞𝑡
𝑚 = 𝑞𝑡
𝑑𝑚(?̅?𝑡
𝑚, 𝑧𝑡) = ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑚𝑁
𝑖=1                                                                                                                 (6) 
The variable qit
p
 corresponds to the quantity produced by firm i, qt
dm
= qt
dm
(?̅?𝑡
𝑚, 𝑧𝑡) refers to 
the observed demand function of the collusion at k=0, t=0, qt
m
 is the observed quantity 
demanded for price ?̅?𝑚, 𝑧𝑡 denotes a vector of determinants of collusion’s demand curve, 𝑙𝑖𝑡 
refers to a vector of cost determinants for each individual firm i, and 𝜓𝑖  reflects the influence 
that firm i possesses in the operating sector. Therefore, for the last factor holds that  
                                                          
8
 The common price charged by collusion at time k=0 is denoted by ?̅?𝑚. 
9
 See Rotemberg (1982a). 
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∑
𝜓𝑖
∑ 𝜓𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
= 1
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                                                                                                                                (7) 
where 𝜃𝑖 =
𝜓𝑖
∑ 𝜓𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 is the weighted average of individual production in collusion 
10
. 
      The expected profits of individual firm i participating in collusion are given by 
 
𝛾𝑖𝑡(?̅?
𝑚) = ?̅?𝑚
𝜓𝑖
∑ 𝜓𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑𝑚(?̅?𝑚, 𝑧𝑡) − 𝑐𝑖𝑡(
𝜓𝑖
∑ 𝜓𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑞𝑡
𝑚, 𝑙𝑖𝑡)                                                                    (8) 
However, if production is increased beyond the threshold point by an individual firm (due to 
an increase in observed demand), then that firm will start charging a competitive Bertrand 
price 𝑝𝑖
𝐵 by forcing the remaining N-1 firms to follow such strategy as well. Under Bertrand 
competition, the expected profits for each firm are given by 
𝛿𝑖𝑡(𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝐵) = 𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑑(𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝐵, 𝑧𝑖𝑡) − 𝑐𝑖𝑡(𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑝, 𝑙𝑖𝑡)                                                                                         (9) 
where qit
Bp
 corresponds to the quantity produced by firm i when charging pi
B
. 
 
3.5.Definition of Value Functions 
Let Vi
m
(
m
p ) be the expected discounted present value of firm i if 𝑝𝑖
𝑚 = ?̅?𝑚 in normal periods. 
Let also Pr(.) denote probability with respect to the distribution of 𝜃𝑖which follows the same 
properties as 𝜓𝑖 , dependent on demand shocks. Also, Prb(.) denotes the probability with 
discrete density that defines the volume of output produced in every sub-period t. If it is also 
assumed that γi(pi
m
)>δi(pi
B
), the value function for each firm satisfies the following equation 
  
𝑉𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑚 = ?̅?𝑚) = 𝛾𝑖(?̅?
𝑚) + 𝛽Pr (𝑞𝑑𝑚 ≤ ?̂?𝑚)𝑉𝑖
𝑚(?̅?𝑚) 
                           +Pr (𝑞𝑑𝑚 > ?̂?𝑚)(𝑃𝑟𝑏(𝑞𝑝 = 𝑞𝐵𝑝))𝑇−1𝑃𝑟𝑏(𝑞𝑝 = 𝜃𝑖𝑞
𝑚)[∑ 𝛽𝑡𝛿𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝐵) + 𝛽𝑇𝑉𝑖
𝑚]𝑇−1𝑡=1  
                             +Pr (𝑞𝑑𝑚 > ?̂?𝑚)(𝑃𝑟𝑏(𝑞𝑝 = 𝑞𝐵𝑝))𝑇−1𝑃𝑟𝑏(𝑞𝑝 = 𝜃𝑖
1𝑞1)[∑ 𝛽𝑡𝛿𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝐵) + 𝛽𝑇𝑉𝑖
1]𝑇−1𝑡=1  
                             +Pr (𝑞𝑑𝑚 > ?̂?𝑚)(𝑃𝑟𝑏(𝑞𝑝 = 𝑞𝐵𝑝))𝑇−1𝑃𝑟𝑏(𝑞𝑝 = 𝑞𝐵𝑝)[∑ 𝛽𝑡𝛿𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝐵)]𝑇𝑡=1                 (10) 
                                                          
10
 This factor can also be viewed as the degree of market power of firm i. 
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The first term of the right hand side reflects the returns that every firm i expect to 
receive if the agreement for charging a fixed price level ?̅?𝑚 persists, as long as the quantity 
demanded threshold is not overcome. The remaining three terms capture the implications of 
deviating from the pre-agreed price level due to an increase in observed demand. Specifically, 
the second term reflects the assumption presented by Green and Porter where Cournot 
(Bertrand in this case) competition persists for T-1 sub-periods and in time T collusion reverts 
back in charging the initial monopolistic price level. The third term provides the first form of 
punishment; after competing in Bertrand terms for T-1 sub-periods, most of the firms believe 
that such behaviour will be repeated. In order to punish such actions by minimizing 
intertemporal expected occurring losses, they agree in forming another collusion under which 
they charge a price level ?̅?1 < ?̅?𝑚. This action materializes because even if at least one firm 
starts charging 𝑝𝑖
𝐵, the participants will not be able to identify that firm because all of them 
will adopt the same strategy almost instantaneously.  
This assumption may not accurately correspond to reality, but it is of great help to this 
analysis for emerging its dynamic elements. If firms could observe the one who would be 
deviating every single time, then they could adopt various strategies. They could either 
bestow penalties on this firm, or if the deviating firm had higher market power than the rest, 
all of them would be forced to charge competitive prices, where in the long-run only the 
strongest firm would survive. This effect is captured by the last term of this equation. It 
indicates a complete breakdown in collusion agreements and gives the signal for an all-out 
competition among participants, thus rendering any agreement about future collusion 
impossible. 
Another difference from the original paper concerns the probability that determines 
the volume of output produced. It will be set as 𝑟𝑘+1 = (𝑃𝑟𝑏(𝑞
𝑝 = 𝑞𝑖
𝐵𝑘))𝑇−1the probability 
which shows how long Bertrand competition will last. In the original paper, it is assumed that 
𝑟1(𝑃𝑟𝑏(𝑞
𝑝 = 𝑞𝑖
𝑝𝑘)) = 1 and thus, the duration of charging a competitive price is determined 
only by Pr (𝑞𝑑𝑚 > ?̂?𝑚). In the present case, the duration of such competition is determined 
by 𝑟1(Pr(𝑞
𝑑𝑚 > ?̂?𝑚)) and according to firm decisions of how they will respond in time T, 
their strategy is given by 𝑃𝑟𝑏(𝑞𝑝 = 𝜃𝑖𝑞
𝑚) if they choose to return to the initial collusion; 
𝑃𝑟𝑏(𝑞𝑝 = 𝜃𝑖
1𝑞1)  if they choose to form another collusion; and 𝑃𝑟𝑏(𝑞𝑝 = 𝑞𝑖
𝐵𝑝)  if they 
choose not to cooperate. For this reason holds that  
71 
 
𝑟1[𝑃𝑟𝑏(𝑞
𝑝 = 𝜃𝑖𝑞
𝑚) + 𝑃𝑟𝑏(𝑞𝑝 = 𝜃𝑖
1𝑞1) + 𝑃𝑟𝑏(𝑞𝑝 = 𝑞𝑖
𝐵𝑝)] = 1                                                      (11) 
      In this point, by taking logarithms of (1) at k=0, t=0, it follows that 
1( ) ( )
m m
d
it i i t it i itq a m p z p
                                                                                                    (12) 
In this equation, it is seen that the real price effect of this sector is not taken into 
consideration since every firm charges the same nominal price level and acts like a 
monopolist whose products do not have any substitutes
11
. This means that elasticity bi will be 
fixed responding to the agreed price level and won’t impose any changes in demand for the 
output of collusion. Intuitively, this outcome is consistent with the assumptions of this model 
because (12) indicates that a change in demand will take place only if there is a change in μi 
or ζi
1
 that can occur due to fluctuations in the liquidity capacity of the public or the quality of 
investment. Either way, a change in observed demand does not result from a change in the 
elasticity of demand with respect to nominal price. Since it has been assumed that production 
always corresponds to the level of observed demand, it holds that 
𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑝 = 𝜃𝑖𝑞𝑡
𝑚 ⇔ 𝑞𝑡
𝑚 = 𝑞𝑡
𝑑𝑚(?̅?𝑚, 𝑧𝑡) =
𝑎𝑖+𝜇𝑖(𝑚𝑡−𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝜆−?̅?𝑚)+𝜁𝑖
1(𝑧𝑖𝑡−?̅?
𝑚)
𝜃𝑖
                        (13) 
 
Based on the assumptions made for Pr(.), it holds that 
𝑃𝑟(𝑞𝑑𝑚 ≤ ?̂?𝑚) = Pr (
𝑎𝑖+𝜇𝑖(𝑚𝑡−𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝜆−?̅?𝑚)+𝜁𝑖
1(𝑧𝑖𝑡−?̅?
𝑚)
?̂?𝑚
≤ 𝜃𝑖) = 1 − 𝐹(
𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑑
?̂?𝑚
)                                 (14) 
The last element of this analysis corresponds to the incentives of punishment. In order 
for such action to be credible, all firms must abandon a Pareto optimal condition and choose a 
different one, less preferable than the initial. This means that the expected profits and the 
expected value from an action of punishment must be less than the initial expected returns 
from collusion. For this reason, since it has already been assumed that γi(pi
m
)>δi(pi
B
), it must 
also hold that 
1
1( ) ( ) 0
m
m
i iV p V p  . If (10), (11) and (14) are substituted in this inequality it 
holds that 
                                                          
11
 It holds because ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 𝑝𝑡  (see equation 4). 
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                                     (15) 
The first and the second term of the right hand side is the same as in the model of 
Green and Porter. They indicate the single-period gain in returns to colluding plus the 
expected discounted value of firm i in Bertrand environment. This was the sum of the value 
of firm i when there was no punishment. In this model, expression (15) reflects the fact that 
the value function includes an extra element; the expected gain in entering an infinite 
Bertrand competition for more than one periods or for the rest of the game. If the right hand 
side is greater than the form of punishment under which firms create a new collusion with 
lower price (i.e. 𝑉𝑖
1(?̅?1)), then firms will have the incentives not to choose this new form of 
punishment. 
Specifically, (15) provides the main outcome of this paper. The act of punishment 
indicates the risk that firms may be willing to take in order to discipline their collusion. If 
most of them are determined to sustain such collusion in the long-run to secure and form a 
strong arsenal against future uncertainty, then they may also be willing to force such 
punishment upon the colluding firms. This action can minimize any unnecessary losses and 
keep the firms on operating by both ensuring their survival and effort to recover their losses 
after the emerged slump in demand. In addition, the act of punishment is a way of exploiting 
the weakest firms by revealing their cost elements through their inability to keep on operating 
under a lower price level. This way, the remaining members of the collusion and especially 
the ones on the margin of operating under the new price level, will be forced to abide by the 
contracted rules.  
Therefore, if firms intend to impose a form of punishment, they will have to maximize 
the gap between the two forms of collusion at k=0 and k=1 and thus, by substituting (2) in 
(15) it is obtained 
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1
1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
m
m m m
i i i i i iV p V p V p V p                                                                                                        (16) 
The first-order partial derivative for (16) is 
𝜗[𝑉𝑖
𝑚(𝑝𝑖
𝑚)−𝑉𝑖
1(𝑝𝑖
1)]
𝜗𝑝𝑖
𝑚  =0 for every firm i. 
So, it holds that 
0= '
1[(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Pr( )] ( )
d d
B mi i
i i im m
q q
F r F q p
q q
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𝜗𝑉𝑖
1(𝑝𝑖
1)
𝜗𝑝𝑖𝑚
                                                                                                                        (17) 
where  ' 11 ( )[ ( 1) ( 1)]
d
i t it
i im m m m
i i
q m z
F
p pq q
  
 
   
 
and 𝛾𝑖
′(𝑝𝑖
𝑚) =
𝜗𝛾𝑖
𝜗𝑝𝑖
𝑚 
Equation (17) states that the marginal return to a firm from reducing its price in 
normal periods (𝛾𝑖
′(𝑝𝑖
𝑚)) must be equal to the sum of (i) the marginal increase in risk of 
suffering a loss in returns (𝛾𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑚) − 𝛿𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝐵)), (ii) the discounted expected profits from 
maintaining an infinite Bertrand competition (
𝛿𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝐵)
1−𝛽
 ) and (iii) the marginal value from 
entering a new collusion by triggering a reversionary episode
12
. Without (ii) and (iii), this 
equation reflects the incentives of charging a lower price level when observed demand is 
increased beyond the trigger quantity and subsequently, return to the initial collusion. In the 
present model, it reflects the incentives of participants to punish any defection from the initial 
collusion. The only term that has further to be defined is the expected marginal value of a 
new collusion under a change in pi
m
. If a similar function like Vi
m
 is assumed, then the 
                                                          
12 If this equation holds, then the participants will be indifferent in choosing between the alternative forms of 
punishment. 
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decision variable that would affect 𝑉𝑖
1, would be the price set ?̅?1 under which firms are called 
to set a new fixed price ?̅?1 < ?̅?𝑚.  
Equation (17) reflects the set of strategies that firms have in their disposal in order to 
exploit the benefits of collusion and maximize their intertemporal gains. The form of 
punishment in forming new collusions will not be adopted, only when individual profits from 
collusion k are equal or slightly less than the ones under Bertrand competition (for k=0, the 
initial monopoly m holds). This means that firms will stop adopting the first form of 
punishment as long as  𝑝𝑖
𝑘 = 𝑝𝑖
𝐵𝑘 and 
𝛾𝑖
𝑘(𝑝𝑖
𝑘) ≤ 𝛿𝑖
𝑘(𝑝𝑖
𝐵𝑘) ⇔ 𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝜃𝑖
𝑘𝑞𝑘 − 𝑐𝑖(𝑞𝑖
𝑝) ≤ 𝑝𝑖
𝐵𝑘𝑞𝑖
𝐵𝑘 − 𝑐𝑖(𝑞𝑖
𝐵𝑝) 
                                              ⇔ 𝑝𝑖
𝑘 ≤
𝑐𝑖(𝑞𝑖
𝐵𝑝)−𝑐𝑖(𝑞𝑖
𝑝)
𝑞𝑖
𝐵𝑘−𝜃𝑖
𝑘𝑞𝑘
                                                                                 (18) 
The right hand side of (18) indicates the difference between the risk in average cost 
that firm i will undertake under Bertrand competition and the benefit in average cost that firm 
i faces if the choice of producing 𝜃𝑘𝑞𝑘 is maintained without defecting from collusion. As 
long as the price choice falls below that difference, then it pays no more to use as a method of 
punishment (or sustain) the formation of a new collusion by charging a lower common price 
because 𝑝𝑖
𝑘 ≤ 𝑝𝑖
𝐵 = 𝑚𝑐𝑖, thus signaling negative profits. 
 
3.6.Concluding Remarks 
According to such results, there are two final observations about the formal model of 
collusion under demand and cost uncertainty. First, the higher the operating cost of individual 
firm i, the lower the incentives of deviating from collusion will be. However, given the fact 
that collusion cannot observe the sequence of firms that cause a reversionary episode, then if 
a form of punishment is chosen, the weakest firms will be the first to face the consequences. 
On the other hand, if some of the firms with a high 𝜓𝑖  value are expected to deviate, then 
Bertrand competition will be chosen. This happens because the degree of distrust among 
firms overcomes the degree of profit loss due to uncertainty. In equilibrium, the frequency of 
a reversionary episode to occur is given by 𝐹(
𝑞𝑖
𝑑
?̂?𝑚
). 
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Second, firms know that a higher observed demand level does not reflect 
simultaneous low pricing strategies by competitors. Consequently, it is rational for them to 
participate in reversionary episodes as long as there is belief that no punishment will occur
13
. 
A reversionary episode is just a temporary switch to Nash equilibrium in non-contingent 
strategies. It would not pay any firm to deviate unilaterally from its Nash strategy in this 
temporary situation as was presented by the original paper. This behaviour is expressed by 
equation (17) and as long as it is satisfied, firms will be able to choose a form of punishment 
as the optimal reaction. This strategy may be adopted even if entering a reversionary episode 
was the optimal choice, as it would be suggested if the terms of punishment 
𝛿𝑖
1−𝛽
 and 
𝜕𝑉𝑖
1(𝑝𝑖
1)
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑚   
were excluded. 
The structure of this model has tested a more general case, as well as provided a 
general outcome compared to the one of Green and Porter by trying to provide a degree of 
convergence between theory and reality. Some of the assumptions may still have quite a 
significant gap from reality, but the main point was to formulate a model of rational strategic 
choices consistent with Nash equilibrium where punishment is taken into account. In marked 
contrast, such actions play an essential role in maintaining an ongoing scheme of collusive 
incentives.  
The traditional views would predict the transience of collusion in a market marked by 
these episodes of price instability, and a breakdown of collusion at the beginning of 
competition by eliminating such effect. However, this model suggests that industries under 
certain structural characteristics will exhibit demand and industry fluctuations as a feature of 
a stable, time-stationary pattern of output if the operating firms are colluding
14
.  
The theoretical rationale reflected by this model will be incorporated in the empirical 
research presented over the following chapters in order to capture market factors that affect 
pricing decisions. The demand function will be used to identify how various measures 
influence the manufacturing production and the market power indicators. These indicators 
can either verify or reject the persistence of production decisions below the equilibrium level 
of competition. This theoretical intuition will be investigated for the 3-digit Greek 
manufacturing sectors along with the fact of whether the speed of price adjustment to 
                                                          
13
 This outcome corresponds to the one proposed by Green and Porter (1984). 
14 See Appendix B1 for the stochastic process of output which arises in the equilibrium of the model.  
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equilibrium is affected by relevant measures that may result in long-run nominal price 
rigidity. 
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4. Model Formulation and Data Variables of Empirical Investigation 
The literature review of market imperfections and price rigidity utilizes a range of empirical 
tools in order to reach a conclusion that illustrates the relationship between market power 
acquisition and rigid pricing decisions. The degree of market power has been expressed both 
in terms of production (Bresnahan, 1982) and pricing decisions (Hall, 1988; Roeger, 1995) 
along with the degree of price rigidity reflected by the speed of convergence to the state of 
equilibrium (Dixon, 1983). As a result, the first measure is going to be taken into 
consideration in the empirical analysis of this study given its formulation and its significance 
on the theoretical concept presented in chapter 3
15
.  
 In particular, it is useful to identify whether imperfect competition exists in the Greek 
manufacturing sectors in terms of production decisions. It is expected that if firms exercise 
their market power then this measure will provide evidence of imperfect competitive conduct. 
However, if there exist exogenous factors, such as government taxation, that distort the 
competitive price level, then there may be evidence of sluggish and over-pricing behaviour 
but the production-based indicator might not suggest the same outcome.  
 For this reason, the estimation of the speed of price adjustment will provide evidence 
of whether nominal price rigidity persists in the Greek manufacturing sectors and if so, how 
market power influences this particular outcome. This means that pricing decisions may not 
incorporate changes in the costs of production given the degree of market power exercised by 
a particular sector or firm. In this case, it is expected that a positive relationship will emerge 
by verifying the fact that nominal price rigidity is associated with market power. 
Consequently, this chapter will present the formulation and implementation of those 
measures in the Greek manufacturing sectors in order to test the theoretical intuition that 
nominal price rigidity is caused by market power acquisition. 
In this chapter, the model formulation of the conjectural variation methodology and 
the speed of price adjustment concept will be presented. The empirical investigation is 
conducted in a four step analysis by taking into consideration 56 3-digit NACErev2 level 
manufacturing sectors over the period 1980-2012 in the Greek economy. Each step will be 
                                                          
15
 The price-cost margin approach of Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) was not included in this study as the effect 
of inputs on pricing decisions is reflected by the pricing equation (see section 4.1.2). 
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discussed separately and a thorough description of the underlying methodology and 
techniques will be developed. 
 In particular, the first step consists of an analysis for the whole Greek manufacturing 
industry by considering the aggregate effect of the constituent manufacturing sectors. This 
means that aggregated sectorial effects can reflect the behaviour of the whole manufacturing 
industry and thus, provide an interpretation of the market structure and the degree of price 
rigidity over the sample period. As a result, the indicators of conjectural variation and speed 
of adjustment will be estimated for the Greek manufacturing industry overall by 
incorporating the individual effects originating from the manufacturing sectors. 
 The second step, disaggregates the analysis to a 3-digit level by estimating the results 
of market power and price rigidity for each manufacturing sector individually. A range of 
panel estimation techniques will be employed in order to obtain such estimates that will 
incorporate pricing and production decisions that may lead to imperfect competitive conduct. 
 The third step, on the other hand, aggregates once again the effects of the 
manufacturing sectors in order to observe the overall behaviour of the manufacturing 
industry. However, the estimation process is conducted for each year individually over the 
period 1980-2012. This means that the behaviour of the Greek manufacturing industry will be 
estimated for each year by investigating whether production and pricing decisions resulted in 
market power acquisition and sluggish adjustment to equilibrium. 
 The fourth and last step concerns the main implication of this study which refers to 
the relationship between nominal price rigidity and market power. In particular, one equation 
is going to be estimated. It takes into consideration how the speed of price adjustment is 
affected by the degree of market power exercised by the manufacturing sectors along with 
their production costs. This is the most important objective of this study concerning the 
relationship between nominal price rigidity and market power by either verifying or rejecting 
the effects of profitability and leadership (Bedrossian and Moschos, 1988; Olive, 2008). 
Therefore, those steps are going to be discussed in this chapter in order to identify whether 
imperfect conduct and sluggish pricing decisions persist both in the manufacturing industry 
and the individual manufacturing sectors. 
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4.1. First Step: Assessment of the Greek Manufacturing Industry 
 
4.1.1. The Conjectural Variation Approach 
In this section, the methodology on the techniques of investigating the conditions of 
imperfect competition is introduced, as aforementioned in the literature. To begin with, the 
first approach used in this study in order to investigate the degree of market power in the 
Greek manufacturing industry was developed by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982), as 
expanded by Bresnahan (1989). This approach corresponds to the conjectural variation model 
of competition, where firms within an industry are assumed to face an inverse demand 
function 𝑝 = 𝑝(𝑦, 𝑧) with  𝑌 = ∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 , where 𝑝 is the output price, yi represents the quantity 
supplied by firm i and z is a vector of exogenous factors affecting the demand curve. 
             By also assuming a profit function of the form  
( , ) ( , )i i i i ip Y z y C y w                                                                                                                               (19) 
where Ci is the cost function of firm i and wi is a vector of input prices for firm i, the first 
order condition of profit maximization for (19) is given as: 
( , ) 0i ii
i i i
Cp Y
p Y z y
y Y y y
  
   
   
                                                                                                        (20) 
In order to get the expression of conjectural variation elasticity, (20) has to be re-arranged 
into 
𝑝−𝑀𝐶𝑖
𝑝
= −(
𝜗𝑝
𝜗𝑌
𝑌
𝑝
) (
𝜗𝑌
𝜗𝑦𝑖
𝑦𝑖
𝑌
) = −
𝑓𝑖
ℎ
                                                                                           (21) 
where MCi is the marginal cost of firm i, ℎ ≡ (
𝜗𝑌
𝜗𝑝
𝑝
𝑌
) < 0 denotes the elasticity of industrial 
output demand with respect to price and ( )
i
i
i
yY
f
y Y

 

 represents the conjectural variation of 
firm i by indicating the reaction of industry output to a change in individual firms’ output 
decisions as a measure of competition. A value of fi equal to zero for all firms means that the 
industry is under conditions of perfect competition, while a value of one indicates a 
monopolistic market. When fi ranges over zero and one, it is assumed that conditions of 
Cournot oligopoly for the industry are implied.  
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             According to Bresnahan (1989), if equation (21) is multiplied by yi/Ci, by summing 
over every firm i and rearranging the terms, the supply function for the whole industry is 
obtained 
(1 )y d
f
S MC
h
                                                                                                                                            (22) 
where Sy is the ratio of aggregate revenues to total cost, MCd is the industry weighted 
marginal cost, 
𝑝−𝑀𝐶𝑑
𝑝
= −
𝑓
ℎ
 and f indicates the conjectural variation elasticity for the whole 
manufacturing industry. Also, according to Cowling and Waterson (1976), f indicates the 
average degree of competition, which measures the average deviation of a monopolistic 
behaviour in the whole industry. If it is properly identified, it reflects the degree of market 
power exerted by all manufacturing firms, where f=1 indicates a monopoly, f=0 indicates 
perfect competition and 0<f<1 Cournot Oligopoly. 
The last part of this approach concerns the specification of price and output indexes. 
By following the methodology of Dickson and Yu (1989), the industry demand curve is 
represented by 𝑌 = 1 𝑝|ℎ|⁄ where |h| denotes the absolute value of demand elasticity with 
respect to price. Also, the weighted industry marginal cost curve MCd is presented by 
Y=𝑀𝐶𝑑
𝜀
, where ε refers to the inverse of the weighted industry demand elasticity with 
respect to marginal cost. In addition, the left hand side of equation (22) denotes the Lerner 
Index
16
 which shows the relative markup or the price-cost margin for every firm i, which is 
defined as the ratio of conjectural variation elasticity over industry elasticity of demand. 
Based on this index, the oligopoly price p0 and oligopoly output Y0 are given as 
1
0 0
| |
( )
| |
h
p Y
h f


                                                                                                                                          (23) 
| |
| | | |
0 0
| |
1/ ( )
| |
h
h hh fY p
h

                                                                                                                              (24) 
As long as 0<f<1, p0 and Y0 denote the oligopolistic price and output respectively. If f takes 
the value of zero, the level of price and output under perfect competition will be 
1
c cp Y
  and 
| |1/ hc cY p  respectively, while a value of f equal to unity reflects the monopolistic price level 
1
| |
( )
| | 1
M M
h
p Y
h


 and output 
| |1/ hM MY p  respectively. 
                                                          
16
 Lerner Index= (pi-MCi)/pi which indicates the relative price-cost margin for firm i. 
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As a result of this formulation, the first set of functions necessary for the estimation of 
conjectural variation elasticity is extracted and modified from Bresnahan (1989) and Rezitis 
and Kalantzi (2012, 2013). In particular, a transcendental logarithmic (translog) specification 
of the total cost function
17
 is taken into consideration, along with two inputs (i.e. capital and 
labour), one output and symmetry and linear homogeneity restrictions with respect to input 
unit costs imposed. The equation is formulated as: 
2
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1
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2
t t t
y t yy t ly t l
t t t
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1
1
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t t
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g x T x T Y x T
UKC UKC
                                                                 (25) 
where Ct represents the aggregate cost of the manufacturing industry, Yt corresponds to the 
volume of industry output, ULCt denotes the unit labour cost, UKCt  is the unit capital cost
18
, 
T is the time trend and φ1t is a random error term which indicates the presence of endogeneity. 
It is worth noting that the original formulations use wages and capital prices 
respectively instead of unit cost indicators. That kind of approach takes into consideration the 
variations in both wage contracts and capital depreciation, but neglects their relationship 
towards the production process. In order to capture the relationship amongst total salaries, 
gross capital expenditures and output, the unit cost approach is more sufficient. Rezitis and 
Kalantzi (2011a, 2011b) based their study on input prices, so it will be beneficial to compare 
and contrast the results of this study with their results in order to see if there is any significant 
difference.  
             Additionally, output is measured in terms of total value added, so there is no need to 
include the input of raw materials necessary for production, since total value added is 
equivalent to revenues, less the purchases of materials and services attributable to production. 
A number of papers (i.e. Bedrossian and Moschos, 1988; Siegel, 1999) regard the purchase of 
materials as variable cost because such costs depend on the volume of production. However, 
this means that they measure output in terms of gross output. On the other hand, in this first 
approach, since Yt is expressed as the final product reflecting total value added, then this 
study accounts labour and capital as the only input factors. Also, gross capital expenditures 
                                                          
17
 The translog cost function of this form results from the translog specification, introduced by Christensen et al. 
(1973) which is a second order Taylor series approximation to any cost function that satisfies the assumption of 
concavity (Saal and Parker, 2000). 
18
 '  remuneration
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are considered to be the sum of capital equipment and capital investment
19
 undertaken, 
necessary for the production process by representing the fixed cost of the translog cost 
function. 
In order to capture the effects of labour and capital upon the cost function of the 
manufacturing industry, Shephard’s Lemma20 is applied in (25) by providing the cost share 
equation of labour and capital respectively 
ln ln( )tlt l ly t ll tl
t
ULC
s a g Y g x T
UKC
                                                                                                      (25a) 
ln ln( )tkt k ky t kl tk
t
ULC
s a g Y g x T
UKC
                                                                                                    (25b) 
Since the sum of the dependent variables over the two cost share equations (25a) and (25b) 
always equals 1, then only one equation is linearly independent. As a result, it is necessary to 
omit one equation (the equation for capital is considered) in order to avoid singularity of the 
estimated covariance matrix. In addition, since labour and capital share are the two input 
components of the cost function, their coefficients, or otherwise their impact on total cost, 
must always be equal to 1. This means that al+ak=1 must hold in all cases, where al and ak 
denote the elasticity of cost with respect to labour and capital respectively.  
The last important element for the estimation of conjectural variation of the 
manufacturing industry, refers to the industry supply function which is described as 
2(1 ) ln ln( )
man t
Yt y yy t ly ty t
t
f ULC
s a a Y g x T
h UKC
                                                                            (25c) 
where slt is the ratio of labour cost to total cost, skt corresponds to the ratio of capital cost to 
total cost and sYt represents the ratio of industry’s aggregate revenue to total cost. 
Additionally, h denotes the industry demand elasticity with respect to price and fman is the 
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 As defined by the Hellenic Statistical Authority (EL.STAT.). The formulation of this index is based on the 
methodology provided by Rezitis and Kalantzi (2012).  
20
 In the theory of the firm, Shephard’s Lemma provides a formulation for each input factor included in the cost 
function. In this case, the derivative of the cost function with respect to capital and labour unit costs c(w,y) is 
given by:  
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, and the derivative of the cost function with respect to output (marginal cost) is given by 
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, where xi(w,y) represents the conditional factor demand for input i 
expressed in terms of unit cost prices (w1=labour unit cost and w2=capital unit cost) and output y and mc denotes 
the marginal cost assuming that input prices are determined by output y (Shephard, 1953). 
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conjectural variation indicator for the whole manufacturing industry. In particular, fman 
indicates the aggregate effect of manufacturing industry upon the whole economy and thus, 
provide an index of competition and market power. Therefore, an alternative interpretation 
would regard the effect of the industry’s output decisions to Gross Domestic Product. 
             This indicator takes values over the range [0,1] where 0 indicates a perfect 
competitive market, while 1 indicates a monopolistic market. The right hand side variables of 
(25a), (25b) and (25c) can be estimated from the cost function of the manufacturing industry 
(25). The remaining two unknown variables are the conjectural variation (fman) and the 
demand elasticity (h) of the industry. Since the main interest lies on the investigation of fman, 
the only parameter that needs to be estimated is h. 
             Its estimation is provided by the following demand function as initially indicated in 
the studies of Lopez, Azzam and Liron-Espana (2002), Azzam and Pagoulatos (2006), and 
Rezitis and Kalantzi (2012, 2013): 
ln ln( *100) ln( *100) ln( *100)z Ht t tt
t t t
P Z Herf
Y a h h h
b b b
     
ln( *100)
*
liq t
t
t t
MS
h u
b POP
                                                                                                                        (26) 
where h
z
 is the elasticity of output with respect to investments Zt, h
H
 represents the elasticity 
of output with respect to sales concentration Herft
21
, h
liq
 corresponds to the elasticity of 
output with respect to available liquidity, bt is a variable deflator which is considered to be 
the consumer price index, POPt is the population of Greece in time t and ut is a random error 
which is correlated with the independent variables, by indicating the problem of endogeneity. 
The original model includes the first parameter h and the elasticity of output with respect to 
real Gross National Product. In this regression, the effects of investment, market 
concentration and liquidity have been added in order to identify factors like the preferences of 
consumers based on market dominance or reputation. An additional factor regards the 
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 As an index of sales concentration, a similar method like the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for market 
concentration is considered which is defined as 𝐻 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 , where 𝑠𝑖 is the share of each 3 digit sector (in 
this study) to industry output and n is the number of the 3 digit sectors. The HHI ranges from 1/n (high 
competition) to one (monopoly). The Horizontal Mergers Guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission (2010) suggest that a HHI less than 0.01 indicates high competitive market 
conditions, while an index above 0.25 indicates a high degree of concentration. Thus, in this study, the sales 
concentration index is defined as 𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑓 = ∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 , where Si is the ratio of individual sales to total sales. 
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production decisions made by firms based on an index of liquidity
22
 available in the Greek 
economy. 
             In particular, investments can be considered as an important factor that can shape the 
allocation of market power within industries and affect or change consumers’ preferences. 
Bustamante (2011, 2015) argued that when production technologies and the level of 
investments is heterogeneous within an industry, then cross sectional variation in expected 
returns will be high and that industry will be more concentrated. The manufacturing industry 
may provide a consistent example of that argument due to its importance to the aggregate 
economy through its contribution to the satisfaction of the primary needs of consumers.  
             Sales concentration is another index that may be able to provide evidence about 
consumers’ preferences based on the share of sales that a firm or a sector holds in contrast to 
their competitors. In a number of studies (Rezitis and Kalantzi 2011a, 2011b) the ratio of 
sales to total sales is considered to be an important factor that may affect the degree of market 
power a firm or a sector holds. For this reason, a similar index to the HHI is taken into 
consideration which does not result in multicollinearity in (26) and at the same time provides 
a relationship between sales concentration and output produced. This indicator is also 
important especially on a 3-digit level analysis because it might be able to provide an 
explanation to the fact of whether consumers tend to choose from the most reputable 
suppliers. 
             The last indicator refers to a measure of liquidity and its effect upon individuals’ 
decisions about their purchases. In particular, part of the structure of the demand function is 
based on the theoretical foundations provided by Rotemberg (1982a) where he assumes a 
demand function subject to real price changes and real money balances. As real money 
balances he used the ratio Mt/PtVt, where Mt is the nominal money supply, Pt is the aggregate 
price level and Vt is a time varying taste parameter. In this study, the time varying taste 
parameter is assumed to be the population of Greece while the price deflator refers to the 
consumer price index, as considered by Rezitis and Kalantzi (2012, 2013). 
             As nominal money balances, the money supply index (M2) for the Greek economy is 
used in order to estimate whether there is a significant effect on production decisions caused 
                                                          
22
 As an index of liquidity, the money supply (M2) available to the Greek economy has been taken into 
consideration instead of Gross National Product. This was chosen in order to test the impact of a change in 
accessible money which may expand or reduce liquidity from the Greek economy and thus, the Greek 
manufacturing sectors by affecting their production decisions. 
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by a change in the available liquidity in the whole economy. Intuitively, it is expected that 
when there is a contraction in money supply, consumers will face a reduction in their liquid 
assets and thus, they will limit their consumption or any other expenditure in order to 
compensate for the lost amount of liquidity. However, since the manufacturing industry is a 
crucial industry for people’s primary needs, it would be interesting to test the effects of 
money supply upon production decisions which are highly determined by expectations of 
future demand. 
 
4.1.2. A Measure of Price Rigidity: The speed of price adjustment 
The second approach concerns the estimation of a set of price adjustment equations to both 
cross sectional and time series analysis in order to obtain the coefficient of the speed of price 
adjustment in the manufacturing industry as developed by Bedrossian and Moschos (1988). 
This study takes into account changes in the nominal price level and particularly, in the 
wholesale price set by the manufacturing sectors. Nominal price rigidity can be identified as 
the resistance of the nominal price level to changes in the market clearing price over a 
relevant time period. The indicator of the speed of price adjustment reflects this condition and 
tests the intensity of the nominal price resilience according to shifts in the cost of inputs, as 
determinants of supply decisions. This means that the speed of price adjustment indicates the 
proportional change in the nominal price level according to fluctuations in the cost of inputs 
faced by firms or sectors.  
  In particular, assume that the optimal price level under equilibrium is specified in a 
log-linear form as a markup from inputs, which in the original case correspond to unit labour 
and unit material costs. However, since the authors argued that they have used unit material 
cost due to insufficient data of unit capital costs, in this study the indicator of unit capital cost 
is proposed under the conjectural variation approach. Under oligopolistic conditions, the 
equilibrium markup is positively related to industrial concentration and negatively related to 
the elasticity of demand
23
. Also, under the assumption that major changes in the structure of 
                                                          
23
 Based on Hannah and Kay (1977), the markup over marginal costs at the industry level is equal to HHI/h, 
where HHI is the Herfindhal index of concentration and h is the elasticity of demand. Another interpretation is 
provided by Bersnahan (1982, 1989) as it is used in the conjectural variation approach, where Lerner Index is 
equal to f/h, and f is the elasticity of conjectural variation, an index of market concentration. If it is also assumed 
that the industry faces a Cobb-Douglas production function in conjunction with the marginal costs of labour and 
capital, the price level can be written as a markup over unit costs. This means that the price level is related to the 
level of excess demand via markup and not the rate of change of prices as in the competitive price models. 
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the industry may take a considerable time to manifest themselves, only demand conditions, as 
indicated by the deviation between actual output and its trend, are allowed to have an 
influence on the price markup. 
             The equilibrium price level is defined as 
*
0 1 1 3ln (ln ln ) ln ln
f
t t t t t tP c c Y Y ULC UKC                                                                                 (27) 
where P
f*
t is the equilibrium price level in time t, Yt is the actual output in terms of total value 
added, ?̂?𝑡 is the output trend, ULCt and UKCt denote the unit labour and capital cost 
respectively and  ηt is a random error term which is assumed to account for all the non-
systematic and non-measurable influences. In particular, the wholesale price index is 
extracted from total value added in order to take into consideration the estimation of capital 
and investment costs by excluding material costs, plus the percentage of taxes implied on 
sales
24
. 
              Theoretical exposition suggests that c1, 𝛽1and 𝛽3 will be positive, since an increase 
in unit costs and/or an increase in production indicated by a positive shift in demand curve 
will drive the price level upwards. In particular, an increase in unit costs will cause an 
increase in the price level in order to compensate that change, while a positive shift in 
demand curve will lead to a higher price level in order to exploit consumer surplus. On the 
other hand, in real world markets firms may have the incentives to maintain a rigid price level 
for some time despite fluctuations in unit costs or demand due to various reasons, such as 
maintaining their customers or due to formal (or informal) contracts.  
             In order to derive the speed of price adjustment, Bedrossian and Moschos (1988) use 
the partial adjustment mechanism according to which the actual proportional change in prices 
is a fraction of the desired proportional change 
*
1 1ln ln (ln ln )
f f f f
t t t tP P P P    ,             0λ<1                                                                               (28) 
where λ is the speed of price adjustment which is assumed to be constant over a period of cost 
and price fluctuations. An additional terminology for λ addresses the speed at which prices 
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Value of Sales
Sold Volume
f
tP Taxes  . The definition of taxes includes the Value Added Tax (VAT) in sales as a 
percentage of the wholesale price level. It is not taken into consideration any taxes on production that consist of 
taxes on buildings, the ownership or use of land or other capital assets used in production, on the labour 
employed or any compensation paid to employees. 
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adjust to increases/decreases in total costs by denoting both the ability and the flexibility of 
firms to affect the pricing decisions of their products. 
 In theoretical terms, this value suggests the speed that prices adjust to changes in 
market clearing factors under the Walrassian concept of equilibrium. Under this rational, in a 
perfectly competitive environment the value of adjustment would be equal to unity, thus 
suggesting total flexibility. This means that no frictions from other factors have an influence 
to pricing decisions. However, in real world economies, there are many factors that can affect 
production decisions, such as menu costs or market power. Consequently, the price level will 
not incorprorate changes to market clearing factors immediately as firms may not be willing 
or able to face the costs of that adjustment. This is a form of price rigidity denoting that 
changes in input costs or any other factor influencing the price level may take some time in 
order to be reflected in the price level. This happens in order for firms to maintain their 
customers and thus, a relatively high profit level.  
             In addition to the original paper, two extra effects are to be taken into consideration: 
the effects of the price levels charged in the European Union market (EU27) and the effects 
of taxes on sales (VAT). The theoretical intuition suggests that individual state markets which 
are part of the European Union market should face a price pattern based on price-demand 
elasticity, cost elasticity and any fiscal or monetary policies implied which may affect their 
pricing decisions. Since only 19 of the 27 members of the European Union utilize the euro 
currency, it would be of great interest to see whether fluctuations in policies may cause a 
significant change in pricing behavior in the Greek markets. On the one hand, changes in 
monetary policy implied by the European Central Bank may have the same effect upon the 
economies under the Eurozone and thus, pricing decisions of the interacting markets and 
sectors. On the other hand, changes in fiscal policy will not have the same effect on markets 
because fiscal policy can be decided individually by each state. This means that changes in 
monetary but certainly in fiscal policy may not result in the same outcome for the economies 
of the EU27.  
             For this reason, two additional price convergence mechanisms are introduced by 
incorporating the same properties as equation (28). They reflect the actual deviation between 
domestic and foreign prices with respect to the optimal level under equilibrium and the actual 
gap between wholesale prices and the portion of taxes added to the optimal level 
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where P
eu
t reflects the wholesale price level charged in the EU27 market and P
T
t is the extra 
percentage of the final price due to added taxes. This shows that λeu and λT correspond to the 
speed of price deviation between domestic wholesale prices and (i) foreign wholesale prices 
and (ii) value added tax respectively. As it is seen, both λeu and λT are positive and less than 
one which indicates that the actual difference of the left hand side can never be greater than 
the right hand side. This suggests that when the speed of price adjustment/convergence gets a 
value equal to unity, then the actual price will be the optimal under equilibrium. By 
substituting (27), (29) and (30) in (28) it is obtained 
' ' ' '
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             Equation (31) is the basic estimation form which takes into consideration the effects 
of output, unit labour and capital costs, the price level with one time lag (t-1), the price level 
in the European Union market and taxes added on the wholesale price index P
f
t. Additionally, 
the coefficients of lnP
eu
t and lnP
T
t may not appear to have the same effect on lnP
f
t. In 
particular, it is expected that an increase in taxes will increase the wholesale price level, 
while an increase in foreign prices may have an uncertain effect. This implies that when those 
coefficients have the same sign and given that λeu and λT range over zero and unity, by 
solving the system of (28), (29) and (30) it is found that λ> λT and λ> λeu. These inequalities 
suggest that the speed of price adjustment will be greater than both the speed of domestic-
foreign price convergence and the speed of price-tax adjustment.  
                                                          
25
 The variance 𝜎𝜂𝑡
2 is not assumed to be identical across time for each 3-digit sector, because each observation 
of the time series sample has its own variance var(εt)= 𝜎𝜂𝑡
2. This means that the errors εt appear to be 
heteroskedastic and the degree of heteroskedasticity depends on the relative importance of 𝜎𝜂𝑡
2. 
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             However, if the latter inequality is reversed, then the elasticity (coefficient) of lnP
eu
t 
with respect to lnP
f
t will be negative which means that domestic pricing decisions do not 
follow the same behaviour as foreign pricing decisions. Those cases imply that whenever a 
change in both foreign pricing and tax pricing policy causes a simultaneous increase in P
f
, 
then the speed of price adjustment will always be greater than the other two measures. 
Otherwise, it will hold that λeu>λ> λT where the speed of price-tax adjustment will be slower 
than the speed of price adjustment which in turn, will be slower than the speed of domestic-
foreign price convergence.  
Since equation (31) is the basic estimation form, the main interest of this study will be 
focused on the estimation of the elasticity of the key variables with respect to lnP
f
t in order to 
identify their effects and thus provide an empirical outcome about pricing decisions in the 
Greek manufacturing industry. As indicated by Bedrossian and Moschos (1988), lagged 
values of unit labour and capital cost have been used in order to account for possible delayed 
effects of unit cost changes on pricing behaviour due to real world inflexibilities such as 
wage contracts, investing decisions and capital equipment provision. In addition, those 
delayed effects take into account lagged pricing decisions of the EU market and taxation in 
order to incorporate their effect on lnP
f
t. 
In addition, it is worth noting that the variables P
eu
t and P
T
t are used as a comparison 
point to the equilibrium level of P
f
t. This means that the level charged by the EU27 is taken 
into account in order to calculate the speed of adjustment between the Greek and the 
European manufacturing industry. However, this rationale is not very clear when the variable 
of taxation is considered. In particular, this variable has been included in the analysis in order 
to test whether fluctuations in the VAT are reflected in the final wholesale price level. If that 
coefficient is equal to unity then a change in VAT is 100 percent reflected in the final price 
level. If that value is equal to zero then there is no effect and any other value between zero 
and unity refer to a partial transmission of the VAT increase.  
The empirical intuition would suggest that in monopolistic markets, the coefficient 
should be equal to unity as the monopolist does not face any form of competition and thus, 
the number of consumers who will stop purchasing his goods will be minimal. On the other 
hand, in competitive markets where price wars may define market behaviour, firms may 
choose not to reflect the VAT change in their price level at all. This strategy will result in a 
persistent low price level which will allow the firm(s) to attract more consumers or maintain 
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the number of existing consumers. In imperfectly competitive markets, it can be expected that 
this value will range between zero and unity because firms may be able to extract a higher 
level of consumer surplus. As a result, the coefficient of taxation in this model will reflect 
part of the pricing strategies of the Greek manufacturing sectors which may complement the 
evidence obtained about the market structure. 
 
4.2. Second Step: Assessment of the Greek Manufacturing 3-digit Sectors 
 
4.2.1. The Conjectural Variation Approach 
In this step of the analysis, the set of equations presented in section 4.1.1 are being taken into 
consideration in order to estimate the elasticity of conjectural variation for each one of the 56 
sectors of the Greek manufacturing industry. The only difference is that both supply and 
demand functions are modified by including cross-sectional dummy variables which account 
for changes among the manufacturing sectors (i.e. Breshnahan’s cross-sectional specification). 
In particular, as argued by Görg and Warzynski (2003), since a sectorial level panel data set 
is taken into account, it is most suitable to estimate the aforementioned elasticity along with 
the elasticity of the demand function variables for a given sector individually. The 
assumption of this procedure necessitates that those measures remain fixed over the testing 
period for a given firm. This technique allows a higher degree of ﬂexibility in the 
econometrical analysis in order to estimate the conjectural variation elasticity and thus, 
provide a measure of market power, as discussed in section 4.1.  
             The modification and formulation of the supply function using cross-sectional 
dummy variables requires an aggregation of the 3-digit sectors into 13 sets of 2-digit sectors
26
. 
In particular, by taking into consideration the estimations for the manufacturing industry, the 
supply function will be estimated for 13 2-digit sector sets in order to test the conjectural 
variation of each of the constituent 3-digit sectors. This means that the following supply 
function will be estimated thirteen times, according to the manufacturing industry’s demand 
elasticity h 
1
[1 ( )] ln ln( )
k
pin i t
Yt i y yy t ly ty
i t
f f ULC
s DS a a Y g x T
h h UKC
                                                               (32) 
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 See Table 5 and Table A. 
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where fpin indicates the conjectural variation of a particular sector chosen as benchmark in the 
operating 2-digit sector, fi refers to the change in the conjectural variation elasticity of sector i 
with respect to the fixed sector and DSi is a dummy variable (i=1,..,k, where k is the number 
of the constituent 3-digit sectors included in the 13 2-digit sectors) which is set to unity for 
sector i and zero otherwise. It is worth mentioning that equation (32) could be estimated for 
every 3-digit sector individually by treating the manufacturing industry as the aggregated 
sector (1-digit).  
             However, in order to avoid any bias in the estimations of conjectural elasticity due to 
heterogeneous product units, it would be useful to provide a more disaggregated 
methodology by aggregating 3-digit into 2-digit sectors. This approach allows for testing the 
differences between sectors which appear to have similar characteristics compared to others 
in order to minimize the degree of product heterogeneity. For instance, the sub-sectors of the 
food and beverages manufacturing industry may appear to have a different behaviour and 
heterogeneity compared to the sub-sectors of the chemical industry. The greater the level of 
disaggregation, the more precise the estimations for the interacting sectors will be. So, in 
order to estimate the conjectural variation elasticity from equation (32), equations (25) and 
(25a) must be considered as they provide the estimates of the right hand side variables.  
Nevertheless, the estimation of demand elasticity for the manufacturing industry is 
needed under the cross-sectional approach. In order to extract such estimations, the following 
set of equations based on (26) is used 
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                                                                           (33) 
where h101, h
z
101, h
H
101 and h
liq
101 denote the elasticity of price, investments, sales 
concentration and liquidity respectively with respect to output for the sector of production, 
processing and preserving of meat and meat products (i.e. 101), hi, h
z
i, h
H
i and h
liq
i correspond 
to the change in the elasticity of price, investments, sales concentration and liquidity 
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respectively of sector i (i=102,…, 310 or i=2,…56 which denote the order of those sectors, i.e. 
sector 102 corresponds to 2, sector 310 to 56 and so on) with respect to sector 101, DSi is a 
dummy variable which is set to unity for sector i and zero otherwise, h, h
z
, h
H
 and h
liq
 are 
considered to be a measure of elasticity which is fixed across sectors in each equation 
respectively and ?⃗? 𝑡 is a vector of random errors which are correlated with the independent 
variables, by reflecting the problem of endogeneity as in equation (26). 
             This system of equations provides detailed estimations for each independent variable 
by using dummy variables in order to estimate their elasticity in each 3-digit sector. In 
contrast to (32) where the sample of the 3-digit sectors is categorized into thirteen 2-digit 
sectors, the present set of equation is aggregated in a 1-digit level (manufacturing industry). 
This approach is vital in order to extract the aggregate elasticity of demand rather than the 
elasticity of demand of each 2-digit sector. For this reason, the first sector of the foods 
industry (i.e. sector 101) is considered as benchmark and any changes in the aforementioned 
elasticity measures of the remaining 55 sectors are compared to this benchmark.  
             In particular, in the first equation of this set, elasticity of price with respect to output 
of the 3-digit sectors with respect to the one of sector 101 is estimated by treating the effects 
of the remaining three variables (i.e. investments, sales concentration and liquidity) as fixed. 
In the second equation, the same procedure takes place for the elasticity of investments and 
so on. As it will be discussed in chapter 6, the elasticity of demand from the last equation is 
taken into account in the supply function (32), where the effect of liquidity is not fixed. This 
formulation is selected in order to extract the estimations of the conjectural variation 
elasticity for each 3-digit sector following the same procedure as Rezitis and Kalantzi (2012, 
2013). 
             The reasoning for adopting this approach rather than estimating fifty six time series 
regressions lies on the estimation of such measures for a given time period
27
. As discussed in 
section 4.1, the conjectural variation elasticity provides an estimation of market power by 
indicating the effect of individual production on aggregate production or sectorial production 
on industrial production. For this reason, the estimates of market power of each 3-digit sector 
for every year would not provide an accurate measure of market power over the whole testing 
period i.e. 1980-2012. This means that this approach is clearly focused on providing an 
                                                          
27
 It is also dependent on the significance of the Breusch-Pagan LM test which tests for the presence of cross-
sectional dependency between the error terms of the individual entities. 
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overall measure of market power for both the manufacturing industry and each 3-digit sector 
individually.  
  However, this aspect can also be considered as a limitation of this analysis. Since a 3-
digit sector data set is used, the conjectural variation indicator cannot account for any 
changes in production within the 3-digit sectors. If changes in production by the constituent 
firms of a particular sector occur, then conjectural variation elasticity will not reflect them 
because output variables correspond to the production activities of the whole sector. As a 
result, any variation in firms’ production decisions will be incorporated as part of the whole 
production of that particular 3-digit sector. Therefore, this study is focused on production 
decisions of the aforementioned sectors and not of the constituent firms (i.e. 4-digit level) of 
those sectors.  
 
4.2.2. A Measure of Price Rigidity: The Speed of Price Adjustment 
The last approach of this step concerns the estimations of the degree of nominal price rigidity 
in each of the 3-digit sectors of this sample. In particular, the pricing equation (31) is used for 
the manufacturing industry in order to extract the speed of price adjustment (λ) and the other 
estimators as well. The sole reason of this procedure lies on the acquisition of a possible 
effect that such variables may have upon fluctuations in the price level p
f
 over the period 
1980-2012. As a result, a time series analysis is adopted for each 3-digit level sector rather 
than a fixed/random effects model. This action reflects the main concern of estimating the 
elasticity of all variables throughout a given period and not by considering their effects as 
fixed
28
. The latter methodology was more suitable under the conjectural variation approach 
given the necessity of extracting the aggregate elasticity of demand in order to be used in the 
supply function and thus, acquire the conjectural variation indicator of each 3-digit sector. 
However, in this case, elasticity of cost variables with respect to output and the remaining 
three price indices are of great importance in order to test whether they appear to have any 
significant effect on the wholesale price index p
f
 
29
. 
             The properties of equation (31) appear to be the same for many 3-digit sectors 
compared to the manufacturing industry. In conjunction with evidence of serial correlation in 
                                                          
28
 See Table 8. The significance of the Breusch-Pagan (LM) test verifies the absence of cross sectional 
dependency between the residual terms of the sample’s entities. 
29
 See Appendix B2 for an Error Correction Model estimation process. 
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the standard errors in the study of Bedrossian and Moschos (1988), in this study there is 
evidence of serially correlated errors as well. A possible reason could be, as identified by the 
authors, that unit capital cost is not considered to be constant throughout the testing period. 
However, the main arising issue in the estimation of the manufacturing industry and each 3-
digit sector respectively corresponds to the presence of heteroskedasticity. This means that a 
degree of variability may be observed among the 3-digit sectors because the including 
variables of the pricing equation may appear to have a different effect on the price level index 
of each individual sector (a more descriptive analysis will be provided in chapter 6). 
             Intuitively, the selection of such equation was made based on the reasoning that 
wholesale prices are influenced by changes in cost parameters, past pricing behaviour, 
foreign pricing behaviour and tax implementations on sales. Specifically, cost parameters 
reflect the most objective factor that can influence nominal price level directly because 
changes in input prices and especially, input price increases most of times lead to an increase 
in the nominal price level. This means that an increase in unit costs may cause an increase in 
wholesale prices because since the price of inputs has increased, the price of output will be 
increased as well but not necessarily with the same rate. Secondly, past pricing behaviour 
may part a crucial role on present pricing decisions. It captures every condition that has 
formed the nominal price level index at time t-1 and through a process of adaptation those 
conditions will be taken into account at time t. This implication means that long-term effects 
or policies, such as tax implementations or any other fiscal policy, will always be captured by 
present and future pricing decisions.  
             Lastly, foreign pricing decisions may have an effect on domestic pricing behaviour as 
well, especially if those sectors are interacting in the same markets. Given that condition, 
they will behave as competitors and thus, try to influence the level of nominal prices in order 
to attract the maximum portion of potential demand. An interesting way to test whether such 
conditions hold between domestic and foreign sectors (EU27) would be to take into 
consideration the level of imports and exports of the Greek manufacturing sectors. However, 
an examination of the possible role of the European Union suppliers in domestic markets and 
of exportation of domestic manufacturing products was attempted in the last step. The impact 
of two additional variables on the speed of price adjustment was tested: imp defined as the 
ratio of imports by sector over sales and exp defined as exports by sector over sales, as 
indicated by Bedrossian and Moschos (1988). The estimations obtained by such variables 
were highly insignificant in that equation by validating the findings of Bedrossian and 
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Moschos, while the remaining coefficients were slightly changed
30
. This means that the price 
of inputs used in production may result in a similar change in both domestic and foreign 
prices. 
 
4.3.Third Step: Assessment of the Manufacturing Industry Performance over the Period 
1980-2012. 
 In the third step, the study takes into consideration the performance of the manufacturing 
industry over the period 1980-2012 in order to obtain the estimates of market power and price 
rigidity indexes. However, the focus of this step is placed on the sub-period 2005-2012, 
which is a turning point for the Greek economy. In particular, over the latter time sample, the 
significance of economic fluctuations is quite important. It covers a time range from the post-
era of the Olympic Games till the first years of the austerity policies implementation. The 
first milestone of this period concerns the Olympic Games of 2004 which was expected to be 
one of the most important projects. As an outcome of this event, aggregate economy was 
expected to flourish by resulting in increased exports, as well as capital imports due to 
expectations of an upward trend in output growth (Kasimati, 2003). The second milestone 
regards the financial crisis occurred in 2008 and its impact upon global economy, while the 
last milestone regards the beginning of the austerity policies era for Greece in 2010.  
             The difference of this step compared to the cross-sectional analysis lies on the fact 
that dummy variables for each sector are replaced by time dummy variables (time series 
specification) for each year over 1980-2012. According to these estimates, the market 
conditions over the sub-period 2005-2012 are identified in order to see (i) whether positive 
fluctuations in the Greek economy have affected the performance of the manufacturing 
industry; (ii) whether there was any impact on production decisions or market power over the 
pre-financial crisis period; and (iii) how the Greek economy and particularly the Greek 
manufacturing industry structure have been affected by the implemented austerity policies. 
Therefore, the main interest of the present study is to test whether the measures of market 
power and nominal price rigidities were affected over this period as a result of fluctuations in 
aggregate economy.  
                                                          
30
 In addition, there is also evidence of non-stationarity persistence in levels for both imports and exports series 
(see Appendix B2).   
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4.3.1. The Conjectural Variation Approach 
As mentioned above, in this step sectorial dummy variables are replaced by time dummy 
variables which can capture the effects of market power fluctuations within the Greek 
manufacturing industry. As pointed out by Görg and Warzynski (2003), it is very difficult to 
assume that the degree of market power has remained constant over time, as it is assumed 
when cross-sectional dummy variables are used. However, many studies estimate average 
market power over a certain time period, when other studies, like Levinsohn (1993), take into 
account ﬁrm level data with a smaller time span which attempt to capture structural 
adjustments. In this study, the measure of market power will be estimated along with the 
degree of nominal price rigidity for the Greek manufacturing industry over the period 1980-
2012.  
             Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that this approach cannot capture any 
fluctuations of such measures over time for each 3-digit sector individually. Since 3-digit 
level data constitute the micro-part of this analysis, while 1-digit level data part the macro-
part, it is needed to include 4-digit level data in order to estimate any changes in such 
variables for the 3-digit sectors. However, the data set needed for this analysis in a 4-digit 
level were not available for each sector and therefore, the use of 3-digit data is selected as the 
basis of this study. Another argument could be that 2-digit level data should have been 
considered as the macro-part and thus, changes over time for 2-digit level sectors should have 
been estimated. The reasoning for excluding this element lies on the fact that 2-digit level 
estimates would not provide the best possible macro aspect of the manufacturing industry. 
They may be aggregated but they cannot generate the same results as the whole Greek 
manufacturing industry. This means that 2-digit data may be available but they can be 
regarded as the second best choice for both the micro and macro-part of this study. 
             By following a similar procedure as in the previous step, the supply function for the 
Greek manufacturing industry is given by 
2012
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where f1980 is the conjectural elasticity for year 1980, ft is the change in conjectural elasticity 
with respect to f1980 and DTt is a time dummy variable (t=1981,…,2012) which is set to one 
for year t and zero otherwise. As in the previous step, the right hand side estimations can be 
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extracted from (25) and (25a), while the aggregate (industry) demand elasticity for this case 
must be estimated from the relevant demand function. Once again, in the supply function of 
this form, the first year of the sample is treated as benchmark in order to estimate the changes 
of the rest sub-periods with respect to 1980. 
             The demand function is estimated as in the second step by replacing the cross-
sectional dummy variables with time dummy variables. However, under this approach, the 
time dummy variables are applied only to the industry price elasticity and elasticity of 
liquidity with respect to output, in order to identify their effect over 2005-2012 in the Greek 
manufacturing industry. Once again, the estimation of the former elasticity is extracted by the 
second regression, i.e. where the only changing variable is liquidity. The set of demand 
functions is given by 
2012
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where h2005 and h
liq
2005 denote the industry price elasticity and liquidity elasticity with respect 
to output for year 2005, ht and h
liq
t denote the change in respect to h2005 and h
liq
2005 
respectively, DTt is a time dummy variable (t=2006,…,2012) which is set to one for the year 
t and zero otherwise, h, h
z
, h
H
 and h
liq
 are considered to be measures of elasticity which are 
fixed across the time sample in each regression respectively and ?⃗? 𝑡  represents a vector of 
random errors which are correlated with the independent variables, by indicating the problem 
of endogeneity as in the former equations of demand. 
             This set of equations provides detailed estimations for the industry price and liquidity 
elasticity with respect to output by using time dummy variables in order to estimate their 
effect in the Greek manufacturing industry. In particular, the sectorial sample is categorized 
as a 1-digit level industry, where the effects for each 3-digit sector are considered as fixed. 
This assumption holds since the manufacturing industry reflects the macro-part of the 
analysis and therefore, the extracted estimations address the behaviour of the whole industry.  
             Another characteristic of (35) regards the time sample taken into consideration. A 
time sample over the whole period 1980-2012 could have been used, as in supply function, 
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by including 33 years. Subsequently, the effects of any changes in industry price and liquidity 
elasticity with respect to output could have been identified. However, the reason for which 
this part has limited the testing years into 8 refers to the significance of the estimated values. 
Whereas the current t-statistic values of both demand estimates are significant at the 1% level 
of significance, they fail to provide similar results when every year is included in the analysis. 
As the year span is extended, a number of estimates tend to be insignificant even at the 10% 
level of significance, especially for the liquidity index.  
Additionally, time dummy variables have been applied only to the aggregate 
industry’s elasticity of price and liquidity with respect to output. This is chosen because the 
effects of investments and sales concentration on production decisions (output) were 
insignificant for a number of years over 1980-2012 as well. However, their effect over the 
whole period has been found to be significant (see chapter 6), which is treated as fixed. For 
this reason, a time sample over 2005-2012 has been used by excluding the two extra 
equations of demand function under which time dummy variables are applied to investments 
and sales concentration.  
             The main focus of the conjectural variation approach under this specification is based 
on the estimation of price and liquidity fluctuations. On the one hand, pricing decisions 
appear to have an effect on the manufacturing industry’s output decisions given fluctuations 
of the economic policies implied over 1980-2012. On the other hand, it is very interesting to 
test the effect of such changes in output with respect to money supply. The manufacturing 
industry is considered to be one of the most important industries due to the provision of 
commodities that satisfy people’s primary needs, such as food or clothing. This means that 
changes in money supply may have an insignificant or a highly inelastic effect on output 
since consumption of such products cannot be substituted. Therefore, even if money supply is 
greatly reduced under the form of income or any other earnings, consumption decisions may 
remain the same for a category of products which may not have any substitutes and thus, 
render their purchase as obligatory. 
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4.3.2. A Measure of Price Rigidity: The Speed of Price Adjustment 
The last approach of this step regards the estimations extracted from pricing equation (38) for 
the Greek manufacturing industry over the period 1980-2012. In particular, it is mentioned in 
4.1.3 that the first step will provide the estimates of the pricing equation according to the 
methodology of Bedrossian and Moschos (1988) over the whole time period. The second step 
will take into account 56 time series for each 3-digit sector respectively in order to test the 
elasticity of the wholesale price level P
f
 with respect to cost fluctuations along with 
fluctuations in the three price indices taken into account. In this step, the effects of lagged 
pricing decisions (t-1) for the Greek manufacturing industry over the period 1980-2012 are 
estimated. This means that a time dummy variable will be used, proposed in section 4.3.1, 
DTt (t=1981,…,2012), which is set to one for the year t and zero otherwise. The estimations 
are provided by the following regression 
' ' ' '
0 1 1 3 1980 1ln (ln ln ) ln ln (1 )ln
f f
t t t t t tP c c Y Y ULC UKC P               
2012
' '
1 1 2
1981
(1 )( *ln ) ( )(1 ) ln (1 ) lnf eu eu eu T Tt t t t t t
t
DT P P P       

                                 (36) 
             In this step as well, unit costs instead of input prices are regarded in order to capture 
the relationship between total remunerations, gross capital expenditures and output expressed 
in terms of total value added. Specifically, the effects of unit costs are treated as fixed 
throughout the time sample while allowing only for variable P
f
t-1 to vary each year over 
2005-2012. This reasoning is based on the interest of this study to test the effects of 
fluctuations in price indicators rather than input price indicators. The estimations of input 
prices for a given time period are considered to be sufficient for the necessity of the empirical 
implications of this step. Also, the error term εt is described by the same properties as in the 
previous steps where there may be no serial autocorrelation but the effects of 
heteroskedasticity are still present.  
             The main interest behind this approach is focused on the effect of lagged pricing 
decisions on the final wholesale price level over the sub-period 2005-2012. Once again, by 
using this specification for the pricing equation, the estimated results will be identified as 
whether such decisions have been subject to changes in aggregate economy or resulted in 
uncorrelated behaviour with such fluctuations. The main intuition for using a time series 
specification for the Greek manufacturing industry lies on the interest in testing the pricing 
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and production behaviour of the whole industry for a given time period. Instead of limiting 
this study to the sub-period 2005-2012, it has been chosen to include every year in order to 
obtain an overall and accurate set of estimates of the speed of price adjustment over the 
whole period 1980-2012.  
             The reason of this argument depends on the description of the transition from a 
prosperous and growing economy (2005-2008), to a slightly declining (2008-2009) and 
ultimately, to a plunging economy (2011-2012)
31
 expressed in terms of Gross Domestic 
Product and aggregate demand. As a result of such effects which describe the aggregate 
behaviour of individual sectors, it is of great interest to test whether there has been a 
significant effect upon the Greek manufacturing industry’s activities. Based on that result, it 
would be beneficial to identify how production and thus, pricing decisions have been shaped 
according to the unit cost and pricing factors included in the pricing equations. 
 
4.4.Fourth Step: Determinants of the Speed of Price Adjustment 
In the previous steps, the estimations regarding the market power indices can be extracted 
along with the indicator of price rigidity corresponding to the speed of price adjustment. In 
this final step, one regression is estimated that takes into account a set of supply-side 
variables that may appear to have an influence on the speed of price adjustment. The 
estimations extracted from those regressions will be able to provide an interpretation 
regarding the level of those two indices and their relationship with the undertaken variables. 
             In particular, Bedrossian and Moschos (1988) argued about the distinction observed 
between the level of profitability in firm and industry level by analysing the effect of market 
concentration on the speed of price adjustment. The “leadership effect” which is connected 
with interfirm profitability differentials within an industry and the “industry profitability 
effect” are likely to have a negative impact on such adjustment. This means that 
concentration may appear to have a positive influence only if the first effect overcomes the 
impact of the latter. Otherwise, the relationship between market concentration and the speed 
of price adjustment will be negative.  
                                                          
31
 See Tsakalotos (2011) and EL.STAT. database. 
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             Another determinant of this indicator may be the volume of sales of each sector that 
can enhance the leadership effect. In conjunction with market concentration, an indicator of 
sales may also provide a relationship with the speed of price adjustment as a determinant of 
the size of the industry (Olive, 2008). The greater the size of the industry, the less rigid the 
price level will be because bigger firms can defray their costs easier than smaller firms. 
However, the influence of this indicator on the speed of price adjustment depends on the very 
nature of the industry and its returns to scale. For instance, industries with constant or 
diminishing economies of scale (increasing average cost as production increases) may appear 
to change their prices more often than other industries due to the fact that an increase in sales 
may lead to an increase in production and thus, an increase in average cost. This means that if 
average cost reaches a higher level, then the price level must be increased accordingly in 
order for profits to remain at the same level. Therefore, as sectorial sales increase, the speed 
of price adjustment may increase by rendering the occurrence of collusive agreements in 
favour of price rigidities very difficult. 
             Lastly, even if the volume of sales within an industry may affect the degree of price 
rigidity, it may not be a sufficient indicator unless average costs are taken into account in 
order to define the industry profitability effect. The very nature of those costs, both fixed and 
variables, may be able to capture the rigidity of the nominal price level, especially in sectors 
where firms are characterized by collusive behaviour. If competition is limited, then 
downward price rigidities may appear regardless fluctuations in average costs. Otherwise, 
changes in costs may have a positive effect on the speed of price adjustment. Bloch and Olive 
(2003) and Olive (2008) take into consideration in their pricing equation only the average 
variable cost instead of the average total cost. In this study’s pricing equation both unit labour 
and capital costs are considered in order to test their individual effect on pricing behaviour. 
For this reason, the average total cost measure is included in the price adjustment equation in 
order to test the total effect of cost fluctuations. Even if labour input fluctuations are more 
frequent than capital fluctuations, the latter may have a greater influence compared to the 
former. 
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4.4.1. The Speed of Price Adjustment Formulation 
The regression of this step is concerned with the values of the speed of price adjustment (λ) 
for the 56 3-digit sectors of the Greek manufacturing industry. The estimations of λ have been 
extracted from equation (31) for each 3-digit sector and provide an average measure of price 
rigidity over the period 1980-2012. The analysis estimates this particular equation for each 
year over the period 2005-2012. These years have been taken into consideration firstly, 
because of the available data set under which the important indices of this equation can be 
calculated and secondly, due to their economic significance for the Greek markets. In 
particular, 2008 may describe how 3-digit manufacturing industry behaved when the global 
financial and economic crisis erupted; 2010 may capture the behaviour of those sectors when 
austerity policies were implied on the Greek economy by leading to a plunge of aggregate 
income and thus, aggregate demand; 2011 and 2012 take into consideration the years after the 
implication of the austerity policies which may reflect a better description of the effects that 
those policies have inflicted on the Greek manufacturing industry. 
             The cross-sectional approach may not provide an average effect of the independent 
variables of this regression on the speed of price adjustment for the 3-digit manufacturing 
sectors; however it may offer a better approximation of the values of the structural variables. 
This means that under small fluctuations between lagged prices (Pt-1) and current target prices 
(Pt), the cross-sectional variation of the average industry should be relatively small compared 
to the cross-sector variation in the structural variables. This influence refers to an aspect 
incorporated in the present empirical model (Olive, 2008). The basic estimation of the speed 
of price adjustment is of the form 
𝜆𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑅4𝑑𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍4𝑑𝑖 + 𝛾3𝐴𝐶𝑑𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑓𝑖 + 𝜐𝑖                                                   (37) 
where CR4 is the 3-digit manufacturing sector concentration ratio for the four largest 4-digit 
level firms, SIZ4 corresponds to the average sales across the four largest 4-digit level firms in 
the 3-digit sector, AC refers to the average total cost of each sector, fi represents the 
conjectural variation elasticity of each sector and υi is an independent error term for 
which 𝜐𝑖~(0, 𝜎
2
𝜐)
32
. 
                                                          
32
 The speed of price adjustment equation (37) has been formulated according to Domberger (1979), Dixon 
(1983), Bedrossian and Moschos (1988), Martin (1993) and Olive (2008). The additional variables included in 
this study refer to the average total cost and the conjectural variation elasticity in order to test the influence of 
market power and total cost fluctuations on the speed of price adjustment. However, the length of production 
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             To begin with, equation (37) follows the formulation provided by Olive (2008) by 
adding weighted average indicators across all sectors of the manufacturing industry. This 
approach has been selected in order to increase the accuracy of the estimations and avoid any 
extreme temporarily fluctuations of these measures. For instance, assume there is an 
unexpected fluctuation in a particular sector which had only occurred for one year and does 
not provide an accurate description of that sector’s behaviour. Consequently, by adding a 
weighted average indicator the impact of that fluctuation can be restricted and be converged 
towards its average value. Since the selected years may be described by such fluctuations 
which may or may not persist in the long-run, the use of such method may provide more 
credible estimations. 
             In particular, CR4d is the ratio of sales of the four largest firms of each 3-digit sector 
to the value of the manufacturing industry over the period 2005-2012
33
. It is obtained by 
multiplying CR4 by the ratio of 3-digit sector sales to the value of the manufacturing 
industry; SIZ4d corresponds to the average measure of sales for the four largest 4-digit firms 
over the period 2005-2012. It is obtained by multiplying the four-firm concentration ratio 
CR4 by the sales of the sector and dividing by four; ACdi represents the average total cost of 
each 3-digit sector over the period 2005-2012. It is obtained by multiplying AC by the ratio of 
3-digit sector total cost to the total cost of the manufacturing industry; lastly, fi is the 
conjectural variation elasticity of each 3-digit sector and is obtained by the supply function 
(32)
34
. 
 However, the indicators of market power CR4 and f differ in the nature of their 
formulation. The first variable is an indicator expressed in terms of sales by capturing the 
tendnency of the four 4-digit sectors with the highest value of sales over a time period. This 
means that the CR4 ratio is an indicator of sales arising in a particular 3-digit and thus, it 
refers to the conditions of that sector by neglecting any interactions with other 3-digit sectors. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
period (production lag) has not been taken into account, despite its inclusion in many of the above studies, due 
to limited data for the whole set of the manufacturing industry. 
33
 The value of the manufacturing industry refers to the value of sales in the domestic market by including 
changes in the volume of imports. Katics and Petersen (1994) and Ghosal (2000) provide evidence that an 
increase in the share of imports of the U.S. manufacturing industries, may weaken the market power of the 
incumbent firms that face a high degree of concentration (Olive, 2008). 
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On the other hand, the conjectural variation elasticity takes into account the behaviour of 
every 3-digit sector and reflects its influence on the aggregate industry. As a result, this 
variable captures production decisions upon the aggregate industry and thus, it is an indicator 
of market power reflecting the structure of the market. For this reason, both measures have 
been included in order to provide robust results about the profitability effect in the Greek 
manufacturing sectors. 
             An additional reson behind the selection of these variables lies on the theoretical 
significance that concentration and cost indices may have on the speed of price adjustment. 
Specifically, sales part a very crucial market factor that may affect both production and 
pricing decisions in the long-run. Persistent increases in demand for a sector’s products will 
tend to drive production up and thus, sales which will in turn increase the concentration ratio 
of that sector. This means that a boost in production may result in an increase in average or 
even marginal cost by resulting in an increase of the price level.  
             On the other hand, even if an increase in production does not have a significant effect 
on variable costs, the additional portion of demand served by a sector may result in higher 
market power for that sector. Such effect may also result in higher nominal prices, given the 
nature of the product, its elasticity of demand, and the number of substitutes which may 
satisfy the same needs of consumers. According to those characteristics, the conjectural 
variation elasticity which has been taken into consideration in the previous steps may provide 
a significant influence on the speed of price adjustment. Intuitively, market power results in 
lower production accompanied by relatively high prices which may appear to be both upward 
and downward rigid. Downward rigidity may persist as long as there are not significant 
changes in the demand curve for the products of that sector for a given price level, while 
upward rigidities may occur due to the uncertain effect an additional price increase may have 
on consumers. Based on this rational, a fall in the level of production may appear to have a 
similar effect on the speed of price adjustment given that market power is exercised on 
consumers. 
             As has been argued by Bedrossian and Moschos (1988), since λi is estimated from the 
pricing equation (31), the estimations ?̂?𝑖  are used instead, which are cross-section 
observations and have their own variance var(?̂?𝑖). This means that the estimating equation 
takes the following form 
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ˆ 4 4i di di di i iCR SIZ AC f w                                                                                      (38) 
where wi is a composite error terms with variance 𝜎𝑊
2 = 𝜎𝜐
2 + 𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑖), by assuming that 
the terms of the right hand side are independent. This indicates that the errors wi appear to be 
heteroskedastic while the extend of heteroskedasticity depends on the importance of 𝜎2𝜐 and 
var(?̂?𝑖). However, since 𝜎
2
𝜐 has been assumed to be constant, the properties of var(?̂?𝑖) are not 
known. If var(?̂?𝑖) appears to have linear properties, then the variance of the composite error 
terms wi will be of known form; otherwise, their variance will have non-linear properties. 
Therefore, the type of heteroskedasticity may not be known and thus, only a few tests may be 
applied (see chapter 5) in order to acquire heteroskedastic-consistent estimations. 
 Overall, an indicator of market power and of nominal price rigidity will be analysed 
in three steps in order to identify the market structure and pricing behaviour of the 
manufacturing industry and the manufacturing sectors over the period 1980-2012. The results 
obtained by those steps will be considered in the fourth and last step, which incorporates 
market factors that promote sluggish or flexible pricing decisions. The relationship between 
nominal price rigidity and market power will be tested in order to investigate whether the 
former concept is caused by the latter and thus, whether sluggish pricing decisions are 
affected by market power acquisition. For this reason, the measures of 𝜆𝑖 and 𝑓𝑖 have been 
chosen to test this particular outcome by either validating or rejecting the profitability effect. 
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5. Econometrics Approach and Estimation Methods 
 
5.1. Panel Data Analysis 
The current chapter analyses the econometrical methodology which has been used in order to 
extract the empirical results of the equation systems presented in chapter 4. In particular, as 
mentioned above, this study is focused on providing the degree of market power (i.e. 
conjectural variation elasticity) along with the speed of adjustment in the Greek 
manufacturing industry. For this reason, the sample comprises data in an annual basis over 
the period 1980-2012 for 56 3-digit NACErev2 level sectors of the whole manufacturing 
industry  based on the Statistical Nomenclature of Economic Activity of 2008 
(STAKOD_2008). The constituent 3-digit sectors of the Greek manufacturing industry are 
presented in Table A. The selection of the data sample was based on the available data 
provided by the Hellenic Statistical Authority (EL.STAT.) database. In particular, the bulk of 
data has been obtained from the Annual National Industrial Survey (AIS) of the Hellenic 
Statistical Authority, the European Statistical Authority (Eurostat), the Bank of Greece (BoG) 
and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This means that 
the secondary data set which has been taken into consideration in this study forms a panel 
data sample of 56 cross section entities and 33 time points, which conclude the number of 
total observations to 1840
35
. 
             A panel data analysis will be helpful in order to identify the behaviour of the 3-digit 
manufacturing sectors regarding their market power and their pricing decisions. In particular, 
under this kind of analysis it is able to observe any fluctuations of the crucial measures of 
interest over the time period sample for each of the 56 3-digit sectors (cross sectional 
specification). Also, it is able to observe such fluctuations for the whole manufacturing 
industry for each year individually (time-series specification). This means that panel data 
analysis allows for individual estimations, either in terms of cross-section or time series, 
which may result in sufficient estimations for the purpose of this study
36
.  
                                                          
35
 The statistical software used to estimate the model of the present study are Stata 10 and Eviews 8. 
36
 If it is assumed that the number of sectors is N and the number of years T, a solely cross-sectional analysis 
takes into consideration the estimations for each sector for only one year (Nx1), while a time series analysis 
regards the estimations of one sector throughout the whole time sample (1xT). On the other hand, a panel data 
analysis allows for the dimension of the above matrices to be NxT, where N>1 and T>1.   
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 It is worth mentioning that the estimation process of the present model could also be 
carried out by employing the VAR methodology for panel data. However, given the presence 
of panel series stationarity, a simple regressions analysis of fixed and random effects is 
chosen. In addition, given that the same methodology is adopted by the studies of Rezitis and 
Kalantzi (2012, 2013), it is of great significance to compare the results under the same 
methodological procedure. In addition, the cross section approach of the pricing equation is 
estimated both as a simple regression and as a vector error correction model in order to 
compare and contrast the results and thus, their consistency to the study of Bedrossian and 
Mochos (1988). Therefore, the underlying methodology is in accordance to the 
aforementioned studies in order to validate and extend the significance of the results in a 
policy framework. 
             Hsiao (2014) argues that panel data analysis may provide more accurate inference of 
the parameters taken into consideration, since they appear to have both great sample 
variability and a satisfactory number of degrees of freedom. Some other benefits of this 
analysis correspond to the possibility of controlling individual heterogeneity or allowing 
studying the dynamic behaviour of the sample. Individual heterogeneity may appear to have a 
significant role to the interpretation of the estimated results due to the fact that past 
implications adopted under the assumption of homogeneity may be falsified. In the present 
case, the 3-digit level analysis may be considered to appear an intermediate degree of 
heterogeneity, as discussed in section 4.2.1.  
Therefore, the interactions and pricing decisions, along with any other parameters that 
may affect the market power of each sector must be treated carefully. The reason for this 
argument results from the necessity of acquiring efficient estimations of the degree of market 
power without allowing any biases to rise due to any type of misspecification. On the other 
hand, dynamic relationships among the undertaken measures of the analysis rely on the 
differences observed among the inter-individual sectors. The validity of such relationships 
lies on the reduction of the degree of collinearity between current and lag variables, which 
may provide more robust estimates for unrestricted time-adjustment patterns (Pakes and 
Griliches, 1984). 
             Another element which is of great importance to this study regards the micro-
foundations of aggregate data analysis. As Hsiao (2007) argues, aggregate data analysis often 
takes into consideration the assumption of the “representative agent”, or in this case, the 
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assumption of the “representative firm”. However, since the sample (among others) consists 
of heterogeneous micro units, the acquired properties under a time series analysis may result 
in different estimates of aggregate compared to disaggregate data (Granger, 1991; Lewbel, 
1994; Pesaran, 2003). This means that such estimations may be biased and thus, indicate an 
incomplete or even falsified interpretation of market behaviour.  
For this very reason, this study intends to include the most disaggregate level of the 
manufacturing industry possible, based on the limitation of data acquisition and the 
transformation necessary for the undertaken analysis. Although a moderate degree of 
heterogeneity emerges under the consideration of 3-digit level data, the underlying 
methodology (see chapter 4) attempts to minimize that effect. It also intends to provide robust 
estimations according to both cross-sectional and time series specifications for each sector 
and generally, for the Greek manufacturing industry. 
             Following the choice of forming a set of panel data in this study, the next step regards 
the methodology which will provide the analysis of that set and result in the estimation of the 
important coefficients. In particular, the main issue that may arise under a panel data analysis 
corresponds to the importance of the error term’s properties. It can determine the type of 
methodology it should be used to obtain both unbiased and efficient estimations. Those 
properties may address the problem of whether the error term may vary non-stochastically or 
stochastically over time t or sector i, which requires a special treatment of the error variance-
covariance matrix. Based on those assumptions, the following approaches/models were 
selected: the Fixed Effects model, when at least one explanatory variable is correlated with 
the heterogeneous individual effects term and the Random Effects model, when the error term 
of the constituent entities is serially correlated but there is no correlation between the 
explanatory variables and the individual effects (Wooldridge, 2002). 
             The fixed effects model is used to explore the relationship between the independent 
and dependent variables within an entity, which in this case corresponds to the manufacturing 
sectors. The very definition and nature of that entity can result in a unique set of individual 
characteristics that may influence the value of the estimated parameters. The major market 
variables in this study are considered to be conjectural variation elasticity and the speed of 
price adjustment. This means that based on the characteristics of the manufacturing sectors, 
the market variables will get the analogous values consistent with the behaviour and market 
characteristics of the manufacturing industry. 
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According to Baltagi (2001), a general case of a one-way linear unobserved individual 
effects model for N individual observations and T dated periods has the following form 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, for i=1,…,N and t=1,...,T                                                                        (39) 
where yit is the dependent variable for individual i and time t, α denotes the overall constant 
term of this regression, X’it represents the transpose time variant regressors’ vector (1xk), μi 
corresponds to the time invariant individual effects term which also addresses the cross-
sectional effects (random or fixed) and uit is the idiosyncratic error term. Unlike the vector of 
regressors X’it, the time invariant individual effect μi cannot be easily estimated (i.e. due to 
historical or institutional factors). The fixed effects model considers that the heterogeneous 
individual effects term is correlated with the vector of regressors. Since μi cannot be 
controlled directly, the fixed effects model demeans (39) by using the following 
transformation 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 = (𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋′̅̅ ̅𝑖)𝛽 + (𝜇𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) + (𝑢𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)                                                                   (40) 
where  ?̅?𝑖 =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 , 𝑋′̅𝑖 =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑋′𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1  and  ?̅?𝑖 =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 . Since the time invariant 
individual effect is fixed, then the difference from its mean will be zero and thus, its impact 
from regression (39) is eliminated. In order to extract the estimator for the fixed effects 
model  ?̂?𝐹𝐸 , the analysis has to take into account the degree of correlation between the 
individual effects term and the vector of regressors. For this reason, the problem of 
endogeneity arises under which the OLS estimator may not result in unbiased and consistent 
estimates (see section 5.3)
37
. 
             The main assumption behind the consideration of this approach lies on the fact that a 
set of characteristics within that entity may affect or bias the market variables. Therefore, a 
solution must be found in order to control and avoid any biased estimations. This problem 
occurs due to the presence of correlation between the individual effects term of the entity and 
the independent variables by raising the problem of endogeneity. In order to eliminate the 
effects of those time invariant characteristics from the independent variables, as well as 
acquire consistent estimations, the fixed effects approach is considered to be the most suitable 
(Kohler and Kreuter, 2005). As Bell and Jones (2015) mention, the problem of endogeneity 
                                                          
37
 A different specification of equation (40) may be provided by including dummy variables as has been 
presented in sections 4.2 and 4.3. By doing this, the fixed effects model corrects the estimations from 
heterogeneity bias by taking into account the variation between the time variant variables (i.e. regressors) and 
the time invariant effects. 
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may result in inconsistent estimates due to omitted variables, simultaneity, sample selection 
or measurement error.  
However, as mentioned above, the panel sample used in this analysis is subject to a 
degree of heterogeneity which is caused by the selection of 3-digit level data. Consequently, 
any bias that may occur due to the presence of endogeneity may be addressed as 
“heterogeneity bias” (Bento, Li and Roth, 2012)38. The reasoning behind this argument lies 
on the fact that the fixed effects model uses orthogonal projections in order to remove any 
cross-section or period specific means from the dependent and the independent variables
39
. 
This procedure is performed on the specified regression of the demean as presented above 
(Baltagi, 2001). 
             Another important aspect of the fixed effects approach is that time invariant 
characteristics are unique to each individual entity, the 3-digit level sectors, and should not be 
correlated with other individual characteristics. This model incorporates all time invariant 
differences between the individual entities in order for the estimated coefficients to be 
unbiased and consistent. Each individual entity is different and thus, its error and constant 
term should not be correlated with others. When the individual effects term of each entity is 
correlated with the error term, the fixed effects approach cannot provide efficient inferences. 
As a result, a different method must be used that takes into consideration the between 
correlation of those terms for each of the constituent entities.  
             A limitation that arises from such correlation addresses the fact that the fixed effects 
model cannot be used to investigate time invariant causes of the explanatory variables. This 
limitation occurs because time invariant characteristics are perfectly collinear with the 
individual entities (Kohler and Kreuter, 2005). This means that the fixed effects model is 
solely designed to study changes within a set of entities. That property may fail to produce 
efficient inferences whenever there is evidence of correlation between the individual effects 
and the error term of the entities. 
             Since the fixed effects model may not be suitable to address the presence of serial 
correlation, the second methodology refers to the random effects model. In particular, under 
                                                          
38
 This form of bias may persists whenever the random effects estimation is used in order to analyse data with 
non-zero correlation between the regressors and the individual effects term. Under such cases, the fixed effects 
model is more suitable because it accounts for a stochastic error term. 
39
 In this case, a one-way linear model has been included by allowing only for individual time invariant 
characteristics. An extra term γt could have also been added which would account for periodic specific effects.  
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this approach the variation across individual entities is assumed to be random and 
uncorrelated with the independent or predictor variables included in every regression. 
However, the problem of endogeneity must not rise when the random effects model is taken 
into consideration. Green (2008) argues that the most important distinction between the fixed 
and the random effects model concerns the fact whether the unobserved individual effects 
involve several elements that are correlated with the regressors in each equation. As a result, 
the latter model does not account the presence of endogeneity. This means that the presence 
of a stochastic behaviour, which introduces variations in the dependent variable that cannot 
be explained on the basis of the independent variables, is important for the use of the fixed 
effects model whenever there is no serial correlation. Otherwise, the random effects model is 
chosen where the error term is random from one measurement to another. 
             A simple random effects model that addresses the characteristics of this study has the 
following form 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, for i=1,…,N and t=1,...,T                                                                       (41) 
and 𝛽0𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝑤𝑖 
By substituting the latter into the former equation, it is obtained 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + (𝑤𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡)                                                                                                                 (42) 
where yit is the dependent variable for individual i and time t, 𝛽0 denotes the overall constant 
term and X’it represents the transpose time variant vector of regressors (1xk). Those terms can 
be viewed as the “fixed part” of this model, as was introduced in equation (41). On the other 
hand, the “random part” consists of the two error terms wi and uit which are correlated. In 
particular, wi is the individual effect for each entity i=1,…,N, which allows for differential 
intercepts over the given time sample and uit corresponds to the individual entity error term 
i=1,…,56 for each year t=1980,…,2012. If it is assumed that both of those terms are 
independent identically distributed with zero mean and constant variances σ2w and σ
2
u 
respectively, then each individual entity i, along with the time sample t, come from a single 
distribution which is estimated based on the available data set.  
The term wi which reflects the individual specific within effect may follow the same 
properties with the individual effect μi in equation (39). In addition, if in equation (42) each 
individual entity was treated as an average or as an aggregate entity (i.e. 1-digit level), then 
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the average effect of wi would be zero. This means that if a time series specification under an 
average entity is to be taken into consideration, the error term wi could be replaced by a 
different error term i.e. wt, which would allow for differential intercepts for every time t. This 
term can be identified as the γt periodic specific effect and can also be added in equation (39) 
to provide a two-way linear unobserved effects model. 
             The random effects model is best suited when there is evidence that differences 
across individual entities (i.e. individual effects) may have an influence on the dependent 
variable of a specific regression. An interpretation of this approach may address the 
assumption that cross-sectional (μi) and periodical effects (wt), which emerge in this sample, 
are treated as realizations of independent random variables with zero mean and constant finite 
variance. Consequently, the error term of the constituent entities may not appear to have any 
correlation with the independent or predictor variables. This outcome allows for time 
invariant variables to be treated as explanatory variables. In contrast, the fixed effects model 
cannot be used to investigate the influence of time invariant variables on the dependent 
variable. This happens because such characteristics are assumed to be collinear with each 
individual entity and thus, they are absorbed by the intercept.  
             Another aspect of the random effects model regards the fact of specifying individual 
characteristics that part each entity which may or may not influence the independent variables. 
The problem in this argument lies on the fact that some observations may not be available for 
some years, which means that they will be excluded from the analysis. However, such 
omissions may lead to biased estimations which will result from misspecified regressions and 
thus, they will fail to provide correct inferences. A similar disadvantage that comes from 
using the random effects model regards the assumption of exogeneity due to the fact that the 
error term is not correlated with the explanatory variables.  
In particular, the presence of endogeneity arises when multiple processes are related 
to a given time varying covariate (Bell and Jones, 2015). The time varying regressors X’it 
may include two sub-vectors: one that regards the time period t and does not vary over the 
individual entities; and one which regards the differences between those entities i for each t 
(i.e. heterogeneous individual effects). Those parts of the vector of regressors address the 
effects occurring at time t, by treating each individual entity as given, and the effects 
occurring for each individual entity over the whole time period t=1,…,T. In general, when the 
above misspecifications are avoided and unbiased results are obtained under the 
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consideration of those two parts of X’it, the random effects model may appear to be efficient. 
Its significance is important in cases where the fixed effects specification fails to provide 
sufficient interferences, under the assumption of the presence of correlation between the error 
term and the heterogeneous individual effects. 
             The estimation process of the set of regressions presented and analyzed in chapter 4 
takes into account the manufacturing panel data set of this study. Therefore, the fixed and 
random effects models have been applied in most of those regressions. However, it may be 
rather difficult to accurately observe whether the individual effects term appears to be 
correlated with the regressors. Both models will result in different estimations but it may not 
be observed which one will provide the most accurate results
40
. The following section 
provides the econometrical methods that will be employed. The selection of such methods is 
based on the characteristics of the individual entities and the properties of the error term that 
arise in each regression. 
 
5.2.Estimation Tests 
The presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term of a single model 
may result in incorrect inferences under the implication of a number of estimation tests. In 
particular, some problems that may affect the selection of the appropriate test are based on 
the obtained value of the standard errors of the coefficients; the degree of multicollinearity 
observed among the predictor variables; the presence of endogeneity; and the correct 
specification of the model. Those issues reflect a part of the conditions that have to be taken 
into consideration in order to obtain correct inferences. For this reason, the estimators must 
be unbiased, consistent and efficient in order to provide the best available interpretation of 
the explanatory variables’ influence on the dependent variable. Therefore, in this section, the 
estimation methods taken into account in this study are going to be analyzed, mostly based on 
the econometrics textbooks provided by Hayashi (2000) and Wooldridge (2002) and the 
guide of the econometrical software Eviews 8. 
             If a model is assumed under which none of the above problems occur, then the most 
suitable estimation method corresponds to the Least Squares (OLS) estimator. On the one 
hand, the use of this method is strictly connected with a set of assumptions which may be 
                                                          
40
 See Appendix B3 for the relevant diagnostic tests. 
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difficult to occur simultaneously in a single model. On the other hand, if such assumptions 
are satisfied, then the OLS estimator provides the best available inferences for the estimated 
coefficients. In particular, this technique is used for linear regression models in which the 
sum of squares of the vertical distances between the observed and the predicted measures of 
the linear approximation is minimized. It also accounts for any cross-equation restrictions on 
the parameters of the model that may determine the way of estimating the system of 
regressions. If such restrictions are absent, then each regression can be estimated separately
41
. 
By considering, once again, the simple regression form of (54), the distance between the 
observed and the predicted characteristics of the linear model refers to the sum of squares of 
the residual term for each observation 
𝑆𝑆𝑅 = ∑ ?̂?𝑖𝑡
2 = ∑ (𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥
′
𝑖𝑡𝑏)
2 = (𝑦 − 𝑋𝑏)′𝑁𝑖=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 (𝑦 − 𝑋𝑏)                                                    (61) 
where ?̂?𝑖𝑡 is the residual term of the regression model, yit and x’it correspond to the vector of 
the dependent variable and the transpose vector of the independent variable respectively, 
symbol (′) represents the matrix transpose and b denotes the estimator for which the SSR is 
minimized. This estimator reflects the OLS estimator of the 𝛽 coefficient and it is extracted 
by the following expression 
𝑏𝑂𝐿𝑆 = argmin𝑏∈𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑅(𝑏) = (
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑥′𝑖𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1
−1 1
𝑁
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1                                                     (62) 
The SSR(b) function is a quadratic form in respect with the estimator b with a positive-
definite Hessian matrix, by indicating the existence of a unique global minimum under which 
bOLS=b. Therefore, the OLS estimator will be expressed as  
𝑏𝑂𝐿𝑆 = (𝑋
′𝑋)−1(𝑋′𝑦)                                                                                                                                  (63) 
             However, in order for the OLS estimator to provide correct inferences, a set of 
assumptions must be satisfied. Otherwise, the estimations suggested by this method may be 
subject to different types of misspecifications. These assumpitions refer to the linearity of the 
model, the strict exogeneity of the error term and the absence of multicollinearity between the 
regressors, the absence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity from the error term. If all 
                                                          
41
 If the presence of cross-equation restrictions are present, such as cross-equation heteroskedasticity, then the 
cross-equation weighting technique is applied, under which the weighted sum of residuals’ squares is minimized. 
Those weights are the inverse of the estimated standard deviations of vector X and they are derived by dividing 
them to the unweighted parameters of the model.   
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assumpitons are satisfied, then the error term follows normal distribution with zero mean and 
σ2 variance. 
Whenever the assumptions about the error term are valid, then the method which will 
result in unbiased, consistent and efficient estimations refers to the Least Squares technique. 
However, if one of those assumptions, such as the absence of heteroskedasticity and/or serial 
correlation in the error term is not valid, then different techniques must be adopted in order to 
result in correct inferences. The application of those methods depends on the nature of the 
occurring problem within the regression model and the necessary modification that has to be 
made to account for or eliminate those issues. A general case which treats the presence of 
both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term regards the Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) method.  
In particular, the same equation (44) is taken into consideration as before under which 
the error term has a mean equal to zero, but its variance is given by Var(εi|X)=Ω, where Ω is 
a known variance matrix. If the error term appears to have a constant variance σ2ΙΝ and zero 
serial correlation, then the diagonal entries of Ω will be equal to σ2ΙΝ, while the off-diagonal 
entries will be zero. However, if the presence of both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
in the error term is observed, this implies that the error term variance will not be constant 
anymore. In addition, their correlation will be different than zero, by denoting that 
Ε(εi
2
|X)=Ω   σ2ΙΝ and E(εiεJ|X)  0. 
             Given those conditions, it is assumed that an estimator b for the unknown vector of 
coefficients 𝛽  of the regressors X exists, which is different than the OLS estimator. This 
estimator is extracted from the vector of the residual term and therefore, by following a 
similar procedure as in the OLS estimation, it is obtained that 
𝑏𝐺𝐿𝑆 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑏∈𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑅(𝑏) = (𝑦 − 𝑋𝑏)’ 𝛺
−1(𝑦 − 𝑋𝑏)                                                                 (64) 
The GLS technique estimates bGLS by minimizing the squared Mahalanobis (1936) distance 
of the known and unknown parameters of this model in order to extract the GLS estimator 
𝑏𝐺𝐿𝑆 = (𝑋’𝛺
−1𝑋)−1(𝑋’𝛺−1𝑦)                                                                                                                   (65) 
In particular, the GLS estimator, which accounts for the presence of heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation in the variance-covariance matrix Ω, is considered to be unbiased, 
consistent and efficient (BLUE), while the OLS estimator fails to satisfy the last property in 
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such cases. The GLS estimator is also asymptotically normal as it follows the same properties 
as the OLS estimator in a linearly transformed version of the model, where disturbances in the 
Ω matrix arise. Therefore 
√𝑛(𝑏𝐺𝐿𝑆 − 𝛽)
𝑑
→ 𝑁(0, (𝑋′𝛺−1𝑋)−1                                                                                                         (66) 
Τhe equivalence of those two estimators under different conditions may be proved if 
it is consider that Ω=ΒΒ’, where B denotes a Hermitian, positive-definite matrix which is 
comprised by the variance-covariance matrix Ω. Therefore, by multiplying equation (44) with 
the inverse of matrix B, the variance of the new error term u*=uB
-1
 will be equal to the 
identity matrix I, because Var(u*|X)=B
-1Ω(Β-1)’=ΙΝ. For this reason, the coefficient estimator 
b can be easily calculated by applying the OLS technique to the transformed data and 
minimizing the difference between 𝑏∗𝐺𝐿𝑆 − 𝑏𝐺𝐿𝑆, extracted by equation (65). This difference 
indicates the effect of standardizing the scale of errors and thus, the GLS estimator is 
considered as the best linear unbiased estimator for the vector of regressors’ coefficients 𝛽.  
             A different application of this estimator concerns the case under which there is no 
serial correlation in the error term, but there is still evidence for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. This indicates that the off-diagonal entries of the Ω variance-covariance 
matrix will be zero, while the diagonal entries will still be different than σ2ΙΝ. If the 
heteroskedasticity is of known form, then the GLS estimator can be transformed into the 
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimator which corrects for this type of heteroskedasticity.  
             Suppose that there exist a series w, whose values are similar to the reciprocals of the 
error term’s standard deviation (Aitken, 1946). The WLS method uses the series w as weights 
to the estimation of the linear regression in order to correct for heteroskedasticity by initially, 
dividing those weighted series by its mean and subsequently, multiplying the data set of each 
observation by their scaled weights. This procedure is a normalization that appears to have no 
effect on the estimated parameters of the model, but renders the weighted residuals more 
comparable to the unweighted residuals. Therefore, the condition for acquiring the WLS 
estimator is similar to (65), by minimizing the sum of squares residuals 
𝑏𝑊𝐿𝑆 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔min𝑏∈𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑅(𝑏) = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡
2(𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡𝑏)
2𝑁
𝑖=1                                                                  (67) 
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If it is also assumed that W is a diagonal matrix (NxN) which includes the scaled 
weight w along the diagonal and the off-diagonal entries are zero, then the WLS estimator is 
provided by 
𝑏𝑊𝐿𝑆 = (𝑋
′𝑊′𝑊𝑋)−1(𝑋′𝑊′𝑊𝑦)                                                                                                  (68) 
Therefore, by introducing the weighted scales w to treat the presence of heteroskedasticity of 
known form, the WLS method provides efficient estimations, while the variance estimator 
s
2
WLS appears to be consistent, given the fact that  
𝑠2𝑖𝑗,𝑊𝐿𝑆 =
𝑆𝑆𝑅(𝑏𝑊𝐿𝑆)
max (𝑁𝑖,𝑁𝑗)
=
(𝑦𝑖−𝑋𝑖𝑏𝑊𝐿𝑆)
′(𝑦𝑗−𝑋𝑗𝑏𝑊𝐿𝑆)
max (𝑁𝑖,𝑁𝑗)
                                                                                  (69) 
where the max function of Ni and Nj is designed to account for the case of unbalanced data by 
weighting down the covariance terms. This is a fact that renders this estimator as consistent, 
assuming that any missing values are asymptotically negligible.  
             However, a problem which may arise in the case of both GLS and WLS estimations 
regards the fact that both matrices Ω and W may not be easily observed. Generally, the 
covariance of the error term between different entities or periods may not be observable, 
meaning that a different formulation has to be used in order to overcome this kind of problem. 
The most popular technique corresponds to the Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS), 
an implementable transformation of the GLS estimator that takes into consideration an 
estimated version of the variance-covariance matrix. In particular, the FGLS method is 
developed in two steps. In the first step, the regression model is estimated by the OLS 
estimator (or any other consistent but inefficient estimator) in order to extract the residual 
term and build a consistent estimator from the error term variance-covariance matrix. After 
the extraction of the residual term, in the second step the GLS procedure is adopted and 
therefore, results in an unbiased, consistent and efficient estimator similar to the GLS.  
             Nevertheless, the FGLS estimator is considered to be similar to the GLS only in large 
samples. In finite small samples, its properties may not be known or unable to be observed. 
This happens because in small samples the extraction of the FGLS distribution may be very 
difficult due to the very small number of observations compared to the dimension of the 
variance-covariance matrix. This fact may render the computation of the new estimator 
impossible. However, an alternative method under which the accuracy of the FGLS estimator 
can be improved in finite samples is to use the residuals from the FGLS estimation. This 
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action is necessary in order to update the variance-covariance matrix of the error term and 
subsequently, adjust it to the new FGLS estimator to improve its efficiency, such that the 
variance between those two estimators is very small. In particular, the FGLS method takes 
into account the estimated ΩOLS variance-covariance matrix obtained in the first step and 
afterwards, it results in the first FGLS estimator 
' 1 1 ' 1
1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )FGLS OLS OLSb X X X y
                                                                                                 (70) 
where ?̂?𝑂𝐿𝑆 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙(?̂?1
2, … , ?̂?𝑁
2). By extracting the residual term from this model in 
order to obtain the new variance covariance matrix ΩFGLS1, it is known that  ?̂?𝐹𝐺𝐿𝑆1 = 𝑌 −
𝑋𝑏𝐹𝐺𝐿𝑆1. Therefore, the new FGLS estimator will be defined as 
' 1 1 ' 1
2 1 1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )FGLS FGLS FGLSb X X X y
                                                                                                    (71) 
where ?̂?𝐹𝐺𝐿𝑆1 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙(?̂?𝐹𝐺𝐿𝑆1,1
2, … , ?̂?𝐹𝐺𝐿𝑆1,𝑁
2) . This means that under regularity 
conditions both of these FGLS estimators are normally asymptotically distributed with mean 
zero and variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑏𝐹𝐺𝐿𝑆𝑖) = 𝑝 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑁→∞(𝑋’𝛺
−1𝑋|𝑁).  
             In this study, however, the implementation of the (F)GLS and WLS estimators 
depends on the pattern of correlation within and between the residual terms of different 
entities. This implies that based on the nature of that correlation, the variance-covariance 
matrix will be shaped by including different values of variance-covariance estimations. The 
emergence of such correlation refers to the cases of cross-section specific and periodic 
heteroskedasticity on the one hand, while on the other hand, the cases of contemporaneous 
and between period covariance. The reason which those cases are accounted for lies on the 
extraction of the residual weights that can be used to estimate a GLS weighting 
transformation. Subsequently, the re-estimation on the weighted data is calculated until the 
coefficients and weights converge (efficient estimator).  
             The first case addresses the presence of cross-sectional heteroskedasticity, under 
which different residual variances may be allowed for each cross-section, by assuming that 
the residual terms between different cross-sections and time periods are zero. This implies 
that 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡
2|𝑋∗) = 𝜎𝑖
2  and  𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑢𝑗,𝑡−𝑠)|𝑋
∗) = 0 , where 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 , 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠  and X* reflects the 
regressors matrix X. If estimated by assuming fixed/random effects, it also reflects the cross-
section (individual) or periodical effects. By using the cross-section specific residual vector, 
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it is seen that 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑢
′
𝑖|𝑋
∗) = 𝜎𝑖
2𝐼𝑇 , where T denotes the time dimension. Therefore, the steps 
for acquiring the FGLS estimator in this case concerns the extraction of the cross-section 
residual vectors and subsequently, their implementation as weights in a WLS procedure in 
order to obtain efficient FGLS estimations. 
             The second case regards the presence of periodic heteroskedasticity within each 
individual entity. By following the same procedure as before, in this case as well the residuals 
between different cross-sections and periods are assumed to be zero. Therefore, it is obtained 
that 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡
2|𝑋𝑡
∗) = 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2  and  𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑗,𝑡−𝑠|𝑋𝑡
∗) = 0 . By using the period specific residual 
vector in the same procedure described above, it is also found that 𝐸(𝑢𝑡𝑢
′
𝑡|𝑋𝑡
∗) = 𝜎𝑡
2𝐼𝑁, 
where N is the number of individual entities. The estimation of FGLS occurs when the 
weights extracted from this type of heteroskedasticity are used in order to form the weighted 
variance-covariance matrix.  
             The third case concerns the presence of contemporaneous correlation which allows 
for conditional correlation between the residuals for different individual entities, by 
restricting them in different periods to be uncorrelated. The contemporaneous covariances are 
provided by 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑗𝑡|𝑋𝑡
∗) = 𝜎𝑖𝑗 and 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑗,𝑡−𝑠) = 0, under which the correlation between 
the residual terms of different entities is not dependent on time t. By using the period specific 
residual vectors, it is obtained that  𝐸(𝑢𝑡𝑢
′
𝑡|𝑋𝑡
∗) = 𝛺𝑁 for all 𝑡 ∈ [0, … , 𝑇] . The variance-
covariance matrix between the N cross-sections is denoted by ΩΝ, in which the elements 
indicate the FGLS estimations for the system where the residual term is both cross-sectional 
heteroskedastic and contemporaneous correlated. The residual terms are employed from the 
first stage of the estimation (OLS) to obtain an estimate of ΩN, while in the second stage the 
FGLS method is applied in order to acquire efficient estimations. 
             The last case corresponds to the presence of both period heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation in the error term of a given individual entity, but restrains the residuals of 
different cross-sections from being correlated. Therefore, the results of the formulation are 
captured by 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖,𝑡−𝑠|𝑋𝑡
∗) = 𝜎𝑡,𝑡−𝑠 and 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑗,𝑡−𝑠|𝑋𝑖
∗) = 0 , where in this case, 
heteroskedasticity depends on time. By using the cross-section specific residual vectors, it is 
obtained that 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑢
′
𝑖|𝑋𝑖
∗) = 𝛺𝑇 for all 𝑖 ∈ [1, … ,𝑁] . The variance-covariance matrix 
between the time periods T is denoted by ΩT which includes the covariances across periods 
for a given individual entity. When estimating a specification with this matrix, the residual 
terms from the OLS estimation are considered to be subject to both heteroskedasticity and 
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serial correlation. As a result, the FGLS method is applied in order to obtain efficient 
estimations.  
             According to the nature of such problems, the most suitable adjustments must be 
taken into consideration in order to acquire efficient estimates to account for the presence of 
the four aforementioned cases. An additional methodology that can be used in order to 
account for the presence of heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation corresponds 
to the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) method, developed by Zellner (1962). In 
particular, this method regards a generalization of a linear regression model (multivariate 
regression) which takes into consideration the estimation of a set of regressions of the 
form 𝑌 = 𝑋′𝛽 + 𝑢, under the assumption that the vector of regressors strictly consists of 
exogenous regressors. This means that this model accounts for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in the error terms across equations, while 
the estimated entries of the variance-covariance cross-equation matrix are based on the 
estimated parameters of the unweighted system.  
             The set of equations included in this model can be estimated by the SUR estimator 
which will provide both consistent and efficient estimations, while the OLS estimator may 
appear to be consistent but not efficient if it is applied on each equation individually. 
Specifically, the SUR estimator is equivalent to the OLS under two cases. In the first case, 
there must be no contemporaneous correlation between the error terms of different equations. 
In the second case, each equation has to include the same number of exogenous variables, i.e. 
the rows and the columns of the X matrix must be the same. On the other hand, if those 
conditions are not valid, then the SUR estimator will be equivalent to the FGLS method with 
a specific formation of the variance-covariance matrix. 
             In particular, Zellner (1962) assumed a model which includes a set of N regressions 
of the following form 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, i=1,..,N and t=1,…,T                                                                                             (72) 
where i denotes the number of equations of the system, which is fixed, and t corresponds to 
the number of this model’s observations (time periods), which is assumed to be large and thus, 
tend to infinity. This shows that the vector of regressors X is a (NxM) dimension matrix, 
while the remaining vectors have a dimension of (Nx1). The main assumption of this model is 
that the error terms uit are considered to be independent across different time periods, but they 
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may appear to be contemporaneous correlated, as mentioned before. Therefore, these 
assumptions indicate that 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−𝑠|𝑋) = 0, for t  s, while 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑢𝑗𝑡|𝑋) = 𝜎𝑖𝑗, for i  j, 
where Σ=[σij] denotes the (NxN) matrix of skedasticity between cross-equation error terms. 
This means that the variance-covariance matrix of the error term u will be 
𝛺 = 𝐸(𝑢𝑢’|X) = 𝛴 𝐼𝑇                                                                                                                               (73) 
where IT is the (TxT) identity matrix and  represents the Kronecker product (Zehfuss, 1858) 
which is a combination of two matrices of arbitrary size that result in a blocked matrix. In 
other words, the blocked matrix consists of the product of each observation of the one matrix 
multiplied with each observation of the other matrix. 
             Based on those transformations, the SUR model is estimated by applying the FGLS 
procedure and following the two steps procedure as presented above. In the first step, an OLS 
regression is applied on the system of equations (72), from which the residual terms are 
extracted in order to estimate the matrix of skedasticity 𝛴 = ?̂?𝑖𝑗 = (
1
𝑇⁄ )?̂?’𝑖?̂?𝑗 . In the second 
step, the GLS method is applied by regarding the variance-covariance matrix and thus, the 
SUR estimator will be 
𝑏𝑆𝑈𝑅 = (𝑋′(?̂?
−1 𝐼𝑇)𝑋)
−1𝑋′(?̂?−1 𝐼𝑇𝑋)𝑦                                                                                       (74) 
This estimator is considered to be unbiased in small samples, when the error term is assumed 
to have symmetric distribution. On the other hand, in large samples, it is considered to be 
consistent and asymptotically normal with distribution
42
 
√𝑇(𝑏𝑆𝑈𝑅 − 𝛽)
𝑑
→ 𝑁(0, (
1
𝑇
(𝑋′(?̂?−1 𝐼𝑇)𝑋)
−1
))                                                                                (75) 
As a result, the SUR estimator can provide a more efficient alternative in order to account for 
the presence of both heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in the error terms of 
an equation system. The main restriction refers to the fact that the vector of regressors must 
consist of exogenous variables. In the case where at least one of those regressors is 
endogenous, then this model can be generalized into the simultaneous equation model, which 
allows for endogenous variables in matrix X. 
                                                          
42
 For more information, see Amemiya (1985). 
122 
 
             The aforementioned process and estimation techniques have been discussed, under 
the assumption that the error terms of the system regressions appear to be heteroskedastic and 
serially correlated. However, if the problem of endogeneity is identified, then all the above 
techniques will not result in unbiased and consistent estimations and thus, they will not 
provide the best alternative estimator. The most suitable method for this problem is 
considered to be the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation procedure, developed by Wright 
(1921), which results in consistent estimates when at least one of the explanatory variables 
are correlated with the error term (i.e. E(X’u|X)  0).  
             According to Pearl (2003), a reason for this problem may regard the misspecification 
of the regression model, when there are explanatory variables which have not been included. 
Under this case, and given the fact that the error term is homoscedastic and not serially 
correlated, these omitted variables can be used as instruments, in order to obtain consistent 
estimates. In particular, a variable can be considered as an instrument for a specific regression, 
when it is not included in the set of explanatory variables, but it is correlated with at least one 
of them. This means that if two variables are correlated, one included in the regression model 
and another one which is not part of that model, then the latter variable can be used as an 
instrument to obtain the desirable results.  
The second condition that must hold in order for the IV estimation to be adopted, 
regards the fact that the instrument must not be correlated with the error term of the 
regression, in order to avoid the problem of endogeneity. Therefore, the IV estimation is 
regarded as the best alternative technique when there exists an instrument which is correlated 
with at least one (endogenous) explanatory variable and does not appear to be correlated with 
the error term of the regression. 
             Once again, equation (44) is considered to be the regression model, where in this case, 
the set of explanatory variables X is correlated with the error term u. In addition, the error 
term is considered to have a constant variance through time (homoscedastic errors) and no 
serial correlation. If the OLS estimator (62) is used, then 
' 1 ' 1( ) ( ) ( ' ) ( '( )) ( ' ) 'OLSb X X X y X X X X u X X X u 
                                                    (76) 
Whenever the error term is not correlated with the set of regressors X, then by using the 
method of moments, suggested by Pearson (1894), it holds that E(X’u|X)=0). This means that 
E(bOLS)=𝛽, where the OLS estimator is considered to be unbiased and consistent. On the 
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other hand, if the set of regressors X is correlated with the error term, then the OLS estimator 
will be both biased and inconsistent because E(X’u|X)  0 and thus, E(bOLS) ≠ 𝛽. For this 
very reason, a set of instrumental variables z is included in a (NxK) matrix of instruments Z. 
This indicates that the mean of the elements of (44) will be obtained, conditional on z, equal 
to 𝐸(𝑦|𝑧) = 𝛽𝐸(𝑥|𝑦) + 𝐸(𝑢|𝑧). Since the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the 
error term, then E(u|z)=0. Therefore, the IV estimator will be formulated as  
1( ' ) 'IVb Z X Z y
                                                                                                                                      (77) 
This estimator is consistent only when the aforementioned conditions are valid. However, in 
order to take this estimation into account, it is assumed that the size of the instrumental 
matrix Z is equal to the size of the explanatory variables matrix X (NxK). This indicates that 
the model is exactly identified. If the number of instruments is equal to M>K, then the model 
is over-identified and the most suitable estimation methods to use are the Two Stage Least 
Squares or the Generalized Method of Moments, which will be presented below. In the case 
where M<K, the model is under-identified and therefore, it cannot result in consistent 
inferences. 
             A special computational approach of the IV estimation, which is going to be taken 
into consideration in this study, concerns the Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) method, 
developed by Theil (1953) and Basmann (1957). This estimation technique is used to 
calculate the IV estimations in two distinct stages. In the first stage, the 2SLS procedure 
calculates the portion of the endogenous and exogenous variables which can be used as 
instruments by using an OLS regression of each variable on the set of instruments Z. In the 
second stage, a regression of the original equation is estimated, under which both explanatory 
and instrumental variables are replaced by their fitted values estimated during the first stage. 
The coefficients of this regression are the 2SLS estimations. 
             In particular, during the first stage, each column of X on Z is regressed by regarding 
the expression X=Zδ+ε, where the estimation of δ is  𝑑 = (𝑍’𝑍)−1𝑍’𝑋  and ε represents a 
homoscedastic, non-serially correlated error term. The predicted values of this expression are 
indicated as  
?̂? = 𝑍𝑑 = 𝑍(𝑍’𝑍)−1𝑍’𝑋 = 𝑃𝑍𝑋                                                                                                               (78) 
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These values are saved for the second stage of this procedure, under which the original 
regression is estimated, which results in the 2SLS estimator 
𝑏2𝑆𝐿𝑆 = (𝑋’𝑃𝑍𝑋)
−1𝑋’𝑃𝑍𝑦                                                                                                                            (79) 
while the estimated variance-covariance matrix of these estimates is provided by  
 ?̂?2𝑆𝐿𝑆 = 𝑠
2(𝑋’𝑃𝑍𝑋)
−1                                                                                                                                  (80) 
where s
2
 is the estimated residual variance-covariance matrix from the OLS regression. This 
procedure is able to provide consistent estimates when the explanatory variables are 
correlated with the error term, by introducing the use of a set of instruments of the 
aforementioned properties, in order to account for this issue. 
             Nevertheless, as has been mentioned, the use of the IV/2SLS estimation technique 
assumes the absence of heteroskedasticity of any form, along with the absence of serial 
correlation in the error term of each regression. If one or both of those issues co-exist with 
endogeneity, then the IV estimates will not be efficient, thus resulting in underestimated 
standard errors. For this reason, a different transformation of the IV methodology must be 
provided in order to acquire correct inferences which will account for the presence of both 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in the error term of each regression. 
Suppose there are two cases: in the first case there is no contemporaneous correlation 
between the error terms of the system’s regressions but there is evidence of heteroskedasticity. 
In the second case, both of those problems are observed. Based on the methodology that has 
been presented so far, a transformation of the IV or otherwise, the 2SLS method can be based 
on the procedure followed by the WLS estimation, which results in a new estimator called 
Weighted Two Stage Least Squares (W2SLS). 
             In the second case, where the error term is assumed to be both heteroskedastic and 
contemporaneous correlated, in conjunction with the presence of endogeneity, an extended 
estimator of the 2SLS technique is regarded; the Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS). In 
particular, this procedure was developed by Zellner and Theil (1962) which combines the 
2SLS with the SUR methodology. The 3SLS estimator provides consistent and efficient 
properties by applying the SUR implications on a 2SLS procedure of the unweighted system, 
by enforcing any cross-parameter restrictions. The resulting estimates are used to form a full 
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cross-section variance-covariance matrix which is taken into account to transform the 
equations and eliminate cross-equation correlation. 
             In particular, the 2SLS is a single-equation estimator which does not take into 
consideration serial or contemporaneous correlation and thus, it is not fully efficient. On the 
other hand, the 3SLS is a system technique that estimates all the included coefficients of the 
regression model and subsequently, forms weights and re-estimates the model by using the 
estimated weighting matrix
43
. The first two stages are estimated as the ones of the 2SLS as 
described above. In the third stage, the FGLS procedure is applied on the system equations, 
analogous to the SUR procedure. The latter method accounts the OLS residuals to obtain a 
consistent estimate of the cross-section variance-covariance matrix Σ, only when the 
independent variables are exogenous. In any other case, the estimated matrix Σ is inconsistent. 
For this reason, the 3SLS method replaces the OLS with the 2SLS residuals in order to 
account for the presence of endogeneity and therefore, generates a consistent matrix Σ. By 
taking into consideration the 2SLS estimator (79) and by applying the FGLS technique, the 
3SLS estimator is denoted by 
𝑏3𝑆𝐿𝑆 = (𝑍(?̂?
−1 ⊗ 𝑋(𝑋′𝑋)−1𝑋′)𝑍)−1𝑍(?̂?−1 ⊗ 𝑋(𝑋′𝑋)−1𝑋′)𝑦                                                 (81) 
where the elements sij of Σ are given by  
𝑠𝑖𝑗 = ((𝑦𝑖 − 𝑍𝑖𝑏2𝑆𝐿𝑆)′(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑍𝑖𝑏2𝑆𝐿𝑆))/𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑁𝑖 , 𝑁𝑗)                                                                         (82) 
Therefore, the 3SLS estimator by regarding the SUR combined with the 2SLS procedure, 
results in efficient inferences where the estimation of the variance-covariance matrix is 
subject to consistency. 
The last estimation technique which is going to be part of the analysis concerns one 
case under which the number of instruments is greater than the number of regressors. Since 
there has been mentioned that in the case of equality, the IV estimator will result in efficient 
estimates, in this case, the most appropriate estimator is obtained by the Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) method, developed by Hansen (1982). The application of this technique 
is regarded in the context of semi-parametric models, where the parameters are finite-
dimensional and the exact distribution function may not be observable.  
                                                          
43
 This procedure is the endogenous variable case of the SUR estimator, since the regression system and the 
latter method assume that the independent variables must not be correlated with the error term of a single 
equation. 
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In particular, the main point of the GMM estimator represents a theoretical relation 
that all the involving parameters must be able to satisfy. For this reason, this methodology 
tries to provide a set of estimations as close as possible to the actual values of these 
parameters. The estimated parameters are used in order to minimize the weighted distance 
between the theoretical and the actual values. In addition, the GMM estimator is considered to 
be robust due to the fact that it does not require any information about the exact distribution 
of the disturbances. This is a property which renders it more preferable to other estimators. 
             Suppose that the available data set includes T observations (t=1,…,T), where Yt 
corresponds to a N-dimensional multivariate random variable and 𝜃 is a vector of parameters, 
for which the model must provide estimates as close as possible to the actual values. A 
theoretical relationship that these parameters have to satisfy is usually the orthogonality 
conditions between some function 𝑓(𝜃) and a set of instrumental variable zt, such that 
𝑚(𝜃) = 𝐸(𝑓(𝜃)′𝑍) = 𝐸(𝑓(𝑌𝑡, 𝜃))                                                                                                         (83) 
where m is the sample of moments. A general assumption of this estimation technique 
regards the fact that the dependent variables’ set Yt may be obtained by a weakly stationary 
ergodic stochastic process. This means that the error term of such regression is not 
necessarily IID. The estimated sample average of (83) is denoted by  
1
1
ˆ ( ) ( , )
T
t
t
m f Y
T
 

                                                                                                                                      (84) 
Consequently, if this expression is minimized with respect to 𝜃, the estimation of 𝜃0 will be 
very close to its actual value. This outcome is expected because as the number of 
observations T increases, the estimated value of (84) will tend to converge to its actual value 
(83), by indicating that  ?̂?(𝜃) = 𝑚(𝜃) = 0 . This condition shows that in order for this 
equality to exist, there must be at least one 𝜃0 ∈ 𝜃 for which the estimated value will be 
converging towards its actual value, which is equal to zero. The properties of the GMM 
estimator will greatly depend on the nature of the f function, meaning that under this method, 
an entire family of norms is considered for f, defined by 
||?̂?(𝜃)||2
𝐴
= ?̂?(𝜃)′𝐴?̂?(𝜃)                                                                                                                       (85) 
where A is a positive definite weighting matrix, which is computed based on the available 
data set ?̂?. Thus, the GMM estimator can be defined as 
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𝜃 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜃 ?̂?(𝜃)′?̂??̂?(𝜃)                                                                                                           (86) 
This estimator is subject to consistency; it is asymptotically normal and given the weights of 
matrix A it can also be asymptotically efficient according to the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and/or serial correlation. 
             To conclude with, the aforementioned estimation methods have been considered in 
this study due to the emergence of the corresponding problems they are called to correct. 
Given the specification of the four-step regression model analysis and based on the suggested 
estimators under each methodology, the obtained results are considered to be robust to the 
presence of heteroskedasticity, serial and/or contemporaneous correlation and endogeneity. 
Consequently, the next chapter of this study presents the set of regressions, discussed in 
chapter 4, in which the appropriable methodological techniques are applied in order to result 
in correct inferences. Based on the value of those estimates, the competitive conditions and 
the speed of price adjustment in the manufacturing industry will be identified, along with the 
significance that particular variables may appear to have on the Greek economy. 
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6. Empirical Procedure and Results 
This chapter presents the estimations obtained from the equations presented in chapter 4 
which will result in evidence that reflect the market structure and the speed of price 
adjustment of the Greek manufacturing industry. The presentation and analysis of those 
results will be discussed by the following order: initially, the conjectural approach will be 
regarded and thus, the cost, demand and supply functions will be analysed throughout the 
three undertaking steps. Subsequently, the second part refers to the discussion of the pricing 
equation and the degree of price adjustment according to fluctuations in the pricing equation 
factors. The last part includes the equation presented in the fourth step, under which the 
relationship between the speed of price adjustment and a set of market factors suggested by 
previous studies is investigated. Based on those estimates, the market structure of the 
manufacturing sectors and the structure of the whole manufacturing industry is going to be 
identified, in conjunction with the pricing behaviour and its sensitivity to changes in costs
44
. 
 
6.1.The Conjectural Variation Approach 
 
6.1.1. First Step 
The first approach is divided into three different specifications that capture the conjectural 
variation elasticity of the whole manufacturing industry, the 3-digit sectors and each year 
individually over the time period sample. As mentioned before, the reason for considering the 
division of this methodology in three different steps corresponds to the identification of 
market power in terms of production decisions (Bresnahan, 1982, 1989; Lau 1982) which 
denotes the degree of oligopolistic power. The first specification represents the estimation of 
this measure for the whole manufacturing industry over the period 1980-2012 by aggregating 
the panel data set of the 3-digit sectors
45
. It considers the system of equations (25), (25b), 
(25c) and (26), which correspond to the cost, capital share, supply and demand function 
respectively. The index of conjectural variation is captured by the supply function, while in 
                                                          
44
 Such costs in the present study refer to input costs, price adjustment costs, foreign competition in terms of 
price changes and taxes. 
45
 The estimation process of the manufacturing industry does not correspond to a time series analysis. It takes 
into account the panel set of the 3-digit sectors in order to generate the estimates for the aggregate industry. 
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order to obtain such estimation, a set of variables have to be estimated from the cost and 
demand function as well.  
             The estimation method used for the estimation of the system is the 3SLS technique 
due to the emergence of endogeneity, along with the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation in the error terms. In particular, the presence of endogeneity is observed in the 
cost, output, unit cost and sales concentration variables based on the formulation of the cost, 
supply and demand function respectively. Therefore, the instrumental variables taken into 
consideration in the 2SLS procedure correspond to the exogenous input prices of labour and 
capital (w and u) and the lagged values of investment, sales concentration and money supply. 
In addition to these variables, cross-section and time dummy variables are included, along 
with time trend, as indicated by Rezitis and Kalantzi (2012, 2013) so that the number of 
instruments to be at least equal to the number of regressors in each equation. 
             The precedent corresponding test to the estimation method refers to the identification 
of cross-sectional independence between the cross-sections of this sample. The reason for this 
test lies on the fact of choosing between a simple OLS regression, where individual effects do 
not arise between the 3-digit sectors (independency), and a random effects model under the 
alternative hypothesis of cross-section correlation (dependency). If the latter hypothesis is 
valid, then the Hausman test is performed to identify whether the problem of endogeneity 
holds and thus, whether the fixed effects model has to be selected over the random effects 
model
46
. Given the results of these tests, in conjunction with the Likelihood Ratio and the 
Wooldridge test for identifying heteroskedasticity and serial correlation respectively, the 
estimation technique is chosen.  
In the case of the manufacturing industry, the results indicate that the fixed effects 
model is more suitable than the random effects, and given the presence of heteroskedasticity, 
the 3SLS estimation technique will be preferable for the cost and the supply function. 
However, the demand function is not found to be subject to either heteroskedasticity or serial 
correlation. This means that the 2SLS technique would provide consistent and efficient 
estimates without requiring a FGLS transformation. Therefore, the conjectural variation 
                                                          
46
 Initially, the fixed effects approach is conducted by using the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) 
estimation method in order to correct the estimations from heterogeneity bias. The random effects approach is 
conducted by employing the generalized least squares method (GLS) in order to correct the presence of serial 
(between) correlation. 
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system is broken down into two sub-systems; the first one comprises of the cost and supply 
functions while the second one only of the demand function. 
 
Table 2. Estimation of the Cost, Supply and Demand Function in the Greek Manufacturing Industry 
over the period 1980-2012 (Bresnahan Specification).  
Notes: The values in parentheses indicate t-statistics. The numbers in brackets indicate p-values. 
If |z|  |z0.1|=1.645, it indicates significance at the 10% level for a two-tailed t-test. 
If |z|  |z0.05|=1.960, it indicates significance at the 5% level for a two-tailed t-test. 
If |z|  |z0.01|=2.576, it indicates significance at the 1% level for a two-tailed t-test, where z denotes the estimated 
value. 
a
 ak=1-al. gkl=-gll. gky=-gly. 
b 
H0: Cross sectional independence (OLS) versus H1: Cross sectional dependence (Random Effects Model). 
c
 H0: Homoskedasticity (σ
2
1=…σ
2
Τ=σ
2
). 
d
 H0: Random Effects Model versus H1: Fixed Effects Model. 
e
 H0: No first-order serial-correlation [Corr(Δuit. Δuit-1)=-0.5]. 
f
 The F-test is used to test the joint significance of the including regressors. 
1
 Diagnostic tests obtained from the cost function. 
2
 Diagnostic tests obtained from the supply function. 
 
Parameters 
 
Estimations of (25) and (25c) Parameters Estimations of (26) 
a0 8.014872 (67.144500) a (constant) 19.765642 (46.890982) 
ay 0.764166 (52.61546) h (price) -0.982261 (-3.108433) 
ayy 0.127243 (3.644083) h
z
 (investment) 0.208304 (3.588869) 
gly 0.055571 (13.25223) h
H
 (herf) 0.047251 (2.212013) 
gky -0.055571 (-9.736153) h
liq
 (ms) 0.551947 (5.813401) 
al
a 
0.795333 (26.246601)   
ak 0.204667 (4.138255)   
gll
a 
0.084286 (12.07033)   
gkl
a 
-0.084286 (8.138194)   
xt -0.013236 (-2.531320)   
xty  0.001557 (3.201825)   
xtl -0.001731 (-3.196618)    
fman 0.513468 (3.195944)   
 
Estimation 
Method
 
 
3SLS
1
 
 
3SLS
2 
Estimation Method 2SLS 
Breusch-
Pagan Test 
(LM test)
b 
 
 
6.1512 [0.0329]
1 
5.0188 [0.0461]
2 
Breusch-Pagan Test 
(LM test)
b
 
6.2061 [0.0307] 
Likelihood 
Ratio Test
c 
 
130.7746 [0.0000]
1 
142.9185 [0.000]
2 
Likelihood Ratio 
Test
c 
38.9635 [0.9499] 
Hausman 
Test
d 
 
49.7083 [0.0000]
1 
34.7611 [0.0000]
2 
Hausman Test
d 
75.1574 [0.0000] 
Wooldridge 
Test
e 
 
1.0627 [0.3182]
1 
7.0162 [0.0193]
2 
Wooldridge Test
e
 0.8164 [0.5718] 
Wald Test
f
 1757.4126 [0.0000]
1 
13.2793 [0.0003]
2 
Wald Test
f
 14.7990 [0.0000] 
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             The empirical results and the diagnostic tests applied for the manufacturing industry 
(Bresnahan specification) are presented in Table 2. The estimations of the cost, supply and 
demand parameters are obtained as indicated in chapter 4. It is expected that the translog cost 
function must satisfy the conditions of concavity and monotonicity
47
, while the estimated 
parameters must be statistically significant at least at the 5% level of significance. A negative 
relationship between the output and price variables is also expected, if it is assumed that the 
goods produced by the manufacturing industry are normal. 
The value of the estimated parameters along with their sign seem to be consistent with 
economic theory, while all the estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level of 
significance (except from sales concentration). The parameters of the cost function having the 
greatest theoretical importance are considered to be the elasticity of cost with respect to 
output (ay), labour (al) and capital (ak), such that the aforementioned conditions are valid. 
According to the value of these elasticities, the shape of the average cost curve can be defined 
conditional on output. 
             In particular, the elasticity of cost with respect to output is found to be close, but less 
than unity (i.e. ay=0.764166), thus indicating that an increase in output equivalent to 1 
percent, will cause the total cost of the industry to increase by 0.764166 percent. Since the 
elasticity equivalence is less than unity, it can be argued that the industry is characterized by 
economies of scales, which implies that average cost is a declining function with respect to 
output. This means that the manufacturing industry is facing cost advantages due to various 
factors, such as size and/or operating scale because unit cost tends to increase by a slower 
rate than it should be per extra unit of production. In fact, by introducing the formulation 
provided by Brown et al. (1979), the degree of economies of scales is expressed as: 
𝑆𝐶𝐸 = 1 − 𝑎𝑦 − 𝑥𝑡𝑦
∗?̅?                                                                                                                                (87) 
where  ?̅? corresponds to the average value of the time trend of this sample. In the case of the 
manufacturing industry the value of this measure is SCE=0.209365, which is positive and 
                                                          
47
 The condition of concavity implies that the Hessian matrix of the cost function must be negative semi-definite, 
under which each partial derivative of second order must result in a negative value.  A different interpretation of 
this condition implies that all own partial elasticities of substitution as introduced by Allen (1938) and Uzawa 
(1962) are negative at their sample mean. The condition of monotonicity implies that the contribution of inputs 
in the production process must be positive, i.e. al>0 and ak>0, in order for the cost function to be increasing in 
terms of those inputs (positive first-order derivative). 
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thus, provides evidence that the industry is facing a falling average cost curve with respect to 
output
48
.  
             An arguable reason for this outcome may be related to the increasing technological 
progress by investing in fixed capital (or human capital as well) which would result in 
decreasing unit costs. An additional reason may concern a relatively high level of labour 
intensity (or high labour cost share), which could also lead to decreasing costs through an 
increase in total productivity. Based on the available dataset, the highest ratio of investments 
to sales is observed in the 2-digit industry of chemicals and chemical products (i.e. 20) and 
the industries of electrical, machinery and motor equipment (i.e. 27, 28 and 29). On the other 
hand, the industries with the lowest ratio of investments to sales are considered to be the 
industry of food and beverages (i.e. 10), along with the industry of textiles and wearing 
apparel (i.e. 13 and 14). Intuitively, it can be expected that a negative relationship would exist 
between labour and capital intensity, since lack of investments can be substituted by extra 
labour productivity.  
             In addition, even if such negative relationship exists between total labour and capital 
expenses as indicated in Table 2, the intensity of these two measures may not follow the same 
pattern. For instance, in the food and beverages industry, even if there is lack of investments 
in capital improvement, labour intensity tends to fall over the period 2005-2012 as reflected 
by the dataset of the manufacturing industry and IOBE (2013). This fact indicates that either 
the remuneration of the employed is decreasing
49
 by a faster rate than a fall in sales or the 
growth rate of sales is higher than that of remunerations or both of those measures have a 
different sign. However, the intensity of cost factors may also change due to fluctuations in 
sales, even if input costs are fixed. In this case, the level of sales is either increasing or 
decreasing, while the use of inputs remains the same. This outcome may be caused due to a 
                                                          
48
 A negative value of SCE would indicate that the manufacturing industry faces decreasing economies of scale, 
under which an increase in output would cause an approximately same or higher increase in total cost (i.e. 𝑎𝑦 +
𝑥𝑡𝑦 ∗ 17 ≥ 1).  
49
 The remuneration of the employed is expressed in terms of labour man-hours. This indicates that even if 
remunerations are decreased, labour man-hours may decrease as well, remain the same or even increase. The 
former case reflects a positive relationship between these two measures, which may refer to an investment 
oriented industry that chooses to reduce its labour force. However, the two latter cases address a flexible 
negative relationship which might be observed in markets with excess labour supply, thus being independent of 
investing decisions. 
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boost in total productivity by the present labour force or due to the inability of industries to 
change their inputs (i.e. because of rigid contracts)
50
. 
             Furthermore, there exist two additional elements of the translog cost function that 
have to be identified. They refer to the value of ayy, gly and gky which denote the presence of 
homogeneity and homotheticity respectively. In order for homogeneity to hold, a change in 
the elasticity of cost with respect to output, as output changes, is denoted by ayy and has to be 
equal to zero. On the other hand, homotheticity renders necessary that the sum of any change 
in the elasticity of cost with respect to every input, as output changes, must be equal to zero 
as well.  
As presented in Table 2, the production function of the manufacturing industry 
appears to be consistent with the property of homotheticity, because gly+ gky=0; however, the 
property of homogeneity does not hold, since ayy=0.127243  0. A value of ayy which is 
different than zero indicates that any scale effect will start to run out as output reaches 
sufficiently high levels. This means that given the fact that economies of scales persist, under 
which ay<1 at low output levels, the average cost curve will appear to have a U-shape. This 
happens because the partial second-order derivative denoted by ayy shows that there exist a 
local minimum for the total cost curve. Additionally, cost elasticity with respect to output is 
equivalent to the ratio of marginal over average cost (MC/AC). Consequently, economies of 
scale suggest that marginal cost is below average cost, which in turn suggests that the average 
cost is falling with respect to output (Zardkoohi, Rangan and Kolari, 1986). 
The following significant set of results concerns the estimates of cost elasticity with 
respect to labour and capital unit costs, the two inputs included in this analysis. In Table 2, it 
is seen that the sum of these measures (i.e. al= 0.795333 and ak= 0.204667) is equal to unity. 
This outcome confirms the assumption that a proportional increase in the price of every input 
causes a shift of the cost curve by the same amount, while output is held constant. However, 
an important factor in the translog cost function is the value of inputs as a share of total cost. 
In order to calculate the cost share measures, the following equations are taken into 
consideration: 
 
                                                          
50
 Generally, it holds that changes in factor intensity depend on the technology of production, the elasticity of 
substitution between input factors and the pattern of relative input prices over a period. 
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𝐿𝐶𝑆 = 𝑎𝑙 + 𝑥𝑡𝑙 ∗ ?̅?                                                                                                                            (88) 
𝐶𝐶𝑆 = 1 − 𝐿𝐶𝑆 = 1 − (𝑎𝑙 + 𝑥𝑡𝑙 ∗ ?̅?)                                                                                            (89) 
             The values of labour and capital cost share are equal to LCS=0.765906 and 
CCS=0.234094 respectively, an outcome suggesting an approximately 75% use of labour in 
production, while the use of capital is determined at a 25% level. The positive value of labour 
and capital inputs indicates that their share has a positive effect on the total cost of the 
industry. Also, since their sum is equal to unity, it is shown that there is no misspecification 
of the translog cost function. If that sum was less than unity, it would mean that either the 
variable of total cost lacks labour and capital data, or there exist additional input factors 
which have not been taken into consideration. Additionally, since cost elasticity with respect 
to labour and capital unit costs is positive, then input shares increase with their prices. The 
higher the contribution of a particular input to the total cost function, the higher its demand 
inelasticity will be, since al and ak express the effect of a change in labour and capital unit 
costs respectively on total cost
51
. Therefore, given that the share of labour is 75%, then its 
demand can be considered to be strongly inelastic in the production process of the Greek 
manufacturing industry. 
  The remaining parameters of the translog cost function refer to the trend of total cost 
and its elasticity with respect to output and unit labour cost respectively, in order to identify 
their path over the period sample 1980-2012. The percentage change of total cost with respect 
to time trend, denoted by xt, shows evidence in favour of a significant reduction by 0.013236 
from 1980 until 2012. However, this fact does not mean that Ct has declined individually, but 
rather the ratio of total cost to unit capital cost. Therefore, the falling trend xt is the result of 
either a faster increasing unit capital cost compared to a slower increasing total cost or a 
faster declining total cost compared to a slower declining unit capital cost (or a combination 
of both cases).  
In addition, the value of xty and xtl, which correspond to the elasticity of total cost with 
respect to the sum of output and unit labour cost with the time trend, appears to be equal to 
0.001557 and -0.001731 respectively. Such results suggest that changes in output have a 
significant positive but very low effect on total cost over time, while changes in unit labour 
                                                          
51
 The parameters gll and gkl denote a change in the elasticity of cost with respect to labour and capital 
respectively, as labour unit cost changes. This means that if the translog cost function is homogenous with 
respect to inputs, then these variables must satisfy the condition gll+ gkl=0, since they reflect the partial second-
order derivative of total cost to labour and the cross-partial derivative of gk to labour. 
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cost appear to have a significant but very low negative effect on total cost over time as well. 
The necessity of these estimates lies on the calculation of the degree of economies of scales 
and labour cost share respectively. This indicates that output and unit labour cost over time 
appear to have an opposite, but very low, effect on total cost over 1980-2012. 
             The second function of the estimated set corresponds to the demand function and 
particularly, the effects of pricing, investment, sales concentration and liquidity upon 
production decisions. As aforementioned, the concept of endogeneity appears in the variable 
of sales concentration and therefore, the 2SLS estimation technique is selected. The value of 
the Bresuch-Pagan test provides evidence that the null hypothesis of cross-sectional 
independence is rejected. This means that contemporaneous correlation exists between the 
error terms of the manufacturing sectors for the demand function. As a result, either the 
random or the fixed effects model will be used in order to validate the presence of 
endogeneity in the demand equation. The Hausman test provides evidence in favour of the 
fixed effects approach over the random effects and thus, it supports the presence of 
endogeneity within the 3-digit sectors. Lastly, the likelihood test for heteroskedasticity and 
the Wooldridge test for serial correlation in the error term of each entity respectively do not 
reject the null hypothesis. This suggests that the residual terms of the demand function appear 
to be homoscedastic and no serially correlated. 
             By taking into consideration the results of the diagnostic tests, the demand function is 
estimated under the 2SLS technique, without applying FGLS as a third step, since both 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are absent. The estimates obtained by this method are 
both individually and jointly significant at the 1% level of significance (excluding the 
endogenous variable of sales concentration) based on the indicated values of the t-statistic 
and the F-statistic. In particular, the industry elasticity of output with respect to price appears 
to be negative and equal to h=-0.982261. Since the absolute value of the elasticity index is 
less than unity, the demand curve of the manufacturing industry appears to be marginally 
inelastic because a change in price by 1% will reduce net output of the industry by 
approximately 0.98%. The proportional change is less than 1 and therefore, producers may 
exert a degree of overpricing behaviour whenever a change in the price and output level 
results in higher profit rates.  
An additional interpretation of the aforementioned elasticity value lies on the nature 
of the manufacturing industry’s products and the needs of consumption they are called to 
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satisfy. As presented in Table A, many of the constituent sectors supply products that are 
considered to be highly important for the satisfaction of people’s primary needs, such as food 
and clothing. Under the assumption that many related goods produced in the Greek economy 
are part of the same 3-digit sector, it would be very difficult for consumers to change their 
consumption level or turn to substitute goods, if there exist any. For this reason, changes in 
the price level of such products may not result in greater changes in their consumption level 
and thus, their production. 
             The second estimate concerns the elasticity of output with respect to investments. 
The theoretical intuition behind the selection of such variable in the demand function refers to 
the fact of whether consumers tend to change their preferences given the undertaking 
investments of a particular sector. Such action would provide evidence that consumers may 
prefer quality (reflected by higher price) over quantity by gaining higher satisfaction in the 
former rather than the latter case. For instance, low price products may be viewed as low 
quality products, assuming this is not a result of intense competition. Consequently, they may 
not satisfy the same needs of consumption as a higher priced product in which a certain 
amount of resources has been invested. The interpretation of this elasticity measure, if 
positive, would suggest two different results: the first one concerns the preferences of 
consumers for products supplied by sectors that appear to be investing in their production; 
and the second one refers to investment decisions as a result of an increase in demand for the 
supplied product of a particular sector
52
. Either way, investment in capital equipment that 
results in production improvement may draw consumers’ attention and motivate them to 
choose the products of such sectors. 
             In fact, the estimate for the manufacturing industry provides evidence that the 
elasticity of output with respect to investment is equal to h
z
=0.208304. This means that an 
increase in the level of investment by 1% in the manufacturing industry has led to an increase 
by approximately 0.20% in aggregate output over the period 1980-2012. This outcome 
provides evidence that changes in the level of investment can lead to significant, but inelastic 
changes in net output. This measure appears to be in favour of a causation by investment to 
output. Consequently, this value suggests that investment decisions are important for the 
Greek manufacturing industry because investment can lead to increased production. 
                                                          
52
 However, it can also be assumed that if the latter case holds, an expansion of investment in capital equipment 
would not be the only way of an increase in production. An additional increase could be invested in wages or 
additional labour force by enhancing total productivity and thus, total production. 
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             The third estimate refers to the sales concentration indicator, as presented in section 
4.1. This particular index provides an interpretation of market concentration in terms of sales 
rather than production level, in order to test whether a higher volume of sales leads to 
changes in net output. The sign of the elasticity of output with respect to the current measure 
of concentration can determine whether these two variables can move in the same direction. 
On the one hand, if that elasticity is positive, then a larger concentration index leads to a 
higher volume of production. This outcome indicates that output and concentration move in 
the same path and based on the value of elasticity, the effect of changes in the latter variable 
can be identified by changes in the former variable.  
             For instance, if elasticity of output with respect to concentration is greater than unity, 
then an increase in sales concentration caused by an increase in sales of an individual sector 
(numerator) or by a reduction in industrial sales (denominator) will lead to higher production. 
This may indicate an increase in demand for the products of that sector, assuming that its 
price has remained fixed. A different interpretation may address an increase in sales 
concentration due to a fall in the industrial price level. This effect would mean that a higher 
level of output results from a price reduction which may lead to an increase in quantity 
demanded for that industry’s products and therefore, cause an increase in production. 
However, if that elasticity value is positive and less than unity, then the intensity of increased 
production will be less than a proportional increase of the concentration index. 
On the other hand, if the value of elasticity of output with respect to sales 
concentration is negative, an increase in concentration will lead to a lower volume of output. 
That effect would suggest the presence of waste in production caused by two effects: an 
increase in the price level by a number of individual sectors (in conjunction with the 
declining level of production); or a higher fall in industrial output rate in comparison with 
changes in the industrial price level. In the former case the numerator would increase by a 
higher rate than the denominator, while in the latter case, the denominator would decline by a 
higher rate than any change of the numerator. Either way, when this particular elasticity index 
appears to be negative, then output is increased/decreased due to a reduction/increase of sales 
concentration. 
             The value of the elasticity of output with respect to sales concentration for the 
manufacturing industry over the period 1980-2012 is found to be equal to h
H
=0.047251, 
which is significant at the 5% level of significance. This particular value provides evidence 
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that concentration and output decisions appear to have a positive sign but their relationship is 
highly inelastic. This estimate suggests that if the manufacturing industry becomes more 
concentrated in terms of sales, then its net output will increase by a very small percentage 
equal to 0.047251. Therefore, sales concentration and output decisions may appear to be 
positively correlated, however, their connection has been found to be very weak. This could 
indicate that changes in the present concentration index of the Greek manufacturing industry 
may be dominated by changes in the price level rather than changes in quantity produced.  
The fourth estimate corresponds to the effects of liquidity in the Greek economy and 
in this case, in the Greek manufacturing industry, expressed in terms of money supply (M2). 
The studies of Rezitis and Kalantzi (2012, 2013) take into consideration Gross National 
Income (GNI) as an index of income in order to identify its effect on production decisions 
and thus, on observed demand. As explained in section 4.1, the present study treats the 
measure of money supply as a liquidity rather than income factor. This happens to identify 
whether any changes in available liquidity can cause a change in the level of demand for the 
products of the manufacturing industry. This particular indicator has been selected because 
money is considered to be perfectly liquid and thus, it can be used for immediate transactions.  
On the other hand, GNI reflects the level of income as argued by Todaro and Smith 
(2011), which is defined as the desirable level of consumption and savings obtained, given 
that all necessary expenses have been deducted. This means that savings or investments (if 
any) may not be immediately retrievable, a fact that may postpone consumption. Therefore, 
the GNI indicator does not provide a general view of liquidity flow in aggregate economy as 
money supply, and for this reason it is replaced in the present study. In addition, the measure 
of money supply reflects the aggregate amount of money that has flown in the Greek 
economy over the period 1980-2012 without distinguishing between consumption, savings or 
expenses. It is a general indicator that is used to capture any changes in the available level of 
liquidity to production decisions and thus, to net output of the manufacturing industry. 
             Elasticity of output with respect to money supply may appear to have a positive or an 
insignificant sign; however, it is rather unlikely to have a negative sign. In particular, a 
negative sign would mean that an increase in available liquidity of consumers through an 
increase of money supply would lead to a fall in net output or otherwise, to a reduction in 
total value added. This would indicate, given that consumers have a higher amount of money 
that consumption has shifted from the manufacturing to a different industry. This outcome 
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could not be consistent with reality because there is no other industry that can be considered 
as a substitute to the manufacturing industry
53
. 
             Consequently, it is expected that the current elasticity index will be positive. Indeed, 
elasticity of output with respect to money supply is found to be significant at the 1% level of 
significance and equal to 0.551947. This value provides evidence of a positive relationship 
between output and money supply by indicating that changes in money supply appear to have 
an inelastic effect on manufacturing output decisions over the period 1980-2012. In particular, 
an increase in money supply by 1 percent results in an increase of manufacturing output by 
0.55 percent. This means that the sensitivity of the manufacturing industry to additional 
liquidity is more than one half of that extra amount of money. This outcome, in conjunction 
with the aforementioned elasticity measures, verifies the argument that the Greek 
manufacturing industry is very important to the Greek economy because it serves the primary 
needs of consumers. 
             The last equation which is taken into consideration in the first step’s system is the 
supply function (25c) in order to estimate the conjectural variation elasticity of the 
manufacturing industry over the period 1980-2012. By definition of the supply function of 
this form, the estimation process necessitates the use of the elasticity of output with respect to 
price for the industry, which is found to be h=-0.982261. When this value is substituted in the 
supply equation, the estimation process can occur such that the index of competition, 
conjectural variation elasticity, to be extracted. The 3SLS estimation technique is used, given 
the presence of both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term φ2t, in 
conjunction with the presence of endogeneity caused by the variables of unit costs and output. 
The Breusch-Pagan LM test is found to be significant at the 5% level of significance, by 
suggesting the presence of cross-sectional dependence in the supply function of the 
manufacturing industry as well. Additionally, given that the Hausman test suggests once 
again the consideration of the fixed effects model, the estimation process of the system
54
 is 
performed by using the 2SLS technique and subsequently, by applying the FGLS 
transformation to correct for both heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. 
                                                          
53
 In addition to this argument, Betti et al (2007) showed that a significant proportion of Greek households over 
1990-2000 were indeed liquidity constrained. 
54
 The system refers to equations (25), (25a), (25b) and (25c).The diagnostic tests were conducted for the total 
cost and supply function separately in order to identify the properties of the error terms. 
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             The conjectural variation elasticity fi, given its definition, expresses an indicator of 
competitiveness in a particular sector, according to the contribution of an individual sector in 
terms of production, to the output level of the whole industry. The value of this contribution 
ranges between 0 and 1, where the former value indicates conditions of perfect competition, 
while the latter one indicates a monopolistic structure. In the case of the Greek manufacturing 
industry overall, conjectural variation elasticity is found to be equal to fman=0.513468, which 
is a significant estimate at the 1% level of significance.  
             This particular estimate ranges between 0 and 1, a result consistent with theory, while 
it also provides evidence that there exist a degree of imperfect competition in the 
manufacturing industry. Bresnahan (1982) supported that the higher the value of this measure, 
the higher the degree of concentration in that market. This means that a value of conjectural 
variation equal to 0.5 would indicate that the particular industry behaves in terms of a 
duopoly. This holds because a change in production of each individual sector on average 
would cause the same increase in total output equal to one half. Therefore, a value of 
0.513468 in the Greek manufacturing industry provides evidence of a significant degree of 
imperfect competition, under which the individual sectors on average appear to have a value 
of conjectural variation elasticity similar to the one of duopoly. This means that the Greek 
manufacturing industry is either dominated by a few large 3-digit sectors or by a few large 
producers operating in particular sectors, or both.  
             The results obtained from the translog cost, demand and supply function for the 
whole manufacturing industry over the period 1980-2012 provide evidence in favour of 
imperfect competitive conditions, given the value of conjectural variation elasticity. In 
addition to this result, price demand elasticity is found to be inelastic, while investment, sales 
concentration and money supply indicators are found to have a significant positive, but highly 
inelastic effect on industrial output. The value of these measures which have been taken into 
account in the demand function can justify the presence of imperfect competition in the 
manufacturing industry. Inelastic values may lead to a degree of market power since 
producers may be able to observe that changes in their pricing decisions may result in lower 
percentage changes in quantity demanded and thus, try to acquire higher levels of profit. 
Either way, this step has provided an overall interpretation of the manufacturing industry in 
terms of production decisions, including 56 3-digit sectors over 33 years. For this reason, two 
additional steps will be presented, under which the examination of each individual sector and 
each year will be tested respectively. 
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6.1.2. Second Step 
The second specification of the conjectural variation approach refers to the panel estimation 
of conjectural variation elasticity of each constituent 3-digit sector. As in the first step, the 
cost function (25) along with the cost share equations of labour and capital (25a) and (25b) 
are taken into account. However, the supply and demand functions used in the first step are 
transformed in order to fit in the 3-digit level panel analysis which will reflect the estimates 
of the manufacturing sectors. 
In this step, as mentioned in section 4.2.1, a cross sectional dummy variable DSi 
(i=1,..,k), which is set to unity for the i sector and zero otherwise, is going to be added in the 
aforementioned supply and demand functions to capture the individual effects of each sector. 
Therefore, the equations of supply and demand are transformed into (32) and (33) 
respectively which incorporate the cross-sectional specification of this study. This 
specification of panel data analysis has been chosen over an individual time series analysis 
under which the demand equation would be estimated for each sector separately. The main 
reason for choosing the panel data approach lies on the presence of cross-sectional 
dependency between the error terms of the individual entities. If there is evidence of such 
dependency, then the cross-sectional specification of panel data analysis can take into 
account that form of dependency by applying either the fixed or the random effects model. 
             As in the previous step, the system of the cost, demand and supply function must be 
estimated and thus, the indicators of conjectural variation elasticity have to be obtained. For 
this reason, it is necessary to extract the value of price elasticity of each sector and 
particularly, the value of elasticity of aggregate output with respect to each 3-digit sector’s 
wholesale price level. However, since the demand equation consists of four explanatory 
variables (i.e. wholesale price, investment, sales concentration and liquidity indicator), it 
would not be feasible to estimate the cross-sectional effects of each variable simultaneously. 
This holds because the number of regressors would exceed the number of instruments and 
therefore, the model would be under-identified. For this reason, the demand function is 
divided into four equations, where each one of them satisfies the assumption of ceteris 
paribus.  
In particular, the equation set of (33) consists of four equations. The first equation 
allows the estimation of the price elasticity indicator of each 3-digit manufacturing sector 
over the period 1980-2012, but it constraints the estimation of the three remaining variables 
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to an average long-run value. This means that the remaining variables reflect an average 
estimation of the 56 constituent manufacturing sectors over the period 1980-2012
55
. The 
second equation treats investment decisions as the cross-sectional variable, and so on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
55
 Note that such estimations are not equivalent to the ones provided by equation (26). The latter equation results 
in estimates reflecting the whole manufacturing industry, while the estimates of (33) result in an average value 
of the constituent 56 3-digit sectors of this analysis when individual effects are accounted for each sector. 
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Table 3. Estimations of the Demand Function of the 3-digit Sectors in the Greek Manufacturing 
Industry over the period 1980-2012 (Bresnahan Cross-Sectional Specification) 
Parameters Estimation of (33): First regression Estimation of (33): Second regression 
a (constant) 18.227654 (12.26058) 18.372131 (13.514238) 
h (price) - -0.969517 (-4.431229) 
h
z
 (investment) 0.226404 (5.413808) - 
h
H
 (herf) -0.055765 (-2.233745) -0.022645 (-2.097789) 
h
liq
 (ms) 0.476254 (4.483182) 0.527516 (3.845215) 
h101|h
z
101 -0.952531 (-5.000731) 0.218583 (3.682585) 
h’102|h’
z
102 -0.789774 (-4.527045) 0.140618 (1.691878) 
h’103|h’
z
103 -1.061923 (-5.997912) 0.246652 (3.964877) 
h’104|h’
z
104 -0.954497 (-5.056293) 0.219088 (3.891635) 
h’105|h’
z
105 -0.842937 (-4.822564) 0.226383 (3.911973) 
h’106|h’
z
106 -0.901376 (-4.901627) 0.192472 (2.701135) 
h’107|h’
z
107 -1.049981 (-5.995958) 0.183651 (2.511825) 
h’108|h’
z
108 -0.842638 (-4.834071) 0.254136 (4.079477) 
h’109|h’
z
109 -0.877128 (-4.898470) 0.256665 (4.094659) 
h’110|h’
z
110 -0.761936 (-4.434082) -0.003641 (-0.485806) 
h’120|h’
z
120 -0.870744 (-5.680441) 0.230965 (2.511402) 
h’131|h’
z
131 -0.986032 (-5.836623) 0.282952 (4.271138) 
h’132|h’
z
132 -0.799842 (-5.645146) 0.212122 (3.180135) 
h’139|h’
z
139 -0.885056 (-5.916582) 0.239366 (3.849333) 
h’141|h’
z
141 -1.445907 (-6.523222) 0.228721 (3.436184) 
h’143|h’
z
143 -1.057333 (-5.968075) 0.213362 (3.112401) 
h’151|h’
z
151 -0.884947  (-5.614131) 0.226746 (3.865178) 
h’152|h’
z
152 -0.917940 (-5.805087) 0.255191 (4.099595) 
h’161|h’
z
161 -0.855978 (-5.867018) 0.132051 (2.022143) 
h’162|h’
z
162 -0.940651 (-5.901258) 0.164289 (2.165547) 
h’171|h’
z
171 -1.124961 (-6.362332) 0.271991 (4.125107) 
h’172|h’
z
172 -1.290055 (-6.427803) 0.265709 (4.137404) 
h’192|h’
z
192 -0.908495 (-5.811596) 0.283347 (4.386759) 
h’201|h’
z
201 -0.827914 (-5.492551) 0.179044 (2.270926) 
h’202|h’
z
202 -0.861758 (-5.595018) -0.125477 (-2.930603) 
h’203|h’
z
203 -0.818619 (-5.576136) 0.220679 (3.706848) 
h’204|h’
z
204 -0.744985 (-5.180191) 0.225298 (3.754735) 
h’205|h’
z
205 -0.729280 (-4.985732) 0.141897 (2.018199) 
h’221|h’
z
221 -1.070195 (-5.975562) 0.111307 (1.859751) 
h’222|h’
z
222 -1.285984 (-6.479175) 0.188123 (2.299697) 
h’231|h’
z
231 -1.519206 (-6.881614) -0.032534 (-1.973403) 
h’233|h’
z
233 -1.435121 (-6.729528) -0.028275 (-1.884414) 
h’234|h’
z
234 -1.249278 (-6.164139) -0.057056 (-2.063649) 
h’235|h’
z
235 -1.146913 (-6.032616) 0.167058 (2.053447) 
h’236|h’
z
236 -1.633038 (-7.045673) 0.190394 (2.228056) 
h’237|h’
z
237 -1.047770 (-5.836492) -0.022641 (-2.042773) 
h’239|h’
z
239 -1.349345 (-6.371013) 0.147669 (2.002506) 
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(Table 3 continue) 
h’241|h’
z
241 -0.880851 (-5.842858) 0.212362 (3.595069) 
h’242|h’
z
242 -0.831536 (-5.737318) 0.223098 (3.687359) 
h’243|h’
z
243 -0.881054 (-5.851643) -0.062241 (-2.335382) 
h’244|h’
z
244 -0.920842 (-5.924564) -0.026375 (-2.109596) 
h’251|h’
z
251 -0.906673 (-5.908401) 0.001906 (0.604807) 
h’252|h’
z
252 -0.910975 (-5.906493) 0.150812 (2.064741) 
h’253|h’
z
253 -0.829649 (-5.717329) 0.242318 (3.551509) 
h’257|h’
z
257 -0.840842 (-5.722714) 0.189142 (2.225731) 
h’259|h’
z
259 -0.900367 (-5.896523) 0.263597 (4.499264) 
h’271|h’
z
271 -1.027825 (-5.984226) 0.225135 (4.012668) 
h’273|h’
z
273 -1.113791 (-6.021342) 0.192617 (2.245638) 
h’274|h’
z
274 -1.195172 (-6.061394) 0.131659 (2.083795) 
h’275|h’
z
275 -1.097168 (-6.028376) 0.007772 (0.999341) 
h’281|h’
z
281 -1.044960 (-5.951689) 0.178251 (2.143513) 
h’282|h’
z
282 -1.026055 (-5.934536) 0.213505 (3.861793) 
h’283|h’
z
283 -1.011110 (-5.874053) 0.182474 (2.191317) 
h’289|h’
z
289 -1.173291 (-6.065186) 0.228719 (4.036404) 
h’292|h’
z
292 -1.038342 (-5.946828) 0.189825 (3.745407) 
h’310|h’
z
310 -0.867587 (-5.804937) 0.199671 (3.889384) 
Estimation Method 3SLS 3SLS 
Breusch and Pagan Test 
(LM Test) 
3.2512 [0.0791] 
3.5187 [0.0692] 
Likelihood Ratio Test 235.3432 [0.0000] 286.3918 [0.0000] 
Hausman Test 64.2573 [0.0000] 54.1294 [0.0000] 
Wooldridge Test 0.0915 [0.7918] 0.1183 [0.7895] 
Wald Test 8.3827 [0.0000] 10.7146 [0.0000] 
Notes: See notes in Table 1. 
The values presented in this table correspond to the total value of each elasticity index, as the sum between the 
sector 101 and the change of the corresponding sector i (i.e. h’i=h101+hi). 
 
             The results are presented in Tables 3 and 4. As in equation (26), the presence of 
endogeneity between the explanatory variables (excluding Pt) and output does not allow the 
use of the OLS estimation method. This means that the necessity for the inclusion of 
instruments corresponds to the application of the 2SLS estimation method. Table 3 presents 
the estimated equations by considering the wholesale price (Pt) and the investment level (Zt) 
as the cross-sectional variables. In particular, the Breusch-Pagan LM test is found to be 
insignificant at the 5% level of significance by indicating the presence of cross-sectional 
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independency
56
. Additionally, the likelihood ratio and the Wooldridge test provide evidence 
in favour of the presence of both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at any conventional 
level of significance. Therefore, both equations are estimated by employing the FGLS 
estimation method. However, given the presence of endogeneity, the 3SLS estimation 
technique is used in order to treat the issue of endogeneity and subsequently, the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
The estimates obtained by the first equation of (33) treat the wholesale price indicator 
as the cross-sectional variable. Therefore, the indexes of investment, sales concentration and 
liquidity reflect an average value of the constituent 3-digit sectors over the sample period 
1980-2012. In particular, elasticity of aggregate output with respect to investment and 
liquidity are found to be significant at any conventional level of significance and their values 
are consistent with the extracted estimates of (26). Elasticity of aggregate output with respect 
to sales concentration has been found to be significant at the 5% level of significance; 
however, its value is negative and equal to -0.055765, which is different from the estimate 
obtained for the whole manufacturing industry during the first step. Such value indicates that 
under this particular cross-sectional specification, the 3-digit sectors of this sample on 
average face an inelastic reduction in aggregate production as they become more 
concentrated in terms of sales. More details about the relationship between aggregate 
production and sales concentration will be provided below, where the latter index will be 
considered as the cross-sectional variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
56
 However, since the estimations of the Breusch-Pagan LM test are significant at the 10% level of significance 
and the remaining demand equations result in significant results at the 5% level of significance, the cross-
sectional specification of panel data analysis is chosen. 
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Figure 1: Elasticity of nominal wholesale price with respect to output of the 3-digit manufacturing 
sectors over 1980-2012. 
 
 
The inclusion of a cross-sectional dummy variable, as mentioned before, results in 
individual estimations of the elasticity of aggregate output with respect to wholesale price of 
each constituent 3-digit sector of this study. In particular, all of the estimates are significant at 
any conventional level of significance and their value is less than unity. As in the first step, 
the price elasticity index for each sector is inelastic by reflecting that positive (negative) 
fluctuations in wholesale pricing decisions of each sector will result in negative (positive) 
fluctuations in aggregate production by a lower percentage. The reason for this outcome, as 
argued in the previous step, lies on the fact that the products of the manufacturing industry 
are considered to be important for consumption. The estimates of price elasticity of this 
sample range between -0.729280 and -1.633038. This set of estimates provides evidence in 
favour of the main assumption of this study that the constituent 3-digit manufacturing sectors 
are crucial to domestic consumption. 
             In particular, the most inelastic estimates have been obtained by the sectors of 
chemical products (i.e. 205), of cleaning and polishing preparations (i.e. 204) and of 
beverages (i.e. 110). On the other hand, the most elastic estimates fluctuate around 1.6 and 
result from the sectors of articles of concrete, cement and plaster (i.e. 236), of glass and glass 
products (i.e. 231) and of wearing apparel (i.e. 141). The remaining sectors, as illustrated in 
figure 1, fluctuate around 0.9 on average. This means that sectors facing a relatively low price 
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elasticity index may be able to charge higher prices in contrast to sectors which are found to 
have a higher price elasticity indicator. The group of sectors experiencing the lowest absolute 
elasticity is the group of chemical products (i.e. 20) and the group of furniture (i.e. 31). On 
the other hand, the groups which have been found to have the highest absolute value of 
elasticity refer to the group of non-metallic mineral products (i.e. 23) and the group of 
wearing apparel (i.e. 14). 
             On the basis of theory and intuition, the index of price elasticity could be an indicator 
of market power and a mean of consumer surplus exploitation for every sector, especially 
when the particular elasticity index is less than unity. However, an approach which is 
considered to be closer to reality has to incorporate additional variables that might result in 
contradicting results. Regardless the value of the estimates extracted from this equation, the 
same procedure has to be repeated for the remaining indicators in order to observe their 
behaviour. The main reason of this part is to understand the decision process of both 
producers and consumers which result from their interactions in the market of manufacture. 
             The second indicator which is treated as the cross-sectional variable in the second 
regression of (33) corresponds to the level of investments undertaken by each sector of the 
manufacturing industry over the period 1980-2012. Therefore, as in the previous case, the 
remaining three variables (i.e. Pt, Herft and MSt) are considered as fixed across the 
manufacturing industry over the same period. In particular, the average value of elasticity of 
aggregate output with respect to the wholesale price index is -0.769517, which is consistent 
with the estimations for the whole manufacturing industry. Sales concentration elasticity 
corresponds to a negative value -0.022645 as in the first equation of the demand set by 
indicating that the sectors of this study face a highly inelastic reduction in aggregate 
production as they become more concentrated in terms of sales. Lastly, liquidity elasticity is 
0.527516, a value which is also consistent with the aforementioned estimations. 
             The cross-sectional estimates of investment elasticity obtained for the 3-digit 
manufacturing sectors of this study vary in terms of significance. In particular, elasticity of 
aggregate output with respect to investment for sectors 102, 110, 221, 233, 251 and 275 is not 
found to be significant at the 5% level of significance. This outcome indicates that in the 
particular sectors, investment decisions did not result in additional significant changes in the 
level of the manfuacturing industry’s output. On the other hand, the estimates obtained for the 
remaining manufacturing sectors are found to be significant at least at the 5% level of 
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significance. The value of the estimated elasticities range between -0.125477 and 0.283347, 
where the lowest value corresponds to the sector of pesticides and other agrochemical 
products (i.e. 202) and the highest value to the sector of refined petroleum products (i.e. 192).  
 
Figure 2: Elasticity of investment with respect to output of the 3-digit manufacturing sectors over 
1980-2012. 
 
              
Such evidence suggest that investment decisions appear to have an inelastic effect on 
aggregate output of the manufacturing industry by verifying the estimated value obtained for 
the industry as a whole in the first step. In some sectors, investment decisions appear to have 
no additional significant effect at all or even a negative effect on production decisions. The 
reason for such outcome may lie on the fact that investing decisions are made in order to 
improve the quality of a particular product, to reduce the costs of production or even improve 
the reputation of a particular sector (or firm) in the industry of manufacture. According to the 
type and the effectiveness of investment, production decisions may be affected along with the 
demanded quantity of supplied products.  
             However, one of the restrictions of this study involves the fact that the dataset of 
investment does not distinguish between different types of investment. For this reason, there 
is an aggregated formulation of such types given the significance and the magnitude of 
investment elasticity. For instance, a significant positive elasticity value could suggest that 
investment decisions have been made in favour of a boost in production which may be a 
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0 10 20 30 40 50I
n
ve
st
m
e
n
t 
El
as
ti
ci
ty
 
Manufacturing Sectors 
149 
 
result or may result in a boost of demand for particular products. The sectors with the highest 
value of investment elasticity are the sectors of refined petroleum products (i.e. 192), of 
preparation and spinning of textile fibres (i.e. 131) and of pulp, paper and paperboard (i.e. 
171). On the other hand, the sectors with the lowest (negative) value are the sectors of 
pesticides and other agrochemical products (i.e. 202), of other products of first processing of 
steel (i.e. 243) and of other porcelain and ceramic products (i.e. 234).  
             Nevertheless, an additional consideration has to be regarded, where investment 
decisions have not resulted in the desirable outcome. If a particular sector invests in 
improving the quality of its product but quantity demanded for this product is not increased, 
then that sector will have to reduce its output by resulting in a ceteris paribus reduction of 
aggregate output. Whichever the case, the indicator of investments has been taken into 
account in this study in order to test whether such decisions have an impact on the level of 
output of the manufacturing industry. Despite a number of sectors, the majority of the 
constituent sectors proved to have a significant positive effect on production by indicating 
that investments in the manufacturing industry result in a positive inelastic change of 
aggregate output. 
             Table 4 presents the estimations obtained by the remaining two equations of (33) 
concerning elasticity of aggregate output with respect to sales concentration and liquidity 
respectively. In particular, in contrast with the aforementioned equations of price and 
investment, the Breusch-Pagan LM test provides evidence in favour of cross-sectional 
dependency for both indicators, significant at the 5% level of significance. This means that 
since there is dependency across the individual entities of this study, the type of dependency 
must be identified by using the fixed or the random effects model. The results obtained by the 
Hausman test reflect strong evidence in favour of endogeneity within each individual entity, 
significant at any level of significance.  
Therefore, the fixed effects approach is going to be used for the equations of sales 
concentration and liquidity. In addition, the likelihood ratio test suggests the presence of 
heteroskedasticity at any conventional level; however, the Wooldridge test provides no 
evidence of serial correlation. For this reason, the equations should be estimated by using the 
least squares dummy variables (LSDV) method, but given the presence of endogeneity in the 
demand function and the presence of heteroskedasticity, the 3SLS estimation technique is 
taken into consideration. 
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Table 4. Estimations of the Demand Function of the 3-digit Sectors in the Greek Manufacturing 
Industry over the period 1980-2012 (Bresnahan Cross-Sectional Specification) 
Parameters  Estimation of (33): Third regression Estimation of (33): Fourth regression 
a (constant) 18.205451 (12.062081) 18.926414 (12.961212) 
h (price) -0.902089 (-3.943660) -0.880925 ( -4.952327) 
h
z
 (investment) 0.219834 (5.868810) 0.182373 (7.208786) 
h
H
 (herf) - -0.019396 (-2.019626) 
h
liq
 (ms) 0.519121 (4.540391) - 
h
H
 101|h
liq
101 0.251905 (2.059035) 0.478927 (4.494816) 
h’H 102|h’
liq
102 0.131366 (1.827194) 0.416813 (4.273284) 
h’H 103|h’
liq
103 0.185617 (2.019534) 0.505425 (4.588752) 
h’H 104|h’
liq
104 0.148733 (1.896890) 0.487502 (4.530662) 
h’H 105|h’
liq
105 -0.115427 (-2.029102) 0.501935 (4.575083) 
h’H 106|h’
liq
106 0.144583 (1.918994) 0.532510 (4.682710) 
h’H 107|h’
liq
107 0.295393 (2.078131) 0.464481 (4.445032) 
h’H 108|h’
liq
108 0.192377 (2.035352) 0.497307 (4.563299) 
h’H 109|h’
liq
109 0.130597 (1.878071) 0.507282 (4.596290) 
h’H 110|h’
liq
110 0.169224 (1.980823) 0.463331 (4.443513) 
h’H 120|h’
liq
120 -0.126787 (-2.064368) 0.422104 (4.288454) 
h’H131|h’
liq
131 -0.076107 (-1.980870) 0.537816 (4.699775) 
h’H 132|h’
liq
132 -0.039882 (1.815482) 0.465321 (4.440137) 
h’H 139|h’
liq
139 -0.091207 (-2.028395) 0.510197 (4.606262) 
h’H 141|h’
liq
141 -0.047744 (-1.862548) 0.552404 (4.746553) 
h’H 143|h’
liq
143 -0.080349 (-1.991514) 0.537570 (4.689303) 
h’H 151|h’
liq
151 -0.050202 (-1.880868) 0.487743 (4.527819) 
h’H 152|h’
liq
152 -0.087483 (-2.009051) 0.576231 (4.839301) 
h’H 161|h’
liq
161 0.124198 (1.765218) 0.505074 (4.582767) 
h’H 162|h’
liq
162 0.233364 (2.040337) 0.528356 (4.671100) 
h’H 171|h’
liq
171 -0.148641 (-2.148948) 0.522858 (4.646669) 
h’H 172|h’
liq
172 -0.091425 (-2.027491) 0.537467 (4.697886) 
h’H 192|h’
liq
192 -0.232517 (-2.651690) 0.538745 (4.708112) 
h’H 201|h’
liq
201 -0.187298 (-2.053015) 0.530945 (4.676061) 
h’H 202|h’
liq
202 -0.140875 (-2.139933) 0.434249 (4.337362) 
h’H 203|h’
liq
203 -0.131998 (-2.059699) 0.491089 (4.540219) 
h’H 204|h’
liq
204 -0.192989 (-2.203436) 0.500169 (4.572667) 
h’H 205|h’
liq
205 -0.063775 (-1.978266) 0.498514 (4.572448) 
h’H 221|h’
liq
221 0.091748 (1.659969) 0.468727 (4.463815) 
h’H 222|h’
liq
222 -0.050229 (-1.861708) 0.544779 (4.727111) 
h’H 231|h’
liq
231 -0.107454 (-2.072357) 0.307308 (3.858637) 
h’H 233|h’
liq
233 0.156542 (1.940784) 0.423711 (4.293581) 
h’H 234|h’
liq
234 0.131776 (1.813848) 0.319964 (3.895844) 
h’H 235|h’
liq
235 0.141969 (1.834321) 0.526300 (4.662186) 
h’H 236|h’
liq
236 0.217488 (2.045170) 0.539791 (4.699226) 
h’H 237|h’
liq
237 0.104496 (1.691126) 0.439424 (4.359833) 
h’H 239|h’
liq
239 0.077115 (1.563115) 0.478292 (4.483579) 
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(Table 4 continue) 
h’H 241|h’
liq
241 -0.060609 (-1.908251) 0.551807 (4.744959) 
h’H 242|h’
liq
242 -0.057800 (-1.896595) 0.479276 (4.495695) 
h’H 243|h’
liq
243 -0.094836 (-2.014162) 0.399633 (4.233325) 
h
’H
 244|h’
liq
244 -0.168352 (-2.217316) 0.455561 (4.432202) 
h’H 251|h’
liq
251 -0.140168 (-2.164833) 0.487807 (4.526464) 
h’H 252|h’
liq
252 -0.127857 (-2.120988) 0.492508 (4.532063) 
h’H 253|h’
liq
253 -0.154691 (-2.184180) 0.298065 (3.801526) 
h’H 257|h’
liq
257 -0.137519 (-2.157786) 0.438007 (4.342921) 
h’H 259|h’
liq
259 -0.063901 (-1.913746) 0.534115 (4.699490) 
h’H 271|h’
liq
271 0.167844 (1.971444) 0.485937 (4.524934) 
h’H 273|h’
liq
273 0.136813 (1.901893) 0.545689 (4.730053) 
h’H 274|h’
liq
274 0.041874 (1.208693) 0.471959 (4.467512) 
h’H 275|h’
liq
275 0.124148 (1.772211) 0.451441 (4.389891) 
h’H 281|h’
liq
281 -0.063073 (-1.931853) 0.456298 (4.416351) 
h’H 282|h’
liq
282 -0.059692 (-1.898919) 0.552741 (4.749066) 
h’H 283|h’
liq
283 -0.085425 (-1.985838) 0.518179 (4.640944) 
h’H 289|h’
liq
289 -0.166473 (-2.235464) 0.486038 (4.524355) 
h’H 292|h’
liq
292 0.020234 (1.055629) 0.516816 (4.618815) 
h’H 310|h’
liq
310 0.066103 (1.354427) 0.548315 (4.738051) 
Estimation Method 3SLS 3SLS 
Breusch and Pagan 
Test (LM Test) 5.1093 [0.0437] 6.5238 [0.0342] 
Likelihood Ratio Test 258.2014 [0.0000] 301.8371 [0.0000] 
Hausman Test 48.5193 [0.0000] 63.9183 [0.0000] 
Wooldridge Test 0.0734 [0.8012] 0.1587 [0.7279] 
Wald Test 9.4817 [0.0000] 9.1874 [0.0000] 
Notes: See notes in Table 1. 
 
The values presented in this table correspond to the total value of each elasticity index, as the sum between the 
sector 101 and the change of the corresponding sector i (i.e. h’i=h101+hi). 
 
             The estimation of sales concentration is constructed by treating herf as the cross-
sectional variable, while the remaining variables are kept constant for the 56 constituent 
sectors over the period 1980-2012. In particular, the estimate of elasticity of aggregate output 
with respect to the wholesale price, investment and liquidity index is found to be equal to -
0.902089, 0.219834 and 0.519121 respectively at any conventional level of significance. 
These values are consistent with the estimations obtained by equation (26) and the demand 
equations of price and investment. However, the cross-sectional concentration estimates 
obtained for the 3-digit sectors of this study do not appear to be as significant as the estimates 
of the aforementioned equations. There are no significant estimations at the 1% level of 
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significance, while 22 sectors of the sample appear to have an additional insignificant effect 
on the manufacturing industry’s aggregate output. 
             The value of output elasticity with respect to sales concentration, as argued above, 
does not have the same sign in every 3-digit sector. There is a number of positive elasticity 
estimations, which sugegst that an increase in the rate of sectorial concentration will lead to 
an increase in output of the manufacturing industry. However, there are negative signed 
estimates as well, which are interpreted as a negative relationship between sales 
concentration and industrial output. This means that a greater degree of sales concentration 
leads to a reduction of the manufacturing industry’s output. Intuitively, a positive elasticity 
value of this index reflects that if the level of sales of a particular sector is increased 
relatively to the sales of the whole manufacturing industry, then aggregate output will be 
increased as well. The reason for this outcome is partially due to an increase in the level of 
production of this sector, given a higher rate of sales, and partially due to a potential increase 
in production of the remaining sectors
57
.  
On the other hand, a negative value indicates that despite a relative increase in the 
level of sales of a particular sector, aggregate output of the manufacturing industry falls. A 
possible reason for this outcome could be the acquisition of market power. If that sector 
increases its level of sales by reducing the level of production, then increased concentration 
has a negative effect on the production level of the manufacturing industry. This outcome 
might emerge only if the remaining sectors make such production decisions that result in a 
decrease of aggregate output through increased wholesale price levels. For this reason, sales 
concentration which may reflect a form of market power is taken into account in the demand 
equation of this study. By estimating this equation, there is evidence obtained regarding the 
effects of this particular indicator on production decisions and therefore, on consumer 
preferences captured by the demand function of this type. 
  
 
 
                                                          
57
 An increase of the sales concentration index is a relative increase in sales between the particular sector and the 
remaining sectors. Therefore, this could mean that there may be an increase in the level of sales of every sector, 
but the highest rate is achieved by that particular sector.   
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Figure 3: Elasticity of sales concentration with respect to output of the 3-digit manufacturing sectors 
over 1980-2012. 
 
              
The estimates of sales concentration elasticity, appear to have both negative and 
positive effects on the manufacturing industry’s level of output. In particular, the lowest 
values significant at least at the 5% level of significance are obtained by the sector of refined 
petroleum products (i.e. 192), of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing (i.e. 204), of 
basic chemicals and plastics and synthetic rubber in primary forms (i.e. 201) and of basic 
precious and other non-ferrous metals (i.e. 244). On the other hand, the highest concentration 
values of elasticity significant at least at the 5% level of significance are estimated for the 
sector of bakery and farinaceous products (i.e. 107), of processing and preserving of meat and 
production of meat products (i.e. 101), of products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting 
materials (i.e. 162) and of articles of concrete, cement and plaster (i.e. 236).  
             In both cases where changes in sales concentration have a respective effect on 
aggregate output, the value of sales concentration elasticity is quite inelastic. This means that 
changes in sales decisions undertaken by the constituent sectors of the manufacturing 
industry will result in weak and inelastic changes in the output level of the whole 
manufacturing industry. Production decisions and sales can partially reflect fluctuations in the 
quantity demanded and supplied by the 3-digit manufacturing sectors. Therefore, the index of 
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 10 20 30 40 50
Sa
le
s 
C
o
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
 E
la
st
ic
it
y 
Manufacturing Sectors 
154 
 
sales concentration may reflect the degree of market power or the acquisition of market 
power by a number of these sectors as a result of demand fluctuations
58
. 
             The last element of this study’s demand equation addresses the effect of fluctuations 
in the available level of liquidity on aggregate output of the manufacturing industry. As 
discussed in chapter 4, this particular indicator is based on the theoretical foundations 
provided by Rotemberg (1982a), under the assumption of a demand function subject to real 
price changes and real money balances. As nominal money balances, this study considers the 
money supply index (M2) for the Greek economy in order to estimate the relationship 
between the level of available liquidity and the manufacturing industry’s aggregate 
production. 
             Rezitis and Kalantzi (2012, 2013) took into account the indicator of Gross National 
Income in the demand function of their study in order to identify the value of elasticity of 
aggregate output with respect to national income. This factor can also be treated as an index 
of liquidity since income is expressed in monetary units. However, by definition, economists 
interpret income as the amount of money which is used for consumption and savings that 
individuals have earned over a particular time period. Consequently, the available income 
that consumers have to use for consumption corresponds to their net spending or otherwise, 
the amount of available money excluding savings. This indicator may be subject to 
fluctuations of consumption, savings or labour decisions; however, it does not reflect directly 
fluctuations in money provision and thus, money supply. Changes in monetary policy are 
reflected by the available level of money supply but an income indicator may not be able to 
capture such changes without being subject to additional variations. 
             In conjunction to this line of reasoning, Davidson (2002) argued that an additional 
factor which is able to affect consumption, savings and any other liquidity decisions 
corresponds to uncertainty. When the degree of future uncertainty is very high, individuals 
will choose to have liquid assets, such as cash, instead of choosing to invest in illiquid assets. 
This happens because due to exogenous factors, such as the state of the economy or economic 
policies, people form lower expectations about the returns from investing in an illiquid asset. 
This case holds because they may not be able to immediately convert these assets into cash 
when an unexpected urgent liability emerges. For such reasons, in this study it has been 
                                                          
58
 The best indicator of demand behaviour in this study is considered to be the index of sales. Since the volume 
of sales reflect the purchasing choices of consumers, it can also be viewed as an indicator of consumer 
behaviour and thus, as an indicator of demand decisions. 
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chosen to replace the indicator of GNI with the indicator of money supply (M2) as a 
mechanism that reflects the quantity of monetary units and does not include any external 
monetary factors (i.e. consumption or savings decisions)
59
. 
             The last part of the demand equation set treats the liquidity index as the cross 
sectional variable, while the indicators of price, investment and sales concentration are 
considered as fixed across the industry over the sample period 1980-2012. The estimated 
values of the non-cross sectional variables are -0.880925, 0.182373 and -0.019396 for the 
wholesale price, investment and sales concentration index respectively significant at the 5% 
level of significance. The cross-sectional estimates of liquidity index have a positive sign and 
they are significant at the 1% level of significance as expected. This outcome verifies the 
rational presented in section 5.1.1 under which positive fluctuations in money supply result in 
higher production levels in the manufacturing industry. This happens due to either actual or 
expected higher demand for the products of this particular industry. However, a crucial factor 
which may affect the flow of liquidity in the Greek economy concerns the state of the 
economy. If for instance, there are limited expectations about inflation and growth, then an 
expansionary monetary policy through money provision may result in absence from liquidity 
and consumption (Davidson, 1968, 1972, 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
59
 The money supply index (M2) may be a better indicator for explaining fluctuations in the available level of 
money in the Greek economy; however it is not the best available indicator which reflects choices between 
liquid or illiquid assets. An alternative indicator could be the value of the Greek stock market and particularly, 
the value of the 3-digit manufacturing sectors’ stocks. 
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Figure 4: Elasticity of money liquidity with respect to output of the 3-digit manufacturing sectors over 
1980-2012. 
 
 
             The estimates obtained from the constituent 3-digit sectors of this study do not 
provide evidence in favour of a negative value of elasticity of aggregate output with respect 
to liquidity. In particular, the highest elasticity values are obtained by the sector of other 
general purpose machinery (i.e. 282), of wearing apparel except fur apparel (i.e. 141), of 
basic iron and steel (i.e. 241) and of furniture (i.e. 310). On the other hand, the lowest values 
are observed in the sectors of steam generators (i.e. 253), of other products of first processing 
of steel (i.e. 243), of glass and glass products (i.e. 231) and of other porcelain and ceramic 
products (i.e. 234). The values of elasticity of aggregate output with respect to liquidity are 
also inelastic but their magnitude fluctuates around 0.50. This means that expansion in money 
supply over the period 1980-2012 has resulted in significantly lower increase in 
manufacturing production. 
             The consideration of the particular demand function, under which the indexes of 
wholesale price, investment, sales concentration and liquidity are estimated, has resulted in 
significant estimates for the constituent sectors of the manufacturing industry. The theoretical 
intuition regarding the value of the above variables has been found to be consistent with 
empirical evidence and therefore, there were no violations of economic theory. However, the 
only variable which appears to have different signs among sectors is sales concentration 
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which represents a market power index.  For this reason, depending on the market 
significance expressed in terms of sales, sectors with greater power will be able to manipulate 
their pricing decisions and therefore, their production. 
             In addition to the importance of the above estimations for the manufacturing industry, 
the secondary concern for estimating a demand function of this form regards the estimation of 
the first index of market power of this study, which is conjectural variation elasticity. As 
discussed in chapter 4, this particular indicator developed by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau 
(1982) provides evidence of market power expressed in terms of production; the closer the 
value of this index to unity, the greater the market power of a particular sector or firm will be.  
             The main rational concerning the formulation of the present elasticity indicator 
corresponds to the identification of market structure depending on production decisions. If 
the value of a particular firm or sector is close to 0, then this firm is considered to behave as 
if the market structure is one of competition; a value of 0.5 reflects decisions equivalent to 
the production levels indicated by Cournot duopoly; a value greater than 0.5 and less than 1 
represents an imperfectly competitive market structure because production decisions are not 
considered to be consistent with the corresponding decisions under competition; and lastly, a 
value equal to unity indicates that firms behave as if they were monopolists and therefore, 
their production level is equivalent to the one of monopoly. 
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Table 5. Estimations of the Conjectural Variation Elasticity of the 3-digit sectors in the Greek 
manufacturing industry over the period 1980-2012 (Bresnahan Cross-Sectional Specification). 
Parameters Estimations of (32)     
f’101 0.468333 (2.013847) f’201 0.421357 (2.126354) f'271 0.554826 (2.193842) 
f’102 0.457895 (1.971381) f’202 0.423908 (2.009781) f273 0.556346 (2.361514) 
f’103 0.466525 (2.071635) f203 0.440199 (2.109580) f'274 0.553154 (1.981737) 
f’104 0.461913 (1.941374) f’204 0.419091 (1.983746) f'275 0.553728 (1.876192) 
f’105 0.474167 (1.991830) f’205 0.446917 (1.993472) f'281 0.533082 (2.091837) 
f’106 0.476332 (2.048173) f221 0.522522 (2.058772) f'282 0.522592 (2.059181) 
f’107 0.465013 (2.158173) f’222 0.520256 (2.374613) f'283 0.515564 (1.950193) 
f’108 0.467736 (2.128379) f’231 0.558117 (2.065748) f'289 0.516797 (1.940192) 
f’109 0.467259 (2.291833) f’233 0.551608 (2.048179) f292 0.493549 (2.410394) 
f110 0.483398 (2.219384) f’234 0.556167 (1.998751) f'310 0.468359 (2.119486) 
f’120 0.446334 (1.973615) f’235 0.553599 (2.019384) 
f131 0.421517 (2.081736) f’236 0.554052 (1.973516) 
f’132 0.413755 (1.761376) f’237 0.559975 (2.183746) 
f’139 0.414021 (2.001938) f239 0.563671 (2.387168) 
f141 0.422511 (2.139183) f’241 0.479512 (1.978371) 
f’143 0.418466 (1.073612) f242 0.480346 (2.201938) 
f151 0.470411 (1.998137) f’243 0.479796 (2.103948) 
f’152 0.462028 (0.839155) f’244 0.470792 (2.057161) 
f’161 0.406755 (0.731438) f251 0.544819 (2.149188) Estimation Method 3SLS 
f162 0.413886 (1.976691) f’252 0.538944 (0.871635) Breusch and Pagan 
Test (LM Test) 
5.3817 
[0.0372] 
f171 0.523012 (1.893842) f’253 0.533322 (1.564713) Likelihood Ratio 
Test 
164.7837 
[0.0000] 
f’172 0.517631 (1.018374) f’257 0.543993 (2.071665) 
Hausman Test 
59.1837 
[0.0000] 
f’192 0.601123 (0.987681) f’259 0.549742 (0.981709) 
Wooldridge Test 
6.6912 
[0.0277] 
Notes:  See notes at Table 1. 
The diagnostic tests presented correspond to the first regression (101-120 sectors) by indicating that similar 
estimations have been obtained for the rest 12 regressions. 
The values presented in this Table correspond to the total value of the conjectural variation elasticity, as the sum 
between the fixed sector pin and the change of the corresponding sector i (i.e. f’i=fpin+fi).  
The 2-digit sectors in this analysis have been formed as: (101-120), (131-139), (141-143), (151-152), (161-162), 
(171-172), (192-205), (221-222), (231-239), (241-244), (251-259), (271-275), (281-310). 
The 13 sets of the 3-digit sectors have been formed as follows:  
(i) 101-120 (110 as fixed point)        (vi) 171-172 (171 as fixed point)        (xi) 251-259 (251 as fixed point) 
(ii) 131-139 (131 as fixed point)       (vii) 192-205 (203 as fixed point)       (xii) 271-275 (273 as fixed point) 
(iii) 141-143 (141 as fixed point)      (viii) 221-222 (221 as fixed point)      (xiii) 281-310 (292 as fixed point) 
(iv) 151-152 (151 as fixed point)      (ix) 231-239 (239 as fixed point) 
(v) 161-162 (161 as fixed point)       (x) 241-244 (242 as fixed point) 
The Wald Test (H0: fi=fj=…=0) applied for each regression results in the following values: 
(i) 17.5981 [0.0000]           (vi) 0.8973 [0.4728]            (xi) 0.6918 [0.6367] 
(ii) 10.3823 [0.0000]          (vii) 9.8573 [0.0000]           (xii) 13.5787 [0.0000] 
(iii) 0.5281 [0.6948]           (viii) 10.3155 [0.0000]        (xiii) 12.9946 [0.0000] 
(iv) 8.1383 [0.0000]           (ix) 15.4831 [0.0000] 
(v) 6.5727 [0.0000]            (x) 10.3754 [0.0000] 
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             Table 5 presents the conjectural variation estimations obtained for the constituent 3-
digit sectors of the manufacturing industry. The first step of this procedure takes into 
consideration the cost function (25) in conjunction with the supply function (25c) of the 
manufacturing industry. In addition, the cross sectional dummy variable is applied to the 
indicator of conjectural variation elasticity by following a similar procedure as before. The 
value of the industry’s elasticity of output with respect to the wholesale price level is 
extracted from the fourth equation of the demand function set (33) and it is applied on the 
estimation procedure of the supply function
60
. However, the supply function in this step is 
estimated 13 times based on the 2-digit level categorization formed in this study.  
In particular, according to the nature of the products produced by the constituent 
sectors, there is a division of the industry sample into 13 categories instead of treating the 
manufacturing sectors as a whole. Rezitis and Kalantzi (2012, 2013) do not distinguish their 
industrial sample. They use a similar formulation by estimating a single supply function for 
the corresponding sectors under the consideration of a single fixed point. In the present case, 
13 categories are formed which can also be considered as aggregated 3-digit sectors (i.e. 2-
digit) that result in more significant estimates compared to a case where the supply function 
is estimated one time only
61
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
60
 The main motivation of choosing the value of the industry’s elasticity of output with respect to wholesale 
price from the fourth demand equation corresponds to the magnitude of this index. Compared to the price 
elasticity indexes obtained by the second and third equation, the fourth index is lower in absolute value than the 
rest and therefore, the ratio of conjectural variation over price elasticity will be higher by maximizing the 
difference between those two measures (Rezitis and Kalantzi, 2013).  
61
 By estimating 13 supply equations, the 13 3-digit sectors are treated as the fixed sectors in each estimated 
equation in order to identify the difference between that particular sector and the remaining when the cross 
sectional dummy variable is applied. 
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Figure 5: Conjectural variation elasticity of the 3-digit manufacturing sectors over 1980-2012. 
 
  
The estimates of conjectural variation elasticity provide evidence in favour of an 
imperfectly competitive market structure in each of the 3-digit sectors of the manufacturing 
industry as a result of production decisions. The values of elasticity index range between 
0.406755 and 0.601123 by indicating that 47 out of 56 sectors operate in terms of imperfect 
competition. The majority of sectors are found to have a significant degree of market power 
in the whole manufacturing industry with the exception of 9 sectors. The estimation method 
which is taken into account for the cross sectional supply equation (32) corresponds to 3SLS, 
as in the previous step due to the presence of endogeneity in conjunction with the presence of 
both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the cross sectional error terms.  
             In particular, the LM test results in significant value at the 5% level of significance by 
indicating the existence of cross sectional dependency and therefore, that the random effects 
model is more suitable than the OLS estimation. In addition, the Hausman test provides 
significant evidence at the 1% level of significance by validating the presence of endogeneity 
within the cross sections and thus, the selection of the fixed effects model. Lastly, the 
likelihood ratio and the Wooldridge test are significant at least at the 5% level of significance 
which results in the presence of periodic heteroskedasticity and serial correlation respectively. 
             The aforementioned diagnostic values reflect the estimation of the first cross-
sectional supply equation, or otherwise, the supply equation of the industry of food, 
beverages and tobacco. However, since the values of the diagnostic tests provide evidence in 
favour of endogeneity, heteroskedasticity and serial correlation for the remaining 12 2-digit 
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level supply equations as well, the fixed effects model along with the 3SLS estimation 
technique is used for each supply equation
62
. Conjectural variation elasticity estimations for 
each sector excluding the fixed (or pinpointed) sector reflect differences compared to the 
elasticity value of the latter sector. The estimation of the supply equation under the 
consideration of the cross sectional dummy variable DSi, results in a particular value for the 
fixed sector. This value is treated as a benchmark, and subsequently, conjectural variation 
elasticity is estimated for the remaining sectors, expressed as the difference from the value of 
the fixed sector. For this reason, the estimations presented in Table 5 reflect the final value 
f’i=fpin+fi of each sector, where fpin corresponds to the conjectural variation of the fixed sector 
and fi refers to the change in conjectural variation elasticity of sector i with respect to the 
fixed sector pin. 
             The conjectural variation elasticity of the constituent 3-digit sectors of the 
manufacturing industry is presented in Table 5 and illustrated in Figure 5. Since the value of 
elasticity ranges over 0.413886 and 0.556346, the manufacturing sectors operate in terms of 
imperfect competition, under which their production decisions tend to be close to duopolistic 
decisions. In particular, the lowest conjectural variation elasticity value (aside from the 
insignificant values) is observed by the sector of saw milling and planning of wood (i.e. 161), 
of weaving of textiles (i.e. 132), of manufacture products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting 
materials (i.e. 162) and of manufacture of other textiles (i.e. 139). On the other hand, the 
highest conjectural variation elasticity value and therefore, the highest degree of market 
power is observed by the sector of manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products (i.e. 
192), of cutting, sharping and finishing of stone (i.e. 237), of manufacture of other porcelain 
and ceramic products (i.e. 234), and of manufacture of wiring and wiring devices (i.e. 273). 
Consequently, such evidence suggest that the majority of the 3-digit sectors of the 
manufacturing industry have been operating under imperfect competitive conditions over the 
period 1980-2012, by resulting in lower production than it should be under competitive (or 
perfectly competitive) conditions.  
             The estimations obtained by this step under the cross sectional approach have 
resulted in evidence in favour of imperfectly competitive, wholesale price inelastic markets, 
where investment and liquidity decisions influence production decisions undertaken by each 
sector. The magnitude of these effects may not be the same for every sector, but the 
                                                          
62
 Since the results of significance are very similar, Table 4 includes only the diagnostic tests of the first supply 
equation. 
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theoretical intuition regarding production and consumption decisions has been validated by 
the obtained estimates. On the one hand, imperfect competitive markets tend to face inelastic 
prices and in this case, wholesale prices because the greater the market power, the higher the 
flexibility of pricing decisions might be. On the other hand, consumers may tend to value the 
degree of quality of each sector or firm, expressed in terms of investment and sales; the 
higher the value of these measures, the greater the interest of consumers may be in choosing 
the best alternative by considering both price and quality level.  
 
6.1.3. Third Step 
The third step of the conjectural variation estimation approach corresponds to the time series 
specification of panel analysis. In this step, the constituent variables are going to be estimated 
for the manufacturing industry as a whole, for each year over the period 1980-2012 and 2005-
2012 respectively by utilizing the panel set of this study. The main motivation of undertaking 
this particular specification reflects the investigation of market conditions in the 
manufacturing industry before and after the financial collapse of 2008, along with the 
beginning of the austerity period of the Greek economy in 2010 (Tsakalotos, 2011). 
According to this line of reasoning, the expected period sample under the time series 
specification was 2005-2012. However, the estimation of the price adjustment equation (38) 
necessitates the estimation of conjectural variation elasticity over 1980-2012. Therefore, the 
supply equation is estimated over the period 1980-2012 and the demand equation over the 
sub-period 2005-2012 respectively. 
             The estimation of the cost, supply and demand equation takes into consideration the 
panel aggregation of the 3-digit sectors into the manufacturing industry for each year 
individually. This is reflected by the time individual effect which applies a time dummy 
variable DTt (t=1980,…,2012), that is set to one for the t sub-period and zero otherwise, to 
the corresponding variables of conjectural variation, wholesale price and money supply. The 
estimation procedure is the same as the cross sectional specification of panel data by 
replacing the cross sectional dummy DSi with the time dummy variable DTt. The estimates 
obtained by this particular specification reflect the behaviour of the whole manufacturing 
industry over the aforementioned period samples. The introduction of the time dummy 
variable distinguishes the panel set into individual years rather than individual sectors. This 
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means that the individual effects reflect the difference between the starting year (i.e. 1980) 
and the 32 remaining years up to 2012
63
. 
An additional step in this analysis could be the time series specification of the 
constituent 3-digit sectors rather than the whole manufacturing industry over the period 1980-
2012. However, the manufacturing industry data set is subject to two restrictions which do 
not allow an analysis reflecting 3-digit level time estimates. The first restriction corresponds 
to the bulk of available data. If there were sufficient data for the 4-digit sectors of the 
manufacturing industry, then by applying the time series specification, the degree of market 
power in the corresponding 3-digit manufacturing sectors could be estimated. The second 
restriction lies on the formulation of the time dummy variable DTt. As discussed in the 
previous step, both cross sectional and time series specification in panel data are considered 
to treat any other factor as fixed (i.e. ceteris paribus). The cross sectional specification allows 
only the number of the constituent sectors to change, by treating time period as fixed. On the 
other hand, the time series specification allows only time to change, by considering the 
number of sectors as fixed and therefore, as an average entity reflecting the manufacturing 
industry. Given those restrictions, the best option in this study is to treat the manufacturing 
industry as a whole and thus, estimate the degree of market power for each year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
63
 As in the second step, this is not a cross section estimation for each year separately as cross dependency rises 
in the panel set. For this reason, the time dummy variable reflects the individual effects occurring over 1980-
2012 for each year individually for the whole manufacturing industry. 
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Table 6. Estimations of the Cost, Demand and Supply Function of the 3-digit Sectors in the Greek 
Manufacturing Industry over the period 1980-2012 (Bresnahan Time-Series Specification)  
 
Parameters 
Estimation of (25) 
and (34) Parameters Estimation of (35) 
 
Estimation of (35) 
a0 7.834202 (66.09271) a (constant) 15.300621(14.081239) 13.714196 (9.01683) 
ay 0.725135 (7.357960) h (price) - -0.668471 (-2.99837) 
ayy 0.059836 (10.230472) h
z
 (investment) 0.164614 (2.118841) 0.118412 (2.129546) 
gly -0.101488 (-2.664674) h
H
 (herf) -0.017786 (-1.976839) -0.035398 (-1.99450) 
gky 0.101483 (2.746162) h
liq
 (ms) 0.308271 (2.956173) - 
al 0.781334 (4.414935)    
ak 0.218666 (2.519322)    
gll 0.061394 (2.943402)    
gkl -0.061397 (2.138739)    
xt -0.017912 (-2.587643)    
xty 0.032496 (2.360634)    
xtl -0.002087 (-2.165653)    
f1980 0.482195 (2.201823)    
f'1981 0.462176 (2.141826)    
f'1982 0.486291 (2.182133)    
f'1983 0.456041 (2.071287)    
f'1984 0.421737 (2.012936)    
f'1985 0.442612 (2.048131)    
f'1986 0.494141 (2.190282)    
f'1987 0.386331 (1.991827)    
f'1988 0.407041 (2.011892)    
f'1989 0.354642 (1.962635)    
f'1990 0.381113 (1.995283)    
f'1991 0.361625 (1.901288)    
f'1992 0.415732 (2.037893)    
f'1993 0.386486 (1.989271)    
f'1994 0.364137 (1.971822)    
f'1995 0.315331 (1.948178)    
f'1996 0.433785 (2.059837)    
f'1997 0.471727 (2.138121)    
f'1998 0.512201 (2.229185)    
f'1999 0.459486 (2.132917)    
f'2000 0.528932 (2.240192)    
f'2001 0.531902 (2.488171)    
f'2002 0.541603 (2.538192)    
f'2003 0.577965 (3.380092)    
f'2004 0.516328 (2.399188)    
f'2005 0.553453 (3.196351) h2005|h
liq
2005 -0.856155 (-2.235950) 0.556778 (2.697877) 
f'2006 0.549271 (2.448374) h2006|h
liq
2006 -1.013228 (-2.451637) 0.561732 (2.817362) 
f'2007 0.555259 (3.158377) h2007|h
liq
2007 -1.077780 (-2.318471) 0.572771 (3.133158) 
f'2008 0.561316 (3.279836) h2008|h
liq
2008 -1.212549 (-3.168937) 0.548173 (2.581736) 
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(Table 6 continue) 
f'2009 0.552918 (3.161831) h2009|h
liq
2009 -1.022132 (-2.873541) 0.514246 (2.279809) 
f'2010 0.533716 (2.498374) h2010|h
liq
2010 -1.071333 (-2.901630) 0.493847 (2.213948) 
f'2011 0.531371 (2.519138) h2011|h
liq
2011 -1.004613 (-2.841938) 0.443768 (2.771653) 
f'2012 0.551832 (3.138173) h2012|h
liq
2012 -1.072777 (-2.751133) 0.524615 (2.418374) 
Estimation 
Method 
 
3SLS
a 
 
3SLS
b 
 2SLS 
 
2SLS 
Breusch and 
Pagan Test (LM 
Test) 
 
6.5092 
[0.0346]
a 
 
5.5017 
[0.0388]
b 
 5.0133 [0.0453] 
 
 
5.2184 [0.0417] 
Likelihood Ratio 
Test 
109.7841 
[0.0000]
a 
147.1855 
[0.0000]
b 
 6.2578 [1.0000] 
 
5.8173 [1.0000] 
Hausman Test 50.7623 
[0.0000]
a 
38.8143 
[0.0000]
b 
 50.0713 [0.0000] 
 
52.3617 [0.0000] 
Wooldridge Test 0.5471 
[0.7517]
a 
6.5519 
[0.0341]
b 
 0.4183 [0.8391] 
 
0.5136 [0.7694] 
Wald Test 130.8371 
[0.0000]
a 
13.7878 
[0.0002]
b 
 9.1736 [0.0000] 
 
9.5134 [0.0000] 
Notes: See notes in Table 1 and Table 5. 
a
 Diagnostic tests obtained from the cost function 
b
 Diagnostic tests obtained from the supply function 
The values presented in this Table correspond to the total value of the conjectural variation elasticity, as the sum 
between year 1980 and the change of the corresponding years t (i.e. f’t=f1980+ft). 
 
The time series estimates of the cost, supply and demand equation are presented in 
Table 6. The estimates obtained by the cost function represent the same theoretical 
implications for the manufacturing industry as in the first step. The estimates of the supply 
equation reflect the value of conjectural variation elasticity and therefore, the degree of 
market power in the manufacturing industry in each year over the period 1980-2012. The 
demand equation estimations are consistent with the results obtained in the first and second 
step. They account aggregate output elasticity with respect to the level of wholesale price and 
liquidity respectively. 
             However, the time series specification of the demand function is subject to the 
following conditions; the first part refers to the variables analyzed under this particular 
specification. Instead of estimating the values of all demand factors as in the cross-sectional 
specification, this step is restricted to the estimation of output elasticity with respect to the 
wholesale price and liquidity indicator
64
. The second condition corresponds to the time range 
of the time dummy variable DTt.  Instead of including the whole time sample (i.e. 1980-2012), 
                                                          
64
 The wholesale price level and the available money in the economy (M2) are considered to be of great 
importance for this study and in particular, for the manufacturing industry. For this reason, the estimations of the 
investment and sales concentration indicators are not presented in Table 6 which means that discussion will only 
be focused on the two former indicators of demand.  
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the time range over 2005-2012 has been selected given its significance for the Greek 
economy as a whole (see section 4.3 or above).  
             The time series specification of panel data analysis has been chosen in this step as 
well, given the results obtained by the diagnostic tests. In particular, the results of the cost 
and supply equation are very similar; the Breusch and Pagan test is significant at the 5% level 
of significance by indicating the presence of cross-sectional dependency between the error 
terms of the cross-sections and thus, the use of the random or fixed effects model. The 
Hausman test is found to be significant at the 1% level of significance by suggesting the 
formulation of the fixed effects model due to the presence of correlation between the 
individual effects and the explanatory variables. In addition, the likelihood ratio test provides 
significant results in favour of heteroskedasticity, but the Wooldridge test suggests the 
absence of first-order serial correlation in the cost function’s residual term. On the basis of 
the aforementioned results, the 3SLS estimation procedure is applied to both equations due to 
the presence of endogeneity in the second stage and the emergence of heteroskedasticity in 
the error term in the last stage. 
             By taking into account the diagnostic tests, the fixed effects model under the time 
series specification is used in order to extract the estimations of conjectural variation 
elasticity of the Greek manufacturing industry for each year over the period 1980-2012. 
 
Figure 6: Conjectural variation elasticity of the manufacturing industry for each year over the period 
1980-2012. 
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As illustrated in Figure 6, the value of this indicator of market power based on production 
fluctuates between 0.354642-0.577965, by suggesting that the Greek manufacturing industry 
has been operating under conditions of imperfect competition for the majority of this time 
period. However, there was a decline in the degree of market power over 1986-1991 and over 
1992-1995. The main reason of this outcome corresponds to the mechanism of the Single 
European Market (SEM). In particular, this set of policy implications took effect in 1987 and 
was completed in 1992-1993 in order to enhance free trade among the countries of the 
European Union. As a result, competition was enhanced in the Greek manufacturing industry 
by causing a fall in the profit margin and an increase in production of the firms. This action 
forced the Greek manufacturing firms and sectors to abide by the rules of the European 
Union by leading some problematic firms to leave the industry (Rezitis and Kalantzi, 
2011a)
65
. 
             In addition, during the period 1989-1991, there was a number of acquisitions and 
joint ventures that took place in the manufacturing industry and specifically, in the industry 
of food and beverages (Rezitis and Kalantzi, 2012). The main motivation of those actions was 
for the Greek sectors to gain access to new markets and establish a position which will 
improve the reputation of Greek products and result in a degree of power. According to 
OECD Economic Outlook (2000), the share of the European Union of global M&A (mergers 
and acquisitions) increased from 10% in 1985-1987 to 29% in 1993, which has also led to a 
burst of foreign direct investment and therefore, to improved technology.  
             After 1995, there was a continuous increase of market power in the Greek 
manufacturing industry, with the highest peak reached in 2003, where the value of 
conjectural variation elasticity was 0.577965. This number denotes a high degree of imperfect 
competition which can be viewed as a result of a demand boom in the Greek economy (IOBE, 
2013). An additional interpretation for the persistence of imperfect competition could be the 
lack of improvement of capital equipment (Giokas, Eriotis and Dokas, 2015). The capital 
stock of the Greek manufacturing sectors was not improved significantly over 1995-2003 
which means that technology was not used as a mean of competition. The reason for this 
outcome lies on the lack of investments in advanced technologies, which could improve the 
                                                          
65
 According to the Greek National Documentation Centre (NDC), in 1993 there was an attempt to enhance the 
competitive forces of the manufacturing firms by increasing production and reducing wholesale prices. In 
particular, many Developmental Laws and Operational Programs, such as the “Operational Programme for 
Research and Technology II” and the “Industrial Research Development Programme” contributed to the 
research and technological infrastructure of the Greek firms. 
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efficiency of the firms and therefore, allow them to be more competitive. Another 
explanation could be the launch of the euro currency in 2000, when Greece became part of 
the Eurozone. Given the fact that the Greek manufacturing industry was already part of the 
SEM, a new currency in conjunction with free trade in the European Union resulted in 
increased market power in the domestic market for two reasons. The first one refers to the the 
higher exchange value of the euro compared to the one of the drachma currency, while the 
second corresponds to the demand increase due to the aforementioned reason. This means 
that increased aggregate demand resulted in market power acquisition by the manufacturing 
industry. 
             The last and most important period of this sample corresponds to 2005-2012. In 
particular, following the financial and economic crisis of 2008, the conjectural variation 
indicator slightly declined from 0.561316 to 0.531371. This change does not indicate a 
significant reduction of market power; however, it also does not indicate an increase of 
market power. In particular, according to the Annual National Industrial Surveys (AIS) of the 
Hellenic Statistical Authority, there has been a decrease in the number of firms in the Greek 
manufacturing industry over the period 2010-2012 (see section 7.2). This fact could indicate 
that the remaining firms should start exercising their market power given that a number of 
firms were forced to exit their sectors due to their inability to operate under such conditions 
(Khanna and Tice, 2005). 
             However, this action is not observed according to the present data set. A possible 
interpretation could be that since aggregate income has declined, there is no point in 
acquiring additional market power through lower production and higher prices because 
consumers will not be willing to spend more in consumption under these conditions
66
. A 
different explanation could refer to the fact that given the availability of the current data set, 
there is no evidence in favour of an increase in the degree of market power. In the following 
years, there is an upward trend of this indicator which suggests that the manufacturing firms 
exercise their power in their sector respectively. Either way, the variations of conjectural 
variation elasticity over the period 2005-2012 are not considered to be intense compared to 
the other sub-periods of this sample. 
                                                          
66
 In particular, many states tried to minimize the impact of the financial crisis to their economies by 
implementing contractionary fiscal policies (Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi, 2015). 
169 
 
 In addition, it is worth noting that market power acquisition may also be a result of 
informal/illegal activities between firms. According to OECD (2015), there have been a few 
cases of corruption identified in the Greece economy. For instance, there is prosecution 
against two tobacco firms for bribery in order to promote their interests in domestic and 
foreign markets. The firms were trying to acquire market power by bribing individuals in 
forming agreements that would be of disadvantage to their competitors. There are also 
bribery allegations for firms trying to secure EU funds in order to gain competitive advantage 
over their competitors through increased credit access. There are more similar cases 
identified in the Greek economy overall, but the main outcome is that such behaviour creates 
an unequal advantage to those particular firms. It can be treated as a barrier to entry or as a 
force to exit for some incumbent firms.  
Moreover, tax evasion may also contribute to market power. If firms do not pay their 
fair share of taxes, they can use that amount of money to acquire additional market power 
through a higher level of available liquidity. According to Ethnos (2006), in 2005 49% of the 
firms inspected by the Greek tax authorities were found to have committed tax evasion, while 
in 2006 that percentage fell to 41.6%. It is evident that given the incomplete tax collecting 
mechanism, firms (and individuals) are able to take advantage of such gaps in the regulatory 
framework and thus, secure additional funding with unofficially avoiding to paysome of their 
liabilities. Consequently, the estimates of the conjectural variation elasticity may also reflect 
such factors that have to be investigated by the competition authorities. 
             The second equation estimated for the Greek manufacturing industry over the period 
2005-2012 refers to the demand function (35) in order to identify the variations of aggregate 
output elasticity with respect to the wholesale price and liquidity level of the industry. The 
restrictions imposed in this equation correspond to the estimated sub-period. In particular, in 
order to estimate the magnitude of those indicators during the sub-period 2005-2012, the time 
series specification of panel data analysis was estimated for t=2005,…,2012, which means 
that the time dummy variable DTt was applied eight times, according to the number of years. 
An additional restriction of this equation refers to the absence of the investment and sales 
concentration indicator. In order to simplify the analysis and highlight the most important 
elements of demand over this particular sub-period, the latter indicators have been excluded 
from the time series specification process. 
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             The Breusch and Pagan LM test is found to be significant at the 5% level of 
significance, by indicating the presence of cross sectional dependency and therefore, it 
necessitates the time series specification of panel data rather than a time series analysis. The 
Hausman test is also found to be significant at the 1% level of significance by indicating that 
the fixed effects model is preferable to the random effects model. The likelihood ratio and 
Wooldridge tests are found to be insignificant by suggesting the absence of both 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error terms of the manufacturing entities. 
According to these results, the 2SLS estimation method is used to obtain the estimations of 
the wholesale price and liquidity indicator respectively.  
             The first estimation of (35) treats the wholesale price indicator as the time effect 
variable and the remaining as fixed. The average value of aggregate output elasticity with 
respect to investment, sales concentration and liquidity are found to be significant at least at 
the 5% level of significance over the sub-period 2005-2012. Their magnitude and signs are 
not surprising; elasticity with respect to investment and liquidity is positive and inelastic, as 
in the first step, while elasticity of sales concentration is negative and highly inelastic, by 
suggesting an inverse relationship between aggregate production and sectorial sales. In 
addition, elasticity of aggregate output with respect to wholesale price over the sub-period 
2005-2012 is found to be significant at the 5% level of significance and elastic over 2006-
2012, which is close to the estimated values of the first and second step respectively. The 
highest degree of elasticity in absolute value was reached in 2008 (–1.212549), while the 
lowest is found to be in 2005 (-0.856155) and 2011 (-1.004613). 
             The second estimation of (35) treats the liquidity indicator as the time variable and 
the remaining as fixed. The average value of aggregate output elasticity with respect to 
wholesale price, investment and sales concentration are found to be significant at the 5% 
level of significance by following the same results as before. In particular, elasticity of 
investment is found to be significant and inelastic by expressing a positive relationship to 
aggregate output. Elasticity of wholesale price and sales concentration is found to be negative 
by suggesting an inverse relationship with aggregate output over the sub-period 2005-2012. 
Elasticity of aggregate output with respect to liquidity appears to be inelastic and positive 
according to the aforementioned results. In particular, the highest value of elasticity is found 
to be 0.572771 in 2007, while the lowest degree of elasticity is found to be 0.443768 in 2011. 
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             The significance of the indicators of wholesale price and liquidity reflect the 
economic conditions faced by the Greek economy over the period 2005-2012. In particular, 
the lowest value of aggregate output elasticity with respect to liquidity is found to be in 2011. 
This year can be considered to be the year of realization of the austerity policies implemented 
in 2010 by indicating that a percentage change in available liquidity results in a 0.443768 
change in production. In general, this particular indicator of elasticity is quite inelastic, even 
over the sample period 1980-2012. However, the lowest value is observed in the second year 
of austerity policies which can be used as an interpretation that additional liquidity is not 
spent in the manufacturing industry as it used to. The value of this index was 0.572771 in 
2007, the year before the financial crisis, but in 2011 this indicator was reduced by 34.6%, 
reflecting an economic environment of future uncertainty (Tsakalotos, 2011). 
             On the other hand, aggregate output elasticity with respect to the wholesale price 
indicator of the manufacturing industry was found to have the lowest effect in 2005, a year 
following the successful hosting of the Olympic Games. This fact could indicate that the 
manufacturing firms were adjusting to the needs of the market by exercising their power 
according to consumer behaviour (Porter, 1974). If people were still influenced by the 
exogenous demand shock, then firms could use this particular information in order to limit 
their production, increase their prices and still maintain the same number of consumers, 
which could increase their profits. 
             Either way, it is clear that the financial crisis of 2008 and the implementation of 
austerity policies in 2010 have manipulated the effects of nominal price levels and liquidity 
on aggregate output and therefore, on consumer demand. According to the psychology of the 
public which is influenced by the economic environment, firms can identify and adjust their 
production in order to satisfy both the needs of consumers and their own needs as well. This 
behaviour can be suggested by the indicator of conjectural variation elasticity that reflects a 
fall of market power of the manufacturing industry in 2009 and 2011 respectively. In addition, 
before 2008, the indicators of market power, wholesale price and liquidity elasticity appear to 
have their highest values, which could validate the prosperity of the Greek economy 
following the Olympic games of 2004. 
The conjectural variation elasticity indicator for the Greek manufacturing industry and 
the constituent 3-digit sectors has resulted in evidence in favour of imperfect competition. In 
particular, the market structure of the Greek manufacturing industry over the period 1980-
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2012 has been found to be oligopolistic and equal to 0.513468. This value indicates that the 
included individual sectors appear to have on average a value of conjectural variation 
elasticity similar to the one of a duopoly, by resulting in a degree of market power. In general, 
the 3-digit sectors have been found to have significant market power over the period 1980-
2012, while the manufacturing industry as a whole has experienced fluctuations according to 
the economic developments in the Greek and the EU economy. Therefore, according to the 
estimated results of the conjectural variation elasticity methodology, it can be argued that 
production decisions of the Greek manufacturing 3-digit sectors reflect a degree of market 
power exercised over 1980-2012 in the Greek economy. 
             The results of the present study seem to validate the findings of Rezitis and Kalantzi 
(2012, 2013) in favour of imperfect competition in the Greek manufacturing industry. 
Elasticity of conjectural variation for the whole industry was found to be equal to 0.4568 by 
the aforementioned authors, while the elasticity value of this study is found to be equal to 
0.513468. Both values indicate a degree of oligopolistic conduct, but the latter value reflects 
a higher degree of imperfect competition. The reason for this slight divergence may lie on the 
fact that the present analysis takes into account a 3-digit sector sample, while the study of 
Rezitis and Kalantzi (2013) uses 2-digit sector data. An additional reason could reflect the 
selected time sample; this sample is extended up to 2012, compared to the sample of Rezitis 
and Kalantzi which stops at 2007. Furthermore, the cross-sectional and time series 
specification in the panel data resulted in the same propositions about the behaviour of the 
manufacturing sectors and the whole industry over the period sample. To this end, the present 
study validates the existing findings of imperfect competition in the Greek manufacturing 
industry, expressed in terms of production. 
             An indicator of market power can be used in order to test the relationship between 
market power acquisition and the degree of price rigidity. For this reason, the following 
measure concerning pricing decisions is reflected by the pricing equation (31). The following 
approach is going to result in evidence of either rigid or flexible pricing decisions by 
employing the mechanics of NEIO introduced in section 4.1.2. 
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6.2.The Speed of Price Adjustment: The Pricing Equation 
 
6.2.1. First and Third Step 
The second and final concept that is of great significance and the main core of this study 
corresponds to the degree of price rigidity. In particular, the main objective of this analysis 
refers to the relationship between the speed at which prices change and the degree of market 
power in the Greek manufacturing sectors. The previous section present the results 
concerning the latter concept in terms of production decisions. In this section, the study is 
focused on a concept which has been used intensively by the existing literature (see chapter 
2) and can be employed to identify the degree of price rigidity in industries and sectors.  
             This concept corresponds to the speed of price adjustment, as has been introduced in 
the empirical literature by Means (1935a) and developed by Domberger (1983, 1993), Dixon 
(1983) and Bedrossian and Moschos (1988). According to this particular methodology (see 
section 4.1.2.), lags in pricing decisions are expressed in terms of changes in input costs. If 
there is an increase in unit costs then total flexibility would result in a proportional increase 
of the wholesale price level of the final good. Any other case which would reflect a lower or 
no increase of the price level at all can be considered to be a case of slow price adjustment to 
changes in the unit cost of inputs. However, in this study the concept of the speed of price 
adjustment also takes into account possible lags in foreign pricing decisions (i.e. EU27) and 
taxation (i.e. VAT) on the final product. Therefore, the speed at which prices adjust according 
to changes in output, the unit cost of inputs, foreign wholesale price levels and VAT at time t-
1 reflects the indicator of price rigidity
67
. 
             The main intuition of this study necessitates the estimation of this particular variable 
in order to identify and extend the main contribution of Bedrossian and Moschos (1988) in 
the Greek manufacturing industry. In particular, the authors argued that the speed at which 
prices adjust and the degree of market power of particular sectors take into account “the 
leadership effect” and “the profitability effect”. According to these concepts the size and the 
degree of market power of sectors respectively can influence the pricing decisions of those 
                                                          
67
 These factors will be referred to as the lagged pricing equation factors. 
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sectors by exploiting their market characteristics. Bedrossian and Moschos (1988) showed 
that the Greek manufacturing industry over the period 1963-1977 appeared to exercise its 
market power by estimating a negative relationship between price adjustment and sectorial 
profitability, as well as a positive relationship between price adjustment and leadership. This 
means that profitable sectors and firms prefer to keep their prices stable over time for various 
reasons such as profit and market power acquisition (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Rotemberg, 
1982). On the other hand, large sectors and firms may prefer to adjust their prices according 
to fluctuations in their cost factors in order to maintain their fame and attract more consumers 
(Olive, 2008). 
             The main rationale of such results may lie on the ability of particular sectors to 
exercise their market power or maintain the trust of their customers. Sluggish prices do not 
always reflect exploitation of consumer surplus or intention of gaining additional profits. It 
may refer to an action of maintaining the trust of consumers and preventing them to switch 
over rival firms (Kano, 2013). The aforementioned effects are strictly connected to pricing 
decisions in order to identify how the market structure and the size of the firms may affect the 
speed at which prices adjust to changes in the lagged pricing equation factors of this study. 
             The contribution of this part to empirical literature is considered to be very important 
since there are no relevant studies that capture the aforementioned effects in the Greek 
manufacturing industry over the period 1980-2012. To this end, the main question which is 
going to be tested in section 6.3 corresponds to the relationship between market conditions 
and pricing decisions. Therefore, the last variable that has to be identified is the speed of 
price adjustment for the Greek manufacturing 3-digit sectors over the period sample. The 
methodological procedure is going to be the same as in the case of conjectural variation; 
however, there is a slight difference about the order of steps. This section presents the first 
step and the time series specification of panel data analysis, while it leaves the cross sectional 
analysis for last. The only reason for this change lies on the presentation and discussion of 
results. The estimated results are categorized from the first and third step in the same table 
given the significance of the diagnostic tests. This means that a different approach is 
attempted for the second step which needs further discussion about the methodology and the 
importance of the estimates. Consequently, the analysis begins by presenting the results 
obtained for the Greek manufacturing industry over the period 1980-2012 and its 
performance for each year individually. 
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6.2.1.1.First Step 
The first step of this procedure corresponds to the estimation of the pricing equation (31) for 
the Greek manufacturing industry as a whole over the period 1980-2012 by aggregating the 
3-digit level panel sample. In particular, the pricing equation consists of five variables as 
presented in section 4.1.2; the output gap of the industry, input unit costs, relevant wholesale 
prices charged in the European Union market (EU27), the level of taxation (VAT) and lagged 
pricing decisions. The incentives for including those variable in this analysis follows the 
existing literature and in particular, the study of Bedrossian and Moschos (1988) who applied 
their pricing equation to the 2-digit level manufacturing sectors. However, the pricing 
equation of the present study takes into account two additional variables (p
eu
 and p
T
) in order 
to test their effect on the final wholesale pricing decisions of the manufacturing sectors. 
             The main rationale of this equation lies on the effect that particular variables may 
have over pricing decisions. Equation (31) reflects an inverse demand equation under which 
the final wholesale price level p
f
 depends on the aforementioned variables of this study. This 
means that their total effect must influence the final wholesale price level by 100%. In other 
words, there must be no other variable excluded from this analysis that could affect pricing 
decisions. This is reflected by the value of the Wald test which is going to be discussed below. 
According to this intuition, output and input decisions, as well as competitive foreign prices 
and taxation may affect the pricing decisions of the industry.  
However, the most important factor that contributes to the identification of nominal 
price rigidities refers to past pricing decisions. This means that the price level at time t can be 
shaped by the price level at time t-1, despite any changes that may occur in input costs or 
production decisions. According to the degree of dependence of the price level (p
f
t) on the 
lagged price level (p
f
t-1), this discussion is focused on whether the speed of price adjustment 
is fast or slow. If that adjustment (λ) is close to zero, then pricing decisions are highly 
affected only by past pricing decisions and thus, the speed of price adjustment to changes in 
the pricing equation factors at time t-1 is very slow. On the other hand, if the degree of 
adjustment is close to unity, then present pricing decisions are not affected by past pricing 
176 
 
decisions. As a result, the speed of price adjustment is very flexible to changes in the lagged 
effects of the pricing equation factors. 
             On the basis of the above mechanism, the presentation of the estimations of the 
pricing equation (31) for the Greek manufacturing industry as a whole will be presented. This 
will test whether the speed of price adjustment is fast or slow according to wholesale price 
elasticity with respect to lagged pricing decisions.  
The estimations are presented in Table 7 along with the value of the diagnostic tests. 
To begin with, the Breusch and Pagan (LM) test results in evidence of cross-sectional 
independency. This means that the error terms of the constituent entities (sectors) are 
independent which permits a pure time series estimation process for the constituent entities 
individually without taking into account a fixed or random effects model
68
. The likelihood 
ratio test is also found to be significant by indicating the presence of heteroskedasticity, while 
the Wooldridge test does not provide significant evidence in favour of serial correlation. 
According to those results, the estimation technique which is used to estimate the pricing 
equation is the 3SLS technique due to the presence of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity 
between the dependent and the explanatory variables
69
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
68
 See section 6.2.2.  
69
 The instrument list consists of the lagged values of the explanatory variables of first and second lag order. 
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Table 7. Estimation of the Pricing Equation in the Greek Manufacturing Industry over the period 
1980-2012. 
Parameters Estimation of (31) Estimation of (36) λt (1-λt)/λt 
a0
1 
-0.167367 (-3.174779) 0.032872 (0.830862)   
a1
1 
-0.035931 (-1.608133) 0.005935 (0.365447)   
b1
1 
0.153817 (12.07060) 0.100003 (1.993147)   
b3
1 
0.056696 (4.507480) 0.068241 (1.988665)   
1-λ (price(-1)) 0.664555 (45.17623) -   
λeu' (priceeu)1 0.015263 (1.943596) 0.032965 (1.187221)   
λΤ' (pricevat)1 0.106841 (9.476707) 0.127371 (6.736157)   
λ 0.335445 -   
(1-λ)/λ 1.981114 -   
1-λ1980  0.736153 (15.183712) 0.263847 2.790075 
1-λ’1981  0.518279 (12.812938) 0.481721 1.075891 
1-λ’1982  0.608173 (13.891286) 0.391827 1.552147 
1-λ’1983  0.618724 (13.201933) 0.381276 1.622772 
1-λ’1984  0.418277 (11.239371) 0.581723 0.719031 
1-λ’1985  0.548737 (12.392012) 0.451263 1.216003 
1-λ’1986  0.680616 (20.120394) 0.319384 2.131027 
1-λ’1987  0.561873 (12.023981) 0.438127 1.282443 
1-λ’1988  0.621877 (13.716235) 0.378123 1.644642 
1-λ’1989  0.551879 (12.102339) 0.448121 1.231540 
1-λ’1990  0.770616 (19.001927) 0.229384 3.359502 
1-λ’1991  0.532862 (14.100291) 0.467138 1.140695 
1-λ’1992  0.428168 (11.591283) 0.571832 0.748765 
1-λ’1993  0.380613 (9.1283872) 0.619387 0.614499 
1-λ’1994  0.298274 (6.7626331) 0.701726 0.425058 
1-λ’1995  0.428717 (10.793847) 0.571283 0.750446 
1-λ’1996  0.673847 (15.002932) 0.326153 2.066046 
1-λ’1997  0.816254 (20.119281) 0.183746 4.442295 
1-λ’1998  0.748369 (18.193848) 0.251631 2.974073 
1-λ’1999  0.698997 (15.192783) 0.301003 2.322226 
1-λ’2000  0.608979 (14.192838) 0.391021 1.557407 
1-λ’2001  0.526183 (11.394857) 0.473817 1.110519 
1-λ’2002  0.580717 (13.192831) 0.419283 1.385024 
1-λ’2003  0.681525 (15.182373) 0.318475 2.139964 
1-λ’2004  0.808163 (19.192831) 0.191837 2.426570 
1-λ’2005  0.898318 (26.366315) 0.101682 8.834582 
1-λ’2006  0.846136 (24.173642) 0.153864 5.499246 
1-λ’2007  0.773864 (22.210197) 0.226136  3.422118 
1-λ’2008  0.618137 (15.581731) 0.381863 1.618740 
1-λ’2009  0.539633 (13.753778) 0.460367 1.172180 
1-λ’2010  0.571384 (14.138426) 0.428616 1.333091 
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1-λ’2011  0.651376 (17.391832) 0.348624 1.868420 
1-λ’2012  0.788992 (23.473776) 0.211008 3.739157 
(Table 7 continue) 
Estimation 
Method 
3SLS 3SLS  
Breusch and 
Pagan Test (LM 
Test) 
0.9512 [0.6442] 7.5163 [0.0218]  
Likelihood Ratio 
Test 
327.3399 [0.0000] 329.7396 [0.0000]  
Hausman Test 91.4224 [0.0000] 81.5099 [0.0000]  
Wooldridge Test 0.6173 [0.7183] 0.9173 [0.9584]  
Wald Test (joint) 112.2056 [0.0000] 101.2711 [0.0000]  
Notes: See notes in Table 1. 
1
 a0=λ’c0. a1=λ’c1. b1=λ’β1. b3=λ’β3. λ
eu’
=λ1’(λ
eu
-λ)(1-λeu). λΤ’=λ2’(1-λ
Τ
). 
The value of the Wald test for testing the hypothesis H0: b1+b3+(1-λ)+ λ
eu'
+ λΤ'=1 is 0.9211 [0.3378]. 
The values presented in this table correspond to the total value of the speed of price adjustment, as the sum 
between year 1980 and the change of the corresponding years t (i.e. λ’t=λ1980+λt). 
 
             An additional point that has to be highlighted refers to the significance of the Wald 
test in order to test whether the sum of the coefficients of the pricing equation is equal to 
unity or not. If it is not, this means that there exist additional effects on the wholesale price 
level that are not taken into account in the pricing equation and thus, additional variables 
must be added to fix this omission. The Wald test is estimated under the null hypothesis of 
𝐻0: 𝑏1 + 𝑏3 + (1 − 𝜆) + 𝜆
𝑒𝑢′ + 𝜆𝑇
′
= 1 and it is found to be insignificant at any level of 
significance
70
. To this end, this result indicates that the effect of the explanatory variables is 
always equal to unity or that the wholesale price level is affected only by those particular 
variables. 
             The estimation of the parameters presented in Table 7 reflects final wholesale price 
elasticities with respect to each variable, given that the pricing equation is expressed in 
logarithmic terms. Elasticity of price with respect to output gap is found to have an 
insignificant and low effect on pricing decisions (a1= -0.035931). This value indicates that 
changes in the output gap of the manufacturing industry over the sample period did not have 
a significant effect on the price level. This means that pricing decisions were not affected by 
changes in production and as a result, the output gap cannot be used as a credible factor that 
can reflect a significant effect on industrial decisions. 
                                                          
70
 It is assumed that 𝑏1 = 𝜆′𝛽1, 𝑏3 = 𝜆′𝛽3, 𝜆
𝑒𝑢′ = −𝜆′1(𝜆
𝑒𝑢 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜆𝑒𝑢) and  𝜆𝑇′ = 𝜆′2(1 − 𝜆
𝑇). 
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             Elasticity of price with respect to input unit costs is found to be significant at the 1% 
level of significance both for labour and capital per unit of production. In particular, it is 
found that a change in unit labour cost will affect the final wholesale price level by 0.153817, 
while a change in unit capital cost will cause a change in that level by 0.056696. The effect of 
unit labour cost is almost three times greater than the one of unit capital cost. An 
interpretation of this outcome could lie on the variability of those factors. Capital is 
considered to be fixed in the short run and therefore, its price may not change as frequently as 
the price of labour (Zanias, 1991). Given that the price of labour (wage) is more volatile 
compared to the price of capital, it can have a greater effect on the final wholesale price of 
output. This happens because variability in one of the two determinants of output will 
influence the pricing decisions of the industry. 
             The new variables introduced in the present pricing equation correspond to the 
pricing level of the EU27 manufacturing sectors and the level of taxation on the final product. 
The former factor is found to have an insignificant effect on the 5% level of significance on 
the final wholesale price (λeu'=0.015263). This shows that the price level charged by the 
manufacturing industries of the EU27 does not have a significant effect on the Greek 
manufacturing industry’s pricing decisions. An interpretation of this result could refer to the 
market forces occurring in the Greek domestic market. It could be argued that in the Greek 
market, the degree of competition between Greek and EU products is not significant. 
However, there is no clear distinction of that degree in the EU market in general. As 
discussed in section 4.2.2, the effect of imports and exports on the final wholesale price level 
of the industry was found to be highly insignificant and for this reason it was removed from 
equation (31). Therefore, there is no visible differentiation between domestic and foreign 
competition. This fact may be one of the main limitations of this equation. For this reason, 
the pricing equation is treated as applicable on the Greek market by neglecting any additional 
effects implied by the EU market. 
             The latter factor is found to have a significant effect on the 1% level of significance 
on pricing decisions (λΤ'=0.106841). This value suggests that taxation has significantly 
affected the final wholesale price of the manufacturing industry over the period sample. In 
particular, taxation refers only to the VAT factor imposed on the final product. Any other 
form of taxation is excluded (see Appendix A). This means that it is only rational to assume 
that whenever there is a change in VAT, the final wholesale price level will change as well in 
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order to reflect an exogenous shock imposed by the government. However, if there is no such 
significant change, then this action would imply that the industry did not take into account the 
new VAT in its pricing decisions
71
. The case of the Greek manufacturing industry indicates 
that changes in taxation were reflected by 10% in the final wholesale price level. This result 
provides evidence that changes in the VAT were not fully embodied in the final wholesale 
price. 
 It can be assumed that a value close to unity suggests that additional taxation 
is transmitted to the price level per se, while a value close to zero shows that the 
manufacturing sectors chose to absorb additional taxation without reflecting it to their 
customers. A value close to unity possibly reflects the behaviour of monopolistic firms which 
face an inelastic demand curve and thus, they will not suffer a fall in their profits as they will 
lose only a few customers. A value close to zero may reflect the behaviour of competitive 
firms as they wish to charge the lowest price level in order to attract as many customers as 
possible. Consequently, the value obtained by this study suggest that only a portion of 
additional taxation has been transferred to the final wholesale price level of the 
manufacturing sectors by suggesting an imperfect competitive structure. 
The last and most important factor refers to lagged pricing decisions and the degree 
on which present prices are affected by past price levels. In particular, elasticity of p
f
t with 
respect to p
f
t-1 reflects the degree of dependence of the final price level at time t on the 
corresponding level at time t-1. This measure is found to be equal to 0.664555 for the Greek 
manufacturing industry by denoting a degree of dependence of 66.45 per cent. This result 
shows evidence that the pricing decisions of the industry over the period 1980-2012 were not 
irrelevant to lagged pricing decisions despite changes in the pricing equation factors. That 
degree is found to be close to unity by suggesting evidence of nominal price rigidity. On the 
basis of the formulation of (31), the speed of price adjustment is denoted by λ and thus, it can 
be calculated by taking into account the aforementioned measure of elasticity. This means 
that the speed of price adjustment of the Greek manufacturing industry is equal to 0.335445. 
In particular, this value reflects elasticity or the speed at which prices adjust according to 
changes in the lagged pricing equation factors. A value of 0.335445 indicates that if changes 
                                                          
71
 This action may denote that the industry chose to absorb an increase of VAT in order to avoid an additional 
increase of the final wholesale price level. However, if the VAT change is negative and there is no change in the 
final price level, then that would indicate a profit seeking behaviour as the new price of products should have 
been lower (ceteris paribus). 
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in the present factors occur, they will be reflected only by 33.5% on the final wholesale price 
level by suggesting a relatively slow adjustment. 
             This result partially verifies one of the arguments of Bedrossian and Moschos (1988) 
that suggest the presence of sluggish prices in the Greek manufacturing industry. However, 
an estimation process about the industry as a whole was not conducted and therefore, all steps 
of this analysis must be completed in order to find solid evidence that will either verify or 
contradict the results of the former study. Given the identification of rigid prices in this 
sample, the following question rises of how much time is needed for the price level to 
embody those changes in the lagged pricing equation factors.  There is a process of whether 
prices are considered to be sluggish or not. Nevertheless, the main question should be about 
the time needed to eliminate that gap between changes in input costs and the final wholesale 
price level. Olive (2008) in his study for the Australian manufacturing industry incorporates a 
mean lag formula denoted as the ratio of [(1-λ)/λ], under which the number of annual lags are 
identified in order for the adjustment process to be completed. In this case, the time that the 
industry price level needs to adjust to changes in output, unit cost of inputs, foreign pricing 
decisions and taxation is equal to 1.981114 years. This means that ceteris paribus, the 
adjustment process will last approximately two years in order for the aforementioned changes 
to be reflected on the final wholesale price level. 
             This result validates the intuition of this study that prices in the Greek manufacturing 
industry are quite rigid. According to various conditions that manifested in this particular 
industry (see sections 4.1 and 4.2), the speed of price adjustment is found to be very slow by 
suggesting that two years of adjustment are required in order for changes in the pricing 
equation factors at t-1 to be reflected on the industrial price level at time t. The immediate 
contribution of input changes is found to be approximately equal to 0.21 by suggesting that 
pricing decisions are influenced only by 21% by labour and capital unit costs respectively. 
The factor of taxation (VAT) also contributes by 10% and the remaining percentage is 
reflected by lagged pricing decisions, which is found to be the most significant factor. 
Whenever the degree of dependence between present and past wholesale price levels is close 
to unity, the speed of price adjustment will be very slow and it may take several years for this 
process to complete. Consequently, the next step of this analysis refers to the pricing 
behaviour of the manufacturing industry for each year over the sample period. If, in general, 
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the manufacturing price level is rigid, then the corresponding annual values and subsequently, 
the value of each sector have to be estimated in order to verify those results. 
 
6.2.1.2. Third Step 
The following step takes into account the same process adopted in sections 4.1.2 and 4.2.2 by 
using a time dummy variable in equation (31) in order to estimate the degree of price rigidity 
of the Greek manufacturing industry for each year over the period 1980-2012. The main 
intuition of this approach refers to the behaviour of the industry’s annual pricing decisions in 
order to identify whether the price level has been sluggish or not depending on market 
conditions. 
             It is worth noting that the time series panel data specification for this particular 
pricing equation was not the only available option of estimation. Instead, 33 cross sectional 
regressions for each year could have been estimated that take into account every entity of this 
study. This means that each regression would consist of 56 observations and therefore, annual 
results could be extracted. However, this approach was not chosen as there is no evidence of 
time series independency between the error terms of the cross sectional regressions
72
. To this 
end, in order to avoid any inaccurate results, the fixed effects model has been used to estimate 
the industrial speed of price adjustment in an annual basis. 
             As developed in the conjectural variation approach, the time dummy variable DTt 
(t=1981,…,2012) is applied on the variable of lagged pricing decisions (pft-1), which is set to 
one for the t sub-period and zero otherwise. The limitation of this approach lies on the fact 
that the estimates of the remaining variables will reflect an average value over the period 
sample. Nevertheless, the main interest of this study is to focus on the estimations of λ and as 
a result, the analysis takes into account the estimation of one panel regression including 33 
time dummy variables. The new equation estimated under this approach corresponds to (36), 
under which 1980 is used as the fixed year. The estimated changes obtained by the time 
dummy variable will be expressed in terms of the value of λ1980. The diagnostic tests appear 
                                                          
72
 The Breusch-Pagan LM test was applied by inversing the NxT matrix, where N is the number of sectors and T 
the number of years. Therefore, instead of testing for cross-sectional independency, this formulation accounts 
for time-series independency. 
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to provide the same results as in the first step and thus, the 3SLS technique is used to estimate 
equation (36). 
Figure 7: The speed of price adjustment of the manufacturing industry for each year over the period 
1980-2012. 
 
 
             The results are presented in Table 7 as well. To begin with, the fixed estimations of 
price elasticity with respect to output, the unit cost of inputs, foreign prices and taxation 
appear to have the same sign and contribution (approximately) to p
f
 as in the first step of this 
approach. Figure 7 reflects the estimates of (36) concerning the annual speed of price 
adjustment of the manufacturing industry. The range of those values fluctuates between 
0.101682 and 0.701726 by showing that the industry experienced periods of both rigid and 
flexible price adjustments. The highest degree of adjustment is found to have occurred in 
1994, while the lowest degree is found in 2005. As mentioned in section 6.1.3, 1994 is 
considered to be the first year following the implementation of the Single European Market 
conditions in the Greek markets in order to promote and enhance competitive behaviour 
through various developmental programs. This means that following the evidence of low 
price-cost margins and declining market power (Rezitis and Kalantzi, 2011), the price level 
of the industry became very flexible. This happened because competition was more intense 
and regulations had reduced the incentives of any collusive agreements. 
             On the other hand, 2005 is considered to be the first year following the successful 
hosting of the Olympic Games and as a result, the state of the Greek economy was 
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flourishing (Kasimati, 2003). This fact could be considered as evidence of increased demand 
for the Greek manufacturing products, both domestically and internationally, given that 
aggregate income had increased over the last years by this particular exogenous shock. 
Consequently, the economic environment in the manufacturing industry would not promote 
any intensive competitive behaviour and thus, there was no significant reason to render the 
aggregate price level subject to flexible adjustment. 
             Figure 7 illustrates the variations of the speed of price adjustment and the sub-periods 
in which the industrial price level is considered to be rigid or flexible. In particular, the first 
spike of flexibility occurred in 1984, which corresponds to the introduction of the SEM 
implementation in the Greek markets. This means that under the introduction of 
developmental programs that provided the incentives and regulations to increase the degree 
of competition, pricing decisions became more flexible compared to the four previous years 
(i.e. 1980-1983). However, the first significant under-spike is observed in the following year 
and after a slightly increase over 1986-1989, the second significant under-spike is estimated 
in 1990 equivalent to 0.229384. Given the fact that this particular year is included in the 
implementation period of the SEM, this result is complemented by conjectural variation value. 
As introduced in section 6.1.3, the value of conjectural variation elasticity over 1990 was 
equal to 0.3811 (production above duopoly) which can be interpreted as evidence of low 
market power. If there is simultaneous evidence of high prodcution backed by rigid pricing 
decisions, then it can be assumed that in 1990 there were falling but rigid price levels in the 
manufacturing industry as a result of higher production and thus, higher competition. 
             Nevertheless, over the period 1991-1994, the speed of price adjustment significantly 
increased by reaching its climax in 1994, when the degree of flexibility is found to be 
0.701726. This means that changes in the lagged pricing equation factors were reflected by 
30% in the final wholesale price, which can be interpreted as a successful outcome of the 
SEM implementation. In addition, if the conjectural variation value at that year (i.e. f1994= 
0.3641) is accounted for, it can be argued that the degree of competition was enhanced. 
Consequently, flexible pricing decisions were caused by an improvement in competitive 
conditions.  
Over the three following years (i.e. 1995-1997) there was a sharp decrease of price 
flexibility by resulting in the second under-spike in 1997 equal to 0.183746. This means that 
following the outcome of the aforementioned policies, the speed of price adjustment was 
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drastically reduced. An interpretation of this fact could be that the effects of the SEM 
implementation began to fade away after the completion of particular programs. This might 
mean that the manufacturing industry tended to return to its initial pricing behaviour level. 
Given that the tendency of price rigidity used to be on average around 0.40, the effects of a 
forced degree of flexibility would result in a higher rigid price level afterwards. This rationale 
can also be validated by the conjectural variation value which increased but still, it was 
slightly above the production level of duopoly (i.e. f1997= 0.4717). 
             Over the following period 1998-2001 there was a gradual increase of price flexibility 
by reaching a peak in 2001 equal to 0.473817. The most dominant interpretation lies on the 
introduction of the euro currency in the Greek economy which resulted in a significant degree 
of appreciation of domestic prices (Fischer, 2004). This may be the reason for an increase in 
the conjectural variation value which might have caused an increase in the speed of price 
adjustment. Therefore, an additional interpretation of market power could be that production 
decreased because final wholesale prices were appreciated along with aggregate income
73
, a 
fact that could also be reflected by flexible price levels. 
             The period over 2001-2005 the speed of price adjustment became more sluggish by 
reaching the highest under-peak in 2005 equal to 0.101682. This means that the increase in 
demand as a result of the Olympic Games, allowed the manufacturing industry to maintain 
the wholesale price level very rigid. In conjunction with the estimates of market power, it can 
be assumed that this is a result of the manufacturing industry taking advantage the temporary 
spike in demand. To this end, it can be argued that this particular sub period can be treated as 
the one over which the manufacturing industry acquired a high degree of market power, 
complemented by the results of conjectural variation elasticity (see figure 6). 
             The following period over 2006-2009, the degree of price flexibility gradually 
increased to 0.460367; however, from 2010 and afterwards, the speed of price adjustment 
became more sluggish. The former result could be validated in the context of the financial 
crisis of 2008 which, however, was not fully realised in the Greek manufacturing industry as 
reflected by the flexibility of pricing decisions. Nevertheless, the following years under 
which austerity policies were implemented (Tsakalotos, 2011), a gradual decrease of price 
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 In order for this intuition to be valid, it is assumed that the cost of inputs was not affected by the same degree 
as the final price level by the euro currency. This fact may be validated if capital equipment had been purchased 
from the Eurozone market. 
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adjustment occurred. In conjunction with the estimates of conjectural variation, the intension 
of rigidity in the industry after 2010 may be an act of market power exercise, since the effects 
of austerity forced many firms to exit the industry
74
. This means that if the degree of 
competition is reduced, then opportunities of exploiting consumer surplus can emerge faster. 
             Overall, the Greek manufacturing industry over the period 1980-2012 is characterised 
by stable but not violent changes in the degree of price rigidity. There are sub-periods of high 
rigidity and flexibility, but the transition from one state to another is gradually achieved. 
According to the estimates of conjectural variation elasticity and speed of price adjustment, 
the concluding outcome indicates that the manufacturing industry has been operating under 
non-competitive conditions by seizing available opportunities to exercise its market power. 
There are periods over which imperfect competition weakened as a result of policies and 
programs that tried to promote competition. However, overall evidence point to the fact that 
the Greek manufacturing industry is characterised by rigid pricing decisions and oligopolistic 
behaviour. For such reasons, the average time needed for final wholesale prices to fully 
reflect changes in output, unit cost of inputs, foreign pricing decisions and taxation is 
approximately equal to two years. 
 
6.2.2. Second Step 
The second step of this approach corresponds to the identification of the degree of price 
rigidity in the Greek manufacturing sectors (see Table A). The main intention of this step is 
to estimate a particular effect that captures the behaviour of each 3-digit sector individually, 
which refers to the speed of price adjustment. However, the methodology used in this step 
differentiates the analysis compared to the conjectural variation approach. It does not take 
into account the cross sectional approach of panel data analysis. In particular, in section 6.2.1, 
the panel of the manufacturing sectors that form the aggregate industry was found to be 
subject to cross sectional independency given the significant result of the Breusch and Pagan 
(LM) test. This means that instead of estimating a panel random or fixed effects model, it is 
more useful to run time series regressions for the constituent sectors individually given the 
absence of dependency between the error terms of each entity. For this reason, the pricing 
equation is estimated for each manufacturing sector by running a time series system with 33 
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 See Annual Industrial Survey 2010, 2011 and 2012 and Figures 10 and 11. 
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observations (i.e. 1980-2012). To this end, 56 regressions were run and the estimated results 
are presented in Table 8. 
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Table 8. Estimations of the Pricing Equation (31) of the 3-digit Sectors in the Greek Manufacturing Industry over the period 1980-2012. 
 
 
Sector 
 
 
a0 
 
 
a1 b1 b3 1-λ λ
eu' λΤ' λ AR(1) 
 
Durbin-
Watson Test 
 
Breusch and 
Godfrey Test 
101 -0.354132  
(-1.720054) 
0.025832 
(1.22735) 
-0.059237 
(-0.223594) 
0.040749 
(2.233499) 
0.603757 
(7.554146) 
-0.083413 
(-0.961956) 
0.349007 
(5.717769) 0.396243 - 
 
2.038471 
- 
102 0.026312 
(0.928142) 
0.013311 
(0.567151) 
0.051273 
(2.851391) 
-0.095367 
(-0.572569) 
0.652325 
(8.045522) 
0.060212 
(0.934707) 
0.216209 
(4.463945) 0.347753 
0.781926 
(2.249182) 
 
1.449102 
 
0.298178 
103 -0.731647  
(-2.918232) 
0.035832 
(1.662473) 
0.082512 
(2.701307) 
0.042631 
(4.676976) 
0.656313 
(8.053836) 
-0.073612 
(-1.675022) 
0.083319 
(3.567523) 0.343687 
0.961721 
(2.280017) 
 
1.118374 
 
0.119032 
104 -1.928337 
(-3.911288) 
0.025661 
(1.064125) 
0.416624 
(5.955781) 
-0.225731 
(-1.243786) 
0.693657 
(8.388797) 
-0.260493 
(-0.674153) 
0.198497 
(4.388221) 0.306343 - 
 
2.281736 
- 
105 0.837462 
(3.622329) 
0.024538 
(1.195142) 
-0.046526 
(-1.346347) 
0.073143 
(5.116965) 
0.642188 
(6.202863) 
-0.175615 
(-0.974134) 
0.350327 
(5.818257) 0.357812 - 
 
3.018374 
- 
106 0.918279 
(3.971148) 
0.035339 
(1.501453) 
0.575987 
(6.499821) 
-0.025283 
(-1.486021) 
0.523051 
(3.036755) 
-0.020189 
(-0.063679) 
-0.042214 
(-0.904642) 0.476992 
0.983726 
(2.301938) 
 
1.383741 
 
0.276152 
107 -0.092831 
 (-0.72651) 
0.022656 
(1.091245) 
-0.110675 
(-1.772446) 
0.044933 
(1.492453) 
0.757608 
(9.799886) 
-0.049436 
(-0.351601) 
0.242483 
(4.725113) 0.242392 - 
 
3.193784 
- 
108 -0.823848  
(-1.877826) 
0.034565 
(1.637019) 
0.170656 
(2.035412) 
0.059329 
(2.286686) 
0.827931 
(10.261603) 
-0.157544 
(-1.653965) 
0.091878 
(3.272029) 0.172069 - 
 
2.491831 
- 
109 - 1.073841  
(-2.182899) 
0.043225 
(1.787732) 
0.157245 
(1.978668) 
0.109498 
(3.671685) 
0.476492 
(5.285457) 
0.132321 
(2.239794) 
0.088323 
(3.337977) 0.523508 - 
 
2.001838 
- 
110 0.192835  
(1.283742) 
0.036113 
(1.707587) 
0.144544 
(2.763297) 
0.047901 
(2.348985) 
0.734973 
(7.710602) 
-0.073198 
(-1.412157) 
0.033648 
(2.659584) 0.265027 
0.638137 
(2.148273) 
 
1.783613 
 
0.098371 
120 0.837166 
(2.126277) 
-0.078217 
(-2.090751) 
0.109516 
(2.108097) 
0.069531 
(3.810642) 
0.614831 
(6.427932) 
0.140353 
(2.970258) 
0.071609 
(3.934504) 0.385269 
0.713843 
(2.201374) 
 
1.871364 
 
0.183746 
131 1.029381  
(3.625261) 
0.038095 
(1.683479) 
-0.052134 
(1.642531) 
0.155635 
(5.030296) 
0.618458 
(6.608125) 
-0.087618 
(-1.723809) 
0.155961 
(4.387703) 0.381525 - 
 
2.817331 
- 
132  -0.847465 
(-1.982276) 
-0.030897 
(-1.101793) 
-0.191087 
(0.900115) 
0.256564 
(7.693491) 
0.689352 
(7.124253) 
0.021265 
(0.196286) 
0.226312 
(4.537863) 0.310648 
0.678172 
(2.140394) 
 
1.183811 
 
0.220911 
139 0.192835  
(1.292637) 
0.017448 
(0.798674) 
0.097315 
(2.685873) 
-0.046634 
(-1.157248) 
0.745517 
(9.109683) 
0.009114 
(0.178869) 
0.086199 
(2.104587) 0.254483 - 
 
2.018374 
- 
141 0.857468  
(2.616162) 
-0.002861 
(-0.130375) 
0.131425 
(3.514698) 
-0.082414 
(-0.386981) 
0.845517 
(10.374645) 
0.075506 
(1.399574) 
0.122659 
(2.858519) 0.154483 
0.561372 
(2.071263) 
 
1.691837 
 
0.436132 
143  -0.92814  
(-2.918377) 
0.041157 
(1.668261) 
0.110381 
(3.020199) 
0.037953 
(2.195538) 
0.527597 
(2.699914) 
-0.081355 
(-1.291722) 
0.220371 
(4.583882) 0.472403 - 
 
2.761351 
- 
151  -1.271761  
(-2.918374) 
-0.009612 
(-0.364542) 
0.116344 
(2.012734) 
0.086315 
(2.791731) 
0.697336 
(8.022137) 
0.040063 
(0.838868) 
0.188621 
(3.742946) 0.302664 - 
 
2.914738 
- 
152 0.391788  
(1.987464) 
0.017193 
(0.769881) 
0.173421 
(4.838093) 
-0.153665 
(-1.584021) 
0.731415 
(8.394594) 
-0.025941 
(-0.681872) 
0.114058 
(2.727367) 0.268585 
0.971623 
(2.310988) 
 
1.057289 
 
0.449102 
161  -0.894875  
(-2.381737) 
0.022768 
(0.915482) 
0.249624 
(5.724725) 
-0.095963 
(-0.852149) 
0.600278 
(6.149752) 
0.013179 
(0.160754) 
0.159717 
(3.418422) 0.399722 
0.578132 
(2.110394) 
 
1.810773 
 
0.691832 
162  -0.475724  
(-1.273849) 
-0.005382 
(-0.251483) 
0.308979 
(1.934484) 
-0.083121 
(-0.809107) 
0.637676 
(6.202173) 
0.044209 
(0.729054) 
0.132004 
(2.729748) 0.362324 
0.481371 
(2.047122) 
 
1.929188 
 
0.010183 
171  -0.382273  
 (-0.99837) 
0.045334 
(1.874176) 
0.308958 
(1.875153) 
0.009549 
(0.082681) 
0.659544 
(6.395407) 
-0.124013 
(-1.931173) 
0.016441 
(1.310342) 0.340456 - 
 
2.991736 
- 
172  -0.736623  
(-1.283747) 
0.041036 
(1.889241) 
0.097841 
(2.939002) 
0.038492 
(2.320012) 
0.737868 
(7.580442) 
-0.084336 
(-2.208972) 
0.042288 
(2.055738) 0.262132 - 
 
2.618304 
- 
192 0.849213  
(2.918374) 
0.055784 
(2.308762) 
0.065141 
(2.340243) 
0.137376 
(3.963647) 
0.875036 
(10.813684) 
-0.395916 
(-3.171134) 
0.011042 
(1.916582) 0.124964 
 0.651348 
(2.153827) 
 
1.919384 
 
0.118374 
201 0.657421  
(1.547193) 
0.026457 
(1.934855) 
0.345576 
(4.554615) 
0.599549 
(3.390575) 
-0.004715 
(-0.125784) 
0.099481 
(0.857038) 
0.189451 
(4.833692) 1.004749 - 
 
2.163899 
- 
202 -0.947546  
(-2.817364) 
0.019143 
(0.821825) 
0.460434 
(5.771729) 
-0.047157 
(-1.690227) 
0.543194 
(6.185174) 
-0.022986 
(-0.543462) 
0.138671 
(2.767363) 0.456806 
0.916658 
(2.271257) 
 
1.771622 
- 
203 -1.645378  
(-3.192938) 
0.029838 
(1.348016) 
0.247501 
(3.658987) 
0.120153 
(3.897946) 
0.548864 
(6.169873) 
-0.079692 
(-1.068652) 
0.101785 
(2.416131) 0.451136 - 
 
2.109936 
- 
204 -0.281723  
(-0.517394) 
-0.047932 
(-2.094631) 
-0.158784 
(-0.634183) 
0.457002 
(3.077402) 
0.625614 
(6.361738) 
-0.164273 
(-3.215959) 
0.048029 
(1.985583) 0.374386 
0.725364 
(2.182172) 
 
1.827163 
 
0.219347 
205 0.837461  
(2.103487) 
0.038413 
(1.601954) 
0.054624 
(2.698163) 
0.076717 
(2.394205) 
0.758793 
(8.514349) 
-0.034187 
(-0.325201) 
0.011537 
(1.871501) 0.241206 - 
 
2.337461 
- 
221 0.192986  
(1.192039) 
0.029675 
(1.266573) 
0.150164 
(3.743213) 
0.059392 
(2.442146) 
0.636775 
(7.320969) 
-0.046821 
(-0.829284) 
0.128439 
(2.656267) 0.363225 - 
 
3.947562 
- 
222 0.118834  
(0.637492) 
0.040898 
(1.919783) 
0.377976 
(3.489765) 
-0.018056 
(-1.582161) 
0.624797 
(7.151548) 
-0.160579 
(-2.112737) 
0.061649 
(2.122271) 0.375203 
0.651632 
(2.130193) 
 
1.549013 
 
0.291837 
231 -0.292835  
(-0.918273) 
-0.009961 
(-0.375057) 
0.189074 
(2.815601) 
0.107583 
(3.368003) 
0.759874 
(8.486612) 
0.025553 
(0.651922) 
0.127474 
(2.279391) 0.240126 - 
 
2.491831 
- 
233 0.081821  
(0.291837) 
0.032638 
(1.376974) 
0.495823 
(5.334183) 
0.005566 
(0.024466) 
0.567692 
(5.574466) 
-0.072178 
(-0.496593) 
0.153725 
(2.842115) 0.432308 - 
 
2.710395 
- 
234  -0.837257 
(2.103948) 
-0.007645 
(-0.281648) 
-0.013647 
(3.516915) 
0.035408 
(1.977776) 
0.775147 
(8.150964) 
0.034792 
(0.660214) 
0.290537 
(3.112231) 0.224853 
0.513226 
(2.051622) 
 
1.818176 
 
0.118378 
235 0.958779 
(2.183776) 
 0.047716 
(1.974827) 
0.115318 
(2.926278) 
-0.085247 
(-0.549102) 
0.869332 
(9.123491) 
0.040199 
(1.013791) 
-0.102935 
(-0.761349) 0.130668 - 
 
3.173849 
- 
236 -0.918276  
(-2.103948) 
 0.077314 
(3.129374) 
0.194177 
(3.786844) 
0.076357 
(2.130991) 
0.631866 
(7.625304) 
0.088771 
(4.521278) 
-0.105872 
(-1.675324) 0.368134 
0.831253 
(2.192831) 
 
1.568137 
 
0.318441 
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(Table 8 continue) 
237 0.091823  
(0.192384) 
0.044995 
(1.875473) 
0.128259 
(3.195168) 
0.101595 
(4.328813) 
0.509908 
(5.575271) 
0.143044 
(1.420132) 
0.045405 
(2.049773) 0.490092 
0.710394 
(2.071623) 
 
1.139484 
0.285937 
239 -0.514281  
(-1.837475) 
-0.074342 
(-2.730428) 
0.172923 
(3.825738) 
0.063998 
(2.463522) 
0.708726 
(7.925811) 
0.078779 
(2.777315) 
0.054435 
(2.338031) 0.291274 - 
 
3.771932 
- 
241 -0.746583  
(-1.928374) 
0.032095 
(1.409259) 
0.124829 
(3.172418) 
0.128054 
(3.686513) 
0.422154 
(3.860087) 
0.090538 
(0.382362) 
0.164803 
(2.795728) 0.577846 - 
 
2.193847 
- 
242 -1.437917  
(-3.173645) 
0.033435 
(1.329415) 
-0.001771 
(-3.451674) 
-0.003243 
(-2.213671) 
0.840304 
(9.651163) 
0.059197 
(0.541079) 
-0.029541 
(-0.716372) 0.159696 
0.539188 
(2.008137) 
 
1.867164 
 
0.209183 
243 0.814593 
(2.019387) 
0.033286 
(1.279582) 
0.117826 
(2.645972) 
0.041165 
(2.011026) 
0.504744 
(2.601607) 
0.047948 
(0.172898) 
0.067176 
(2.219762) 0.495256 - 
 
2.973642 
- 
244 0.983121  
(2.103848) 
0.015592 
(0.741813) 
-0.002159 
(3.947892) 
-0.026596 
(-1.619862) 
0.815902 
(9.534371) 
0.082841 
(0.848218) 
0.136879 
(2.971243) 0.184098 - 
 
2.103947 
- 
251 -0.499812  
(-1.461839) 
0.023047 
(1.083635) 
0.447866 
(1.745536) 
0.141372 
(2.015713) 
0.627848 
(6.381531) 
-0.075134 
(-0.707316) 
0.141537 
(2.988135) 0.372152 
0.871362 
(3.018235) 
 
1.958181 
 
0.516733 
252 -0.716268  
(-1.837163) 
0.038513 
(1.354466) 
0.147192 
(1.584992) 
0.068423 
(2.355154) 
0.747458 
(8.097881) 
-0.097031 
(-2.872335) 
0.112446 
(2.937432) 0.252542 - 
 
2.139451 
- 
253 -0.991782  
(-1.990193) 
0.1375012 
(3.800892) 
0.131369 
(3.870352) 
0.067581 
(3.672588) 
0.778855 
(8.403824) 
0.049806 
(2.669026) 
-0.039153 
(-2.736133) 0.221145 
0.609182 
(2.078819) 
 
1.449138 
 
0.109372 
257 0.374728  
(1.281734) 
-0.029548 
(-1.142136) 
0.105074 
(2.501156) 
0.017565 
(3.035648) 
0.804189 
(9.398799) 
0.052326 
(0.770118) 
0.057873 
(1.980421) 0.195811 - 
 
2.184726 
- 
259 1.098337  
(3.103845) 
0.034619 
(1.336561) 
0.189262 
(3.390241) 
0.067622 
(2.083027) 
0.837046 
(9.598239) 
0.030164 
(2.511153) 
0.019173 
(2.352467) 0.162954 - 
 
2.874613 
- 
271 0.847152  
(2.871839) 
0.021465 
(0.921279) 
0.240786 
(3.763102) 
0.158107 
(3.874363) 
0.686231 
(6.267942) 
-0.008492 
(-0.140372) 
0.135119 
(2.468269) 0.313772 
0.761739 
(2.658193) 
 
1.458129 
 
0.339186 
273 -0.646625  
(-1.989031) 
0.023942 
(1.061123) 
0.166049 
(3.014817) 
0.085947 
(2.031958) 
0.711032 
(8.632966) 
0.002919 
(0.060541) 
0.019773 
(2.037334) 0.288968 - 
 
2.381374 
- 
274 -0.764513  
(-2.013741) 
0.013296 
(0.552486) 
0.135959 
(2.944761) 
0.098418 
(2.265104) 
0.773379 
(8.746883) 
0.005873 
(0.148365) 
0.200035 
(4.119066) 0.226621 
0.891782 
(2.271039) 
 
1.193841 
 
0.461531 
275 0.192834  
(1.103947) 
0.040932 
(1.915619) 
-0.007995 
(-1.642991) 
0.054415 
(2.302782) 
0.740546 
(8.386422) 
0.076094 
(2.459605) 
0.286961 
(4.827261) 0.259508 - 
 
2.817376 
- 
281 -0.300195  
(-1.035261) 
0.106305 
(3.508367) 
0.254093 
(2.625379) 
0.135709 
(2.676093) 
0.598406 
(9.514315) 
0.043085 
(2.665758) 
0.181989 
(3.716894) 0.401594 
0.639128 
(2.193847) 
 
1.218371 
 
0.219362 
282 -0.837612  
(-1.998364) 
0.040767 
(1.888547) 
0.152974 
(3.794672) 
0.101026 
(2.226237) 
0.584532 
(9.678531) 
0.037449 
(1.527173) 
0.142155 
(3.576858) 0.415476 - 
 
2.741837 
- 
283 0.118372  
(0.963521) 
0.153677 
(3.116483) 
0.117539 
(3.614699) 
0.098112 
(3.182441) 
0.577826 
(9.850941) 
0.038242 
(1.587865) 
0.121643 
(3.217484) 0.422174 - 
 
2.074813 
- 
289 -0.344617 
(1.184645) 
0.113976 
(2.452343) 
0.237094 
(3.780827) 
0.131194 
(2.502491) 
0.592575 
(8.216933) 
0.052563 
(2.266856) 
0.177917 
(2.152446) 0.407425 
0.886152 
(2.259015) 
 
1.726542 
 
0.239189 
292 0.884613 
(2.3219320 
0.081851 
(3.428348) 
0.227465 
(4.583894) 
0.108118 
(3.531688) 
0.499137 
(6.067661) 
0.073865 
(2.804224) 
0.035191 
(1.864561) 0.500863 
0.601293 
(2.061273) 
 
1.671392 
 
0.291831 
310 -0.716351  
(-2.173646) 
0.005693 
(0.285855) 
0.259351 
(6.085537) 
0.062654 
(2.566314) 
0.506252 
(6.182124) 
0.027548 
(0.985033) 
0.184751 
(3.611581) 0.493748 
0.558137 
(2.029127) 
 
1.781938 
 
0.138474 
Notes: See notes in Table 1 and Table 7. 
The estimation method applied in the equations of this table is the Generalized Method of Moments. 
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The pricing equation (31) along with its variants including the lagged factors of unit 
costs, output, foreign pricing decisions and taxation was estimated initially by the OLS 
method. However, the OLS estimations would be inconsistent due to the presence of 
endogeneity caused by the dependent variable and the explanatory variable of taxation. As 
mentioned in section 4.1.2, p
T 
reflects the VAT percentage embodied in the final wholesale 
price. This means that p
T
 is equal to the VAT percentage of the wholesale price charged by 
the manufacturing sectors, thus reflecting the simultaneous dependency of these variables. 
For this reason, the problem of endogeneity arises in the pricing equation of this study. 
In addition, there is evidence in favour of first-order serial correlation in the residual 
terms of 25 sectors as a result of Durbin’s h statistic to be lower than 275. The results of the 
Breusch and Godfrey test indicate that there is no higher order of serial correlation in any of 
those sectors. Moreover, the Breusch, Pagan and Godfrey test suggests the absence of known 
form of heteroskedasticity, but White’s test provides significant evidence of 
heteroskedasticity in the residual term of every manufacturing sector. This means that 
heteroskedasticity is of unknown form in every regression. Consequently, in order to account 
for the presence of endogeneity, first order serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the 
residual terms of the manufacturing sectors, the GMM estimation technique is employed. It is 
treated as a convenient method of accounting the aforementioned problems in order to get 
unbiased, consistent and efficient estimates of the speed of price adjustment
76
. In addition, in 
order to correct serial correlation, an autoregressive error term AR(1) is added by considering 
that the residual terms depend on their lagged value at t-1
77
.  
             Table 8 presents the estimates of the 56 time series regressions along with the 
diagnostic tests for first-order serial correlation. To begin with, the excess demand proxy 
variable expressed as the difference between output and output trend is found to be 
significant at the 5% level of significance in 11 manufacturing sectors. However, the sign of 
a1, when significant, is not found to be the same across the sectors. In particular, three sectors 
(i.e. 120, 204, 239) appear to have a negative excess demand coefficient on the final 
                                                          
75
 A possible source of misspecification could be the exclusion of unit material cost as the level of output is 
expressed in terms of total value added. A broader formulation of (31) could be to express output in terms of 
gross value added and include an additional unit cost variable of materials. However, given the range of our 
observations (i.e. 33 years), an additional explanatory variable could result in biased estimations because the 
number of the included variables would necessitate for additional years to be taken into account. 
76
 See Appendix B2 for an Error Correction Model estimation process. 
77
 This is known as the Cochrane–Orcutt (1949) transformation (see Wooldridge, 2005). 
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wholesale price level, while the remaining have a positive effect which is consistent with the 
findings of Bedrossian and Moschos (1988).  
             The theoretical intuition implies that the difference between actual output and output 
trend reflects additional levels of demand compared to the average expected level reflected 
by the trend of production. If pricing decisions are adjusted according to the latter 
expectations, then any additional level that results in excess demand should reflect a price 
increase of the sectorial wholesale price, especially in oligopolistic markets. This intuition is 
violated only by 3 sectors, which responded to such changes by reducing their price level and 
this is why the effect, or otherwise wholesale price elasticity with respect to excess demand, 
is found to be negative. There are three additional sectors experiencing negative signs as well, 
but their significance is very low. Overall, the excess demand proxy is not significant in the 
majority of the constituent 3-digit sectors of this sample which means that there are only 11 
sectors that reflect fluctuations of excess demand in their pricing decisions. 
             The theoretical intuition concerning the coefficients of the unit cost variables 
necessitates their positive sign by suggesting that changes in costs are transferred to the final 
wholesale price level. The majority of the constituent sectors, once again, validate this 
intuition by providing evidence that unit costs of capital and labour are incorporated in 
pricing decisions. In addition, there is a number of sectors which appear to have an 
insignificant coefficient of either unit labour or capital cost, by suggesting that changes in 
unit costs may not be totally transferred to the final wholesale price level. A possible 
explanation for this outcome could lie on the degree of competition within the sector or on 
the nature of consumer demand curve. If firms or sectors in general, cannot afford to change 
their prices (i.e. because of intense competition or menu costs), then they will choose not to 
reflect any changes in unit costs by absorbing and incorporating them into their total cost 
function (Rotemberg 1982a, 1982b).  
             In addition, a more extended case of this phenomenon could be a result of significant 
negative price elasticity with respect to unit labour or capital cost. Sector 242 appears to have 
a significant negative coefficient equal to -0.003243, which provides evidence that changes in 
unit capital cost were not reflected in the final wholesale price at all. Instead, there were 
absorbed by the sector in order not to be transmitted to consumers. Overall, even if this case 
is not among the dominant cases in terms of theory, it can be adopted by particular sectors 
and firms which do not prefer to incorporate such changes in their pricing decisions. 
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However, the majority of this study’s sample is in accordance to the main theoretical intuition 
that changes in unit costs are transferred in the wholesale price of the final product
78
.  
              The following concept taken into account as a potential determinant of pricing 
decisions corresponds to competing foreign price levels charged by the EU27 manufacturing 
sectors. Bloch and Olive (1999) found that competing foreign prices are strongly positive 
correlated to the pricing decisions of highly concentrated sectors exposed to a degree of 
foreign competition in the Australian industry. However, the results provided by the present 
study contradict this outcome. In section 6.2.1, it is found that competing foreign prices do 
not have a significant effect on the pricing decisions of the Greek manufacturing industry at 
the 5% level of significance. A similar outcome is also found for the majority of the 
constituent 3-digit sectors. In particular, there are only 14 sectors that appear to have a 
significant price elasticity with respect to competing foreign prices and at the same time, the 
sign of that effect is different among the corresponding sectors.  
             There are 9 of those sectors facing a positive signed elasticity by indicating that 
changes in pricing decisions of the EU27 manufacturing sectors move in the same direction 
the wholesale price level of the Greek manufacturing sectors. An interpretation of this 
outcome could reflect the market principle of price leadership and/or collusive behaviour 
(Rotemberg and Saloner, 1990). If there is an agreement, formal or informal, among the firms 
of a particular sector, then imperfect competitive conduct could emerge. The first case refers 
to a price leading firm which owns private information about consumers’ preferences and 
thus, fluctuations in demand. This fact forces the following firms to adjust their decisions 
according to the leading firm’s decisions. The second case may reflect a collusive contract, 
under which the participating firms will have to adopt the same pricing policy according to 
the terms of that contract. 
             On the other hand, there are 5 of those sectors that appear to have a negative signed 
elasticity with respect to foreign prices. This outcome suggests that changes in the latter 
decisions are inversely reflected by the Greek manufacturing sectorial pricing decisions. A 
reason that could justify such outcome may refer to the degree of competition and lack of 
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 However, in order for this proposition to hold, it is assumed that the equilibrium price level must be a markup 
over unit labour and capital costs by implying that 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 = 1. This rationale is based on the Wald test of 
equation (31). Therefore, the Wald test was also applied in the equilibrium equation (27) under which 𝐻0: 𝛽1 +
𝛽3 = 1. Once again, the result is insignificant for all sectors which proves that the price level of the 
manufacturing sectors is a markup over unit costs.  
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collusive agreements. If, for instance, competing foreign prices increase as a result of input 
cost appreciation, then the Greek sectors can take advantage of this action by reducing their 
prices to attract more customers. Another case of competition could reflect a wholesale price 
reduction adopted by the EU27 sectors. However, instead of competing in similar terms (i.e. 
Bertrand competition), the Greek sectors may choose to increase their price level as a result 
of product differentiation captured by improvement in technology and/or productivity 
(Giokas, Eriotis and Dokas, 2015). As a result, this outcome would suggest a form of 
competition with two effects; pricing and quality differentiation. 
             The remaining sectors, which reflect the overall outcome, appear to have an 
insignificant value of price elasticity with respect to competing foreign prices at the 5% level 
of significance. The majority of those values are found to be negative but their significance is 
very low and therefore, they cannot be treated as credible indications. To this end, 42 out of 
56 sectors in the Greek manufacturing industry do not incorporate fluctuations in competing 
foreign prices into their own pricing decisions. This sugegsts that the degree of influence of 
the EU27 manufacturing sectors is not very strong in the Greek market
79
. This outcome 
validates the reports of IOBE (2013, 2014) supporting that the Greek manufacturing industry 
is one of the most important contributors to Greek GDP and employment by neglecting 
exogenous price shocks originated from the European manufacturing markets. 
             An additional factor taken into account in the pricing equation of this study refers to 
government intervention in terms of value added tax (VAT) in the wholesale price charged by 
the manufacturing sectors. As discussed in section 6.1.2, p
T
 reflects the percentage of the 
VAT as part of the final wholesale price that buyers have to pay for the final product of a 
particular sector. According to changes in the wholesale price and the VAT level over the 
period 1980-2012, the effect of p
T
 was estimated on the final wholesale price of the 
constituent manufacturing sectors. 
In particular, according to the tax report of the European Commission and Eurostat 
(2014), the initial VAT rate introduced by the Greek government in 1987 was a universal rate 
for the Greek economy equal to 18 percent. However, in 2000, there were discussions about a 
fair rate given the heterogeneity and importance of various goods in the Greek markets. This 
                                                          
79
 A very important limitation of this process lies on the fact that the aforementioned estimates reflect changes in 
nominal prices. This means that the comparison process occurs between the nominal price level charged by the 
Greek and the EU27 manufacturing sectors respectively. However, any differences between the aforementioned 
price levels do not reflect a real effect, as the rate of inflation is not taken into account. 
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proposition was legislated in 2005, under which a three-tiered VAT system was established; 
the standard rate was 19 percent and the new reduced rates were 9 percent and 4.5 percent 
respectively. In 2010, given the economic condition of the Greek economy and the 
implementation of the Adjustment Programme, the standard rate increased to 21 percent, 
while the reduced rates also increased to 11 percent and 5.5 percent respectively.  
One year later, there was an additional increase in those rates, under which the new 
standard rate raised to 23 percent and the reduced rates to 13 percent and 6.5 percent 
respectively
80
. In the following months, there were discussions about lowering the standard 
rate in the main region of the Greek economy but there was no actual implementation of such 
policy. In addition, the tax report highlights the fact that the Greek economy has the sixth 
highest standard VAT rate in the EU and the second highest rate in eating-out, as a result of 
fiscal contraction caused by the implementation of austerity policies. 
             The standard VAT rate of 23 percent is applied on the majority of manufacturing 
products such as clothes, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, furniture, chemicals, plastics 
and paper products. The reduced rate of 13 percent refers to products such as food at the 
supermarkets and grocery stores, ready-made or prepared meals, fresh baked goods and 
pastry from bakeries. The second reduced rate of 6.5 percent is applied on pharmaceutical 
products, books, magazines and newspapers. To this end, according to the nature of the 
constituent manufacturing sectors, the analysis took into account the appropriate VAT rate in 
every year over 1980-2012 and therefore, the formulation of p
T
 has been made according to 
the wholesale price level of each 3-digit manufacturing sector. 
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 Those rates may vary in particular Greek islands according to the number of tourists and the level of demand. 
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Figure A: The VAT rates over 1987-2011 in the Greek economy. 
 
             As presented in Table 8, the final wholesale price elasticity with respect to taxation is 
found to be significant at least at the 5% level of significance in 48 out of 56 sectors. This 
reflects that the VAT rate has affected the pricing decisions of the manufacturing sectors over 
the period 1980-2012. This fact shows that the final wholesale price charged by the 
manufacturing sectors takes into account the corresponding VAT rate over the years. The 
estimates suggest that fluctuations in the VAT rate and/or the initial wholesale price (before 
tax) have a significant effect on the final wholesale price, which is also the source of 
endogeneity in the pricing equation (31).  
             The value of λΤ’ suggests that changes in the formulated variable pT were reflected in 
the final wholesale price by a range over -0.039153 to 0.350327. The positive signed values 
refer to the percentage change of p
T
 incorporated in the final wholesale price. Since that 
percentage is lower than unity, it indicates that pricing decisions took into account changes of 
VAT in p
f
 only by that percentage, thus suggesting the imperfect competitive nature of the 
industry. The highest value estimated for sector 105 suggests that changes in p
T
 have 
influenced p
f
 only by 35 percent over the period sample. On the other hand, the negative 
value obtained for sector 253 denotes that changes in p
T
 had a negative effect on p
f
. An 
interpretation of this result could be in accordance to the overall behaviour of that sector not 
to reflect a VAT rate increase in its final wholesale price level, given that there was no 
reduction of VAT over 1980-2012. Therefore, the main implication of those estimates 
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suggests that the majority of the Greek manufacturing sectors incorporated the VAT rate into 
their pricing decisions by transmitting a percentage of such changes to consumers.  
Figure 8: The speed of price adjustment of the manufacturing sectors over the period 1980-2012. 
 
 
             The last, and most important, factor included in the pricing equation of this study 
refers to lagged pricing decisions at time t-1. In particular, the main rationale of this factor 
refers to the degree of dependence between present and past pricing decisions in the 
manufacturing sectors. The pricing equation of this study is based on the initial formulation 
of Bedrossian and Moschos (1988). It takes into account the partial adjustment mechanism 
(28) in order to incorporate lagged pricing decisions in the equilibrium state expressed by 
equation (27). In addition, this analysis includes two additional adjustment mechanisms 
expressed by equation (29) and (30) in which the adjustment between the equilibrium price 
and competing foreign prices and taxation are presented respectively. The main intuition of 
this step refers to the identification of the speed of price adjustment (λ) of the manufacturing 
sectors to changes in the pricing equation factors at time t-1. 
             The estimates presented in Table 8 validate the proposition of Bedrossian and 
Moschos (1988) that the Greek manufacturing industry faces a significant degree of nominal 
price rigidity. In particular, in conjunction with the results of Table 7, the value of 1-λ is 
found to be significant for every manufacturing sector (except 201). The value of wholesale 
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price elasticity with respect to lagged pricing decisions reflects the degree of dependence 
between p
f
t and p
f
t-1. Therefore, if that value is subtracted from unity, then the speed of price 
adjustment will be obtained by reflecting the degree of price rigidity
81
. As mentioned by 
Olive (2008), the speed of price adjustment is affected by target output when a particular 
sector has economies or diseconomies of scale with respect to the costs of adjustment. In the 
present study, those costs refer to the lagged pricing equation factors as the crucial 
determinants of price adjustment. 
The value of λ ranges over 0.124964 to 0.577846 by excluding the insignificant value 
estimated for sector 201. The estimates of price adjustment suggest that the majority of the 
manufacturing sectors appear to have a rather rigid pricing behaviour below 0.5 which can be 
considered as the boundary between partial rigidity and flexibility. The results obtained by 
the time series analysis also validate the indications of the first and third step respectively in 
favour of a significant degree of nominal price rigidity in the manufacturing industry. The 
theoretical implications of the partial adjustment model and thus, the speed of price 
adjustment lie on the degree of dependence between present and lagged pricing decisions in 
the manufacturing sectors. However, there exists a single sector (i.e. 201) that does not 
appear to have a significant value of λ. This means that over the period 1980-2012, the 
pricing decisions of the sector of basic chemicals were not influenced by changes in the 
pricing equation factors at time t-1. This is the sole reason for which the values of wholesale 
price elasticity with respect to unit input costs appear to be higher compared to the remaining 
sectors. 
             As mentioned in section 6.1.2, the speed of price adjustment is modelled in the 
pricing equation as fixed for every sector over the period sample, but as a linear function of 
the structural factors across 3-digit sectors. This fact indicates a linear dependency between 
the final wholesale price level and the pricing equation factors at time t. Nevertheless, the 
theoretical intuition of rigid price adjustment can also be interpreted on the basis of market 
conditions. As Dixon (1983) and Bedrossian and Moschos (1988) argued, the nature of price 
rigidities cannot refer only to oligopolistic conditions. For instance, a collusive behaviour 
among firms or sectors could force the market price level to be quite rigid for a number of 
years by not considering any fluctuations in the remaining pricing equation factors.  
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 It is always assumed that a value of λ=0 refers to complete price rigidity and a value of λ=1 corresponds to 
complete flexibility. 
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However, intense competitive conditions can also result in a slow speed of price 
adjustment through intensive or even secret price cutting. As discussed by Green and Porter 
(1984), whenever there is an exogenous demand shock in a particular sector under collusion, 
there may be at least one firm that will try to take advantage of that shock by violating the 
collusive contract. That violation will lead to a reduced price level charged by that firm and 
thus, excess demand will turn to that particular firm. If this rationale is adopted by every 
participant of the collusion, given the assumption of rationality, the collusion will enter a 
temporary reversionary episode. Under this episode, competitive behaviour will be dominant 
in the short run, and maybe in the long run, meaning that the price level will remain at the 
competitive level despite changes in the cost of inputs or any other significant factor. 
             As a result, the analysis of the speed of price adjustment concept provided evidence 
in favour of a significant degree of nominal price rigidity in the Greek manufacturing sectors. 
This outcome suggests that present pricing decisions are influenced by lagged pricing 
decisions which show that the adjustment process will need some time to accurately reflect 
changes in the pricing equation factors at time t-1 and t. In addition, factors such as 
competing foreign prices and taxation also displayed a significant effect on the wholesale 
price level of the manufacturing sectors’ final product, in conjunction with unit input costs 
and production decisions. Overall, the implication of this step corresponds to the fact that on 
the basis of the aforementioned pricing equation factors, the Greek manufacturing sectors and 
the whole industry have faced a slow speed of price adjustment over 1980-2012.  
 In addition, the values obtained in this study validate the values of Bedrossian and 
Moschos (1988) suggesting that price tend to change relatively slow in the Greek 
manufacturing industry. The authors estimated a range of λ over 0.1246-0.7206 which is 
consistent with the sluggish adjustment results of this study. By taking into account the time 
sample of the aforementioned study over 1963-1977 and of this study over 1980-2012, it can 
be argued that the Greek manufacturing industry always faced a relatively slow speed of 
adjustment. However, the contribution of the present study extends the analysis to the 
aggregate level (i.e. 1-digit level), to the 3-digit level and to the annual behaviour of the 
manufacturing industry. This means that both studies contribute to the literature of price 
adjustment in the Greek manufacturing industry by validating the theoretical and empirical 
intuition of sluggish adjustment. In conjunction with the results of imperfect competition, the 
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next and final step of this study is to test whether such pricing behaviour results from the 
presence of imperfect competition due to various factors, such as collusive agreements. 
             Therefore, the following and final step refers to the nature of the estimated results of 
market power and price rigidity which is the main scope of this study. In particular, in 
sections 6.1 and 6.2 the conjectural variation elasticity and the speed of price adjustment were 
estimated for the Greek manufacturing sectors and the whole industry over the period 1980-
2012. However, it is still not very clear why the degree of market power and price rigidity 
were found to have the aforementioned values. To this end, the final process that must be 
taken into account in order to identify and complete the main scope of this study corresponds 
to potential factors introduced by literature that may influence the speed of price adjustment. 
Consequently, the following sections reflect the results of the formulation of the price 
adjustment equation, as presented in section 4.4, in order to identify the sources of market 
power and nominal price rigidity in the Greek manufacturing sectors. 
 
6.3.The Speed of Price Adjustment Formulation 
According to Dixon (1983) and Bedrossian and Moschos (1988), the speed at which prices 
adjust to changes in costs is found to be negatively correlated to the degree of market power. 
This effect is identified by the authors as the profitability effect by highlighting the fact that 
higher volume of sales in conjunction with rigid prices result in a higher level of profits. The 
empirical evidence of those studies suggest that sectors are able to offset price adjustment 
costs, such as unit and menu costs, by sustaining a slow speed of price adjustment (Kano, 
2013). In addition, the second effect identified as the leadership effect, captures the 
relationship between the speed of price adjustment and the size of the manufacturing sectors. 
It is expected that the larger the size, the more flexible pricing decisions will be as sectors can 
defray price adjustment costs through flexible production decisions. As a result, they have 
less reason to sustain a rigid price level compared to firms exercising their market power 
(Olive, 2008). 
             The main objective of the present study corresponds to the identification of the 
aforementioned effects in the Greek manufacturing industry by considering the findings of 
sections 6.1.2 and 6.2.2 and the respective variables introduced by the existing literature. The 
speed of price adjustment formulation is reflected by equation (38) according to the analysis 
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of Bedrossian and Moschos (1988) and Olive (2008). In particular, the variables through 
which the profitability effect will be identified correspond to the degree of market 
concentration in terms of sales (CR4) and conjectural variation elasticity (f) (Martin, 1993). 
On the other hand, the leadership effect has been identified in the existing literature by the 
production lag indicator and the size of the firms in terms of sales (SIZ4). However, given the 
unavailability of data for the constituent sectors of this sample, the former indicator has been 
excluded from this study and replaced by average cost (AC). The average cost indicator can 
capture the effect of leadership according to the ability of the manufacturing sectors to adjust 
their prices more often when changes in the average cost of inputs occur at any time t
82
. 
Therefore, according to the sign and the magnitude of the coefficients, the effects of 
profitability and leadership will be identified. 
             Following the methodology adopted by the aforementioned papers, the speed of price 
adjustment formulation will be estimated under a cross-sectional approach for each year over 
2005-2012. Given the significance of this particular sub-period, it is of great interest to 
identify the two effects in the manufacturing industry according to the behaviour of the 
constituent 3-digit sectors. A limitation of this approach corresponds to the inability of 
identifying the two effects in the 3-digit level individually by including a full set of firm-level 
data. If the present data set comprised of input costs of the manufacturing firms, then the 
analysis could involve the characteristics of a 4-digit level specification in full scale. For this 
reason, the present study is limited to the estimation of those effects in the manufacturing 
industry, but the accuracy of the observations reflects the indicators obtained by 3-digit and 
4-digit level concentration and size data respectively. 
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 Olive (2008) takes into account the average variable cost (AVC) for the Australian manufacturing sectors by 
neglecting the influence of capital investment in pricing decisions. In this study, the volatility of investments is a 
very important factor which may also capture the relationship of the speed of price adjustment to changes in 
average total cost of the manufacturing sectors. 
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Table 9. Estimations of the Speed of Price Adjustment Equation (38) of the 3-digit Sectors in the 
Greek Manufacturing Industry for each year over the period 2005-2012. 
Parameters 2005 2006 2007 2008 
γ1 (CR4d) -0.159182 (-2.549121) -0.098615 (-2.341726) -0.129181 (-2.419285) -0.143641 (-2.52845) 
γ2 (SIZ4d) 0.108517 (2.851829) 0.051726 (2.351944) 0.071829 (2.591823) 0.078575 (2.613163) 
γ3 (ACd) 0.031722 (2.159772) 0.019182 (1.990182) 0.028171 (2.019231) 0.058882 (2.711216) 
γ4 (f) -0.261728 (-2.018471) -0.381625 (-2.980195) -0.281762 (-2.139185) -0.394811 (-3.05716) 
Estimation 
Method 
WLS WLS WLS WLS 
Durbin-
Watson Test
a 
2.057182 2.118475 2.009175 2.173542 
Breusch and 
Godfrey Test
b 
- - - - 
Breusch, 
Pagan and 
Godfrey Test
c 
4.081726 [0.0274] 4.118172 [0.0256] 3.861729 [0.0353] 3.1276 [0.0491] 
White Test
d 2.549128 [0.0396] 3.679182 [0.0000] 4.771681 [0.0000] 5.113334 [0.0000] 
Wald Test
e 14.1928 [0.0000] 16.9182 [0.0000] 13.5571 [0.0000] 10.7215 [0.0000] 
Notes: See notes in Table 1. 
a
 If d  2. there is no evidence of first order positive serial correlation in the error term. where d is the value of 
the DW test. 
b
 H0: No serial correlation of ρ-order in the error term (ρ1=…=ρρ=0). 
c
 H0: Homoskedasticity versus H1: Heteroskedasticity of known form ( 2 2
1( )t h a   ). 
d
 H0: Homoskedasticity versus H1: Heteroskedasticity of unknown form. 
e
 The F-test is used to test the joint significance of the including regressors. 
  
(Table 9 continue) 
Parameters 2009 2010 2011 2012 
γ1 (CR4d) -0.081724 (-2.318471) -0.139997 (-2.505212) -0.159816 (-2.577958) -0.178371 (-2.63812) 
γ2 (SIZ4d) 0.097261 (2.737182) 0.068492 (2.482706) 0.136375 (3.056953) 0.121985 (2.991928) 
γ3 (ACd) 0.049182 (2.373910) 0.026348 (2.009718) -0.068838 (-2.298546) -0.041827 (-2.04917) 
γ4 (f) -0.258744 (-1.998155) -0.461536 (-3.381825) -0.149909 (-1.398274) -0.292716 (-2.19273) 
Estimation 
Method 
WLS WLS WLS WLS 
Durbin-
Watson Test
a 
2.038172 2.187697 2.179473 2.139281 
Breusch and 
Godfrey Test
b 
- - - - 
Breusch, 
Pagan and 
Godfrey Test
c 
3.589811 [0.0375] 4.097136 [0.0288] 3.349351 [0.0431] 4.017162 [0.0305] 
White Test
d 2.761744 [0.0328] 3.209626 [0.0018] 7.521841 [0.0000] 2.918273 [0.0284] 
Wald Test 18.1928 [0.0000] 11.6125 [0.0000] 15.8646 [0.0000] 10.1825 [0.0000] 
Notes: See notes in Table 1. 
a
 If d  2. there is no evidence of first order positive serial correlation in the error term. where d is the value of 
the DW test. 
b
 H0: No serial correlation of ρ-order in the error term (ρ1=…=ρρ=0). 
c
 H0: Homoskedasticity versus H1: Heteroskedasticity of known form ( 2 21( )t h a   ). 
d
 H0: Homoskedasticity versus H1: Heteroskedasticity of unknown form. 
e
 The F-test is used to test the joint significance of the including regressors. 
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             To begin with, the diagnostics tests presented in Table 9 correspond to the ones 
introduced in section 5.2, given the exclusion of a panel data approach. There are 8 estimated 
cross-sections constituted by 56 observations, according to the number of the 3-digit sectors 
of the sample. The Durbin-Watson test is found to be higher than 2 in the undertaken cross-
sections by suggesting the absence of first order positive serial correlation in the residual 
terms of equation (38) over 2005-2012. However, the heteroskedasticity tests of White and 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey are found to be significant at least at the 5% level of significance in 
every cross-section. Such evidence suggests the presence of heteroskedasticity of known 
form by indicating that the variance of the error term for each year is not constant (see section 
5.2). In conjunction with the evidence provided by the White test, which identifies additional 
forms of heteroskedasticity and misspecifications, it can be argued that heteroskedasticity of 
the speed of price adjustment formulation is of known and linear form. 
             To this end, the estimation method that has been chosen and considered to be the 
most accurate according to the diagnostics results corresponds to the Weighted Least Squares 
technique. In particular, since the form of heteroskedasticity appears to be linear, the error 
term’s standard deviation will be equal to 𝜎𝑖
2 = 𝜎𝑤𝑖𝑗
2 = 𝜎𝜐
2 + 𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑖), where 𝑤𝑖𝑗reflects 
the source of heteroskedasticity across the entities. Therefore, the scaled weights that correct 
this problem correspond to (𝜎𝜐
2 + 𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑖))
−1/2. They are applied to the OLS estimation of 
(38) in order to obtain efficient estimators and homoscedastic residual terms. 
The estimates of market power are reflected by the coefficients of the concentration 
ratio and elasticity of conjectural variation. Both of them are found to be significant at least at 
the 5% level of significance in every year across 2005-2012, with the sole exception of 2011, 
where the latter estimator is insignificant. The sign is negative in every case by reflecting an 
inverse relationship between market power and price flexibility. Such results validate the 
findings of Bedrossian and Moschos (1988), as well as additional studies that argue in favour 
of negative correlation between the speed of price adjustment and the degree of market power. 
             The magnitude of market concentration ranges over -0.081724 in 2009 and reaches a 
value of -0.178371 in 2012. On the other hand, the magnitude of market power in terms of 
production (f) appears to have a stronger effect on the speed of price adjustment. The lowest 
value is found for 2011, which is insignificant and equal to -0.149909, while the highest 
absolute value appears in 2010 equal to -0.461536. These estimates indicate that production 
decisions, according to which the market structure is reflected, have a greater effect on 
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pricing decisions than the concentration indicator. In particular, the CR4 formulation was 
presented by Martin (1993) by taking into account the volume of sales of the four largest 
domestic firms to the value of the sector in a particular time period. However, the remaining 
firms are excluded by assuming an insignificant effect on the concentration ratio.  
             On the other hand, the advantage of that measure compared to conjectural variation 
elasticity refers to whether production decisions accurately reflect demand conditions. 
Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) assumed that production decisions are formed under 
rational expectations (Muth, 1961; Sargent, 1987) which reflect an accurate estimation of 
demand. This means that production is equal to expected consumption and therefore, the 
former indicator may accurately capture market conditions. However, in terms of reality, 
production tends to be close to the volume of sales but never equal. In the case of the Greek 
manufacturing industry, the data sample shows that production is always close to sales which 
reflects no misinterpretation of the market conditions in the manufacturing sectors. 
             In spite of the difference in the magnitude of the market power indicators, the 
rationale remains the same. The speed of price adjustment in the manufacturing industry is 
inversely related to the degree of market power. An interpretation of this outcome could 
reflect the presence of informal agreements among the constituent firms of the manufacturing 
sectors. If demand fluctuations are not very intense over the years, then the profitability of the 
firms will be increased by sustaining a rigid price level which does not incorporate 
fluctuations in the pricing equation factors. On the other hand, such agreements could also be 
justified in terms of menu costs (Rotemberg, 1982b). Consumers may not prefer changes in 
the price level of products and therefore, they may prefer firms that tend to sustain a stable 
price over a period of time. Such behaviour reflects both upward and downward price 
rigidities with the sole purpose of satisfying the needs of consumers. 
             According to the estimation of the market power coefficients, it can be argued that 
firms in concentrated sectors appear to be able to take price adjustment costs into account by 
choosing not to reflect them in their final wholesale price level. This action does not 
necessarily reflect a profit seeking behaviour as firms may be interested in the number of 
their consumers rather the level of their profits. They may prefer to build their reputation by 
sacrificing additional profits in the short-run in order to ensure the sustainability and 
survivability of the firm in the long-run (Rogerson, 1983). As a result, the profitability effect 
matters in the long-run if the aforementioned incentives are taken into account.  
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 In addition, the presence of the profitability effect in the manufacturing industry 
validates the theoretical suggestion of the collusion model that price rigidities emerge as a 
result of market power. In particular, the formation of collusion reflects market power 
acquisition because firms sign contracts that limit competition by restraining production and 
increasing the price level. This means that the profitability effect is the main objective of 
colluding firms that wish to maintain their profits at a satisfactory level in times of low 
demand. As a result, increased market power leads to a rigid price level. This theoretical 
intuition is confirmed by the negative relationship between market structure and price 
flexibility. 
             However, as Berossian and Moschos (1988) argued, interfirm differences among the 
profitability of the participant firms can affect the speed of price adjustment. If those 
differences are not significant, then the degree of competition will be intensive by resulting in 
more flexible and lower prices as a tool of attracting consumers. On the other hand, if such 
differences are significant, then the level of competition will be low by providing additional 
market power to the firms with the highest level of profitability. Either way, the results of this 
study show that the profitability effect in the Greek manufacturing industry is inversely 
related to the speed of price adjustment; as market power increases, firms and sectors will use 
that power in order to sustain a rigid price level which will result in  profit acquisition in the 
long-run. 
             The two remaining measures correspond to the size of the manufacturing sectors, as 
an expression of the four largest firms, and to the average cost of those sectors for each year 
over 2005-2012. In particular, the size of the sectors is expressed in terms of sales, as 
presented by Olive (2008), while the average cost variable comprises of both labour and 
capital costs
83
. These indicators will identify the leadership effect of the manufacturing 
industry which captures the relationship between pricing decisions and the size of the sectors, 
accompanied by fluctuations in average total cost. As argued by Rotemberg and Saloner 
(1990), large firms may appear to have more flexible pricing decisions due to economies of 
scales. This indicates that if through innovation and improved technology the average cost of 
production falls over the years, then unit costs will also decrease. To this end, if large firms 
wish to enhance competition in the short-run as a form of acquiring greater market power in 
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indicator which reflects fluctuations only in the input of labour. They neglect any fluctuations of capital 
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the long-run, then economies of scales will provide them the opportunity to engage in 
competitive actions.  
In addition, assuming that the degree of competition is intense and at the same time, 
there are menu costs occurring as per Rotemberg (1982b) and Kano (2013), then the largest 
firms will be able to exercise the aforementioned strategy. They will have the opportunity to 
choose between flexible or rigid prices according to actual and expected levels of demand. If 
they have the ability to reduce prices by both attracting additional customers and minimizing 
losses, then the leadership effect will also influence the profitability effect in the long-run. 
The largest sectors can defray any price adjustment costs due to economies of scales and 
therefore, they have less reason to prefer rigid over flexible prices by resulting in additional 
consumers. 
The findings presented in Table 9 reflect a positive and significant effect at least at the 
5% level of significance of the size of the sectors on the speed of price adjustment. The 
values of the estimates range over 0.051726 and 0.136375, where the former is observed for 
2006 and the latter for 2011. In particular, the leadership effect is found to be relatively 
strong in 2005 but over the sub-period 2006-2010, its magnitude fluctuates around 0.07 by 
reaching a climax in 2009. The most interesting observation refers to the years following the 
austerity programme implementation over 2010-2012. The value of the leadership effect is 
0.068492 in 2010 which is in accordance to the former values over 2006-2009. However, in 
the period over 2011-2012, which is considered to be the starting period of economic 
depression, the leadership effect is found to be approximately two times higher compared to 
the previous years.  
In 2011 and 2012, the estimate is equal to 0.136375 and 0.121985 respectively. This 
means that under the effects of falling aggregate demand, the largest manufacturing sectors 
chose to increase the flexibility of their pricing decisions in order to incorporate fluctuations 
of the pricing equation factors in their wholesale price level. Moreover, if it is also considered 
that the cost of inputs followed a slightly increasing trend
84
, then it can be argued that 
relatively higher unit costs were reflected in the final wholesale price. This action can be 
interpreted on the basis of large sectors being confident about the level of demand for their 
products even if the degree of uncertainty about future expected demand is accounted for.  
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In addition, the second factor that partially validates the aforementioned rationale 
refers to the effect of average cost on the speed of price adjustment. The main argument 
corresponds to the fact that large firms can take advantage of economies of scales in order to 
defray the costs of price adjustment. Nevertheless, the first set of estimations (2005-2010) 
that reflect the effect of average total cost fluctuations on the speed of price adjustment 
contradict this particular rationale. As presented in Table 9, the estimates are positively 
signed over 2005-2010, negatively signed over 2011-2012, significant at least at the 5% level 
of significance and they range over -0.068838 and 0.058882. Despite the fact that their 
influence is very low, their significance captures the main proposition of Peltzman (2000) 
that prices rise faster than they fall only over 2005-2010. In particular, a positive sign 
between the flexibility of pricing decisions and average cost reflects the fact that an increase 
in the latter variable will be partially transferred to the wholesale price by resulting in price 
flexibility and thus, higher price level.   
On the other hand, if there is a decrease in average cost, the wholesale price will 
become more rigid. This action refers to the fact that firms and sectors are not willing to give 
up any additional profit opportunities in the short-run by adjusting their prices to such 
changes. This rationale does not validate the leadership effect as economies of scale do not 
result in more flexible prices. An interpretation may be that the majority of the manufacturing 
sectors prefer to pursue a potential increase of their market power in the short run by 
neglecting to reflect adjustment costs in the final wholesale price (that is a form of collusion).  
However, this assumption is valid only when fluctuations in demand can be predicted. 
If the degree of future uncertainty is too intense, then firms and sectors may choose to act in 
accordance to the leadership effect under which they will try to secure the maximum number 
of consumers possible. This fact is reflected by the negative signs appeared in the estimations 
of 2011 and 2012 equal to -0.068838 and -0.041827 respectively. By assuming that the 
imposition of austerity policies results in a slump of aggregate demand, economies of scale 
will provide the opportunity to the manufacturing sectors to adjust their prices according to 
fluctuations in average cost. A negative sign reflects the fact that firms are willing to adjust 
their prices when there is a fall in average cost. On the other hand, an increase in average cost 
is followed by a slow price adjustment that reflects the intention of firms/sectors not to 
transmit additional costs to the final wholesale price level. The exploitation of such changes 
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will manifest according to market conditions and thus, they can contribute to both 
profitability and leadership effect. 
The main implications of this study reflecting the behaviour of the Greek 
manufacturing industry are in accordance with the studies of Bedrossian and Moschos (1988) 
and Olive (2008). In particular, it has been supported that the speed of price adjustment of the 
manufacturing sectors increases with production when there are economies of scale with 
respect to the costs of price adjustment. In addition, sectors exercising their market power 
will prefer to offset such costs by maintaining a slow speed of price adjustment which will 
either increase their profitability or secure their number of consumers (or both). Finally, the 
size of the sectors is positively related to the speed of price adjustment as large firms may 
consider additional alternatives than taking advantage of economies of scales. As suggested 
by the findings of this study, the manufacturing sectors also take into account competing 
foreign pricing decisions and value added after tax in order to adjust their wholesale prices by 
defraying price adjustment costs. This shows that average total cost is not the only factor that 
large firms consider to affect the flexibility of their pricing decisions. Consequently, the 
results of this study can complement the proposition of Olive (2008) that large firms can 
defray additional pricing decision factors by resulting in lower incentives to maintain a slow 
speed of price adjustment. 
The main limitation of this approach corresponds to the lack of average cost data for 
the manufacturing firms (4-digit level) which could have enhanced the validity and accuracy 
of the results. In addition, the omission of the production lag variable, which has been 
included in the empirical literature of price adjustment, was replaced by the average cost 
variable. The estimations were in accordance to the theoretical intuition and thus, it can be 
concluded that it is a very effective replacement of the former variable, both in theoretical 
and empirical terms. 
 
6.4.Policy Implications 
The significant evidence of market power and slow price adjustment suggest that the Greek 
manufacturing industry operates under non-competitive conditions by resulting in social 
inefficiency. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the fluctuations of market power over 1980-2012 
according to production decisions. As discussed in chapter 6, the sub-period over 1988-1994 
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was subject to the structural reforms imposed by the Single European Market (SEM) in order 
to enhance the degree of competition. However, over the following years, the outcome of 
those reforms faded away as production and thus, pricing decisions returned to even more 
intense oligopolistic levels. In particular, the two exogenous shocks of the euro currency and 
the Olympic Games contributed to that fact by creating a temporary boost in domestic 
demand and thus, to a speculative chance for profit-making (Green and Porter, 1984). 
Moreover, the two additional shocks of 2008 and 2010 (global financial crisis and austerity 
policies respectively) seem to have stabilized the degree of imperfect competition but still, 
oligopolistic forces were very intensive. 
 According to such evidence and in conjunction with the speed of price adjustment 
illustrated in figures 7 and 8, the degree of imperfect competition should converge to the 
1994 levels when the SEM implementation reached its climax. This means that a second 
imposition of the SEM policy framework must be reintroduced in the Greek markets in order 
to intensify competitive forces. In particular, the European Commission (2012) is formulating 
a policy framework for the European Union members under which they will achieve new 
levels of growth by developing fully integrated networks  and enhancing the economies 
overall. One of the most important factors corresponds to the enhancement of business 
environment by facilitating the survival of businesses and introducing opportunities for active 
and new entrepreneurs. The Greek business environment leaves little place for new 
inexperienced businesses to operate in highly regulated and monitored markets dominated by 
oligopolistic firms (IOBE, 2014). If the degree of competition is very low, then new 
entrepreneurs will be discouraged from starting their business in particular sectors and 
therefore, they may choose a different alternative by throwing away the potential of 
manufacturing growth. 
  However, aside from new entrants, there are many cases of entrepreneurs who are 
forced to exit particular sectors either because of little market share or because of business 
failure due to unexpected circumstances. The current framework in many EU countries does 
not allow for a second chance in entrepreneurship as those people are stigmatized as failures 
due to insolvency (Eurobarometer, 2010). This action has a negative impact on the whole 
society because there are wasted potential capabilities of welfare efficiency. In particular, a 
failed entrepreneur may become an experienced entrepreneur who learned from his/her 
mistakes and his/her investment decisions. If this case holds, then by re-entering the market 
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he/she will be able to succeed and thus, enhance the degree of competition and efficiency. To 
this end, the European Union must establish a policy framework that will be taking into 
account insolvent and debt-discharge schemes which will provide a second opportunity to 
enterprises to operate in particular sectors
85
. 
 In conjunction with the aforementioned policy, the Greek judiciary of competition 
authorities must also control for any collusive actions that enhance the forces of oligopoly. In 
particular, according to SEM, markets must be allowed to operate independently without any 
government intervention, with the sole exception of competition violations. This means that 
competition authorities must intervene in cases of ill competition or actions that damage 
social efficiency and prevent enterprises from utilizing part of the market share.  
However, as argued by this study, the degree of imperfect competition in the 
manufacturing industry is similar to duopoly accompanied by sticky nominal prices. This 
means that competition authorities have to intensify competitive interactions in highly 
concentrated sectors. They can inform potential entrepreneurs about existing opportunities 
that will introduce new entrants to those sectors by limiting the market power of the 
incumbent firms. To this end, any barriers to entry will be overlapped and any informal 
actions of collusion will be easily prevented as the competition authorities will be actively 
involved in the first steps of the new entrants in the manufacturing industry.  
 An additional factor which may be treated as a barrier to entry refers to the available 
access to finance. Given the imposition of austerity policies and the financial collapse of 
2008, the financial institutions may be reluctant to provide additional funding to start-up 
firms in an economic environment full of uncertainty (Dinopoulos, Kalyvitis and Katsimi, 
2015). This decision limits investment actions and therefore, discourages people to be 
engaged in entrepreneurship. Investment is considered to be the motivating power of growth 
and development through which firms and the whole economy will be benefited (IOBE, 
2014). For this reason, long-term investment can stimulate the productivity capabilities of 
firms by improving their products through various ways of diversification. If every operating 
firm is exposed to that scheme, then competition will be intensified as the most productive 
and successful firms will attract more consumers. Under such conditions, long-term costs 
may be increased but the wholesale price will be kept to a low level as a tool of competition 
(i.e. price-cost margin). 
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 In particular, this factor may be treated as the most constraining element of 
investment and production decisions. As Fairlie and Krashisky (2011) argued, liquidity and 
entrepreneurship are strongly correlated because cash flows can automatically be invested 
and as a result, affect the decisions of the private sector (both households and firms). 
Following the financial collapse of 2008, banks have become reluctant in providing credit 
and loans to firms and especially to start-up projects given the degree of economic 
uncertainty and the low level of interest rates (Lane, 2012). Consequently, the Greek 
manufacturing firms face such liquidity constraints which may be part of the interpretation of 
the inflexible wholesale prices in conjcntion with the decrease in the net number of 
manufacturing firms (see figures 9 and 10). 
The conjectural variation estimates may provide an interpretation to the limited access 
of the manufacturing sectors to finance. As aforementioned, a major side-effect of the 
imposition of austerity polcies is the limited credit provision from banks to manufacturing 
firms. This is a result of the current economic conditions filled with uncertainty that prevent 
banks from providing loans under low interest rates. This means that many firms have been 
forced to exit their sectors, thus leaving only few operating by exercising their market power 
on pricing and production decisions. This argument is validated by the increasing trend of 
market power, which resulted in a market structure similar to a duopoly
86
. 
 According to the estimates presented in section 6.1, output elasticity with respect to 
the degree of liquidity is significant and positive signed for the 3-digit manufacturing sectors. 
This fact indicates that additional liquidity in terms of money inflows will result in increased 
demand for manufacturing products. If demand is increased, then supply must increase well 
in order to avoid a acondition of underproduction and higher prices. An interpretation of this 
outcome can be based on consumer expectations and confidence according to the state of the 
economic environment. If they are confident about their Purchasing Power Parity, then 
entrepreneurs will receive that signal as a temporary shock of demand and thus, they will 
increase their production (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986). Such temporary shocks also 
necessitate a higher level of short-term investment in order to finance the additional part of 
production due to that particular demand shock. This action strengthens social 
entrepreneurship by providing additional motives to new entrepreneurs to be engaged in the 
manufacturing production process. Through such actions, consumer confidence will be 
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 Such constraints can also be viewed as barriers to entry because firms with access to finance will be more 
flexible in repaying their liabilities.  
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restored as the social aspect of entrepreneurship will be promoted and as a result, increased 
demand will be reflected by additional investment leading to higher production levels. 
 Nevertheless, such actions are partially constrained by the European Union as the 
European Central Bank (ECB) is maintaining a fixed level of liquidity for every Eurozone 
country through the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). Consequently, the only option 
left corresponds to fund provision by the European Investment Bank (EIB). The acquisition 
of funding by the EIB supports private investment and promotes engagement by small and 
medium sized firms. Over the period 2008-2012 the EIB provided more than 11 billion euros 
to the Greek economy by promoting competition and encouraging new firms to enter the 
Greek market (see European Investment Bank in Greece). As a result of the austerity policy 
mixture, it is expected that since aggregate demand sharply decreased, the number of the 
manufacturing firms would decrease as well. The following figures illustrate the net number 
of firms in the manufacturing industry over the sub-period 2005-2012. 
 
Figure 9: Net Number of firms operating in the manufacturing industry over the period 2005-2012. 
 
Source: EL.STAT. ProdCom database. 
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Figure 10: Net Number of manufacturing firms employing more than 10 workers over the period 
2005-2012. 
 
Source: EL.STAT. ProdCom database. 
 
Figure 9 reflects the net overall number of firms in the manufacturing industry, while 
figure 10 illustrates the net number of firms employing more than 10 people over the sub-
period 2005-2012. The former figure validates the theoretical intuition that the exogenous 
shock of recession resulting in diminishing aggregate output has a negative effect on the net 
number of active firms in the manufacturing industry. In particular, following 2008, the net 
number of firms has been decreasing by reaching a climax of negative growth rate in 2012 
equal to 13.8 percent.  
According to IOBE (2014), austerity policies and limited access to credit had a 
significant effect on investment decisions and especially, on innovation. Over 2009-2011, 
Greek enterprises were ranked in the 4
th
 place in terms of innovative ideas in a pool of 
advanced and innovative countries. However, in 2012, Greece’s ranking dropped down to the 
12
th
 place as the degree of innovation was drastically reduced. The main factor that 
contributed to this outcome corresponds to the fact that 2012 is considered to be an intensive 
year of fiscal adjustment and consolidation. Over 2012, aggregate nominal output fell by 
approximately 20 percent compared to 2009
87
. Since the fall of aggregate output was caused 
mainly by plunging aggregate demand, Greek firms and especially, the manufacturing 
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entrepreneurs shifted away from innovative to survival opportunities in order to ensure the 
long-run operation of their firms. 
A crucial factor that also contributes to this outcome is the limited credit provision by 
the Greek banks. According to Louzis et al. (2015), the non performing loans and the low 
interest rates in the Greek economy are the major factors that cause limited credit provision to 
the private sector. Such limitations are related to the state of the economy and in particular, to 
the pattern of macroeconomic variables. For this reason, banks try to build an arsenal against 
future uncertainty through stronger and more qualitative balance sheets, in addition to 
investing in less risky assets.  
The same results are also validated for the Eurozone by Makri et al. (2014) by 
rendering the manufacturing firms vulnerable to current liabilities and future shocks such as 
increased taxation and lower demand. Even if innovative firms were excelling in their sectors 
before 2010, unfavourable conditions may have forced them to stop operating. Such 
conditions may refer to limited access to finance or to the inability of serving their liabilities. 
This means that solvent firms may face possible payment delays by other firms/individuals 
which will result in further payment delays to employees, suppliers or even banks. Thereby, 
these firms will become insolvent because of liquidity constraints and not because of 
inefficient production. As a result, the remaining firms in the market will acquire market 
power if possible, they will exercise that power on their pricing decisions. 
 To this end, figure 9 in conjunction with the estimates of market power validate the 
theoretical intuition of this study; negative exogenous demand shocks result in market power 
through either oligopolistic pricing and production decisions that force the weakest firms to 
exit their sectors. An interesting result can be observed in the indicators of market power and 
price rigidity. Given that production decisions remain very close to the ones of a duopolistic 
market, the speed of price adjustment of the industry follows a downward trend after 2009 by 
reaching a low average level compared to the post-1999 period. This means that the pricing 
decisions of the manufacturing sectors may reflect a stabilization of the market structure 
close to duopoly due to the slump of aggregate demand in order to secure a minimum number 
of consumers. Consequently, according to such actions, the aforementioned policies of 
drastically reducing market power are justified along with the significance of investments. 
Given that recessionary forces do not provide the opportunity to firms to invest in innovation, 
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an institution like the EIB must step in and create such openings by motivating and 
encouraging entrepreneurs to be actively engaged in innovative actions. 
 Figure 10 illustrates optimistic evidence that entrepreneurship in the Greek 
manufacturing industry is not neglected. In particular, the net number of firms employing 
more than 10 people reflects a different pattern compared to the overall number of 
manufacturing firms. Over the sub-period 2005-2009, the number of those firms was steadily 
declining by suggesting that the driving force of the manufacturing industry lied on firms 
employing up to 10 people. Even if the former group refers to the minority of the 
manufacturing industry, entrepreneurial decisions are somewhat different compared to the 
latter group. In 2010, the net number of firms employing more than 10 people increased by 
7.8 percent when the overall number was decreased by 6 percent.  
However, the most important and promising observation is reflected in 2012. As 
mentioned above, the net overall number of firms was reduced by 13.8 percent. Nevertheless, 
the net number of firms employing more than 10 people was marginally increased by 0.04 
percent. This indicates that despite the fact that 2012 is considered to be an intensive year of 
austerity implementation, new firms and thus, new entrepreneurs chose to start operating in 
the manufacturing industry. Such actions support that despite the hardships of depression, 
entrepreneurial opportunities are always taken into account by new entrepreneurs. 
 However, it is worth noting that such opportunities are exploited by medium and large 
sized firms capable of employing more than 10 people. The remaining (small sized) firms do 
not face the same outcome as indicated by figure 9. It seems that the latter group does not 
have the opportunity to secure financial resources that will be used as a stimulating power of 
innovation. In other words, given the current framework adopted by the EIB and the Greek 
banks, it is very difficult for new and young entrepreneurs to secure a start-up loan to 
establish their own business activities. This means that small sized firms are not equally 
treated compared to medium and large sized firms by the financial institutions. For this 
reason, the EIB in conjunction with the EU and the Greek policy framework must be able to 
provide liquidity to new entrepreneurs to utilize their ideas by promoting growth and 
development in various markets. This action can also be viewed as a mean of competition as 
new firms will struggle to attract customers by utilizing their available resources and thus, by 
efficiently competing with the incumbent firms. If innovation allows for such competitive 
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forces to be active, at least in the short-run, then competition will be intensified by increasing 
the degree of market efficiency. 
 In addition, the results of this study complement the arguments and findings of the 
OECD that the Greek economy and in particular, the manufacturing industry is under-
performing (OECD 2012, 2014)
88
. In the first report, there were 555 problematic regulations 
identified where 329 of them could be improved by bolstering competition. This means that 
the Greek manufacturing industry is heavily regulated by constraining its efficiency and 
capacity which in turn results in welfare losses and market power exploitation. The second 
report was focused on the manufacturing industry and in particular, on the sectors of 
beverages (i.e. 11); textiles, clothing apparel and leather (i.e. 13, 14 and 15); machinery and 
equipment (i.e. 28); and coke and refined petroleum products (i.e. 19). The findings were 
once again in favour of regulations that hurt competition and as a result, OECD made 88 
recommendations on improving legal frameworks by taking into account the EU legislation 
that promotes competition and minimizes barriers to entry. 
 Consequently, the estimates of market power of this study can be justified by the 
constraining regulations in the manufacturing sectors that also result in rigid price levels. This 
means that if a set of policies is imposed under which firms cannot exercise their market 
power on the wholesale price level, then competition may be restored and thus, production 
decisions will converge to the one close to perfect competition. If this outcome is achieved, 
then it will be a sign of healthy competition under which barriers to entry are minimized and 
new entrepreneurs can contribute to the manufacturing production. However, even if such 
regulations are abolished or improved, there are still exogenous factors that have to be taken 
into account, such as limited access to credit and fluctuations in the VAT rate. These factors 
cannot be influenced by entrepreneurial actions and as a result, the state must ensure that the 
best outcome can be accomplished in order to minimize uncertainty and boost investment 
decisions. 
 To this end, innovation can be considered as a significant factor of competition 
through which firms will reduce their costs and diversify their products in order to increase 
their sales. If the final outcome of production as a result of diversification is accomplished, 
then particular firms will gain advantage compared to their competitors. Therefore, if the 
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same rationale is adopted by every market participant, then the degree of imperfect 
competition will be reduced. However, as mentioned before, a very important factor 
illustrated in figure 10 refers to opportunities for new entrepreneurs amidst the Greek 
recession. This means that even if the economic environment is not investment-oriented as 
the degree of uncertainty is very intense, new entrepreneurs may seize that opportunity to 
start their business.  
According to IOBE (2014), the willingness of young entrepreneurs to be involved in 
industrial activities is equal to 6.4 percent of the whole population in 2012. This percentage is 
approximately equivalent to the one observed in 2004 and higher compared to the ones of 
2007 and 2010. The outcome of such evidence shows that new entrepreneurs find depressing 
periods attractive to start their business, even if uncertainty about aggregate economy is very 
intense. This particular behaviour may also contribute to the fact that pricing decisions were 
not rapidly increased as a result of the exogenous negative demand shock of austerity. 
 According to the aforementioned results, young entrepreneurship is very important 
and crucial for the manufacturing industry. The economic environment may discourage such 
entrepreneurial actions but young people choose to take advantage of the process of creative 
destruction, as introduced by Schumpeter (Reinert and Reinert, 2006). This means that under 
extreme conditions (that is unexpected recession) the weakest firms will be forced to stop 
operating but at the same time, new firms will emerge by adjusting to the new business and 
economic environment. However, a barrier that new firms may face corresponds to the 
incumbent firms and the degree of market power. If the latter group has the ability to block 
new entries, then creative destruction will result in greater market power, while innovation 
may not be a choice after all. If a market structure is highly concentrated and very close to 
monopoly, then entrepreneur(s) may not have any incentives to invest, thus resulting in the 
deterioration of the whole market.  
Consequently, the Greek competitive authorities must be able to identify such 
opportunities and regulate any action that may be treated as a barrier to entry. Innovation is 
more important than market power and causation is not always twofold. Innovative firms may 
acquire market power but firms exercising that power may not always be innovative. This 
means that young entrepreneurs must be protected over the first steps of starting their own 
business by initially acquiring business loans and subsequently, being protected by the 
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regulatory authorities. Such protection should not violate or result in the acquisition of market 
power but rather be treated as a safety net to the incumbent firms’ market power.  
Therefore, the significant evidence of market power and slow price adjustment to 
changes in input costs, foreign price levels and taxation reflect a rather under-performing 
condition in the Greek manufacturing sectors. As a result, the Greek regulatory authorities 
have to create a business environment in which new entrepreneurs will be able to seize 
available opportuinities and efficiently operate in the Greek markets. By doing so, efficiency 
wil be restored as imperfectly competitive motives will be reduced and thus, social welfare 
will be increased. This means that the Greek authorities must abolish regulations that 
constraint managerial actions and enhance oligopolistic behaviour through efficient 
intervention. The form of intervention can be either in terms of improving regulations or 
abolishing them in order to allow incumbent and new entrepreneurs to interact efficiently in a 
competitive market environment. 
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7. Conclusions and Future Research 
The New Empirical Industrial Organization models suggest that individual production and 
pricing decisions can affect the degree of competitive interactions in particular markets. 
Regardless of the degree of that power, pricing decisions may reflect the effects of demand 
shocks as the degree of price flexibility can improve the understanding of business cycles. 
 This study modified and incorporated the conjectural variation elasticity model of 
Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) to identify the degree of market power in the Greek 
manufacturing industry in terms of production decisions. The variables of pricing decisions, 
investment, sales concentration and money supply were introduced as potential demand 
shocks that could affect the production level of the manufacturing sectors. In the majority of 
the constituent 3-digit sectors, these variables are found to be statistically significant. This 
outcome indicates that over the period 1980-2012, production decisions were being affected 
by investment, concentration and liquidity fluctuations occurring in the Greek manufacturing 
market. As a result, in conjunction with the total cost of the industry, the market power 
indicator in terms of production decisions reveals significant evidence in the majority of the 
manufacturing sectors. The magnitude of that power fluctuates around the value suggested by 
the Cournot duopoly, as individual production levels had an influence on the level of the 
aggregate industry approximately equal to 0.5. Therefore, the manufacturing sectors were 
producing as if they were involved in a duopolistic market by exploiting consumer surplus. 
 As a result of market power, the next research objective concerns the identification of 
the degree of price rigidity or otherwise, the speed at which prices adjust to changes in 
particular lagged variables (unit costs, taxation, foreign competing prices and excess demand). 
The partial adjustment model of this study provides evidence that the manufacturing industry 
overall, experienced a 0.335445 speed of adjustment. This result suggests that two years’ 
time is approximately needed for the industry to incorporate the aforementioned changes in 
the final wholesale price level. Such changes are not easily reflected in the price level of the 
manufacturing sectors. The majority of those sectors are found to be subject to slow price 
adjustment, ranging from one to five years, over the sample period by complementing the 
findings of Bedrossian and Moschos (1998). The main intuition of this study corresponds to 
the fact that market power causes sluggish nominal price changes, as sectors exercising their 
power have less reason to adjust their prices in any changes of the pricing equation factors. 
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 The final and most important step of this study corresponds to the validation of the 
profitability and leadership effect by testing the speed of price adjustment formulation. This 
approach introduces the relationship between the speed of price adjustment, the degree of 
market power and the size of the manufacturing sectors. According to the value of the 
estimates, the effects of profitability and leadership have been identified along with their 
significance in the manufacturing industry.  
The empirical results obtained by the speed of price adjustment formulation verify the 
theoretical intuition of the model that the degree of price flexibility is inversely related to 
market power and positively related to the mean size of the manufacturing firms. Given that 
the included variables of market power (CR4 and f) and size (SIZ4 and AC) change relatively 
slow, the speed of price adjustment appears to be somewhat stable as there are not volatile 
fluctuations over the sample period. The main conclusion that can be drawn from this 
equation is that large firms have economies of scales with regard to adjustment costs and 
more reason to increase their speed of price adjustment. On the other hand, firms that 
exercise their market power can slow the speed of price adjustment by avoiding to 
incorporate cost changes to the final wholesale price level. This outcome contradicts the 
belief that market power and firm size move the speed of price adjustment to the same 
direction (Olive, 2008).  
The Greek manufacturing sectors have been found to operate under non-competitive 
conditions over the period 1980-2012. The main policy implication should refer to the 
intensification of competition and the abolishment/improvement of inefficient frameworks by 
introducing various investment-oriented policies that can reduce the market power of the 
incumbent firms. In addition, such policies will provide the opportunity to both existing and 
new firms to focus on innovation and diversify their products by attracting consumers, thus 
increasing their market share. However, given the degree and experience of firms exercising 
their market power, the regulatory authorities have to prevent any act of informal agreements 
that will result in barriers to entry. Given such actions, young entrepreneurs will be able to 
establish their business in the manufacturing industry and based on loan provision, they will 
be able to improve their production through investment-oriented actions. 
Nevertheless, a crucial factor which is not taken into account in this study refers to 
aggregate demand behaviour about the products of the Greek economy. Even if output 
elasticity with respect to the wholesale price level is found to be significant and less than 
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unity, consumer behaviour highly depends on the conditions of the aggregate economy. This 
means that austerity policies had an overall effect on aggregate consumption and as a result, 
on aggregate demand. Such factors are not included in the present NEIO model as the 
constituent variables are suitable for micro analysis. The scope of this study lies on the 
identification of market power and the speed of price adjustment to micro variables such as 
unit costs, value added tax and foreign competitive price levels. Any fluctuations of 
aggregate variables are excluded which could be considered as a possible limitation. If such 
measures are taken into account, then the present model could be extended in international 
trade analysis by incorporating both fiscal and monetary factors that reflect international 
competition between different economies. 
In addition, the inclusion of the fixed/random effects model and in particular, the 
inclusion of the dummy variables approach corresponds to the lack of 4-digit level data of 
fixed and variable costs. If a complete dataset was available, then a time series or a 4-digit 
level panel analysis would be more accurate as the estimates would reflect fluctuations in 
firm and not in sectorial level. To this end, the results would be more disaggregated and 
therefore, they would be addressing the behaviour of the manufacturing firms compared to 
sectors. Nevertheless, the degree of market power and price flexibility would not change for 
the manufacturing sectors as the 3-digit analysis reflects sectorial behaviour, which is more 
disaggregated compared to industrial behaviour. As a result, the estimates of the present 
study accurately provide evidence of imperfect competition in the Greek manufacturing 
sectors and thus, in the Greek manufacturing industry. 
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Appendix A 
Table A. Classification of sectors NACE Rev. 2. 
10  Manufacture of food products 
 101 Processing and preserving of meat and production of meat products  
 102 Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs  
 103 Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables  
 104 Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats  
 105 Manufacture of dairy products  
 106 Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products  
 107 Manufacture of bakery and farinaceous products  
 108 Manufacture of other food products 
 109 Manufacture of prepared animal feeds  
11 110 Manufacture of beverages 
12 120 Manufacture of tobacco products  
13  Manufacture of textiles 
 131 Preparation and spinning of textile fibres  
 132 Weaving of textiles  
 133* Finishing of textiles 
 139 Manufacture of other textiles 
14  Manufacture of wearing apparel 
 141 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel 
 142* Manufacture of articles of fur 
 143 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted apparel  
15  Manufacture of leather and related products 
 151 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags and 
saddlery 
 152 Manufacture of footwear  
16  Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except 
furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
 161 Saw milling and planning of wood  
 162 Manufacture of products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting materials  
17  Manufacture of paper and paper products 
 171 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard  
 172 Manufacture of articles of paper and paperboard  
18  Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
 181* Printing and service activities related to printing 
19  Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 
 192 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 
20  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
 201 Manufacture of basic chemicals, fertilisers and nitrogen compounds, 
plastics and synthetic rubber in primary forms  
 202 Manufacture of pesticides and other agrochemical products 
 203 Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and 
mastics 
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(Table A continue) 
 204 Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing 
preparations, perfumes and toilet preparations  
 205 Manufacture of other chemical products  
21  Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical 
preparations 
 212* Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations 
22  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
 221 Manufacture of rubber products  
 222 Manufacture of plastics products  
23  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
 231 Manufacture of glass and glass products 
 232* Manufacture of refractory products 
 233 Manufacture of clay building materials  
 234 Manufacture of other porcelain and ceramic products  
 235 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster  
 236 Manufacture of articles of concrete, cement and plaster  
 237 Manufacture of cutting, shaping and finishing of stone  
 239 Manufacture of abrasive products and non-metallic mineral products 
n.e.c.  
24  Manufacture of basic metals 
 241 Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys  
 242 Manufacture of tubes, pipes, hollow profiles and related fittings, of steel  
 243 Manufacture of other products of first processing of steel  
 244 Manufacture of basic precious and other non-ferrous metals  
25  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 
 251 Manufacture of structural metal products  
 252 Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal  
 253 Manufacture of steam generators, except central heating hot water 
boilers  
 254* Manufacture of weapons and ammunition 
 256* Treatment and coating of metals; machining 
 257 Manufacture of cutlery, tools and general hardware  
 259 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products  
26  Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 
 263* Manufacture of communication equipment 
27  Manufacture of electrical equipment 
 271 Manufacture of electric motors, generators, transformers and electricity 
distribution and control apparatus  
 273 Manufacture of wiring and wiring devices 
 274 Manufacture of electric lighting equipment 
 275 Manufacture of domestic appliances  
28  Manufacture of machineryand equipment n.e.c 
 281 Manufacture of general purpose machinery 
 282 Manufacture of other general-purpose machinery  
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(Table A continue) 
 283 Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery  
 289 Manufacture of other special-purpose machinery  
29  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
 292 Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; manufacture of 
trailers and semi-trailers  
31 310 Manufacture of furniture  
32  Other manufacturing 
 321* Manufacture of jewelry, bijouterie and related articles 
 324* Manufacture of games and toys 
 325* Manufacture of medical and dental instruments and supplies 
 329* Manufacturing n.e.c. 
33 331* Repair of fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment 
*These sectors have been omitted from the analysis due to data inadequacy for calculating the included market 
measures. 
 
A.1. Definition of variables 
Y corresponds to total value added at 2005 constant prices and is formulated by dividing total 
value added in current prices by the total value added deflator (2005=100), as reported in AIS. 
P indicates the wholesale price index of the manufacturing sectors (2005=100), 
obtained by dividing the value of sales over the sold volume of each sector, as reported in 
AIS. 
L denotes man-hours of labour and is formulated by multiplying the annual number of 
employees with the number of average working hours per year, as reported in OECD. 
W
l
 is the wage rate per man-hour (labour compensation) and is formulated by dividing 
the number of remuneration of the employed by the number of total man-hours, as reported in 
AIS. 
ULC denotes the unit labour cost and is formulated by dividing the remuneration of 
the employed by output (Y), as reported in AIS. 
K refers to gross capital expenditures, formulated by the sum of gross asset formation 
and the level of investments at 2005 constant prices. Gross asset formation includes as 
investment assets buildings and installations, transport means, machinery and furniture. The 
rate of depreciation of the investment assets is defined as 3, 9 and 5 percent respectively, as 
indicated by Rezitis and Kalantzi (2012). 
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U
k
 is the user cost of capital, formulated as  𝑢𝑡 = 𝜂𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑟𝑡) + 𝜂𝑡 ∗ (1 + 𝜇𝑡) , 
where 𝜂 is the price of new capital formation (Zanias, 1991), rt is the rate of return of capital 
obtained from the Bank of Greece and μ is the average rate of investment asset depreciation.  
UKC corresponds to the unit capital cost and is formulated by dividing gross capital 
expenditures by output (Y), as reported in AIS. 
C is the total cost of the industry, formulated by the sum of labour and capital cost, as 
reported in AIS. 
b refers to the consumer price index (2005=100), as reported in AIS. 
Z is the level of investment in capital equipment at 2005 constant prices, as reported 
in AIS. 
Herf represents an index of concentration in terms of sales, similar to the Herfindhal-
Hirschman index (HHI). The HHI is defined as 𝐻 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 , where si is the share of each 
firm (or sector) to industry output and N is the number of the firms. The HHI ranges from 1/N 
(high competition) to 1 (monopoly). The Horizontal Mergers Guidelines of the U.S. 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (2010) suggest that a HHI less than 
0.01 indicates high competitive market conditions, while an index above 0.25 indicates a high 
degree of concentration. Therefore, in this study, the sales concentration index is defined 
as 𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑓 = ∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 , where Si is the ratio of the volume of sales to aggregate sales. 
MS denotes the indicator of liquidity, which is the money supply (M2) for Greece at 
2005 constant prices, obtained by the Bank of Greece. 
POP is the population of Greece, as reported in AIS. 
P
f
 is a price index formulated as the sum of wholesale price plus the value added tax 
(VAT) on sales at 2005 constant prices, as reported in AIS and OECD. As value added tax, it 
is defined the percentage of VAT added in sales. It is not taken into consideration any taxes on 
production that consist of taxes on buildings, the ownership or use of land or other capital 
assets used in production, on the labour employed or compensation of employees paid. 
P
eu
 corresponds to the wholesale price index of the manufacturing industry of the 
European Union (EU27) at 2005 constant prices, as reported in Eurostat and EU KLEMS. 
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P
T
 is the value added tax (VAT) on sales at 2005 constant prices, as reported in Ernst 
and Young Global Limited (EY) and OECD. There are three VAT rates in the Greek economy; 
the standard rate which is at the 23 percent level, and two reduced rates at the 13 and 6.5 
percent level respectively. 
CR4d represents the ratio of sales of the four largest firms of each 3-digit sector to the 
value of the manufacturing industry over the period 2005-2012
89
. It is obtained by 
multiplying CR4 by the ratio of 3-digit sector sales to the value of the manufacturing 
industry. 
SIZ4d corresponds to the average measure of sales of the four largest 4-digit firms 
over the period 2005-2012. It is obtained by multiplying the four-firm concentration ratio 
CR4 by the sales of the sector and dividing by four. 
ACd represents the average total cost of each 3-digit sector over the period 2005-2012. 
It is obtained by multiplying AC by the ratio of 3-digit sector total cost to the total cost of the 
manufacturing industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
89
 The value of the manufacturing industry reflects the value of sales in the domestic market by including 
changes in the volume of imports. Katics and Petersen (1994) and Ghosal (2000) provide evidence that an 
increase in the share of imports of the U.S. manufacturing industries, may weaken the market power of the 
including firms which face a high degree of concentration (Olive, 2008). 
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Appendix B1 
A similar approach adopted by Green and Porter (1984) is accounted under which the 
observed output process {Yt}tN is determined by three processes; {Qt
m
} tN that refelcts the 
output process when t is normal (if the industry sets pi
m
 monopoly price for k=0), {Qt
B
} tN 
the output process which would ensue k  if t is reversionary (if the industry is under 
Bertrand competition by charging pi
B
=mci) and {Qt
k
} tN the output process that occurs when 
k>0 and t is normal (if the industry sets a new price set pi
k
<pi
k-1
<pi
m
) when the formation of 
new collusion manifests. As in original model, it is assumed that the time period ends at k=1 
which shows that up to two new collusions can be formed. Whether the observed output level 
is obtained by one of the three sets, it is determined by a process {Wt} tN that specifies the 
condition the industry is under (normal, reversionary or normal after punishing a reversionary 
episode). Also, {Yt} tN is the only component of the joint process {(Wt, Qt
m
, Qt
B
, Qt
1
, Yt)} t
N which is observed. 
In this point, define a switching process to be determined by a probability space (Ω, β, m), a 
state space S, a subset N  S, and five sequences of random variables {W}= {Wt: Ω→S} tN, 
{Y}= {Yt: Ω→R} tN, {Q
m
}= {Qt
m
: Ω→R} tN, {Q
B
}= {Qt
B
: Ω→R} tN and {Q
1
}= {Qt
1
: 
Ω→R} tN that satisfy the following conditions 
(Q
m
)  ( QB)  (Q1) is a set of independent random variables                                               (I) 
(Q
m
) is identically distributed with c.d.f. G,                                                                            (II) 
(Q
B
) is identically distributed with c.d.f. H,                                                                           (III) 
(Q
1
) is identically distributed with c.d.f., J,                                                                           (IV) 
(W) is a Markov process with stationary transition probabilities
90
                                       (V) 
For k=0 and ∀𝑡, St N  Yt= Qt
m
                                                                                       (VI) 
For k=1 and ∀𝑡, StN  Yt= Qt
1
                                                                                        (VII) 
                                                          
90
 A Markov process is described by memorylesness which is why the current decisions of pricing 
strategies have embodied the interactions of previous strategies. In this way, past observations are not 
needed and thus, the Markov properties can be used in order to test the stochastic process of output. 
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For∀𝑘 and ∀𝑡, StN  Yt= Qt
B
                                                                                         (VIII) 
The special case of a switching process usually studied occurs when S={0,1} and N={0}, 
where {W} is a Bernoulli process which is independent of (I). In the case of a collusive output 
process, G, J and H denote the c.d.f.’s normal (under no punishment and punishment actions) 
and reversionary output distribution when S={0,1,…,T-1} and N={0}. The Markov process 
{W} is defined recursively by starting with an arbitrary initial W0: Ω→S, and then imposing 
If WT=0 and QT
m ?̂?𝑚, then WT+1=0                                                                                     (IX) 
If WT=0 and QT
1 ?̂?1, then WT+1=1/2                                                                                     (X) 
If WT=0 and QT
m
   ?̂?𝑚or QT
1 ?̂?1, then WT+1=1                                                                 (XI) 
If WT=ν, 1 v< T-1, then WT+1=ν+1                                                                                   (ΧΙΙ) 
If WT=T-1, then WT+1=0 or WT+1=1/2                                                                                (XIII) 
The process {W} defined by (IX)-(XIII) is a Markov process with stationary transition 
probabilities because {Q
m
} is i.i.d, based on (I) and (II). The transition graph of {W} is shown 
in Figure 11 as a sequential game, in which each arrow reflects a transition probability. The 
aim is to show that W0 can be chosen in such a way that {Y} will be a stationary ergodic 
process. Conditions (VI)-(VIII) show that if Yt is a function of (Qt
m
, Qt
1
, Qt
B
) it will be 
sufficient to prove that the joint process {Q
m
, Q
1
, Q
B
} is ergodic. As argued in the Appendix 
of the original paper (Green and Porter, 1984), this process is ergodic if it is a stationary 
Markov process having a unique invariant distribution, such that if W1 is defined by (IX)-
(XIII), then {Y0, Q0
m
, Q0
1
, Q0
B
} and {Y1, Q1
m
, Q1
1
, Q1
B
} have identical distributions according 
to Breiman (Theorem 7.18, 1968).  
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Figure 11: Strategies that firms can choose when a temporary shock in demand occurs. 
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According to this figure it is seen that the dominant strategy under certainty would be 
the one where firm i maximizes its long-run value function by maximizing its 𝜃𝑖
𝑘𝑞𝑚. This 
occurs when 𝜃𝑖
𝑘
 tends to unity by reflecting that monopolistic power has been acquired by 
the remaining firm(s), thus preventing any threat of competition. For this very reason, 
Bertrand competition will be the optimal choice for firm i only if  
∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐾𝑘=0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡𝑇
𝑡=0 𝛿𝑖
𝑘(𝑝𝑖
𝐵𝑘) ≥ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐾𝑘=0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡𝑇
𝑡=0 𝛿𝑗
𝑘(𝑝𝑗
𝐵𝑘)                                                    (B1.1) 
This expression shows that if the expected value of entering a Bertrand competition is greater 
than the expected value of any other competitor, then firm i will have the incentives to enter 
an infinite reversionary episode and cause a breakdown in collusion in order to acquire 
monopolistic power. 
On the other hand, when uncertainty is introduced as presented in this model, then 
Bertrand competition will not be the optimal solution as long as two conditions are met: there 
is no overconfidence about individual cost functions being much lower than the remaining 
firms’; and there is no total collapse in trust among the participating firms. For this reason, as 
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in the model of Green and Porter, the optimal solution would be the sustainability of collusive 
actions and if punishment is necessary, then firms will have the incentives to form a new 
agreement. The resulting collusion will be sustained only in the short-run and return to the 
initial (optimal) agreement (p= ?̅?𝑚 ) afterwards, if trust is restored among the remaining 
participants. This means that charging a common price ?̅?1 from a price set pi
1
 will be a short-
run solution since in normal periods holds that 
𝛾𝑖
𝑘(𝑝𝑖
𝑚) ≥ 𝛾𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑚) ≥ 𝛾𝑖
1(𝑝𝑖
1)                                                                                        (B1.2) 
This shows that the lower the number of the remaining firms in the operating sector, 
the greater the incentives to return to the initial charging price ?̅?𝑚 will be in order for profits 
to be maximized under the constraint of uncertainty. As a result, based on inequality (15), 
k  it will also hold that 
𝑉𝑖
𝑘(𝑝𝑖
𝑚) ≥ 𝑉𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑚) ≥ 𝑉𝑖
1(𝑝𝑖
1) ⇔  
∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐾𝑘=0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡𝑇
𝑡=0 𝛾𝑖
𝑘(𝑝𝑖
𝑚) ≥ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐾𝑘=0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡𝑇
𝑡=0 𝛾𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑚) ≥ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐾𝑘=0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡𝑇
𝑡=0 𝛾𝑖
1(𝑝𝑖
1)      (B1.3) 
Consequently, the long-run equilibrium choices under uncertainty can either result in 
firms sustaining a collusive act by charging ?̅?𝑘 in the short-run and ?̅?𝑚 in the long-run or by 
charging 𝑝𝑗
𝐵𝑘when there are no incentives in forming a new collusion by at least one firm 
(through firm i’s lack of trust or expectations for eliminating its competitors). 
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Appendix B2 
An alternative method of estimating the pricing equation (31) for the 3-digit manufacturing 
sectors corresponds to the Vector Error Correction model, introduced by Johansen (1991). In 
particular, if the included series (either panel or time) do not appear to be stationary 
(independence of variable at time t from lagged values), then an empirical equation of the 
form of (31) may result in non-stationary errors which in turn may result in a spurious OLS 
regression that over-rejects the null hypothesis. However, even in the case of stationarity, it 
would be useful to check whether a simple regression and an error correction model generate 
similar empirical estimations of the market variables. 
 The Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) statistical test for unit root in panel data is taken into 
account in order to identify whether the panel data series are stationary. This means that the 
error term of the 3-digit sectors over the period 1980-2012 will be subject to the former test 
in order to identify the presence of stationarity. In addition, Maddala and Wu’s (1999) Fisher-
Johansen group ADF test for panel data can identify whether the variables of the pricing 
equation are co-integrated by identifying the presence of unit root. Therefore, the equation 
used in the IPS test of stationarity is the following: 
𝛥𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝛥𝑥𝑖𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑚𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑝
𝑗=1 , m=1,2,3                                     (B2.1) 
where d1t=φ denotes the empty set with no individual effects, d2t= {I} refers to the xit panel 
series with an individual specific mean but no time trend and d3t={I,t} corresponds to the xit 
panel series with  an individual specific mean and linear time trend. The panel unit root test 
concerns the null hypothesis of non-stationarity (H0: γ=0) for all i versus the alternative 
hypothesis of panel stationarity (H1: γ<0). The lag order p is chosen based on the Akaike 
Information Criteria (1987), which in this case is equal to p=3. In addition, the IPS test 
allows for a number of the individual time series to have unit roots under the alternative 
hypothesis. However, the fraction of the panel stationary series is positive. 
According to the results presented in Table 10, the empirical industry pricing equation 
is formulated as per Olive (2008): 
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𝛥𝑝𝑓
𝑡
= 𝛾 + ∑𝑏0𝑗𝛥𝑝
𝑓
𝑡−𝑗
2
𝑗=1
+ ∑𝑏1𝑗𝛥(𝑦 − ?̂?)𝑡−𝑗
2
𝑗=1
+ ∑𝑏2𝑗𝛥𝑢𝑙𝑐𝑡−𝑗
2
𝑗=1
+ 
                      ∑𝑏3𝑗𝛥𝑢𝑘𝑐𝑡−𝑗
2
𝑗=1
+ ∑𝑏4𝑗𝛥𝑝
𝑒𝑢
𝑡−𝑗
2
𝑗=1
+ ∑𝑏5𝑗𝛥𝑝
𝑇
𝑡−𝑗
2
𝑗=1
 
                    −𝜆𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                (B2.2) 
𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 = 𝑝
𝑓
𝑡−1
− 𝜑1(𝑦 − ?̂?)𝑡−1 − 𝜑2𝑢𝑙𝑐𝑡−1 − 𝜑3𝑢𝑘𝑐𝑡−1 − 𝜑4𝑝
𝑒𝑢
𝑡−1
− 𝜑5𝑝
𝑇
𝑡−1
     (B2.3) 
where Δ indicates first difference, parameters b0j up to b5j and φ1 up to φ5 correspond to short-
run and long-run positive constants respectively that vary across the manufacturing industry, j 
refers to the number of lags in first differences, ECMt-1 reflects the error correction 
mechanism that captures the long-run value of the pricing equation factors and λ is the speed 
of price adjustment to long-run equilibrium.  
Finally, the initial model corresponds to a third-order autoregressive distributed lag 
model as indicated by the Box-Pierce-Ljung (Ljung and Box, 1978) Q-test and the Akaike 
Information Criteria (Akaike, 1987). Johansen’s (1991) approach provides evidence of 
whether the variables are stationary at levels or not, and whether a long-run relationship 
exists. This particular approach employs the full information maximum likelihood method, 
which is developed in the following steps: 
Step 1. Apply a unit root test to identify stationarity of time series. 
Step 2. Determine the lag structure k under which the residual terms of the pricing 
equation of the VECM will be uncorrelated. 
Step 3. Estimate regression (B2.2) and obtain the cointegrating vectors from the 
Canonical correlations of the set of the residual terms. 
Step 4. Identify the order of cointegration r. 
The test statistics used for identifying the order of cointegration (r) in panel data are 
constructed as follows: 
𝐿𝑅𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒,𝑖(𝑟|𝑘) = −𝑇 ∑ log (1 −
𝑝
𝑗=𝑟+1 ?̂?
𝑔
𝑗)                                                                        (B2.4) 
𝐿𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑖(𝑟|𝑟 + 1) = −𝑇𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 − ?̂?
𝑔
𝑟+1) = 𝐿𝑅𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒,𝑖(𝑟|𝑘) − 𝐿𝑅𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒,𝑖(𝑟 + 1|𝑘)            (B2.5) 
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where λg is the estimated number of eigenvalues. Equation (B2.4) refers to the trace statistic 
which tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating relations against the alternative of p 
cointegrating relations, for r=1,…p-1. The alternative hypothesis of p cointegrating relations 
denotes the case where all linear transformations are stationary (no unit root) and thus, a 
stationary Vector Auto Regression can be estimated at levels instead of first differences. The 
LR statistic follows the χ2 distribution with p-r degrees of freedom. On the other hand, 
equation (B2.5) reports the maximum eigenvalue statistic that tests the null hypothesis of r 
cointegrating relations against the alternative of r+1 cointegrating relations. The reason for 
including both of those test statistics lies on the fact that conflicting results may emerge. 
However, in such cases, Johansen and Joselius (1990) appear to favour the LRmax statistic. To 
this end, Maddala and Wu’s (1999) test takes into account the aforementioned trace statistics 
for panel data series and as a result, the ADF procedure is applied on the pool of the available 
data
91
. 
Table 10. Stationarity Tests 
Variable Level First Difference Test Type 
p
f
t -9.89693 (0.0000) - IPS 
𝑦𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡 -2.19977 (0.0032) - IPS 
ulct -3.35300 (0.0004) - IPS 
ukct -3.67946 (0.0001) - IPS 
p
eu
t -3.74163 (0.0001) - IPS 
p
T
t -3.01351 (0.0013) - IPS 
𝑦𝑡 -1.37484 (0.0712) -4.21547 (0.0000) IPS 
impt -1.15250 (0.1246) -6.76657 (0.0000) IPS 
expt -0.04974 (0.4802) -6.09305 (0.0000) IPS 
cointegration (εt) -6.92444 (0.0000) - Group ADF 
Notes: Panel data tests were carried out using Stata 10 and time series tests by using Eviews 8. 
The IPS test refers to Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test for unit root in panel data, where H0: Non-Stationarity 
(presence of unit root) versus H1: Stationarity of panel data residual terms. 
Group ADF corresponds to Maddala and Wu test (Maddala and Wu, 1999) for cointegration in panel data where 
H0: Non-Stationarity (presence of unit root) versus H1: Stationarity of cointegrating residual term. 
The panel data test statistics are z distributed under the null and all panel tests have three lags and no time trend, 
according to the indications of the Akaike Information Criteria (Akaike, 1987). 
 
 
                                                          
91
 This is one out of the seven approaches used by Pedroni (1999). 
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Table 10 provides evidence in favour of stationarity for all panel data series excluding 
impt, expt and yt. As mentioned in section 4.1.2, the variables of imports and exports have 
been excluded from the analysis for two reasons; the first one refers to the insignificant 
results generated by the estimation techniques and the second one lies on the non-stationary 
nature of those variables. To this end, it has been concluded that the analysis would be 
simpler if these variables were excluded. The last variable corresponds to yt which reflects the 
level of output of the manufacturing sectors over the period 1980-2012. As the IPS test 
resulted in insignificant evidence of stationarity, the formulation of an excess demand proxy 
variable was decided based on the study of Bedrossian and Moschos (1988). The excess 
demand proxy takes into account the output trend of each sector and thus, it represents the 
sectorial production gap which is found to be stationary. 
 The estimation of the vector error correction model of the pricing equation 
necessitates the error term of (B2.2) to be stationary and no serially correlated by reflecting 
the presence of cointegration of the pricing equation factors. Nevertheless, it is expected that 
the error term of stationary series will also be stationary, as argued by Maddala and Wu’s test 
(Maddala and Wu, 1999). The error term is found to be stationary in levels and therefore, the 
vector error correction model (B2.2) can be estimated in order to extract the long-run values 
of the pricing equation factors. The long-run estimates φ1 up to φ5 are presented in Table 11 
and they are expected to provide similar empirical evidence as the ones obtained by the 
estimates of equation (31). 
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Table 11. Long-run elasticity and speed of price adjustment estimates when the time series 
variables are in natural logarithms  
Sector 𝑦𝑡−1 − ?̂?𝑡−1 ulct-1 ukct-1 p
eu
t-1 p
T
t-1 λ 
101 0.0249817 
(1.217826) 
-0.029237 
(-0.209983) 
0.010749 
(1.998172) 
-0.059188 
(-0.730192) 
0.321938 
(5.187573) 
0.309082 
(7.099821) 
102 0.017283 
(0.569921) 
0.081928 
(3.047188) 
-0.129381 
(-0.691826) 
0.081938 
(1.058172) 
0.193874 
(3.717821) 
0.310806 
(8.193875) 
103 0.025991 
(1.261193) 
0.128391 
(3.061725) 
0.010931 
(2.651542) 
-0.059019 
(-1.329012) 
0.109381 
(3.491009) 
0.379807 
(7.890128) 
104 0.019827 
(1.018276) 
0.328916 
(5.283712) 
-0.318271 
(-1.761728) 
-0.028172 
(-0.301928) 
0.158177 
(3.918815) 
0.289005 
(8.456166) 
105 0.028193 
(1.210294) 
-0.109382 
(-1.667163) 
0.1481772 
(4.891885) 
-0.020192 
(-0.571621) 
0.401983 
(6.098871) 
0.408163 
(5.918372) 
106 0.039183 
(1.549183) 
0.4091844 
(5.198283) 
0.081726 
(2.019283) 
-0.018273 
(-0.281928) 
-0.091831 
(-1.192837) 
0.429038 
(3.109382) 
107 0.018921 
(1.061736) 
-0.019255 
(-1.829001) 
0.089111 
(1.998175) 
-0.038918 
(-0.567612) 
0.301928 
(4.878924) 
0.318163 
(8.671644) 
108 0.035711 
(1.631029) 
0.071829 
(2.018928) 
0.169144 
(2.898177) 
-0.129182 
(-1.549109) 
0.201938 
(4.118273) 
0.281609 
(9.417372) 
109 0.036177 
(1.730192) 
0.209182 
(2.109331) 
0.050991 
(2.018564) 
0.110993 
(2.109883) 
0.130193 
(3.071892) 
0.559801 
(4.489182) 
110 0.030198 
(1.609121) 
0.089192 
(2.291882) 
0.109182 
(2.388717) 
-0.050091 
(-1.320091) 
0.150198 
(2.481877) 
0.398072 
(3.918722) 
120 -0.019382 
(-1.989281) 
0.159182 
(2.391833) 
0.019287 
(1.978817) 
0.139019 
(2.819283) 
0.109381 
(3.971763) 
0.428179 
(5.671723) 
131 0.050192 
(1.750191) 
-0.029019 
(1.716623) 
0.128875 
(3.778182) 
-0.058918 
(-1.610092) 
0.130199 
(4.281773) 
0.369808 
(6.781724) 
132 -0.001928 
(-0.891823) 
-0.098177 
(1.289883) 
0.201857 
(4.189822) 
0.019883 
(0.168923) 
0.189032 
(4.490192) 
0.359802 
(6.678919) 
139 0.038918 
(0.990182) 
0.178291 
(2.788172) 
0.021552 
(1.861892) 
-0.008172 
(-0.201928) 
0.030198 
(1.872663) 
0.209808 
(9.391872) 
141 -0.006571 
(-0.539185) 
0.209918 
(3.716662) 
-0.0291877 
(-0.667182) 
0.058912 
(1.189901) 
0.250198 
(4.019281) 
0.298072 
(8.781921) 
143 0.019821 
(1.291827) 
0.157182 
(2.667145) 
-0.028183 
(-0.981772) 
-0.090172 
(-1.378179) 
0.301928 
(5.120931) 
0.559808 
(2.401496) 
151 0.002938 
(0.401992) 
0.059187 
(1.989912) 
0.1481923 
(2.678912) 
0.039182 
(0.819092) 
0.261902 
(4.501021) 
0.390074 
(6.887192) 
152 0.057162 
(1.289185) 
0.258192 
(4.289991) 
-0.078819 
(-1.871162) 
-0.037162 
(-1.109281) 
0.240193 
(3.817231) 
0.398072 
(6.897271) 
161 0.049182 
(0.991827) 
0.309182 
(4.899182) 
-0.039199 
(-0.908861) 
0.006783 
(0.140196) 
0.190192 
(3.689126) 
0.440898 
(5.557182) 
162 -0.019082 
(-0.871623) 
0.198371 
(1.877616) 
0.067581 
(-1.989027) 
0.060192 
(0.981923) 
0.210934 
(3.781924) 
0.421802 
(5.291993) 
171 0.039481 
(1.558172) 
0.257187 
(2.918273) 
0.059188 
(1.881726) 
-0.140193 
(-1.978912) 
0.009293 
(1.057182) 
0.320807 
(6.103098) 
172 0.019283 
(1.118271) 
0.189283 
(2.481826) 
-0.067182 
(-1.657168) 
-0.097162 
(-2.319283) 
0.110923 
(3.089926) 
0.331099 
(6.678813) 
192 0.078192 
(2.381726) 
0.167381 
(2.219835) 
0.098827 
(2.671662) 
-0.309381 
(-2.898175) 
0.069198 
(1.990013) 
0.199811 
(10.290193) 
201 0.060192 
(2.018283) 
0.4891827 
(4.817726) 
0.4566712 
(3.718726) 
0.059671 
(0.530199) 
0.201983 
(4.910317) 
1.002019   
(-0.281731) 
202 0.025182 
(1.001825) 
0.209183 
(3.187723) 
0.228177 
(2.019983) 
-0.050192 
(-1.019283) 
0.101938 
(2.491022) 
0.389707 
(6.699105) 
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(Table 11 continue) 
203 0.036918 
(1.360912) 
0.140918 
(2.556162) 
0.229183 
(2.788871) 
-0.069109 
(-1.010903) 
0.059182 
(2.201061) 
0.410896 
(6.418773) 
204 -0.050192 
(-2.129106) 
-0.059188 
(-1.109922) 
0.348817 
(2.192835) 
-0.139012 
(-2.956772) 
0.159128 
(2.109382) 
0.479602 
(5.391025) 
205 0.019289 
(0.871823) 
0.109382 
(2.887172) 
0.029918 
(1.89092) 
-0.010993 
(-0.301929) 
0.120998 
(3.103928) 
0.361808 
(7.478192) 
221 0.036172 
(1.319384) 
0.089183 
(2.198387) 
0.129378 
(2.491117) 
-0.030119 
(-0.788912) 
0.201928 
(3.199831) 
0.450898 
(6.019284) 
222 0.038911 
(1.757162) 
0.250192 
(3.201993) 
0.119391 
(2.298177) 
-0.147718 
(-2.089124) 
0.158172 
(2.918273) 
0.490811 
(6.591823) 
231 -0.001625 
(-0.301726) 
0.209198 
(2.491871) 
0.129198 
(2.300912) 
0.059102 
(1.188732) 
0.158918 
(2.491982) 
0.279808 
(7.779185) 
233 0.021883 
(1.019282) 
0.401928 
(4.667162) 
0.056716 
(1.989193) 
-0.059192 
(-0.481283) 
0.109182 
(2.281835) 
0.352812 
(6.109883) 
234 0.018273 
(0.891827) 
-0.057187 
(-1.878199) 
0.078198 
(2.045938) 
0.010938 
(0.488192) 
0.350192 
(4.102931) 
0.309895 
(7.771829) 
235  0.059182 
(2.030192) 
0.159193 
(2.391002) 
-0.128367 
(-0.977615) 
0.078127 
(1.298831) 
-0.019323 
(-1.420019) 
0.221808 
(7.918236) 
236  0.059182 
(2.571823) 
0.157138 
(2.414432) 
0.128374 
(2.095181) 
0.090019 
(4.281831) 
-0.057183 
(-1.501922) 
0.428171 
(6.718293) 
237 0.030192 
(1.768127) 
0.158173 
(2.616253) 
0.071872 
(2.078814) 
0.099832 
(1.401993) 
0.010193 
(1.918282) 
0.430867 
(5.882392) 
239 -0.068172 
(-2.473321) 
0.137889 
(2.891773) 
0.109985 
(2.298175) 
0.069109 
(2.419382) 
0.178391 
(2.991029) 
0.418074 
(6.109932) 
241 0.019766 
(1.318293) 
0.069187 
(2.056162) 
0.109183 
(2.391092) 
0.062291 
(0.371920) 
0.129033 
(2.918231) 
0.498071 
(4.182701) 
242 0.049182 
(1.871626) 
-0.019382 
(-1.871663) 
-0.029198 
(-2.001837) 
0.049102 
(0.609913) 
0.050293 
(1.882942) 
0.290018 
(8.788183) 
243 0.011983 
(1.018374) 
0.157681 
(2.391982) 
0.018374 
(1.989001) 
0.081920 
(1.109384) 
0.019182 
(1.909273) 
0.430817 
(3.012938) 
244 0.029881 
(1.546172) 
0.048187 
(2.009913) 
-0.056596 
(-1.817663) 
0.050192 
(0.689122) 
0.049289 
(2.291023) 
0.270804 
(8.391283) 
251 0.019827 
(1.019283) 
0.187361 
(1.657717) 
0.381726 
(2.817632) 
-0.090193 
(-1.290193) 
0.089126 
(2.201925) 
0.301088 
(6.679901) 
252 0.010981 
(1.102938) 
0.109189 
(1.971832) 
0.109387 
(2.008916) 
-0.108819 
(-2.657182) 
0.201928 
(3.440192) 
0.332716 
(7.019281) 
253 0.101928 
(3.491827) 
0.167182 
(2.183746) 
0.038192 
(1.756152) 
0.097761 
(2.330291) 
0.009283 
(0.701923) 
0.270987 
(8.103926) 
257 -0.011928 
(-1.098821) 
0.159183 
(2.399817) 
0.056661 
(2.019374) 
0.067661 
(0.988891) 
0.240192 
(3.491827) 
0.387107 
(6.901928) 
259 0.028172 
(1.251623) 
0.138177 
(2.651672) 
0.117361 
(2.109873) 
0.059102 
(2.210932) 
0.090918 
(2.812773) 
0.232808 
(8.658133) 
271 0.016172 
(0.781923) 
0.209918 
(3.188742) 
0.198713 
(3.298681) 
-0.007829 
(-0.172839) 
0.059193 
(2.102925) 
0.261088 
(7.199823) 
273 0.028918 
(1.381772) 
0.201833 
(2.877169) 
0.038716 
(2.086154) 
0.001983 
(0.109832) 
0.130198 
(2.517892) 
0.390872 
(7.129831) 
274 0.019182 
(0.817233) 
0.121736 
(2.481762) 
0.109371 
(2.198417) 
0.009182 
(0.148365) 
0.283913 
(4.110938) 
0.270872 
(8.167182) 
275 0.047718 
(1.991827) 
0.029183 
(1.718273) 
0.041237 
(1.998147) 
0.080183 
(2.399812) 
0.178102 
(3.891901) 
0.339808 
(7.810074) 
281 0.110938 
(3.618273) 
0.190397 
(2.201938) 
0.151823 
(2.183749) 
0.020198 
(2.198374) 
0.090193 
(2.950192) 
0.310076 
(5.912883) 
252 
 
(Table 11 continue) 
282 0.038192 
(1.651623) 
0.208915 
(2.918374) 
0.068171 
(2.193826) 
0.029019 
(1.401983) 
0.190392 
(2.949102) 
0.380818 
(6.198374) 
283 0.139182 
(2.891827) 
0.159183 
(2.781923) 
0.041873 
(2.817364) 
0.019387 
(1.509928) 
0.178392 
(3.390112) 
0.479808 
(6.102395) 
289 0.120191 
(2.558172) 
0.281736 
(2.626153) 
0.098172 
(2.109832) 
0.049981 
(2.110932) 
0.229102 
(3.220391) 
0.499809 
(6.871293) 
292 0.091827 
(3.102938) 
0.189301 
(2.758173) 
0.147716 
(2.399018) 
0.069102 
(2.657881) 
0.001291 
(0.871829) 
0.480178 
(6.192837) 
310 -0.009182 
(-0.678172) 
0.189384 
(2.981763) 
0.109382 
(2.388195) 
0.035172 
(1.178739) 
0.120199 
(3.110938) 
0.432816 
(6.391029) 
Notes: See notes in Table 1 and Table 8. Estimations were carried out by using Eviews 8. 
 
The estimated values obtained by the vector error correction version of the pricing 
equation appear to reflect the same empirical suggestions as the estimates of equation (31). In 
particular, the excess demand proxy still results in insignificant estimates by denoting that 
excess demand did not play an important role in the final wholesale pricing decisions of the 
majority of the manufacturing sectors. The same outcome holds for the foreign competing 
price level of the EU27 manufacturing sectors. There exist a number of sectors that appear to 
have a significant effect on domestic pricing decisions but the majority of the latter sectors 
remain unaffected by foreign competition in the domestic market. The unit costs of labour 
and capital do not deviate from the initial estimations, thus indicating that the ratio of labour 
to capital contribution remains the same. Finally, the effect of taxation on fluctuations of the 
final wholesale price level appears to be highly significant by verifying the fact that VAT is a 
very crucial determinant of pricing strategies. 
 Given the above estimates, the speed at which prices adjust to changes in the lagged 
pricing equation factors is similar to equation (31). In particular, the empirical evidence 
obtained from the Vector Error Correction Model suggests that pricing decisions in the 
manufacturing sectors are indeed sluggish given that the average time of adjustment 
corresponds to 1.5 years. However, the only notable fact under this approach refers to the 
magnitude of λ. According to the estimates presented in Table 11, the average sectorial speed 
of price adjustment appears to be 3.7 per cent more sluggish under the Generalized Method of 
Moments estimation technique compared to the Vector Error Correction Model. This means 
that the former approach results in slightly underestimated values of adjustment.  
An interpretation of this outcome may lie on the structure of both models, where the 
latter focuses on the nature of cointegration of the endogenous variables (pricing equation 
factors) by eliminating the effects of potential unit roots and serial correlation. On the other 
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hand, the former model takes into account the presence of endogeneity, heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation in the error term of each sector individually and attempts to generate 
unbiased, consistent and efficient estimates. Either way, both models point to a similar 
empirical outcome in favour of sluggish wholesale pricing decisions based on the fluctuations 
of excess demand, unit costs, competing foreign prices and taxation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
254 
 
Appendix B3 
 
B3.1 Panel Data 
The main models that will be regarded in the panel data analysis are the fixed and the random 
effects model. There are parts as well where those models are neglected in favour of a solely 
cross-sectional or time series analysis. In each of those cases, where the coefficients are 
estimated in every regression, the most appropriate econometrical method would be the one 
that provides unbiased and consistent estimations. In order to choose which of those methods 
will be used, the behaviour of the regressors and the error term in each case must be 
identified.  
In particular, the cases which will determine the methods  that will be taken into 
account are the following; the first case corresponds to whether the error term appears to be 
correlated with the individual effects and whether there is correlation between the 
independent/predictor variables and the error term; the second case regards whether there is 
cross-sectional dependence in the selected panel; the third case addresses the issue of 
heteroskedasticity in the error term; and the fourth case concerns the presence of serial 
correlation when the error term of a given time period has an impact on future time periods. 
Based on those diagnostics and the indications they provide, the most suitable method will be 
considered in the present analysis. 
             The first diagnostic test addresses the issue of choosing between the fixed effects and 
the random effects model. This test is called the Hausman Test (or the Hausman-Wu Test) 
which evaluates the significance of an estimator versus an alternative estimator (Wu, 1973; 
Hausman, 1978). In the case of panel data, it tests whether the individual effects term is 
correlated with the regressors (fixed effects) against the null hypothesis where there is no 
correlation (random effects). In particular, as has been argued by Hausman (1978), this test in 
general can be applied to all hypotheses testing problems under which two different 
estimators are available. By considering a simple linear regression  𝑦 = 𝑋′𝑏 + 𝑒, where b 
consists of two estimators b0 and b1, he regarded two hypotheses: under the null hypothesis 
both of these estimators are consistent, but only the first one is efficient, while under the 
alternative hypothesis only the second estimator is consistent. Therefore, in order to compare 
those hypotheses, he formed the following statistic test which is also known as the Hausman-
Wu statistic 
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𝐻 = (𝑏1 − 𝑏0)′(𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑏0) − 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑏1))
−1(𝑏1 − 𝑏0)                                                                               (43) 
Since both estimators are consistent under the null hypothesis, their difference will 
converge to zero. In this case, this statistic appears to asymptotically follow the χ2 distribution 
where the number of degrees of freedom are equal to the rank of the matrix 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑏0) −
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑏1). On the other hand, under the alternative, the difference between b1 and b0 will be 
significantly different than zero since b0 will be inconsistent (Kunst, 2010). In the case of 
panel data, where b0 corresponds to the random effects estimator and b1 to the fixed effects 
estimator, the Hausman test may also be used as a test of identifying the problem of 
endogeneity. Since under the fixed effects model there is a degree of correlation between the 
individual effects term and the independent variables, the problem of endogeneity arises 
under the alternative hypothesis. 
             By summing up, the first estimator (random effects) is consistent under the null 
hypothesis but inconsistent under the alternative. In contrast, the second estimator (fixed 
effects) may be consistent under both hypotheses; however it retains the properties of 
efficiency only under the alternative. This means that in the case of panel data, the fixed 
effects estimator has good asymmetric properties under both hypotheses, while the random 
effects estimator is asymmetric only under the null hypothesis. As has been presented by 
Kunst (2010), the random effects estimator is inconsistent under the alternative hypothesis of 
choosing the fixed effects model. This emerges from the fact that as the time horizon tends to 
infinity, the individual fixed effects are not estimated as a separate coefficient. They are 
viewed as realizations of random variables with mean equal to zero, which proves that the 
assumption of an unbiased error term does not hold (because the error term mean is different 
than zero) by leading to inconsistency. 
             Following the argumentation, Kunst (2010) refers to the problem of choosing 
between the fixed effects and the random effects approach, based on Mundlak (1978) and 
Hsiao (2004). In particular, the random effects model is more suitable when the absence of 
endogeneity is expected. This expectation may be enhanced whenever the individual 
dimension N greatly exceeds the number of the time dimension T, under which the effects of 
the individual entities may be viewed as random. Additionally, Mundlak (1978) suggests that 
the fixed effects model is just a special case of the random effects model. In particular, the 
individual effects term is correlated with the explanatory variables, while the random effects 
model treats this correlation equal to zero. For this very reason and based on the potential 
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persistence of such correlation, the Hausman test will provide the necessary evidence of 
choosing between the fixed effects and the random effects model. 
             In many cases, the random effects model is chosen whenever there is correlation 
between the individual effects and the error term of each entity. Under such cases, the fixed 
effects model fails to provide efficient estimations since it accounts only for the presence of 
endogeneity and not of serial correlation. However, if the error terms of the entities do not 
appear to be correlated and there is no presence of endogeneity, then both of those models are 
equivalent to a simple OLS estimation. This means that when variance across entities is zero, 
there is no significant difference across the cross-sections and thus, there is no panel effect. 
Due to the absence of individual effects, an OLS regression can be estimated which can lead 
to efficient and consistent results.  
A diagnostic test which can be used in order to identify whether the residuals among 
cross-sections appear to be contamporeneous correlated has been provided by Breusch and 
Pagan (1980) under which they use the LaGrange Multiplier (LM) methodology. The null 
hypothesis of this test regards the assumption of cross-sectional independence (or the absence 
of individual heterogeneity) over the alternative of cross-sectional dependence. According to 
the argumentation of Breusch and Pagan, the LM test for cross independence is subject to 
bias-adjustment and thus, the proposed estimations appear to satisfy the assumption of 
consistency. In particular, the LM test is based on the average of the squared pair-wise 
correlation coeﬃcients of the residuals terms. Its application is feasible on panel data models 
for which the cross-section dimension (N) is relatively small compared to the time dimension 
(T) (Pesaran and Ullah, 2008).  
             According to Breusch and Pagan (1980), a simple pooled regression is taken into 
consideration of the following form 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, for i=1,…,N and t=1,...,T                                                                                    (44) 
where yit is the dependent variable for individual entity i and time t, X’it represents the 
transpose time variant vector of regressors (1xk) and 𝑢𝑖𝑡~(0, 𝜎𝑢𝑖
2 ), where the value of 
variance is allowed to change between entities. In order to estimate this regression, Breusch 
and Pagan proposed the LaGrange Mulitplier (LM) methodology for testing the null 
hypothesis of cross-sectional independence versus the alternative of cross-sectional 
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dependence or otherwise, cross-sectional correlation among the error terms. The test is 
formulated according to the following expression 
𝐿𝑀 = 𝑇 ∑ ∑ ?̂?𝑖𝑗
2𝑁
𝑗=𝑖+1
𝑁−1
𝑖=1                                                                                                                            (45) 
where ?̂?𝑖𝑗
2
represents the sample estimate of the residuals’ pair-wise correlation and is 
expressed as 
1
2
1 1
ˆ ˆ
( )( )
T
it jt
t
ij ji
T T
it jt
t t
e e
e e
  
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 

 
                                                                                                                        (46) 
where 𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝑏  is the OLS estimate of the error term uit and b represents the 
estimations of the vector of coefficients 𝛽(kx1). However, the assumption under which the 
number of the cross-section dimension (N) is considered to be relatively small, compared to 
the time dimension (T), must hold in order for the LM test to be valid. Therefore, under this 
setting, the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence is defined as 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝑢𝑗𝑡) = 0, 
for all t and i  j, where the LM statistic is asymptotically distributed as χ2 with N(N-1)/2 
degrees of freedom. 
             Under this specification of testing for cross-sectional independence and given the fact 
that the number of the individual entities (sectors) in this study is N=56, while the time 
dimension is T=33, the LM statistic will not be able to provide valid inferences. Since in 
micro panel data studies the number of the individual entities exceeds the time dimension, 
cross-sectional dependence is less likely to arise (Baltagi, 2001). Nevertheless, Breusch and 
Pagan argued that when the time horizon tends to infinity and given the fact that ?̂?𝑖𝑗
2
  for 
i=1,…,N-1 and j=i+1,…,N are asymptotically uncorrelated, then a scaled version of the LM 
statistic may account for both large N and large T (Pesaran and Ullah, 2008). The scaled 
version of LM is the following 
1
2
1 1
1
ˆ( 1)
( 1)
N N
ij
i j i
NLM T
N N


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 

 , where 𝑁𝐿𝑀~𝑁(0,1)                                                       (47) 
On the other hand, in cases where the number of the individual entities N significantly 
exceeds the time dimension T, Pesaran and Ullah (2008) argued that a substantial size of 
distortions may arise. This happens because under a finite time dimension, the mean of 
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𝑇?̂?𝑖𝑗
2 − 1 will not be correctly pinpointed at zero and given a large number of individual 
entities N, the LM statistic is likely to provide incorrect results.  
             In order to provide a solution for this weakness, Ullah (2004) presented a set of 
techniques that may address this problem in panel data where N>T (finite) and result in 
correct econometric estimations. Under a set of assumptions, the New LM statistic that Ullah 
proposed is 
1
2
1 1
1
ˆ* (( ) )
( 1)
N N
ij ij
i j i
NLM T k
N N
 


  
  

                                                                                       (48) 
where 𝜇𝑇𝑖𝑗 corresponds to the mean of (𝑇 − 𝑘)?̂?𝑖𝑗
2
 and k is the number of regressors. The 
NLM* statistic is zero regardless the size of N and T under the null hypothesis of non-
correlated error terms. This means that any increase in the individual entities N will be 
unlikely to result in any size distortions
92
. Therefore, by taking into account the New LM 
statistic proposed by Breusch and Pagan (1980) and modified by Ullah (2004) will be able to 
test whether the panel data in each of the undertaken regressions appear to be subject to 
cross-sectional dependency. If the null hypothesis, under which the error terms among the 
entities are uncorrelated, is rejected, then the presence of cross-sectional dependence will be 
considered and thus, the use of the random and fixed effects model.  
However, even if there is evidence of cross-sectional dependence, the analysis has to 
take into account the effects of the correlation between the error terms of the individual 
entities and the correlation within each individual entity. The latter issue addresses the 
problem of endogeneity, which acquires the use of the fixed effects model. For this reason, 
the Hausman test is appropriate in order to test which model is preferable. According to 
Hausman (1978), under the null hypothesis, it is assumed that the coefficients in the fixed and 
random effects are consistent and therefore, the random effects model is selected. This 
happens because the random effects estimator appears to be efficient as well, whereas the 
fixed effects estimator is only consistent.  
             On the other hand, if the null hypothesis is rejected, the effect of correlation within 
the cross-sections emerges, by validating the presence of correlation between the individual 
effects and the explanatory variables of each entity. This effect addresses the problem of 
                                                          
92
 However, as Pesaran and Ullah (2008) argued, there would still be some bias for small samples. In this study, 
such issue does not arise and thus, the NLM statistic is suitable for satisfying the underlying regressions. 
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endogeneity and as argued above, the best way to treat this problem is to use the fixed effects 
model. This approach assumes no correlation between the individual effects and the error 
term, thus focusing on eliminating endogeneity. In addition, the random effects approach 
assumes the absence of endogeneity and consequently, it is focused on eliminating 
correlation between the individual effects and the error term of each entity. 
             The diagnostic tests proposed by Hausman (1978) and Breusch and Pagan (1980) 
will provide the necessary evidence for the regressions of this study in order to test whether 
there is cross-sectional dependence. As a result, the best model between the fixed and the 
random effects will be selected. If those selections are determined, then the following 
important issues respond to conditions that may help to decide which econometrical method 
has to be used to obtain the estimates each regression. Such issues address the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, along with the degree of serial correlation in the error term of an 
individual entity between time lags. Based on their significance, the most suitable 
econometrical techniques will be applied under which the resulting estimations will not be 
subject to inconsistency and inefficiency. In the case of panel data, the study will consider the 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) test for heteroskedasticity, proposed by Neyman and Pearson (1933) 
and the Wooldridge test for the presence of serial correlation in the error term of each entity, 
proposed by Wooldridge (2002). 
             The Likelihood Ratio test, in general, is a statistical test developed by Neyman and 
Pearson (1933), which is used in order to compare the fit of two estimators. In particular, the 
null hypothesis is considered to be a special case of the alternative hypothesis and thus, the 
LR test identifies which estimator is best suited in each of the undertaken regressions. In this 
case, where the LR test is used to provide evidence of heteroskedasticity, the null hypothesis 
assumes the presence of homoscedasticity, while the alternative hypothesis suggests the 
presence of heteroskedasticity. Under the null hypothesis, the variance of the error term for 
every t (t=1,…,T) must be equal and constant over time. This means that H0: σ
2
1=…σ
2
Τ=σ
2
, 
which indicates that the variance of the error term is independent of the time dimension. On 
the other hand, if the null hypothesis is rejected, then at least one of those variances is 
different from the others by providing evidence of heteroskedasticity under which 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑖) =
𝜎𝑡
2 ≠ 𝜎2. This means that the variance of the error term ui is not independent over time and 
thus, it is not constant. 
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             The LR test statistic which accounts for the presence of heteroskedasticity has the 
following form, according to the Neyman-Pearson Lemma (1933) 
𝐿𝑅 = 2(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑢 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑅)= 
      = 2[log(𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) − log (𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦)                                                                                                                                                                                                               
      −log (
𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
)]                                                                                     (49) 
where Lu and LR represent the likelihood for the unrestricted and the restricted model 
respectively
93
.  According to this statistic, the most suitable model will be the one that 
appears to have the most parameters, based on the probability value derived for each 
regression separately. This value is compared to the χ2 distribution under n degrees of 
freedom, where n is the difference between the free parameters in the model under the 
alternative hypothesis and the null hypothesis respectively (Huelsenbeck and Crandall, 1997). 
In the case of panel data, the LR test is used in order to identify the presence of 
heteroskedasticity in the error terms for each individual entity i. It provides the necessary 
evidence through which the most suitable econometrical method will be selected. 
             The second important issue that needs to be identified regards the degree of serial 
correlation in the error terms of the individual entities over the time sample t. In particular, 
the presence of correlation in linear panel data models can lead to biases in the standard 
errors of the estimated coefficients. As a result, such estimates will be less efficient than they 
should to (Drukker, 2003). As mentioned before, the presence of contemporaneous 
correlation in two cases has been discussed: between the error terms of each individual entity 
(cross-section correlation) and within each individual entity, where correlation appears 
between the individual effects term and the explanatory variables. The first case can be 
identified by the Breusch-Pagan (LM) test and be accounted by considering the random 
effects model. The second case can be identified by the Hausman test, under which the fixed 
effects model is more appropriable in order to account the presence of endogeneity. An 
additional case which has not been presented so far refers to the presence of serial correlation 
within the error term of each individual entity. 
                                                          
93
For instance, in the fixed effects model, the unrestricted model may correspond to the FE-3SLS estimator, due 
to the presence of both endogeneity and heteroskedasticity, while the restricted model may correspond to the 
FE-2SLS estimator, under which only the presence of endogeneity holds. 
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             The diagnostic test which is going to be taken into consideration in this study for 
identifying the presence of first-order serial correlation is the Wooldridge test, presented by 
Wooldridge (2002). In particular, there is a number of other tests that can be used for this 
purpose, like the Baltagi-Wu test which is considered to be quite accurate in its estimations 
(Baltagi and Wu, 1999). However, as Drukker (2003) argues, the Wooldridge test bases its 
estimation on a set of fewer assumptions, which may render it less powerful but more robust 
compared to the rest parameterized tests. An advantage over its weaker assumptions concerns 
the fact that it includes a good size and power properties which enhances the fact of 
considering it in this analysis. 
             Wooldridge (2002) assumes a one-way linear model similar to equation (39) 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑍′𝑖𝑡𝛽2 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, for i=1,…,N and t=1,...,T                                                 (50) 
where yit is the dependent variable for individual i and time t, α denotes the overall constant 
term in this regression, X’it represents the transpose time variant vector of regressors (1xk), 
Z’it regards the transpose time-invariant vector of regressors (1xm), μi corresponds to the time 
invariant individual effects term which also addresses the cross-section effects (random or 
fixed) and uit is the idiosyncratic error term. In the case where the individual effect μi is 
correlated with the vectors of explanatory variables X’it or Z’it, the vector of coefficients 𝛽1, 
which represents the time varying covariates, can be estimated consistently by regarding the 
within-transformed data or the first difference data (Baltagi, 2001; Wooldridge, 2002).  
In this case, since the individual effects appear to be correlated with the set of the 
explanatory variables, the most appropriate model which accounts for the presence of such 
correlation is the fixed effects model (alternative hypothesis of Hausman test). On the other 
hand, if the individual effect μi is not correlated with vectors X’it and Z’it, then the vectors of 
coefficients 𝛽1and 𝛽2 can lead to both consistent and efficient estimates by using the random 
effects model (null hypothesis of Hausman test). However, under both cases, the 
idiosyncratic error term within an individual entity is assumed to have zero serial correlation 
i.e. 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝑢𝑖𝑡+𝑠) = 0. If this assumption is not valid, then biased standard errors and less 
efficient estimators will be generated that over-reject the null hypothesis. 
             The methodology that has been attempted by Wooldridge regards the use of the 
residual term resulting from estimating equation (50) in first differences. Therefore, this leads 
to 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = (𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡−1)𝛽1 + (𝑍
′
𝑖𝑡 − 𝑍
′
𝑖𝑡−1)𝛽2 + (𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡−1)                                     (51) 
Since the individual effect μi differs between entities but remains the same within an 
individual entity for the whole time period, its difference between time t and t-1 will be zero. 
Additionally, since there has been assumed that Z’it is a vector of time invariant variables, 
then the difference of those variables between two time periods will be zero as well. This 
means that 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∆𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + ∆𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                 (52) 
where Δ denotes the first difference operator. Therefore, the procedure followed by 
Wooldridge regards the estimation of 𝛽1 through (52) and subsequently, those estimations are 
used in order for residuals ?̂?𝑖𝑡 to be obtained.  
             Drukker (2003) also argues that Wooldridge observed that if the error term of an 
entity is not serially correlated, then correlation between its first and second order differences 
will not be zero, but a negative value equal to -0.5, i.e. 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡−1) = −0.5. This 
indicates that the process estimates the residual terms ?̂?𝑖𝑡 from equation (52) by including 
first order differences and subsequently, it tests whether the correlation coefficient on the 
lagged residual value is equal to -0.5 (null hypothesis). Another important characteristic of 
this test concerns its robustness according to its consideration of a limited number of 
assumptions (Wooldridge, 2002). For this reason, the Wooldridge test is also robust to 
conditional heteroskedasticity, which makes it even more preferable than other tests. To 
conclude with, by employing the Wooldridge test for serial correlation, the null hypothesis 
assumes that if correlation between 𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛥𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 is equal to -0.5, there is no presence of 
first-order serial correlation in the residual term of an individual entity. Otherwise, under the 
alternative hypothesis, the case of first-order serial correlation between different lags of the 
residual term is taken into consideration. 
 
B3.2 Time Series/Cross Sectional Data 
The diagnostic tests presented above, address the issue of heteroskedasticity, endogeneity and 
serial correlation within and between the cross-sections, by employing the fixed and random 
effects model where applicable. However, there are cases under which the estimates of a set 
of regressions occur according to a time series or a cross-sectional approach, in order to 
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validate the desirable theoretical outcome indicated by such estimations. For this reason, the 
presence of both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation has to be identified in each of those 
regressions by using the appropriable diagnostic tests, which differ from the ones presented 
before. 
To begin with, a diagnostic test which is used for the identification of 
heteroskedasticity in time series and cross-sectional analysis is the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
test, developed by Godfrey (1978a) and Breusch and Pagan (1979). The core methodology 
which is adopted in order to develop this test concerns the use of the Lagrangian Multiplier 
(LM) test, initially presented by Aitchison and Silvey (1960), also known as Rao’s efficient 
score test (Cramer, 1946; Rao, 1945, 1973). In particular, the Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test 
accounts for conditional heteroskedastic disturbances in a linear model by employing the 
Lagrangian Multiplier methodology. The null hypothesis of this test concerns the presence of 
homoscedasticity, where the variance of the error term for time t remains constant, versus the 
alternative hypothesis of heteroskedasticity, where the variance of the error term for at least 
one period t is different.  
In particular, as Breusch and Pagan have argued, this test of heteroskedasticity 
appears to have the same asymptotic properties as the likelihood ratio (LR) test
94
. However, 
the advantage of the former test regards its estimation on a two-step basis by estimating two 
least squares regressions, thus avoiding any calculations under which the maximum 
likelihood estimator is obtained. This statistic is formed from the results of maximizing the 
likelihood ratio subject to the null hypothesis which refers to the presence of 
homoscedasticity. Its computation is based either on the computation of the LaGrange 
Multiplier subject to a set of constrains (Aitchison and Silvey, 1960) or on the computation of 
the first order conditions (Rao, 1973).  
             In particular, Breusch and Pagan consider a linear regression as in equation (44) 
under which the error term uit is normal and independently distributed with zero mean and 
variance 𝜎𝑡
2 = ℎ(𝑧′𝑡𝑎). In particular, h(.) is a function which possesses a first and second 
order derivatives, α is a (px1) vector of unrestricted parameters uncorrelated with z’ which is 
the vector of regressors reflecting the form of heteroskedasticity. Under those assumptions, 
the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is expressed as H0: α2=…=αρ=0. In this case, it will 
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 The likelihood ration test can also be used to test for the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity in time 
series and cross-sectional data. It includes the assumption under which the unrestricted model accounts for 
conditional heteroskedasticity, while the restricted model for homoscedasticity. 
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hold that 𝜎𝑡
2 = ℎ(𝑎1) = 𝜎
2 which is a constant term. In the case of heteroskedasticity, the 
variance of the error term will be 𝜎𝑡
2 = ℎ(𝑧′𝑡𝑎). The alternative representation is sufficiently 
general in order to include many of the heteroskedastic forms presented in the literature, such 
as 𝜎𝑡
2 = exp (𝑧′𝑡𝛼) as indicated by Harvey (1976) or 𝜎𝑡
2 = (𝑧′𝑡𝑎)
𝑚 (Goldfeld and Quandt, 
1965; Rutemiller and Bowers, 1968; Glesjer, 1969).  
In particular, if there is reason to believe that the variance matrix of the residuals is 
not independent from the explanatory variables X’it, then an auxiliary regression can be 
considered under which such variance is linearly dependent to the independent variables: 
2
0 1
ˆ 'it it itu                                                                                                                                          (53) 
This auxiliary regression represents the basis of the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for the 
presence of conditional heteroskedasticity. Therefore, if the F-statistic confirms that the 
independent variables are not linearly dependent with the variance of the residuals, then the 
null hypothesis will not be rejected. 
             However, the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test provides evidence for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity of known form, i.e.  𝜎𝑡
2 = ℎ(𝑧′𝑡𝑎). If the form of heteroskedasticity is 
different, then this test will not take it into consideration and thus, it will accept the null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity. This will allow the occurrence of incorrect standard errors 
which will lead to less efficient coefficients. This fact renders the necessity of regarding a 
different diagnostic test for heteroskedasticity which addresses a general rather than specific 
forms of heteroskedasticity.  
A test of this type has been presented by White (1980) where the null hypothesis 
considers that the variance of the residual term is constant, against the alternative of a non-
constant variance. The only difference from the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test is that the 
alternative hypothesis accounts for heteroskedasticity of unknown form or otherwise, of a 
general form. In the latter case, where the White test is found to be significant, 
heteroskedasticity may not be the only cause of this outcome. Another cause which is also 
taken into consideration concerns the presence of specification errors, because the estimated 
regression includes cross-product terms. In the case where those terms are omitted, the White 
test is a test of pure heteroskedasticity of unknown form. 
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             The White test statistic is computed by an auxiliary regression of a similar form of 
equation (44). For simplicity, it is assumed that the dimension of the transpose independent 
variables’ vector is (1x2). Therefore, the regression is of the following form 
0 11 1 12 2it t t ity x x u                                                                                                                  (54) 
Based on this equation, the statistic test is computed by regressing the squared residuals on all 
possible cross products of the regressors. The auxiliary regression is the following 
2 2 2
0 1 1 2 2 3 1 4 2 5 1 2it t t t t t t itu a a x a x a x a x a x x w                                                                         (55) 
             Subsequently, in order to test whether the null hypothesis is rejected or not, the value 
of the F-statistic
95
 is employed, which reflects a redundant variable test in order to observe 
the joint significance of the cross-products included in (55). For this reason, the value of R
2
 is 
regarded multiplied by the number of observations N, thus providing the statistic of White’s 
test, which is the same as the Lagrangian Multiplier (LM)
96. This means that White’s test 
statistic is asymptotically distributed with the χ2 distribution with k degrees of freedom, 
where k denotes the number of parameters in equation (54) without including the constant 
term. Based on the aforementioned procedure, White (1980) argued that this test can also be 
considered as a general model for misspecification, given the fact that the null hypothesis 
assumes that the error term is both homoscedastic and independent of regressors. Under this 
case, the linear specification of the testing model is assumed to be correctly defined. 
Therefore, whenever one of those conditions does not hold, the White test will provide a 
significant test statistic by rejecting the null hypothesis of constant variance in the error term 
over the time period. 
             A different estimator which has been proposed by White (1980) for resulting in 
estimations which are consistent to heteroskedasticity concerns the computation of 
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent (HC) standard errors. In particular, this estimator allows the 
fitting of the model which includes a heteroskedastic error term (Huber, 1967; Eicker, 1967). 
This means that the heteroskedastic consistent estimator can be presented as 
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 𝐹 =
(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑟−𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑢)/(𝑘+1−ℎ)
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑢/(𝑁−𝑘−1)
, where SSRr denotes the restricted model of the residuals of the sum of squares, 
SSRu addresses the unrestricted model of the residuals of the sum of squares and h represents the term which the 
restricted model accounts from. Also, the SSR is defined by 𝑆𝑆𝑅 = ∑ (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥
′
𝑖𝑏)
2 = (𝑦 − 𝑋𝑏)𝑇(𝑦 − 𝑋𝑏)𝑁𝑖=1 .  
96
 The LM statistic is equation (55) divided by 2?̂?4, which follows the χ2 distribution with k degrees of freedom. 
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where 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑖
2) =
1
𝑁
𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙(?̂?1
2, … , ?̂?𝑁
2). The limiting distribution which is followed by 
the HC estimator is √𝑁(𝑏𝑁 − 𝛽) → 𝑁(0, 𝛺)
97
 which is subject to efficiency. An interesting 
note for this estimator regards its derivation in terms of Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) in order to account the presence of heteroskedasticity in the error term (see section 
5.3). This method allows formulations in the weighted variance-covariance matrix of the 
residual term in order to correct the problems of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
             To conclude with, the White test can be viewed as a special case of the Breusch-
Pagan-Godfrey test. While the latter test addresses only the presence of heteroskedasticity of 
known form 𝜎𝑡
2 = ℎ(𝑧′𝑡𝑎), the former test identifies the presence of both heteroskedasticity 
of unknown form and any kind of model misspecification. This means that whenever both 
tests provide significant results, then the type of heteroskedasticity can be assumed to be of 
known form. On the other hand, if the White test rejects the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity, this may not be the case for the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test. The reason 
for this outcome lies on the form of heteroskedasticity. If the form is not known, then the 
latter test will not take it into consideration and thus, it will not reject the null hypothesis. 
This is the main reason for regarding both of those tests in this study in order to be able to 
identify the form of heteroskedasticity. As a result, it will be easier to decide which 
estimation technique will be selected for the acquisition of accurate estimations. 
             The second issue that may arise, as was argued above, refers to the presence of serial 
correlation in the error term of each regression. In particular, this type of correlation is 
observed between the residuals and their own lagged values, a fact that violates the 
assumption of efficiency. This means that since current residuals may be dependent on their 
lagged values
98
, then an accurate prediction for the dependent variable must be formed which 
accounts for the presence of serial correlation. The reason for this outcome is that serial 
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 𝛺 = 𝛦[(𝛸𝛸′)−1]𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑋𝑢)𝐸[(𝑋𝑋′)−1]. The estimation of the variance matrix Ω results in 
?̂?𝑁 = 𝑁𝑉𝑎𝑟𝐻𝐶𝐸(𝑏𝑂𝐿𝑆). 
98
 This case addresses the Autoregressive models of p order AR(p), where the error term is dependent on the 
error terms of the previous p time periods t=2,..,p. Therefore, by assuming a simple regression similar to (44), 
the AR(p) regression will be of the form 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝜌𝑗𝑢𝑖𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑝
𝑗=1 . 
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correlation in the error term results in underestimated standard errors of the coefficients. 
Additionally, if lagged dependent variables appear on the right hand side of the equation as 
well, then the OLS estimator will be both biased and inefficient (Durbin and Watson, 1950). 
             One of the two tests which are going to be taken into consideration in this study for 
identifying the presence of serial correlation in the residual term regards the Durbin-Watson 
statistic test developed by Durbin and Watson (1950, 1951, 1971). In particular, the Durbin-
Watson statistic is a test for identifying the presence of first-order serial correlation in the 
residual term by measuring the linear relationship between adjacent residuals from a 
regression model. It regards an AR(1) formulation for the residual term of an OLS regression 
under which the null hypothesis assumes that the coefficient of the t-1 lagged value is equal 
to zero (ρ=0) and thus, the absence of serial correlation. The alternative hypothesis assumes 
that ρ ≠ 0  and thus, the presence of first-order serial correlation in the residual term. 
Therefore, the Durbin-Watson statistic (d) is defined as 
2
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                                                                                                                                                      (57) 
where T is the number of the time dimension. Based on the argumentation of Durbin and 
Watson, the d statistic is approximately equal to 2(1-ρ), where ρ is the coefficient of serial 
correlation in the residual term. This means that under the null hypothesis, the Durbin-
Watson statistic will be at least equal to 2 (d 2), while under the alternative hypothesis, its 
value will be lower than 2, since ρ >0. In particular, the value of the d statistic fluctuates 
between 0 and 4. When it is found to be less than 2, this provides evidence for the presence of 
positive serial correlation. Additionally, if that value is less than 1, then this is a sign of a 
high degree of correlation, given that the value of successive error terms is very close to one 
another. On the other hand, if d is greater than 2, then this is evidence of negative serial 
correlation between successive error terms which indicates that their value is different from 
one another (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997).  
Positive correlation denotes the chance that a positive error of an observation may 
lead to a positive error for another observation. Similarly, negative correlation regards the 
chance that a positive error may lead to a negative error for another observation and vice 
versa. Given the above indications, Durbin and Watson (1971) highlighted the fact that the 
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value of the critical values dL,α and dU,α depend on three factors: the level of significance α, 
the number of observations N, and the number of the explanatory variables in each regression. 
Their extraction is formulated by the matrix of the explanatory variables, under the 
assumption that this matrix is known. Therefore, the distribution of the Durbin-Watson 
statistic d under the null hypothesis follows the form 
2
1
2
1
~
N k
i i
i
N k
i
i
v x
d
x

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


                                                                                                                                                      (58) 
where k is the number of regressors, xi are the independent standard normal random variables 
and vi are the non-zero eigenvalues of (I-X(X
T
X)
-1
X
T
)A, where A is the matrix 𝑑 = ?̂?𝑇𝐴?̂? that 
transforms the residuals into the d statistic
99
.  
             To sum up, the presence of serial correlation may not be able to affect the consistency 
of the estimated coefficients but it restrains the validation of statistical tests. In particular, 
positive correlation will lead to underestimated standard errors obtained by the OLS 
estimation, meaning that a standard linear regression analysis will cause the computation of 
small standard errors. Those errors will cause both F-statistic and t-statistic
100
 to be 
overvalued by resulting in incorrect inferences under which the null hypothesis may falsely 
be over-rejected.  
A reason for this outcome may be the fact that the mean squared error will tend to 
underestimate the error variance of the sample. Therefore, if the presence of serial correlation 
is significant, then the most suitable method has to be applied to acquire robust estimations to 
this form of correlation. One method presented in the literature concerns the Cohrane-Orcutt 
transformation which corrects first-order serial correlation in the residual terms, under the 
condition that those residuals must follow stationary, first-order autoregressive structure
101
. 
             Nevertheless, despite the important contribution of the Durbin-Watson statistic test for 
the identification of serial correlation in the residual term, three limitations arise which may 
restrict the undertaken analysis. The first limitation regards the issue that the d test accounts 
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 The computational algorithms for finding percentiles of the Durbin-Watson distribution are provided by 
Farebrother (1980). 
100
 The t-statistic of an estimator b is defined as 𝑡𝑏 =
𝑏−𝛽
𝜎𝑏
, where σb represents the standard error of b, which is 
the estimation of the coefficient β. 
101
 For more details, see Cohrane and Orcutt (1949) and Asteriou and Hall (2011). 
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only for the presence of first-order serial correlation. If higher order serial correlation persists, 
then this diagnostic test will be unable to provide evidence that suggest this outcome. 
The second limitation addresses the fact that the d statistic under the null hypothesis 
depends on the matrix of the explanatory variables. In order to account for this issue, Durbin 
and Watson set lower and upper bounds dL,α and dU,α respectively for the distribution of 
statistic d, such that a space will exist under which the test will be inconclusive. The last 
limitation concerns the presence of lagged dependent variables on the right hand side. In this 
case, the estimations will be biased and subject to inconsistency, due to the presence of 
endogeneity. In this case, the residual term will be both serially correlated with its lagged 
values and with the right hand side lagged dependent variables. For those reasons but 
especially, for the limitation of handling serial correlation of higher-order in the residual term, 
the LM statistical test of Breusch (1978) and Godfrey (1978b) is the second test taken into 
consideration.  
             The Breusch-Godfrey (LM) statistical test can be used to test a higher than first order 
serial correlation in the error term of Autoregressive (AR) and/or Moving-Average (MA)
102
 
models. It is not affected by the presence of lagged dependent variables on the right hand side 
of any regression. Those characteristics can render it more preferable to the Durbin-Watson 
test which only considers first order serial correlation in AR(1) non-stochastic errors. In 
particular, a regression of the form of (54) is regarded by Breusch (1978) and Godfrey 
(1978b) where the error term follows an AR(p) autoregressive form 
1
p
it j it j it
j
u u w 

                                                                                                                                      (59) 
The linear regression is initially fitted by OLS in order to obtain a set of residuals ?̂?𝑖𝑡 of the 
following form 
0 11 1 12 2
1
ˆ ˆ
p
it t t j it j it
j
u X u w    

                                                                                               (60) 
This means that if this auxiliary regression is fitted, then the asymptotic approximation, 
which can be used to obtain the distribution of the Breusch–Godfrey test statistic is 𝑁𝑅2~𝜒𝑝
2, 
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 An Autoregressive Moving-Average ARMA(p) model is of the form 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡 +
𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝜌𝑗𝑢𝑖𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=0 , where X is the matrix of the explanatory variables, u corresponds to the p-vector of the error 
term and ρ0=0. 
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where p is the number of the pre-specified time lags in equation (59) and N corresponds to 
the difference between time observations T and the number of time lags p (N=T-p). However, 
if the presence of correlation between the error term and the explanatory variables is 
suspected, then the OLS fitting in order to obtain ?̂?𝑖𝑡 will not provide correct inferences. For 
this reason, as Wooldridge (1990) suggests, the Two-Stage Least Squares formulation will be 
more accurate but it will also give rise to a number of other complications, such as inefficient 
standard errors of the coefficients if the error term wit appears to be heteroskedastic. 
             The null hypothesis of this statistic regards the absence of serial correlation in the 
residual term, which means that the coefficients of the lagged residuals will be zero (H0: 
ρ1=…=ρp=0), while the alternative hypothesis reflects the presence of j-order serial 
correlation (i.e. j=1,…,p). Under the alternative case, both AR(p) and MA(p) processes may 
be included so that the test may appear to have a greater power against a variety of alternative 
serially correlated structures (Godfrey, 1987). As in the Durbin-Watson d statistical test, the 
F-statistic is regarded as an omitted variable test for the joint significance of the p-order 
lagged residuals. However, since the residual term is not considered as a part of the matrix of 
the independent variables, the exact finite sample of the F-statistic may not be known under 
the null hypothesis. However, it is still used for comparison purposes.  
             This procedure shows that the Breusch-Godfrey LM statistical test is used for the 
identification of p-order serial correlation in the error term and utilizes the residuals obtained 
by equation (59). Based on those residual terms, the derivation of a test statistic is formed by 
considering equation (60) under which the value of the correlation coefficient ρj is estimated. 
Additionally, this test provides a general form of the Durbin-Watson d statistic test which is 
only applicable for testing the presence of first-order serial correlation in AR(1) models. The 
specification of the Breusch-Godfrey LM test is not subject to such limitations and therefore, 
it is considered as a more powerful alternative. 
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